In the Interest of S.G., C.G., G.G., and A.G., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0682
Filed July 26, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF S.G., C.G., G.G., and A.G.,
Minor Children,

D.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne

Mefford, District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Lynnette M. Lindgren of Broerman, Lindgren & Denny, Oskaloosa, for

appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Denise McKelvie Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Gamble, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
2

GAMBLE, Senior Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her four children.1

She challenges the statutory grounds for termination, argues termination is not in

the children’s best interests, and contends the juvenile court should have declined

to terminate based on permissive exceptions to termination.2 We affirm.

We review termination proceedings de novo. Z.P., 948 N.W.2d at 522. “We

will uphold an order terminating parental rights where there is clear and convincing

evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Evidence is clear and convincing

when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the

conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431

(Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted).

1 The court did not terminate the parental rights of the children’s father, and the

children are placed with the father.
2 The mother also claims the State failed to make reasonable efforts toward

reunification by refusing to allow her to engage in family therapy with her children,
by failing to follow up on the children’s individual therapy, and by failing to notify
the mother the children were engaged in therapy prior to the termination hearing.
The reasonable-efforts requirement is not a strict substantive requirement, but it is
part of the State’s ultimate proof that the children cannot be returned to the parent.
In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019). So a reasonable-efforts challenge
is generally a component of a statutory-grounds challenge. However, we do not
address the mother’s reasonable-efforts challenges because she did not raise a
reasonable-efforts challenge prior to the termination hearing. See In re E.H.,
No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021) (collecting
cases requiring a parent to bring a reasonable-efforts challenge to the juvenile
court prior to the termination hearing); see also In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148
(Iowa 2002). Moreover, we note the onus is on parents to keep themselves
informed of their child’s medical and mental-health needs. Cf. In re Z.P., 948
N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2020) (citing a father’s lack of knowledge of the child’s
medical and psychological needs as a factor favoring termination); In re J.M.,
No. 22-0514, 2022 WL 2347857, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 29, 2022) (citing a
mother’s failure to keep up the “rudimentary duties of a parent, like being involved
in [the children’s] schooling or therapy” as a factor in favor of termination).
3

We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of a

parent’s rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We consider:

(1) whether grounds for termination have been established, (2) whether

termination is in the children’s best interests, and (3) whether we should exercise

any of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73.

The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2022). This ground for termination requires proof that

(1) the child is four years of age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child

in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody

of the child’s parents for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at

home has been less than thirty days; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the

custody of the child’s parent at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(f); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting section

232.116(1)(f)(4)’s use of the phrase “at the present time” to mean at the time of the

termination hearing). The mother only challenges the fourth element, whether the

children could have been safely returned to her custody. See In re T.W., No. 20-

02145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020).

Following our review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court that the

children could not be returned to the mother’s custody. With the exception of a

six-month period, this family has been involved with the Iowa Department of Health
4

and Human Services3 in some capacity since spring 2017.4 Since that time, the

mother has addressed her substance-abuse issues, gained employment, and

secured housing. However, barriers to reunification still remain.

The mother has a demonstrated history of failing to act in a protective

capacity toward the children. Whenever the mother has been given more

unsupervised time with the children, she has broken a safety plan. During a trial

return period, the mother’s boyfriend, who was not approved to be around the

children, stayed in the mother’s home with the children—sometimes physically

disciplining them.5 The oldest explained that “[i]t kind of felt like he was living there.

He was always there. He always had his clothes there. . . . It just felt very unsafe.”

She told the mother that she was uncomfortable with the boyfriend there and

disciplining the children but it “didn’t really matter to [the mother].” When the

children were removed from the mother’s care as a result of the boyfriend’s

unapproved presence around the children, the mother blamed the children by

yelling at them and calling them liars. Then, once visitation increased to eight-

hour-long unsupervised visitation, the mother permitted the children to have

contact with a cousin who previously molested the oldest child and showed the

oldest child a nude photo.

