George Wilkie Watson v. Cassidy Lee Ollendieck

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1350
Filed May 10, 2023

GEORGE WILKIE WATSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CASSIDY LEE OLLENDIECK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, Richard D. Stochl,

Judge.

A mother appeals a custody decree placing the parties’ child in their joint

physical care. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED.

Stephen J. Belay of Anderson, Wilmarth Van Der Maaten, Belay, Fretheim,

Gipp, Evelsizer Olson, Lynch & Zahasky, Decorah, for appellant.

Kevin E. Schoeberl of Story, Schoeberl & Seebach L.L.P., Cresco, for

appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

Cassidy Ollendieck and George (Will) Watson are the young parents of a

child who was born when they were still teenagers. After a rocky start to their co-

parenting relationship, the district court found their communication was “pretty

good, actually almost unexpected.” As a result, the court granted Will’s request

for joint physical care of the child. Cassidy appeals, claiming the court (1) should

have placed the child in her physical care and (2) “incorrectly omitted a parenting

plan from its determinations.” We affirm in part and remand the case to the court

to set a specific parenting schedule.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Cassidy and Will started dating when they were in high school. The parties

learned Cassidy was pregnant in June 2019, when Will was about seventeen and

Cassidy was nineteen. Will testified their relationship was rocky at that time

because Cassidy was involved with someone else, although she and Will were still

dating. In October 2019, Cassidy moved to North Carolina to live with her parents,

who had relocated there after she graduated high school. Will stayed in Iowa to

finish high school, graduating early in December. The child was born in North

Carolina in February 2020.1 A week or two later, Will went to North Carolina and

lived there with Cassidy and the child for about a month.

Cassidy visited Iowa several times after the child was born, though she

rarely let Will know when she was coming. Will testified he would contact Cassidy

to see the child when he heard they were back. Cassidy would let him, but “always

1 Will’s paternity of the child was established before the child’s birth by an in utero
test.
3

under her conditions,” meaning she had to be present. Their relationship kept

bumping along until December 2020, when Cassidy and Will decided to try living

together in Iowa as a family. They moved into Cassidy’s grandmother’s home in

January 2021 and lived there together with their child until July. Cassidy testified

that she and Will “got in an argument . . . and he just packed up and moved out to

his grandma’s.” But they continued their relationship, spending time together as a

family when Will wasn’t working. According to Will, however, Cassidy refused to

let the child stay with him overnight after they began living separately.

Cassidy relented in early September, agreeing to let the child stay with Will

alone because she was tired from working. When Cassidy went to get the child

the next morning, Will refused to send the child with her. Cassidy said that their

standoff continued for three or four days, although Will testified that it was only

two. In any event, before Will would let the child leave his care, Cassidy testified

that he made her agree to a “2-2-3” alternating care schedule. Will explained at

trial that he wanted something set in stone so that Cassidy would not move to

North Carolina again and take the child with her. He was also concerned about

Cassidy’s mental health, which she denied was an issue.

In September 2021, just before the parties had their falling out, Will

petitioned the district court for joint legal custody and physical care of the child

under Iowa Code chapter 600B (2021), with an alternative request for joint physical

care. In her answer, Cassidy agreed to joint legal custody but asked for the child

to be placed in her physical care, subject to reasonable visitation for Will. Soon

after, the parties filed competing motions on temporary physical care. Following
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an abbreviated hearing, the district court found that temporary joint physical care

was not in the child’s best interest because:

Cassidy provided a large majority of the care for [the child]
since [she] was born, Will and Cassidy have had communication and
mutual respect problems, and these parents appear to struggle
putting their animosity for each other aside to work together to make
the co-parenting decisions which frequently arise in joint physical
care arrangements.

The court placed the child in Cassidy’s temporary physical care with visitation for

Will every other weekend from Friday evening to Sunday evening and every

Tuesday and Thursday evening from 5:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. The order

encouraged Cassidy “to grant Will additional time, which may include earlier pickup

times, later drop-off times, and additional full days when any of this is feasible,

especially when Will is laid off.”

