State of Iowa v. Victoria Jo Dawdy

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0161
Filed April 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

VICTORIA JO DAWDY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Timothy Jarman,

Judge.

A defendant appeals her conviction for third-offense operating while

intoxicated, challenging the denial of her motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.

Victoria Jo Dawdy, Sioux City, self-represented appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

Victoria Dawdy was convicted of third-offense operating while intoxicated

after she crashed her vehicle through a construction zone in Sioux City and into a

parked vehicle. She appeals the denial of her motion to suppress, claiming the

warrant authorizing a blood draw was not supported by probable cause in violation

of the federal and state constitutions.

We start our discussion with the deferential standard of review for search

warrants because that standard dictates what we can consider in resolving the

issue before us and the result of this appeal. See State v. Bracy, 971

N.W.2d 563, 564, 567 (Iowa 2022). Although we review Dawdy’s constitutional

challenge de novo, “we do not make an independent determination of probable

cause; rather, we determine ‘whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for

concluding probable cause existed.’” Id. at 567 (citation omitted). In assessing

whether such a basis existed,

we examine only the information actually presented to the judge. But
we do not strictly scrutinize the sufficiency of the underlying affidavit.
The affidavit of probable cause is interpreted in a common sense,
rather than a hypertechnical, manner. We draw all reasonable
inferences to support the judge’s finding of probable cause and
decide close cases in favor of upholding the validity of the warrant.

Id. (cleaned up).

Turning to the facts in the warrant application,1 at roughly 8:45 p.m. on

September 10, 2019, police officers responded to a report of a two-vehicle collision

1 At the suppression hearing, the State presented testimony from the two police

officers who investigated the accident. As related above, however, we “may not
consider any other relevant information present in the record which was not
presented to the neutral magistrate issuing the warrant.” State v. Thomas, 540
N.W.2d 658, 662 (Iowa 1995). So, like the district court, we have confined our
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in a construction zone. Before officers arrived, the driver of one of the vehicles—

later identified as Dawdy—ran from the scene. Witnesses to the collision chased

Dawdy and brought her back to the crash site.

Once officers got to the scene, they learned Dawdy was driving her vehicle

northbound toward an intersection in “an active construction area where

[n]orthbound lanes are blocked with construction cones and traffic is directed to

the left through the construction.” Even though the “construction [was] clearly

visible from several blocks away,” Dawdy “failed to follow the marked signage and

proceeded straight through the cones and directly into a road closed sign.” She

collided head on with an electrical company’s vehicle parked on the other side of

the sign, significantly damaging both vehicles.

The warrant application noted that officers observed the following

“indicators of [n]arcotic abuse and potentially other drugs” when dealing with

Dawdy:

When officers were speaking to the defendant it was observed
her pupils were highly constricted. The defendant was very detached
from her surroundings and non responsive other than whispering her
own name. The defendant was incapable of focusing. The
defendant would go through a cycle of tensing her whole body up
and standing up then going flac[c]id and folding over herself. While
officers were checking on her welfare she attempted to stand up and
run from officers.

Though she “did not have any exterior injuries,” paramedics transported

Dawdy to the hospital to treat “possible internal injuries.” She lost consciousness

on the way. After arriving at the hospital, she had to be intubated by medical staff

probable-cause review to the information presented to the issuing magistrate: the
warrant application with no attachments or addendums.
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because she could not breathe on her own. Officer William Enockson of the Sioux

City Police Department applied for a warrant for a blood or urine sample from

Dawdy “in reference to an operating while intoxicated investigation.” The

application asserted: “It is believed evidence related to an investigation . . . is in

the blood of the defendant.” A magistrate found probable cause and issued the

warrant.

A toxicology report from the state crime lab showed Dawdy’s blood

specimen was positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and midazolam.

Dawdy was charged by trial information with third-offense operating while

intoxicated. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing the warrant was not supported

by probable cause because, among other things, the signs of impairment

described in the application could have been due to “the trauma of her injuries from

the accident.” Following a hearing, the district court denied Dawdy’s motion.

Limiting its review to the warrant application, the court found “there was

already something seriously ‘wrong’ with the defendant before she would have

suffered any injuries from the collision” considering how it occurred. The court also

highlighted Dawdy’s behavior after the collision, including her flight from the scene,

constricted pupils, inability to focus, and body’s “cycles of tensing up and then

going flaccid.” While the court acknowledged those “might have been symptoms

of internal injuries, they were also indicators of substance abuse.” Based on the

totality of the circumstances, the court concluded the magistrate’s determination

of probable cause had a substantial basis.

After her suppression motion was denied, Dawdy waived her right to a jury

trial and stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, attachments to
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those minutes, and videos related to the incident. The court found Dawdy guilty

as charged, and she stipulated to her prior convictions.

On appeal, Dawdy claims the warrant was not supported by probable cause

because the application was missing key facts—that no standardized field sobriety

tests were performed, medical professionals did not determine whether she was

under the influence, and the application did not explain conditions that could mimic

impairment.2 She also repeats a complaint she made in district court—that the

application’s “non-specific statements do not provide the probable cause

necessary to justify the issuance of a warrant.” As to the court’s conclusion that

Dawdy’s driving showed something was “wrong” with her, Dawdy asserts that does

not mean she did something criminal. Finally, Dawdy reiterates her argument that

her post-collision mannerisms “could as well have been caused by the collision as

have been the result of drug abuse.”

Dawdy’s arguments assign too high of a standard for the determination

before us: whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that

a person of reasonable prudence would believe evidence of a crime could be found

in Dawdy’s blood or urine. See id. Adopting Dawdy’s approach “would deny the

deference we are supposed to afford warrants that have been approved by a

magistrate.” Id. at 570. And it would require a hypertechnical interpretation of the

warrant application, rather than the common-sense one we must employ. Id.

2 To the extent that Dawdy is arguing certain facts were recklessly omitted from

the warrant application, see State v. Poulin, 620 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Iowa 2000), we
agree with the State that error was not preserved because that issue was neither
raised in nor decided by the district court. See State v. McCright, 569
N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997) (“Issues not raised before the district court, including
constitutional issues, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).
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at 567. Upon “look[ing] at the entirety of the warrant application and draw[ing]

reasonable inferences in support of the warrant, there was clearly a substantial

basis for finding probable cause” that Dawdy was operating while intoxicated and

evidence of that would be found in her blood or urine. See id. at 568.

Dawdy plowed through clearly visible cones and a road-closed sign in a

construction zone before she rammed head-on into a parked vehicle, hitting it hard

enough to significantly damage both vehicles—“possibly total[ ]ing” them both.

See State v. Roe, No. 22-1764, 2023 WL 7391721, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8,

2023) (considering the “dynamics of a serious motorcycle crash” in finding a search

warrant for the defendant’s blood was supported by probable cause). Then she

ran from the scene of the crash. See State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 625

(Iowa 1990) (“While flight alone does not give rise to probable cause, it may, when

coupled with a preexisting reasonable suspicion ‘elevate the preexisting suspicion

up to the requisite Fourth Amendment level of probable cause.’” (citation omitted)).

After witnesses brought her back, officers observed multiple signs that Dawdy was

impaired by some sort of drug other than alcohol. See Roe, 2023 WL 7391721,

at *3 (considering signs of impairment observed by officer). While the officers were

tending to her, Dawdy tried to flee the scene again.

The totality of these facts would allow a person of reasonable prudence to

believe that Dawdy was operating while intoxicated. The issuing magistrate

therefore had a substantial basis to conclude probable cause existed. We

accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of Dawdy’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.