In the Interest of J.K., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0561
Filed July 3, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF J.K.,
Minor Child,

T.T., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Joan M. Black, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Robin L. Himes, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

A mother entangled in a “dangerous and unpredictable” relationship with

the father of her child appeals the termination of her parental rights under Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2023).1 She claims the State failed to prove

those grounds for termination and argues termination is not in the child’s best

interests because of their bond. We affirm upon our de novo review of the record.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

When the child at the center of this case was born in 2022, the mother was

already involved with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services. Her

two older children were removed from her custody the year before because of

domestic violence between her and those children’s father. The domestic violence

continued in the mother’s relationship with the father of this child, leading the State

to file a child-in-need-of-assistance petition in May. The child was adjudicated in

June but allowed to remain in the mother’s custody. The mother’s relationship with

the father continued into July, although she told the department that she knew he

was “using something” and she was scared of him. The father had a history of

using methamphetamine, while the mother had used ecstasy and marijuana in the

past.

The State applied for temporary removal in late August, citing the parents’

history of domestic violence and substance use, as well as the mother’s decision

to place the child with her sister because she felt overwhelmed. The juvenile court

denied the application in its dispositional order, determining those issues were not

1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.
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pervasive because the father was in jail and the mother’s sister was not an

inappropriate placement.

By late October, the mother had progressed to overnight visits with her other

two children. And the parents were consistently participating in couples’ therapy.

Less than one week later, however, the State again applied for temporary removal

based on the mother leaving the child in the father’s care in violation of the safety

plan, ongoing concerns for domestic violence in the child’s presence, and the

parents’ inconsistent participation in drug testing. This time, the juvenile court

granted the application. The parents later stipulated to continued removal. The

child has not returned to parental custody since then.

In late December, the child’s guardian ad litem moved to establish a limited

guardianship because the parents were neglecting the child’s medical needs. That

motion was granted. Incidents of domestic violence resulting in police intervention

continued. After one incident in late January 2023, the father obtained a no-

trespassing order prohibiting the mother from being on his property.

Because of the hostility between the parents, their couples’ therapy ended

and their visits with the child were made separate. But, by March, it appeared the

parents were back together. In May, the parents confirmed they had resumed their

relationship and were again living together. Law enforcement was called to the

home the parents shared several times over the next few months. On one

occasion in mid-June, the mother got into a physical altercation with the father’s

ex-girlfriend. The father wouldn’t let the mother leave and began kicking her car.

Other incidents throughout August involved the father’s threats to harm himself

and a stand-off with police. The mother told service providers that she and the
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father had again ended their relationship, but their actions showed otherwise.

Although the mother had progressed to semi-supervised visits, they reverted to

fully supervised after she allowed the father to attend her visits. And while the

parents had resumed couples’ therapy, they stopped attending in August. From

there, the father largely stopped participating in all services but visitation.

During this chaotic time, the mother’s parental rights to her other two

children were terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h). In its

July ruling, the juvenile court detailed the services the mother participated in and

some of her progress but found termination was appropriate due to her

unwillingness to end her volatile relationship with the father. The court noted the

mother “has repeatedly stated that if she had to, she would choose her children”

over her relationship with the father but “[i]n reality, [she] has consistently chosen

[him] over her children.” We affirmed that ruling on appeal. See generally In re

L.S., No. 23-1123, 2023 WL 8448714 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023).

In September, the department recommended proceeding with termination,

given both parents’ participation in services since 2021 with no progress on the

father’s anger issues, domestic violence, and the mother’s continued relationship

with the father. In its permanency order, the juvenile court directed the State to file

a termination petition, and the State did so in October.

The termination hearing was held in January 2024. The department

caseworker testified the main concerns were the continued violence between the

parents, their inability to address that issue, and their dishonesty about their

relationship. The caseworker explained that each time the mother progressed to

a lower level of supervision over her visits, there was another fight between the
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parents. While the caseworker agreed the child was bonded to the mother, she

testified that termination would not harm the child: “That bond is there but it has

diminished over time that I do not believe it’s strong enough to cause undue

trauma.” The mother testified she was no longer in a relationship with the father,

insisting “[i]t’s over for good” and had been since August, when she “realized he

was never going to grow up and be the man he should be.”