The court’s reference to times when Will is laid off was due to his seasonal

work as a dump-truck driver for a rock product company. From around December

to March each year, Will is laid off and does not work. But during the spring,

summer, and fall months, he works from around 5:30 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. While

the temporary order was in place, Will had to miss a few of his mid-week visits due

to out-of-town work, but that was atypical. Cassidy did allow him extra time with

the child during his layoff period, but she denied his requests for more overnights.

And she refused to allow his family to help with transportation on nights when he

had to work past 5:30 p.m. Cassidy believed that Will’s mother provided most of

the care for the child during Will’s mid-week visits, which they usually spent at Will’s

mother’s house. Will denied this, testifying that he exercised his mid-week visits

at his mother’s house so that he could maximize the short time he had with the
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child since he lived about thirteen miles outside of town. Will told the court that if

his request for joint physical care was granted, he would find a different job with a

more accommodating schedule.

Cassidy has a more flexible schedule than Will, having run an in-home

daycare out of her residence since October 2021. She lives in a duplex, while Will

owns a home on a small acreage. Since the temporary hearing, the parties have

been able to work together to rearrange parenting time. They have eaten dinner

together several times and Cassidy has spent the night at Will’s house with the

child a few times. And while Cassidy has been the one to make the medical

appointments for the child, she and Will attend them together. Although Will’s

family is present during his mid-week visits with the child, she spends the

alternating weekends at his house, where he provides all the care for her.

Against this backdrop of improved communication and co-parenting, a two-

day trial was held in July 2022. In its August decree, the district court found that

“both parties have made significant progress” since the temporary hearing. The

court noted that although Cassidy “offered numerous text messages sent before

October of 2021 showing their difficulties in communicating,” there were “none

since that time,” with Cassidy agreeing that “communication has gotten ‘a lot’

better.” In sum, the court found “[b]oth parties love and are loved by their child”

and “capable of providing for her physical, financial, and emotional support.” The

court concluded:

Will and Cassidy have demonstrated an ability to
communicate effectively. There does not appear to be any
substantial conflict between them. The evidence suggests they are
in general agreement about their approach to daily matters. Cassidy
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presented no evidence to the contrary. Shared placement is in the
best interest of [the child].

As for the parenting schedule, the court stated: “While this court does not

favor frequent switching of care (2-2-3) and prefers a week on-week off

arrangement, the parties’ wishes shall be followed.” The court directed Cassidy

and Will to meet and prepare a “proposed joint physical care parenting plan,” to be

submitted to the court within thirty days. If the parties could not reach an

agreement, the court stated “a hearing will be set and the court will receive further

evidence to determine the cause of the disagreement and a possible resolution.”

Cassidy appealed the court’s decree before any plan was submitted.2

II. Standard of Review

We review child-custody cases under Iowa Code chapter 600B de novo.

See McKee v. Dicus, 785 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010); see also Iowa R.

2 Before reaching the merits of Cassidy’s appeal, we considered whether the
decree was interlocutory because the court noted its intention to take further action
on the parenting schedule. While the court retained jurisdiction to address that
issue—a practice our appellate courts have discouraged—we still find the decree
was a final appealable order. See Shipley v. Shipley, 182 N.W.2d 125, 128
(Iowa 1970) (holding that a decree that dissolves a marriage but reserves a
subsidiary issue for future determination is still a final decree for purposes of
appeal); see also In re Marriage of Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Iowa 1978)
(concluding the rules and statutes governing dissolutions “contemplate one final
decree” terminating the marriage and stating if that decree is supplemented by a
later one, “only the supplementary decree may then be appealed”); Elmquist v.
Nairn, 98-1843, 2000 WL 372555, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2000) (addressing
a father’s appeal from the denial of his request for physical care where the court
“reserved jurisdiction on the issue of visitation in order to allow the parties to reach
a mutually workable schedule”); In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 368
(Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (reaching wife’s challenge to a spousal support award where
the court retained jurisdiction to address child support if the parties could not agree
on their obligations). But see In re Marriage of Graziano, 573 N.W.2d 598, 599
(Iowa 1998) (concluding a decree entered after a dissolution trial that “addressed
only the children’s custody, and specified that other issues would be reserved for
further order of the court” was interlocutory).
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App. P. 6.907; Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). This requires

an examination of the whole trial record to decide anew the issues raised on

appeal. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. Despite our de novo review, we give

strong consideration to the district court’s fact findings, including any credibility

findings. See id.; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).

