People v. Owens

2026 IL App (1st) 230816-U
No. 1-23-0816
Second Division
October 13, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
DEANGELO OWENS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Cook County.
Nos. 14 CR 17113
14 CR 17114
The Honorable
Mary Margaret Brosnahan,
Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice D.B. Walker and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s judgment is affirmed, where (1) the trial court did not improperly
expand the scope of the hearing on defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and (2) the trial court properly imposed a 25-year sentencing
enhancement and ordered defendant’s sentences to run consecutively.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant Deangelo Owens was found guilty of robbery, home
invasion, and attempted first degree murder. During posttrial proceedings, defendant alleged
that his trial counsel was ineffective, and the trial court permitted him to file a pro se motion
pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). The trial court ultimately denied the

-- 1 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
2
motion, finding that appointment of counsel for the Krankel proceedings was unnecessary.
Defendant was appointed new counsel for sentencing, and the trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of 65 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, which included two 25-year
firearm sentencing enhancements for the home invasion and attempted murder. On appeal,
defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his Krankel motion without
appointing him counsel for the hearing and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing the firearm
sentencing enhancement to the home invasion conviction and in ordering his sentences to run
consecutively. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Trial
¶ 5 In case No. 14 CR 17113, defendant and codefendant Corey Stewart were charged with
attempted first degree murder, aggravated battery, home invasion, attempted armed robbery,
and aggravated unlawful restraint in connection with an August 27, 2014, incident involving
victims Jason Scott and Crystal Anderson. In addition, in case No. 14 CR 17114, the two
defendants were charged with armed robbery, robbery, vehicular invasion, and aggravated
unlawful restraint in connection with an incident occurring the same day involving victim
Terrence Marshall. The two cases were joined at the State’s request. Defendant requested that
his case be severed from Stewart’s, as defendant was planning on pursuing an alibi defense
which would be inconsistent with Stewart’s anticipated defense, and the two defendants were
tried simultaneously before separate juries.1 Prior to trial, however, defendant changed his
theory of defense and ultimately did not call his alibi witness. At trial, the State nol-prossed a
1 Stewart’s conviction was previously affirmed by this court in People v. Stewart, 2022 IL App
(1st) 200046-U.

-- 2 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
3
number of the counts against defendant and proceeded only on one count of attempted first
degree murder, two counts of home invasion, and one count of armed robbery.
¶ 6 Defendant’s trial occurred over three days, from October 16 through October 18, 2018.
The evidence at defendant’s trial established that, at approximately 7:45 p.m. on August 27,
2014, Jason Scott was at home with Crystal Anderson and her children when defendant and
Stewart knocked on the door. Scott answered and, when they asked for Anderson, went upstairs
to inform her of the visitors. Unbeknownst to Scott, defendant and Stewart followed him
upstairs to Anderson’s bedroom. Upon observing them, Anderson ordered them to leave, and
the four engaged in a physical altercation, with Stewart grabbing Anderson and defendant
grabbing Scott. Scott ultimately pushed defendant toward Stewart and Anderson, then ran
downstairs. Defendant grabbed a firearm which Stewart was carrying and shot at Scott, hitting
him in the arm. Scott continued running, exiting the home. Anderson, who had locked herself
in the bedroom with her children, pushed an air conditioner unit out of the window to allow
her children to exit through the window. Defendant, who had chased Scott into the nearby
alley, fired at him again, hitting his leg. A neighbor called 911, and police arrived, taking Scott
to the hospital, where he remained for approximately a month. Defendant and Stewart,
however, had since fled the scene.
¶ 7 Anderson had known defendant prior to the incident and identified him to police, including
providing his name and phone number.2 After speaking to police at the hospital, she decided
to search for defendant and Stewart. From her vehicle, she observed them entering a liquor
store, and she flagged down a police officer and gave a description of defendant to the officer.
2 Deonte George, who had been in the alley at the time playing basketball and who also knew
defendant, similarly identified defendant as one of the two men running through the alley toward him and
testified that defendant was carrying a chrome pistol. We also observe that portions of the events at issue
were captured on a neighbor’s security cameras.