The mother’s inability to regulate her emotional responses has been an

ongoing issue. The mother has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression,

3 The Iowa Department of Human Services and the Iowa Department of Public

Health merged in 2022 to create the Iowa Department of Health and Human
Services.
4 The child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings giving rise to these termination-of-

parental-rights cases began in January 2021.
5 The boyfriend’s parental rights to his own child were terminated.
5

post-traumatic stress disorder, and substance-abuse disorder (in remission). She

has made progress on her sobriety but, despite therapy and medication, the

mother remains emotionally unstable. Beyond emotional outbursts directed

toward the children, the mother also acts out toward other adults who are involved

in the children’s lives. For example, at an April 2022 review hearing the mother

exclaimed, “Fucking liar” during a social worker’s testimony. Her outbursts

continued through to the termination trial in April 2023—during a supervisor’s

testimony the mother interrupted to call the supervisor a “bitch.” During the

supervisor’s later testimony, the mother exclaimed “I’m sick of it. These are fucking

lies. This is bullshit,” and then she exited the courtroom rather than staying to

participate in the termination trial.6 As the supervisor observed, the mother’s

behavior in court raises concerns for what her demeanor might be like behind

closed doors with her children because these are the times one might expect the

mother to be on her best behavior.

When reunification stalled for various reasons, the mother shifted blame

onto the children rather than accept any responsibility. In response to her belief

that the children were effectively sabotaging reunification, the mother instructed

the children to be deceptive or withhold information from the department. In so

doing, the mother acted with her own motives in mind rather than in consideration

of the children’s safety.

In short, the mother has demonstrated an inability to place the children’s

needs above her own, placing the children’s safety at risk. And her conduct toward

6 The mother eventually returned to the courtroom.
6

the children and others involved in the children’s lives is often harmful to the

children. While we commend the mother for the progress she has made with her

substance abuse, the children cannot be safely returned to her custody due to

remaining reunification barriers. A statutory ground for termination is satisfied, and

we move on to the next step in our analysis.

Next, we consider whether termination is in the children’s best interests.

When making a best-interest determination, we “give primary consideration to the

child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and

growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and

needs of the child[ren].” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa

Code § 232.116(2)). We agree with the juvenile court that termination is in all the

children’s best interests. The mother’s emotions are often volatile, which

negatively impacts the children, and she does not prioritize their safety. All four

children have expressed a desire to live with the father. The oldest two children

specifically want the mother’s rights terminated.7 The mother argues termination

would eliminate potential financial benefits for the children such as child support,

inheritance, or social security benefits. While those potential benefits would be

eliminated by termination, termination would provide the children with permanency

and stability that outweigh any potential financial benefit to maintaining the parent-

child relationships.

Finally, we consider whether the mother established a permissive exception

to preclude termination. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476 (explaining the burden of

7 The oldest two children were thirteen and fifteen years old at the time of
termination.
7

establishing a permissive exception to preclude termination is on the parent). She

cites both section 232.116(3)(a), which permits the court to forgo termination when

“a relative has legal custody of the child,” and section 232.116(3)(c), which permits

the court to forgo termination when “termination would be detrimental to the child

at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Even if

established, we are not required to apply an exception to preclude termination. Id.

at 475. Instead, we have discretion to determine whether or not to apply an

exception. See id.

The father has legal custody of the children, so section 232.116(3)(a) could

be applied to forgo termination. But doing so would conflict with the children’s best

interests, and we find it more prudent to decline to apply this exception to allow the

children to achieve permanency. As to the mother’s parent-child bonds with the

children, we think she overstates them. The oldest two children actively desire

termination of the mother’s rights, and the youngest two want to live with their

father. And none of the parent-child bonds shared between the mother and

children are so strong that “severing [them] would be manifestly detrimental to the

child[ren].” See In re C.E., No. 22-1179, 2022 WL 4362094, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

Sept. 21, 2022). So we decline to apply any permissive exception to termination.

AFFIRMED.