State of Idaho v. Sean Saldatore Hurst

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51830

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 30, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
MARK WAYNE WARNER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Owyhee County. Hon. Randall S. Grove and Hon. Thomas W. Whitney, District
Judges.

Amended order relinquishing jurisdiction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Chief Judge
Mark Wayne Warner appeals from the district court’s amended order relinquishing
jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The State charged Warner with involuntary manslaughter, aggravated battery, aggravated
assault and malicious injury to property and alleged that he is a persistent violator of the law.
Pursuant to an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement, Warner agreed to plead guilty to aggravated
battery (Idaho Code § 18-907) and aggravated assault (I.C. § 18-905) and to admit to being a
persistent violator of the law (I.C. § 19-2514). In exchange for his guilty pleas, the State agreed
to dismiss the remaining charges and for Warner to be bound by a life sentence (with five years
determinate) subject to a period of retained jurisdiction (rider) followed by probation if he

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“successfully complete[d]” his rider. The plea agreement did not define successful completion of
the rider. At sentencing, the district court accepted the binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement and
imposed concurrent unified sentences of life in prison, with minimum periods of confinement of
five years, and retained jurisdiction. The Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) later filed an
addendum to Warner’s presentence investigation report (APSI), recommending the district court
consider placing Warner on probation.
After Warner completed the rider program during the period of retained jurisdiction, the
district court held a review hearing. After considering the IDOC’s recommendation and the factors
set forth in I.C. § 19-2521, the district court relinquished jurisdiction. Warner did not file a direct
appeal from the order relinquishing jurisdiction; however, Warner filed a post-conviction action,
asking the district court (in part) to reinstate his right to appeal from the order relinquishing
jurisdiction. After concluding that Warner was denied the effective assistance of counsel as a
result of trial counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal, the district court entered an amended order
relinquishing jurisdiction. Warner timely appeals from the amended order relinquishing
jurisdiction.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this
Court de novo, in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106
P.3d 397, 399 (2005). As with other types of contracts, “the interpretation of a plea agreement and
its legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the Court if the terms are clear and
unambiguous.” State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911, 914, 120 P.3d 299, 302 (Ct. App. 2005). The
determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law; however, interpretation of
an ambiguous term is a question of fact. State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537
(2010). A trial court’s factual determinations shall not be set aside on review unless they are
clearly erroneous. Id.
The decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish
jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will
not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712,
639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).

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When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Breach of Plea Agreement
Warner contends the district court breached the binding plea agreement by not placing him
on probation following his rider. More specifically, Warner asserts the breach occurred when the
district court relinquished jurisdiction rather than placing him on probation because, he argues,
pursuant to the terms of the binding plea agreement, the IDOC’s recommendation for probation
constituted successful completion of his rider. The State responds, and Warner concedes, that the
claimed breach must be evaluated under the fundamental error framework because the issue is not
preserved. Under this framework, the State argues that Warner has failed to meet his burden of
showing fundamental error. We hold that Warner has failed to show a constitutional violation
entitling him to relief under the fundamental error doctrine.
In order to obtain relief under the fundamental error doctrine, the defendant must
demonstrate three things. First, the defendant must show that one or more of the defendant’s
unwaived constitutional rights were violated. State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129,
133 (2019). Second, the error must be clear and obvious, meaning the record must demonstrate
evidence of the error and evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in
failing to object. Id. Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights, which means the error identified in the first and second prongs of the test actually
affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34. Warner’s claim fails under
the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.
Warner argues that the district court violated the I.C.R. 11 binding plea agreement because
the IDOC’s probation recommendation demonstrated he successfully completed his rider, which
in turn obligated the district court to place him on probation. We disagree.

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When a trial court accepts a plea agreement, it agrees to be “bound by the terms of the plea
agreement in the final disposition of the case.” I.C.R. 11(f)(3). When a plea agreement makes a
particular disposition contingent upon a specified event, the provision operates as a condition
precedent. A condition precedent is an event that must occur before performance under a contract
becomes due. Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Melanese, 175 Idaho 81, 90, 562 P.3d 182, 191
(2024). Both the express and implied terms of the plea agreement must be considered by the trial
court. Lutes, 141 Idaho at 914, 120 P.3d at 302. When a district court agrees to a plea agreement
calling for retained jurisdiction, absent evidence to the contrary, the only implied term that can
reasonably be inferred is that the district court will give genuine consideration to the Department
of Correction’s recommendation made at the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction
period. Id. at 915, 120 P.3d at 303. The district court was not bound to place Warner on probation
simply because the IDOC recommended probation. See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143, 30
P.3d 293, 298 (2001).
In this case, the binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement provides--in relevant part--that, if Warner
successfully completed his rider, the district court would place him on supervised probation. The
plea agreement did not define “successfully complete[d]” nor did it require the district court to
adopt the IDOC’s recommendation as binding. Thus, the plea agreement allowed the district court
to exercise discretion to determine whether Warner had successfully completed the rider, including
consideration of his conduct during the rider and the information contained in the APSI. If Warner
wanted to define “successfully complete[d]” in this way or otherwise make the IDOC’s
recommendation binding, he could have bargained for such a term as part of his plea agreement,
but he did not. Moreover, Warner’s alleged violation of what, at best, amounts to an ambiguous
contract term does not implicate any constitutional right. Cf. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 137 (2009) (holding “there is nothing to support the proposition that the Government’s breach
of a plea agreement retroactively causes the defendant’s agreement to have been unknowing or
involuntary”). Thus, it was within the district court’s discretion under the terms of the plea
agreement to relinquish jurisdiction if, in its assessment, Warner did not successfully complete his

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rider. Accordingly, Warner has not established a violation of an unwaived constitutional right,
and his claim therefore fails under the first prong of the fundamental error analysis.1
B. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction
Warner argues that, even if the district court did not breach the plea agreement by not
placing him on probation, the district court abused its discretion by failing to do so. The State
responds that Warner has failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion. We
hold the district court properly considered the information before it and determined that probation
was not appropriate.
In deciding whether to grant probation or to relinquish jurisdiction, the district court
considered the submitted sentencing materials and arguments. The district court discussed
Warner’s Class B disciplinary offense of obtaining a tattoo during his rider, noting that it was “an
extremely serious disciplinary offense in the rider program.” In the district court’s view, this
offense demonstrated Warner’s “outright open defiance of authority,” which “undermine[d] the
integrity” of the rider, particularly since the tattoo was obtained approximately five months after
sentencing.
The record establishes the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion,
acted within the boundaries of that discretion, applied the correct legal standards, and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Therefore, we hold that Warner has failed to show that the
district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Warner has failed to show that the district court erred in concluding that he had
not successfully completed the rider or that the district court abused its discretion
in relinquishing jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the district court’s amended order relinquishing
jurisdiction.
Judge LORELLO and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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Because Warner has not established a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, we
need not address the remaining two prongs of the fundamental error analysis.

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