-- 3 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
4
The officer entered the store, but was unable to locate anyone matching the description, and
returned to his vehicle. Anderson again spoke to the officer, repeating her description and
providing a description of Stewart, when Terrence Marshall approached and joined the
conversation, indicating that Anderson’s description also matched two individuals who had
recently robbed him. The officer relayed the description over the radio, and defendant and
Stewart were ultimately arrested.
¶ 8 With respect to the robbery, the evidence at trial established that, at approximately 10 p.m.
on August 27, 2014, Marshall was sitting in his vehicle speaking to one of his employees over
the telephone. Defendant approached Marshall and told him, “you know what this is.” Marshall
relayed his location to his employee, then was “ushered” out of his vehicle while Stewart patted
him down. His pockets were emptied and his phone was taken. Defendant ordered Marshall to
enter the back of the vehicle, but Marshall refused, and Stewart instead searched the vehicle.
Several of Marshall’s employees then arrived at the scene, and the two men fled. Upon
searching his vehicle, Marshall discovered that $2700 in sequential $100 bills, which he had
recently withdrawn from the bank, was missing. He immediately reported the robbery to the
police. After defendant and Stewart were arrested, a “large” number of sequential $100 bills
was recovered from Stewart.
¶ 9 At the close of the State’s case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the armed
robbery charge, as Marshall’s testimony contained no evidence of a weapon, and the trial court
agreed that the jury should be instructed only as to the lesser-included offense of robbery.
Defendant presented no evidence in his defense, other than the stipulated testimony of two
police officers concerning the description of the suspects provided to them by Anderson and
Marshall.

-- 4 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
5
¶ 10 Jury Instructions
¶ 11 As relevant to the instant appeal, the jury was instructed that the State had alleged that,
during the commission of the attempted first degree murder, defendant personally discharged
a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to Scott. Accordingly, the jury instructions
indicated that, “[t]o sustain the allegation made in connection with the offense of attempt first
degree murder,” the State was required to prove “[t]hat during the commission of the offense
of attempt first degree murder, the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately
caused great bodily harm to another person.”
¶ 12 In addition, as to the two counts of home invasion, the jury instructions provided that:
“A person commits the offense of home invasion when he, not being a peace officer
acting in the line of duty, without authority, knowingly enters the dwelling place of
another when he knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present, and
while armed with a firearm uses force or threatens the imminent use of force upon any
person or persons within the dwelling place whether or not injury occurs or personally
discharges a firearm that proximately causes great bodily harm to another person within
the dwelling place.”
¶ 13 The next instructions contained separate instructions with respect to the home invasion
charges involving Anderson and Scott, respectively. The jury was first instructed:
“To sustain the charge of home invasion, the State must prove the following
propositions:
First: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, was
not a peace officer acting in the line of duty; and

-- 5 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
6
Second: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible,
knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place of another; and
Third: That when the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible,
entered the dwelling place he knew or had reason to know that one or more persons
was present; and
Fourth: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, was
armed with a firearm; and
Fifth: That while armed with a firearm the defendant, or one for whose conduct he
is legally responsible, threatened the imminent use of force on Crystal Anderson, a
person within the dwelling place;
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant
guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant not guilty.”
¶ 14 The jury was then instructed that, “[t]o sustain the charge of home invasion (discharge of
a firearm), the State must prove the following propositions[.]” The remainder of the instruction
was identical to the instruction given with respect to Anderson except that the fifth proposition
instead provided:
“Fifth: That the defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission
of the offense which proximately caused great bodily harm to Jason Scott, a person
within the dwelling place.”