In its termination ruling, the juvenile court detailed the on-again, off-again

domestically violent rollercoaster that is the parents’ relationship. While the court

acknowledged the mother made progress in some areas, it determined she was

not “willing or able to keep [the child] safe when it comes to” the father, who had

not consistently participated in drug testing or managed “his mental health and his

emotional volatility.” The court implicitly found the mother’s claim that she ended

things with the father not credible, explaining the mother “can say what she

believes the court wants to hear but has not demonstrated that she has actually

made changes in her life that would enable the court to entrust her with the safety

of a child.” As a result, the court found the evidence was sufficient to support

termination under section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) and termination was in the child’s

best interests, with no applicable exceptions. The mother appeals.

II. Analysis

We review terminations of parental rights de novo, applying a three-step

analysis that asks whether (1) a statutory ground for termination is satisfied, (2) the

child’s best interests are served by termination, and (3) a statutory exception

applies and should be exercised to preclude termination. See In re L.B., 970

N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3). While not
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binding, we give weight to the juvenile court’s findings of fact, especially when it

comes to witness credibility. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022).

On the first step, the mother purports to challenge the sufficiency of

evidence supporting both grounds for termination, section 232.116(1)(g) and (h).

“[W]e may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground that we find

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707

(Iowa 2010). While the mother’s petition on appeal provides separate argument

sections for each ground, the substance of each section only challenges

termination under section 232.116(1)(h). Absent a substantive challenge to

termination under section 232.116(1)(g), we could deem the issue waived and

affirm on that ground. See, e.g., In re E.S., No. 23-0544, 2023 WL 3335326, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023). However, we elect to address the merits of the

ground the mother does challenge.

On section 232.116(1)(h), the mother only challenges the final element, that

the child could not be safely returned to parental custody at the time of the

termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4) (requiring clear and

convincing evidence that child cannot be returned to parental custody “at the

present time”); D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting the statutory language “at

the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). The mother

argues—without elaboration—that “[t]here are minimal safety concerns regarding

the child in the mother’s care” and “[t]he child could be safely returned to her care.”

But the mother ignores her “lengthy relationship [with the father] that was

marred by domestic violence.” In re Z.B.-D., No. 08-1221, 2008 WL 4877943, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008). While the mother testified that she had ended
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things with the father, the juvenile court didn’t buy it, and neither do we. History

shows the mother always “reunited with him,” id. at *3, and was continually

dishonest about their relationship status. Even if we believed that the relationship

had recently ended, this “untested period of separation did not warrant a return” of

custody. Id. Although the mother made progress in other areas, her domestically

violent relationship with the father was enough to prevent returning the child to her

custody. Id. (finding the children couldn’t be returned to the mother’s custody

where the “primary if not sole impediment to reunification was” her domestically

violent relationship); see also In re E.B., No. 22-1799, 2023 WL 386700, at *4

(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023) (“The parent[s’] unaddressed and unresolved

domestic abuse . . . presents a danger to the children if they were returned to

parental custody.”).

In a conflated claim on the second and third steps, the mother argues

“termination is not in the child’s best interests,” see Iowa Code § 232.116(2),

“because of the bond between the child and [his] mother,” see id. § 232.116(3)(c).

Because the mother does not address how the best-interests factors in

section 232.116(2) weigh against termination, we limit our analysis to the bond

exception in section 232.116(3)(c). See In re E.S., No. 23-0590, 2023

WL 4104126, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2023) (“Consideration of the parent-

child bond is not a part of our best-interests analysis.”); see also In re L.L.,

No. 24-0431, 2024 WL 2045335, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024) (noting best-

interests claim based on bond exception “is more properly addressed under the

third step”). The exception authorizes the court to forgo termination when it “would
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be detrimental to the child . . . due to the closeness of the parent-child

relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c).

The evidence shows, as the juvenile court and all parties agreed, that the

child is bonded to the mother. But a bond alone is not enough to avoid termination.

See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (“[T]he existence of a bond is

not enough.”). The mother presented no evidence that the child would suffer

physically, mentally, or emotionally upon termination. See In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018) (“[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden

to establish an exception.”). And the department caseworker testified the bond

was not strong enough to cause undue trauma to the child. Given the child’s young

age and extended length of removal, we agree. We therefore conclude this

exception does not apply.

III. Conclusion

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.2

AFFIRMED.

2 To the extent the mother passively requests “a few more months” to work toward

reunification, she does not present us with any “specific factors, conditions, or
expected behavioral changes which [would] comprise the basis for the
determination that the need for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of” an
extension of time. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).