Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board vs. William Michael Vilmont

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1867
Filed April 6, 2012
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
WILLIAM MICHAEL VILMONT,
Respondent.
On review from the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission reports respondent committed ethical
misconduct and recommends the attorney be suspended from the
practice of law. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for
complainant.
William M. Vilmont, Camanche, pro se.

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CADY, Chief Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a
complaint against William Vilmont alleging multiple violations of the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct after he charged and collected a minimum
fee from a client for his representative services in a criminal case. A
division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa
found Vilmont violated the rules and recommended we suspend his
license to practice law for a period of thirty days. On our de novo review,
we find Vilmont violated the rules of professional conduct. We suspend
Vilmont’s license to practice law for a period of thirty days.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
William M. Vilmont is a lawyer licensed to practice law in Iowa. He
maintained an office in Clinton where he practiced law until May 2010.
At that time, he discontinued his practice and closed his office. The
events of this disciplinary proceeding occurred during the months prior
to the time Vilmont stopped practicing law. Vilmont has no record of
prior discipline, but did receive a letter of admonition from the Board in
1994 for representing codefendants in a criminal case without properly
disclosing the conflict of interest.
On January 11, 2010, Vilmont entered into an attorney-client
relationship with an individual named Scott Halverson. Halverson had
been charged by state authorities with the crime of enticing a minor.
Vilmont agreed to represent Halverson in the state criminal proceeding.
Halverson signed a written fee contract prepared by Vilmont. Under the
terms of the agreement, Halverson agreed to pay Vilmont $225 per hour
for his services and further agreed to give Vilmont a retainer of $2500.
Additionally, the contract provided for a minimum attorney fee of $2500.
Vilmont customarily charged a minimum fee for his services in all

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criminal cases. Halverson’s father, Keith Halverson, gave Vilmont a
retainer of $2500. The retainer was placed in a trust account
maintained by Vilmont.
Following the initial client conference, Vilmont entered a written
appearance on behalf of Halverson in the criminal case and filed a waiver
of the preliminary hearing. On January 25, 2010, the district court
dismissed the charges against Halverson. The dismissal was entered at
the request of the State. The State asked the court to dismiss the
charges after it learned federal authorities had filed charges against
Halverson in federal court involving the same matter. Vilmont did not
represent Halverson in the federal criminal proceeding.
On January 30, 2010, Vilmont withdrew the $2500 retainer from
his trust account as payment for his services in representing Halverson
in state court. He did not provide notice or a contemporaneous
accounting to Halverson.
Subsequently, on numerous occasions, Keith Halverson asked
Vilmont to return the retainer and provide an accounting. Vilmont
ignored his requests until June 2010. At that time, Vilmont provided an
accounting to the Board and later to Halverson. The accounting showed
Vilmont worked a total of 3.7 hours in the case and charged $2500 for
his services. His services included one hour for responding to the
request for an accounting.
The Board charged Vilmont with numerous ethical violations. At
the disciplinary hearing before the commission, Vilmont was generally
uncooperative and unapologetic, but did not contest the facts. Almost
defiantly, but without support, he maintained the fee he charged was not
unreasonable.

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The commission found Vilmont charged and collected an
unreasonable fee in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct
32:1.5(a). As a result, the Board additionally found the fee was not
earned when Vilmont withdrew it from his trust account, in violation of
rule 32:1.15(c). The commission also found Vilmont both failed to
properly deliver funds belonging to a client or third person and failed to
provide a timely accounting, in violation of rule 32:1.15(d). Furthermore,
the commission found Vilmont violated numerous court rules governing
the operation of lawyer trust accounts when he withdrew the fee from his
trust account, including failing to timely notify the client of the
withdrawal and provide an accounting of the withdrawal, all in violation
of rule 32:1.15(f).
II. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary actions de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 2011). We
give respectful consideration to the findings and recommendations of the
commission, but are not bound by them. Id. The Board must prove
misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id.
III. Findings and Disposition.
We have previously outlined rules governing the use of
nonrefundable advance fees or minimum fee contracts in our profession.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d
470, 475–77 (Iowa 2003); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Apland, 577 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 1998). The bottom line is
that it is unethical for a lawyer to enter into a nonrefundable advance-fee
contract except in a case involving a general retainer. Frerichs, 671
N.W.2d at 475. Yet, we have cautioned that a criminal defense lawyer
would be hard-pressed to try to utilize this exception to charge a