-- 6 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
7
¶ 15 The verdict forms provided to the jury included (1) verdict forms for attempted first degree
murder, (2) verdict forms for “Home Invasion to Crystal Anderson,” (3) verdict forms for
“Home Invasion to Jason Scott,” and (4) verdict forms for robbery. In addition, the jury
received a form as to the allegation “that during the commission of the offense of attempt first
degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great
bodily harm to another person.”
¶ 16 The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder, home invasion
with respect to both Scott and Anderson, and robbery, and further found that the State had
proven that, during the commission of the attempted first degree murder, defendant personally
discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to another person.
¶ 17 Krankel Proceedings
¶ 18 On December 4, 2018, defendant sent a pro se letter to the trial court indicating that he was
planning on filing a Krankel motion concerning his trial counsel and requesting copies of any
discovery and trial transcripts. When the parties came before the trial court for a posttrial status
hearing, the trial court informed defendant that he was not entitled to such items, as he was
currently represented by his trial counsel. Instead, the trial court explained to defendant that he
was entitled to file a Krankel motion and the trial court would have a preliminary hearing to
determine whether the claims had merit, at which point defendant would be appointed a new
attorney. While the matter was pending, defendant’s trial counsel filed a motion for new trial
on defendant’s behalf.
¶ 19 On February 8, 2019, defendant’s trial counsel informed the trial court that defendant had
retained new counsel, and the trial court permitted trial counsel to withdraw and the new
counsel to file an appearance. New counsel explained that he was retained to represent

-- 7 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
8
defendant on the Krankel matter and, if necessary, for sentencing. On August 9, 2019,
however, defendant’s new counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw. The trial court granted
counsel’s motion on September 18, 2019. The trial court asked defendant if he was planning
on retaining private counsel, and defendant responded, “No, ma’am. I would like to go pro se
on this matter.”
¶ 20 The trial court explained to defendant that, typically, it would conduct a Krankel hearing
and determine whether, based on the allegations, defendant was entitled to the appointment of
an attorney. In defendant’s case, however, before any hearing had occurred, defendant retained
private counsel to represent him, as was his right. As counsel had now withdrawn, “now we’re
back to” the initial procedure. After the trial court again confirmed that defendant was not
planning on retaining another private attorney, it explained:
“THE COURT: All right. So it’s not automatic—when you file a motion saying my
lawyer was ineffective, it’s not automatic after the finding of guilty that you get a new
lawyer appointed to you. I need to do a hearing to determine whether or not we can go
to that next level and then if I determine that there should or could be an attorney
appointed on your case, you can then determine if you want to go pro se or not.
DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: That’s an option. We’ll have to have a long discussion. I have a form
that I have you fill out, et cetera. But right now we’re back in the position of where we
were in December of 2018, which is you at that time wanted to file a pro se motion for
ineffective assistance of counsel.”
The trial court continued the matter to permit defendant to file a pro se Krankel motion.

-- 8 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
9
¶ 21 On October 4, 2019, defendant filed a six-page pro se Krankel motion, claiming that his
trial counsel was ineffective in a number of respects. Specifically, defendant claimed that (1)
counsel had not properly investigated the case, including failing to interview Anderson or
Stewart; (2) counsel had failed to go over defendant’s case with him; (3) counsel failed to
challenge the indictments for robbery and home invasion; (4) counsel failed to request a
severance; (5) counsel failed to demand trial when defendant wished him to do so; (6) counsel
improperly relied on defendant’s input in selecting a jury; (7) counsel failed to ensure that the
jury knew that defendant was charged with attempted murder and not murder; and (8) counsel
failed to bring to the trial court’s attention the fact that several jurors were sleeping during the
trial. In support of his motion, defendant attached several affidavits, including an affidavit from
codefendant Stewart in which Stewart averred that he was the person who shot Scott.
¶ 22 The motion was considered at a hearing on November 4, 2019, at which defendant’s trial
counsel was present. At the hearing, the trial court asked defendant to explain his claims of
ineffectiveness point by point. As he did so, the trial court asked questions to clarify the
argument and, in certain instances, immediately found the claims meritless. For example,
defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek dismissal of the armed
robbery charge where the police report indicated that the items taken from Marshall were taken
from his vehicle, not from his person, and similarly argued that the home invasion counts
should have been dismissed where defendant and Stewart had permission to enter the home.
The trial court informed defendant that his claims had no merit, as they were issues of fact
which were required to be resolved at trial, not matters which would have resulted in the
dismissal of the charges. In addition, where defendant made certain representations as to his