III. Analysis

A. Physical Care

Cassidy claims the district court “incorrectly determined that joint physical

care is in [the child’s] best interests.” Our first and foremost consideration is, of

course, the child’s best interest. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(o); Phillips v. Davis-

Spurling, 541 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Iowa 1995). “The objective of a physical care

determination is to place the child[] in the environment most likely to bring [the

child] to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” In re Marriage

of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007).

“The criteria used in making the physical care determination are the same

for married and unmarried parents.” Flick v. Stoneburner, No. 15-1930, 2016

WL 2743449, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (citing Lambert v. Everist, 418

N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1988)). We consider the factors set out in Iowa Code

section 598.41(3) and In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa

1974),3 though the following nonexclusive factors, which Cassidy focuses her

3 “The factors the court considers in awarding custody are enumerated in Iowa
Code section 598.41(3).” In re Marriage of Courtade, 560 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996). “Although Iowa Code section 598.41(3) does not directly apply to
physical care decisions, . . . the factors listed here as well as other facts and
circumstances are relevant in determining” physical care. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at
696.
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argument on, are the key considerations in determining whether a joint-physical-

care arrangement is in a child’s best interest:

(1) “approximation”—what has been the historical care giving
arrangement for the child[ren] between the two parties; (2) the ability
of the spouses to communicate and show mutual respect; (3) the
degree of conflict between the parents; and (4) “the degree to which
the parents are in general agreement about their approach to daily
matters.”

In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (quoting

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 697–99).

Starting with approximation, Cassidy argues this factor weighs in her favor

because she “has served, informally at first and then formally based on the

temporary order as the primary physical caretaker” for the child. The historical

caregiving arrangement, while important, is not dispositive. See Flick, 2016

WL 2743449, at *2 (collecting cases placing a child in the physical care of the

parent who was not previously the primary caretaker); see also In re Marriage of

Delagardelle, No. 11-1907, 2012 WL 4097259, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Sept. 19, 2012). And it loses significance “where the historically less-involved

parent has proven to be a capable caregiver,” as Will has here. Delagardelle, 2012

WL 4097259, at *2; accord Elsener v. Cochran, No. 12-1647, 2013 WL 3871088,

at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 24, 2013) (finding “[t]his is a textbook case for joint

physical care,” despite mother’s status as primary caregiver while father worked

more outside the home and had less involvement since parties stopped

cohabitating). He has taken an active role in the child’s life—spending as much

time with her as Cassidy will allow. So we do not afford this factor much weight.
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The second and third factors, having to deal with communication, respect,

and conflict, also do not weigh against joint physical care, as Cassidy argues.

While the parties did have some communication problems during their relationship

and its immediate aftermath, those problems did not persist past the September

2021 incident when Will kept the child in his care for a few days. See Dietz v.

McDonald, No. 08-0129, 2008 WL 5234524, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2008)

(“[S]ome failures of communication and cooperation are not surprising with the

breakup of a romantic relationship and must be viewed in that context.”). Cassidy

acknowledged as much at the temporary hearing,4 when she denied that the

parties’ communication was an impediment to joint physical care:

“Q. Ms. Ollendieck, you indicate that you don’t think the joint physical care

arrangement will work out because of communication? A. No, it’s because he

does not have the vested time to spend with her.” And at the custody trial, Cassidy

agreed that since the temporary hearing, she and Will “have gotten along pretty

well.”

There was no evidence to corroborate Cassidy’s general testimony that Will

“has a really bad temper,” is impatient with the child, or controlling with her. Cf. In

re Marriage of Ransom, No. 08-0742, 2008 WL 4877545, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 13, 2008) (detailing examples of a parent’s controlling and disrespectful

attitude toward the other parent). Indeed, the journal that Cassidy offered into

evidence confirmed the parties’ ability to co-parent, documenting several times

when Cassidy and the child ate dinner with Will or stayed at his place after the

4 The transcript of the temporary hearing was admitted at trial as an exhibit.
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temporary order was entered. This is not a case in which the level of discord and

mistrust between the parties is so high as to make joint physical care unworkable.