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minimum, nonrefundable fee for representing a defendant in a criminal
case. See id. at 477; Iowa Ct. R. 45.9(2).
In this case, the minimum fee contract utilized by Vilmont was
clearly unethical. The contract was direct and to the point. It
established an hourly fee for services that would be rendered by Vilmont,
but imposed a floor of $2500. This type of contract was recognized in
Frerichs to be unethical and is prohibited by court rule 45.9(2).
Accordingly, Vilmont cannot use the contract to justify the minimum fee
he charged and collected from his client. Moreover, the amount of the
fee charged and collected by Vilmont for performing the limited and
insignificant services in representing his client was, without question,
unreasonable under the factors outlined in rule 32:1.5(a). We conclude,
without the need for further explanation, that Vilmont contracted,
charged, and collected an unreasonable fee in violation of rule 32:1.5(a).
As found by the commission, the reasonable fee for the services rendered
by Vilmont under the circumstances would have been $607.50.
A violation of one rule of professional conduct often implicates
other rules of professional conduct. Here, Vilmont also violated the trust
account rule by failing to properly treat the retainer as an advance fee
and by failing to follow the rules governing advance fees. See Iowa Ct. R.
45.7; see also id. r. 32:1.15(c), (f). He also failed to promptly render an
accounting when requested. See id. r. 32:1.15(d).
In considering the discipline in this case, we recognize the basic
unethical conduct centered on an impermissible fee arrangement
followed by the failure to render an accounting when requested. The
other violations essentially launched from the unethical minimum-fee
arrangement. Yet, our cases and our rules clearly made the fee
arrangement unethical, and Iowa lawyers have been provided ample

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notice. See Apland, 577 N.W.2d at 60 (imposing public reprimand for
charging a nonrefundable advance fee after recognizing the bar had not
been previously provided guidance on how to handle advance-fee
payments). Thus, we do not believe the conduct in this case warrants a
public reprimand. At the same time, we give respectful consideration to
the recommendation of the sanction by the commission. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d 295, 297 (Iowa 2010).
Considering all of the relevant factors in this case, we agree with the
commission that a thirty-day suspension is an appropriate discipline.
This discipline comports with our cases and is consistent with the goals
served by the imposition of attorney discipline. Additionally, a thirty-day
suspension in this case is generally consistent with our prior cases
regarding fee discipline. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Ries, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2012) (imposing thirty-day suspension for
single violation of failure to timely return overpaid client funds); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442–43
(Iowa 2012) (imposing thirty-day suspension for withdrawing and failing
to promptly refund unearned fees and failing to provide
contemporaneous billing); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Parrish, 801 N.W.2d 580, 589–90 (Iowa 2011) (imposing sixty-day
suspension for several occasions of failing to return client funds from
retainers when they had not been earned); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Feeney, 657 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Iowa 2003) (imposing
thirty-day suspension for failure to promptly repay client funds).
IV. Conclusion.
We suspend Vilmont’s license to practice law in Iowa for thirty
days. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. Iowa
Ct. R. 35.12(3). Vilmont must comply with Iowa Court Rule 35.22

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dealing with notification of any clients and counsel. Costs of this action
are taxed to Vilmont pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26(1). As a
condition to reinstatement, Vilmont shall pay all court costs and refund
to Keith Halverson the sum of $1893.50. Automatic reinstatement shall
not be ordered until all costs and restitution have been paid and Vilmont
has filed a written verification of payment with the court and the board.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.

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