-- 9 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
10
trial counsel, the trial court asked counsel his recollection of the issue. After hearing
defendant’s arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 23 On November 22, 2019, the trial court denied defendant’s Krankel motion, finding that
appointment of counsel and further proceedings on the matter were not necessary. In doing so,
the trial court observed that one of the affidavits in support of the motion was Stewart’s
affidavit averring that he was the shooter. The trial court, however, noted that defendant’s case
and Stewart’s case were tried at the same time before the same trial court, and that Stewart had
made comments during his recent sentencing hearing which were seemingly inconsistent with
the statements in the affidavit. The trial court read the relevant portion of the transcript from
Stewart’s sentencing hearing into the record, noting that Stewart maintained that defendant
grabbed the firearm from Stewart and that Stewart never intended for the situation to rise to
the level it had. As to the claims against defendant’s trial counsel, the trial court found that
they all pertained to trial strategy and there were no claims which merited the need for
appointed counsel to further develop them. As such, the trial court denied defendant’s motion.
¶ 24 Sentencing
¶ 25 Defendant was appointed new counsel for sentencing and, before sentencing, counsel filed
a supplemental motion for new trial, followed by a second supplemental motion for new trial.
The motions came before the trial court on January 13, 2023, and were ultimately denied.
¶ 26 The matter proceeded to sentencing, and the State filed a sentencing memorandum arguing
that defendant’s sentences should be imposed consecutively as both attempted first-degree
murder and home invasion were triggering offenses for purposes of consecutive sentencing.
¶ 27 On April 26, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to 31 years in the Illinois Department
of Corrections for the attempted first degree murder and 31 years for the home invasion count

-- 10 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
11
concerning Scott; the home invasion count concerning Anderson was merged into that count.
For both the attempted first degree murder and the home invasion, the trial court’s sentence
included mandatory 25-year sentencing enhancements based on defendant’s personal
discharge of a firearm. In addition, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years for the
robbery. Finally, the trial court found that consecutive sentences for all of the convictions were
appropriate, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 65 years. In sentencing defendant to
consecutive sentences, the trial court stated: “Great bodily harm has been alleged under
certainly severe bodily injury.”
¶ 28 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied, and this appeal
follows.
¶ 29 ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court improperly conducted his Krankel
hearing and raises several challenges to his sentence. We consider each argument in turn.
¶ 31 Krankel Hearing
¶ 32 A pro se posttrial motion which alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel is governed
by the procedure developed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Krankel and its progeny.3 People
v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 34. This procedure “encourages the trial court to fully address
these claims and thereby narrow the issues to be addressed on appeal.” Id. (citing People v.
Jocko, 239 Ill. 2d 87, 91 (2010)).
¶ 33 When a defendant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court must
employ a two-step procedure. First, the trial court conducts a preliminary examination of the
3 We observe that this procedure applies regardless of whether trial counsel was appointed or was
retained, as is the case here. See In re Johnathan T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶ 44.

-- 11 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
12
factual basis underlying the defendant’s claim. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003).
During this preliminary evaluation, the trial court is permitted to question defense counsel
about the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s allegations, engage in a
discussion with the defendant, or rely on its own knowledge of counsel’s performance at trial
and the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12.
¶ 34 If the trial court determines that the defendant’s claim lacks merit or pertains only to
matters of trial strategy, the trial court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se
motion. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. If, however, the trial court finds that the allegations
demonstrate “possible neglect of the case,” new counsel must be appointed to represent the
defendant at the next stage of the proceeding. Id. The appointed counsel can then independently
evaluate the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim and avoid any conflict of interest which might
arise if trial counsel was forced to justify his or her actions contrary to the defendant’s position.
Id.
¶ 35 “The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an
adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125 (1994)). Accordingly, if the reviewing court
is asked to determine whether the trial court properly conducted a Krankel inquiry, the standard
of review is de novo. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 33.
¶ 36 In this case, defendant contends that, while the trial court indicated that it was conducting
only a preliminary Krankel inquiry, it in actuality conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the
merits of his claims, necessitating the appointment of counsel to represent him at the hearing.
Defendant thus claims that the matter must be remanded for proper Krankel proceedings, with