Cf. In re Marriage of Terrones, No. 20-0538, 2020 WL 7021557, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Nov. 30, 2020) (discussing the many communication problems between the

parties that included disputes about things like whether the child should wear a

headband for a school picture).

As for the last factor, which examines whether the parties are in general

agreement about their approach to daily matters, Cassidy focuses on their differing

opinions on when the child should start potty training. The record shows this is a

minor issue that will soon sort itself out and not one “of such magnitude as to

preclude an award of shared care.” See In re Petesch, No. 10-1984, 2011 WL

2697060, at *1 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 13, 2011) (giving disagreement about potty

training “little if no consideration”).

In sum, we agree with the district court that it is in this child’s best interest

to be placed in her parents’ joint physical care.

B. Parenting Schedule

Cassidy next claims that because of the parties’ difficulties communicating

with one another, the district court should have ordered a set parenting schedule

rather than leaving that issue for them to sort out.5 We agree, though not because

of any communication problems between the parties.

5 Without elaboration, Will argues that Cassidy did not preserve error on this claim
because she did “not raise the issue of lack of parenting plan by post decree
motion.” See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a
fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised
and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). But this
is not a case in which the district court overlooked or was silent on an issue.
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While Iowa Code section 598.41(5)(a) does give the court discretion to

“require the parents to submit, either individually or jointly, a proposed joint

physical care parenting plan,” the statute requires that step to be completed “[p]rior

to ruling on the request for the award of joint physical care.” This is because the

parenting schedule for a joint-physical-care arrangement, like visitation, goes

“hand in hand with custody orders and inhere[s] in final determinations of custody.”

Piechowski v. Shufro, No. 12-1225, 2013 WL 4010245, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 7,

2013). The court “may not delegate its judicial power to determine visitation or

custody arrangements to the parties or a third party.” In re Marriage of Stephens,

81 N.W.2d 523, 530 n.3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added); accord Smith v.

Smith, 142 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Iowa 1966) (“The feasible exercise of a parent’s right

of visitation should be safeguarded by a definite provision in the order or decree of

the court awarding custody of the child to another person.” (citation omitted)). That

decision should instead be made by the court. See In re Marriage of Schmidt,

No. 13-0675, 2014 WL 2432549, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2014) (stating

chapter 598 “mandates the district court to intercede in a dissolution-of-marriage

proceeding to order custody and visitation”).

Though the court can allow the parties to exercise additional visitation or

parenting time as they may agree, the court should include a fall-back schedule in

its decree in the event the parties cannot agree. See, e.g., In re Marriage of

Instead, the court considered the schedule that should be used by the parties,
noting it “does not favor frequent switching of care (2-2-3) and prefers a week on-
week off arrangement,” before deciding that “the parties’ wishes shall be followed.”
Because the court’s decree shows that it “considered the issue and necessarily
ruled on it,” we find that error was preserved. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856,
864 (Iowa 2012).
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Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (affirming the “visitation schedule

in the decree but emphasiz[ing] that these are minimum guildelines and parents

can certainly agree to expand time beyond what is ordered”). Because the court

did not do that here, we remand this case to the district court to set a specific

parenting schedule for the parties.

C. Appellate Attorney Fees

Both parties ask for an unspecified amount of appellate attorney fees from

each other, unsupported by any attorney fee affidavits or other documentation.

Iowa Code section 600B.26 permits an award of appellate attorney fees to the

prevailing party. See Schaffer v. Frank Moyer Const. Inc., 628 N.W.2d 11, 23

(Iowa 2001) (holding that statute allowing trial attorney fees also permits an award

of appellate attorney fees). But after considering the relevant factors, we conclude

both requests should be denied. See Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 26 (Iowa

2005) (“Whether such an award is warranted is determined by considering ‘the

needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and

whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s

decision on appeal.’” (citation omitted)).

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the district court’s decision to place the parties’ child in their joint

physical care but remand the case to the court to set a specific parenting schedule.

Both parties’ requests for appellate attorney fees are denied, and costs on appeal

are assessed equally between the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED.