State v. Gil

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50489

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: July 5, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JUAN JOSE GIL, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Davis VanderVelde, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Juan Jose Gil appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional guilty
plea to felony driving under the influence (DUI). Gil challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress, arguing the evidence of his blood alcohol concentration was obtained after a
warrantless blood draw and should have been suppressed. We affirm the district court.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The factual findings of the district court regarding the traffic stop are uncontested. Officer
Krohn stopped Gil for having a non-functioning passenger-side headlamp, speeding, crossing the
lane dividing line, and then driving while straddling the line. Officer Krohn smelled the odor of
alcohol coming from the vehicle and asked Gil for his license, registration, and proof of insurance.
Officer Krohn then explained his reason for the stop. During their conversation, Gil stated he was

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aware that the passenger-side headlight was out but denied drinking any alcoholic beverages.
During his conversation with Gil, Officer Krohn observed that Gil had a relaxed affect, fumbled
and dropped his wallet as he was attempting to remove his driver’s license, and dropped his phone
as he was attempting to access his vehicle insurance information.
After verifying the information on Gil’s license, registration, and insurance, Officer Krohn
asked Gil to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs) because of the strong odor of alcohol emanating
from the vehicle. The FSTs were recorded by the officer’s body camera and show Gil’s failure to
successfully complete the tests. Gil was arrested for driving under the influence and transported
to the Nampa Police Department. There, Gil was provided an audio admonition of rights; Gil
refused to take a breath test. Officer Krohn informed Gil that if he did not take a breath test, the
officer would obtain a warrant for a blood draw. While Officer Krohn was completing the warrant
application, Corporal Woodward had a brief conversation with Gil. The conversation was not
recorded, but Corporal Woodward indicated that Gil stated he changed his mind and would consent
to the blood draw.
Thereafter, body camera video showed Officer Krohn and Corporal Woodward entering
the holding area and opening the door to the holding cell. Gil was lying on the cell bench. Officer
Krohn and Corporal Woodward engaged Gil in conversation as Gil got up. Corporal Woodward
asked Gil to exit the cell, saying, “You said you’d consent to a blood draw, we gotta get that taken
care of.” Gil then signed a blood draw consent form. The blood draw indicated Gil’s blood alcohol
concentration was over the legal limit.
Gil was charged with felony DUI pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005, second
felony DUI within fifteen years. Gil filed a motion to suppress the blood draw results on the
grounds that the results were illegally obtained without a warrant and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In his motion to suppress, Gil stated he did not consent to the blood draw and signed
the consent form for a blood draw believing a warrant had been obtained. He further argued that
Officer Krohn lacked reasonable suspicion to perform field sobriety tests. The State filed an
objection to the motion to suppress.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Krohn and Corporal Woodward testified and
the body camera footage was admitted without objection. Gil also testified. The district court
denied the motion to suppress evidence, finding that the testimony of the officers was consistent
with the body camera video, and was more credible than Gil’s testimony. The district court also

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found that Officer Krohn had reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests. Finally, the
district court found Gil’s consent to the blood draw was voluntary. Subsequently, pursuant to a
plea agreement, Gill entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress. Gil timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Gil does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that the officer had
reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop and perform the field sobriety tests. Instead, Gil
argues the district court erred when it denied Gil’s motion to suppress because the State failed to
meet its burden of showing he consented to the blood draw. Gil alleges he did not knowingly or
voluntarily consent to the blood draw and denies having a conversation with Corporal Woodward
where he agreed to the blood draw. As a result, Gil argues the consent exception to the warrant
requirement had not been met. The State contends Gil voluntarily consented to the blood draw as
evidenced by his signature on the consent form and the supporting body camera footage from the
officers and, therefore, the burden of proof for the warrant exception has been met.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure. A search conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause
is presumptively unreasonable. State v. Hansen, 167 Idaho 831, 835, 477 P.3d 885, 889 (2020).
Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho
416, 419, 337 P.3d 575, 578 (2014). The State bears the burden of showing that consent was freely
and voluntarily given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Whether consent

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was voluntary is determined by the totality of the surrounding circumstances. Wulff, 157 Idaho at
422, 337 P.3d at 581. The State must show that consent was not the result of duress or coercion,
either expressed or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. Consent is not rendered involuntary
due to an officer’s truthful explanation that the officer could obtain a warrant. State v. Kapelle,
158 Idaho 121, 129, 344 P.3d 901, 909 (Ct. App. 2014).
Here, the district court considered the circumstances surrounding the blood draw and
whether consent was given. During the suppression hearing, Officer Krohn testified about Gil’s
refusal to submit to a breath test. Officer Krohn testified that Gil was adamant about not consenting
to the breath test and, as a result, Officer Krohn forgot to ask Gil for consent to the blood draw.
Officer Krohn explained he put Gil in a holding cell while he began the paperwork for a warrant.
Corporal Woodward testified that he realized there was a conflict between Gil and Officer Krohn,
and because a different officer can be helpful in diffusing the situation, he entered the holding cell
to speak to Gil. Corporal Woodward testified that Gil willingly agreed to consent to a blood draw.
The conversation between Corporal Woodward and Gil was not recorded, and Gil later denied the
conversation occurred. However, a subsequent conversation between Officer Krohn, Corporal
Woodward, and Gil was recorded. As the officers were opening the holding cell for Gil, the
following conversation ensued:
Officer Krohn: All right Mr. Gil you want to step out here for me . . .
[unintelligible] . . . Mr. Gil?
Mr. Gil: What do you mean?
Officer Krohn: Come on out here for me sir . . .
Officer Woodward: . . . You said you’d consent to a blood draw, we gotta get
that taken care of.
Gil exited the cell, and then signed the consent form without objection.
Gil testified and then argued he believed the consent form related to the warrant for a blood
draw and implied the officers deceived him regarding the nature of the form. Following the
hearing, the district court found that the officers’ testimony was more credible than Gil’s, Gil
consented to the blood draw, and Gil’s consent was voluntary.
On appeal, Gil argues his consent was not voluntary and points to his affidavit and
testimony as support. Gil acknowledges the district court’s credibility determinations “are
unchallengeable on appeal” as explained in State v. Howard, 155 Idaho 666, 673, 315 P.3d 854,
861 (Ct. App. 2013). Because the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court, this Court will

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not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho at 106, 897 P.2d
at 997.
Here, the district court found that although Gil denied he had a conversation with Corporal
Woodward, there were other indicators that the conversation occurred, and the district court
explicitly found that Gil and Corporal Woodward had the conversation. The district court found
the body camera video of the conversation between Officer Krohn and Corporal Woodward
supported that conclusion, as did Gil’s demeanor while signing the consent form. The district
court relied upon the body camera footage of the interaction, which demonstrates the officers
indicated the form was for voluntary consent for the blood draw. In light of that video, the district
court also found there was no reasonable basis for Gil’s argument that he was signing a warrant
form because the officers repeatedly used the word “consent.” Ultimately, the district court
concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Gil’s consent was voluntarily given.
The district court was in the best position to make credibility determinations. In this case,
the district court determined the officers’ version of events was more credible than Gil’s. As Gil’s
argument rests on a factual premise rejected by the district court and is unreviewable by this Court,
Gil fails to establish a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court did not err in
denying Gil’s motion to suppress.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The judgment of conviction
is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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