-- 12 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
13
the appointment of counsel to represent him at the hearing. We do not find this argument
persuasive.
¶ 37 As an initial matter, we observe that, while defendant claims in his reply brief that the
hearing was “adversarial,” the State had limited involvement in the proceedings and did not
present any argument during the hearing. Similarly, we are hard-pressed to characterize the
hearing as “evidentiary,” where it consisted primarily of defendant’s explanation of the points
raised in his motion and trial counsel’s responses when requested by the trial court, both of
which are entirely appropriate during the initial stage of the Krankel proceedings. See Ayres,
2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. To the extent that the trial court commented on any evidentiary matters,
they were limited to observing that Stewart’s affidavit arguably contradicted his statements
during his sentencing hearing and did not in any way transform the hearing into an evidentiary
hearing.
¶ 38 We also cannot find that the trial court’s conduct during the hearing “went far beyond a
preliminary inquiry on whether to appoint counsel.” The record demonstrates that the trial
court did exactly what was required under the law: it conducted a preliminary examination of
the factual basis underlying the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim (Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-
78). Defendant’s motion raised a number of issues, and the trial court appropriately went issue-
by-issue to ensure that it understood defendant’s arguments as to each one. Some of
defendant’s claims were meritless on their face, which the trial court noted, while others
required further explanation. Our supreme court has made it clear that a trial court is entitled
to explore the factual basis for the defendant’s claims through discussion with the defendant,
trial counsel, and the trial court’s own knowledge. See Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. This

-- 13 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
14
includes consideration of the merits of defendant’s claims in their entirety, both factual and
legal. See Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 61.
¶ 39 On appeal, defendant points to several examples which he claims demonstrate that the trial
court went beyond a preliminary inquiry. Specifically, he cites a discussion concerning
potentially sleeping jurors, the trial court’s use of the transcript from Stewart’s sentencing
hearing, and general “witnesses and evidence that he claimed counsel had failed to investigate
or that he had not been informed of.” None of these examples, however, suggest that the trial
court improperly expanded the scope of the Krankel proceeding.
¶ 40 As to the matter of the sleeping jurors, defendant claimed that four jurors were sleeping for
two days of the trial. Upon hearing defendant’s claim, the trial court flatly rejected it, indicating
that it had not observed anything of the sort during the trial and further noting that, “I mean I
guess it’s certainly true that once in a blue moon somebody might have nodded off in a jury.
It’s not unheard of. Obviously it’s an important and significant issue, but my goodness, you
can’t miss four people sleeping for two days in a row. Nobody could have missed that.” When
defendant continued to insist that it was true, the trial court asked trial counsel and the State
whether they recalled sleeping jurors. Trial counsel explained that there was one day in which
one juror had closed her eyes for “maybe 30 or 40 seconds” while listening to testimony, but
it was apparent that she was not asleep. The assistant state’s attorney similarly indicated that
he did not recall observing any sleeping jurors and suggested that, “[s]ince there were two
juries, they were getting up pretty often, so for a juror to be asleep doesn’t seem very likely.”
The trial court again indicated that “it’s not a possibility that I would have missed four sleeping
jurors. Nobody could miss four of them. That’s just—that’s not a viable argument.” Defendant
indicated that Stewart’s attorney observed the sleeping jurors, and the trial court responded:

-- 14 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
15
“Well, she could have been called to testify today. If you have witnesses that would say that
right now, I—no, there were not four sleeping jurors present in this courtroom for two days in
a row.”
¶ 41 Defendant contends that there were “factual disagreements” concerning his claim, and that
the trial court suggested that he should have called in a witness, indicating that the trial court
went beyond a preliminary Krankel inquiry in ruling on his claim. The record, however, clearly
demonstrates that the trial court found defendant’s claim meritless based on its own experience
and its own recollection of the trial and that any “factual disagreement[ ]” was based on
defendant’s insistence on a wholly implausible sequence of events. As noted, the trial court
may consider the merits of defendant’s claims in their entirety, both factual and legal, in
conducting a Krankel inquiry. See Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 61. Defendant cites no authority
suggesting that a trial court must accept a defendant’s version of events as true, regardless of
how incredible it is. To the extent that the trial court suggested that Stewart’s attorney “could
have been called to testify today,” we observe that this comment came after the trial court had
repeatedly stated that it found defendant’s version of events to be impossible and cannot find
that it indicates that the trial court was conducting a full evidentiary hearing.
¶ 42 Similarly, we cannot find that the trial court’s comparison of Stewart’s affidavit to his
statement at his sentencing hearing transformed the character of the Krankel proceeding.
Defendant and Stewart were tried simultaneously before the same trial judge, who was present
for the entirety of both jury trials. As such, it is unremarkable that the trial court would notice
when the affidavit submitted by defendant factually contradicted statements the trial court
heard Stewart make during his sentencing hearing. This is especially true given the timing of
Stewart’s sentencing hearing—Stewart’s affidavit was signed on June 7, 2019, his sentencing

-- 15 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
16
hearing occurred on October 22, 2019, and defendant’s Krankel hearing occurred on
November 4, 2019. We recognize that our supreme court has suggested that a trial court should
not rely on matters outside the record when evaluating a defendant’s claims in a preliminary
Krankel inquiry. See People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 36. It is not obvious whether this
includes a trial judge’s personal recollection of statements made during the sentencing of a
codefendant after simultaneous trials. Even, however, if defendant is correct in his claim that
the trial court should not have referenced material from Stewart’s case, we cannot find that the
use of this material suggests that the trial court was conducting an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 43 Finally, the fact that defendant identified certain witnesses or evidence which he claimed
trial counsel had not interviewed or investigated does not automatically mean that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. The trial court in this case asked defendant to
expand on the details of his claims, and asked trial counsel to explain the reasoning behind his
actions, before finding that the claims were either not supported by the record or constituted
trial strategy. See People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 106 (decisions such as what witnesses
to call and whether to object constitute trial strategy). As noted, if the trial court determines
that the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial
strategy, the trial court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. Moore,
207 Ill. 2d at 78. Here, that is exactly what the trial court did and, accordingly, we cannot find
that the trial court improperly expanded the scope of the Krankel inquiry, nor can we find that
defendant demonstrated possible neglect such that appointment of counsel was necessary.
¶ 44 Since we have determined that the trial court conducted only a preliminary Krankel inquiry,
defendant’s arguments about the waiver of counsel are inapplicable, as defendant recognizes
that he is not entitled to counsel at the first stage of the Krankel proceedings. See Moore, 207

-- 16 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
17
Ill. 2d at 78. Consequently, we have no need to further consider defendant’s arguments on this
point.
¶ 45 Firearm Enhancement
¶ 46 Defendant next raises two arguments concerning his sentencing. First, defendant contends
that the trial court should not have imposed a 25-year sentencing enhancement to his home
invasion conviction. A conviction for home invasion is subject to a mandatory 25-to-life
sentencing enhancement where the defendant “[p]ersonally discharges a firearm that
proximately causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death
to another person within the dwelling place.” 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(5), (c) (West 2022). A
conviction for attempted first degree murder is similarly subject to a 25-to-life sentencing
enhancement under the same circumstances. Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(D). In order for either sentencing
enhancement to apply, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant personally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily harm. See
People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 296 (2002) (every fact necessary to establish the sentencing
range is an element of the crime).
¶ 47 In this case, with respect to the attempted murder charge, the State obtained a separate
finding from the jury “that during the commission of the offense of attempt first degree murder
the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm to
another person.” It did not, however, seek a similar finding with respect to the home invasion
count concerning Scott.4 Consequently, defendant claims that the imposition of the sentencing
enhancement to the home invasion count was improper.
4 As quoted in our prior statement of facts, the “personal discharge of a firearm” language was
instead included in the issues instruction for the home invasion concerning Scott.

-- 17 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
18
¶ 48 As an initial matter, the State contends that defendant has both forfeited any challenge to
the sentencing enhancement by failing to object below and has waived such a challenge where
defendant’s trial counsel affirmatively acquiesced to the jury instructions which were given at
trial. To the extent that defendant’s argument is based on the State’s failure to obtain a separate
finding from the jury concerning the home invasion count, we agree with defendant that he
cannot be said to have waived his current challenge, as it is the State’s burden to prove every
element of the offense, which includes the facts necessary to establish the sentencing range.
See Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d at 296.
¶ 49 We agree with the State, however, that defendant’s claim has been procedurally forfeited.
To preserve a sentencing error, a defendant is required to both make a contemporaneous
objection and to include the issue in a written postsentencing motion. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.
2d 539, 545 (2010). Similarly, a defendant generally forfeits any purported jury instruction
error if the defendant does not object to the instruction (or tender an alternative instruction)
and does not raise the instruction issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d
52, 76-77 (2008).
¶ 50 In this case, defendant failed to raise any challenge to the sentencing enhancement, whether
in instructing the jury, in any of his three posttrial motions (drafted by two different attorneys),
during his sentencing hearing, or in his postsentencing motion. While defendant contends that
his sentencing counsel “raised the issue when it arose” at sentencing by “argu[ing] that the jury
instructions for home invasion included non-I.P.I. instructions regarding the personal
discharge of the firearm,” such a contention misstates the record. At the sentencing hearing,
after the trial court had set forth the minimum and maximum sentences for each count,
including the fact that the home invasion count concerning Scott was subject to a 25-year

-- 18 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
19
sentencing enhancement, sentencing counsel expressly agreed with the sentencing structure.
Counsel then stated: “The only thing that I notice is that the verdict form itself did not exactly
mirror Instruction No. 22 and 23, in that No. 22 was listed as home invasion in parenthesis,
personal discharge[,] and that’s not exactly how it is written out on the verdict form. But I do
acknowledge that it does not require separate. I believe that the law does not require it be a
special interrogatory because of the six exceptions to that necessity.” While it is not entirely
clear, it appears that sentencing counsel was referring to the fact that “personal discharge of a
firearm” was not listed on the verdict form itself.5 Counsel, however, immediately
acknowledged that it was not required to be so listed under the law, and the trial court agreed,
given that personal discharge of a firearm was one of the elements the State was required to
prove with respect to the home invasion count concerning Scott. Thus, the record clearly
establishes that, contrary to defendant’s claim, sentencing counsel did not raise any argument
or otherwise challenge the applicability of the sentencing enhancement.
¶ 51 Errors which have been procedurally forfeited may nevertheless be reviewed for plain
error, and the State in its brief on appeal addresses defendant’s claim under that framework. In
his reply brief, however, defendant denies that his claim was waived or forfeited, arguing only
that it was properly preserved. At oral argument, counsel reaffirmed that defendant was not
seeking plain error review and was taking the position that the issue had been properly
preserved. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion in a plain-error analysis, and where
the defendant fails to meet his burden, the procedural default will be honored. Hillier, 237 Ill.
2d at 545. Our supreme court has observed that “[a] defendant who fails to argue for plain-
5 While the instruction as to home invasion concerning Scott provided that “[t]o sustain the
charge of home invasion (discharge of a firearm),” the State was required to prove five propositions, the
verdict form listed “Home Invasion to Jason Scott.”

-- 19 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
20
error review obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion.” Id. Thus, here, where defendant
forfeited his sentencing claim and did not argue for plain error, we honor his procedural default.
See id. at 550 (“Because defendant forfeited review of his *** claims and did not argue plain
error, the appellate court should not have reached the merits of those issues.”).
¶ 52 Consecutive Sentences
¶ 53 The final challenge defendant raises on appeal concerns the trial court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences. When a trial court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment at the
same time, those sentences generally run concurrently. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 2022). A
defendant, however, is subject to mandatory consecutive sentences where “[o]ne of the
offenses for which the defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class
1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” Id. § 5-8-4(d)(1). In this case, the
home invasion conviction was a Class X felony, and the trial court found that “[t]here’s been
a finding of severe bodily injury.” Thus, consecutive sentences were mandatory.
¶ 54 Defendant, however, contends that there was no finding of severe bodily injury and that
the trial court’s statement reflected a misapprehension of the record. As with his prior claim,
defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for review. Unlike his other claim, however,
defendant here contends that “because the improper imposition of consecutive sentences may
violate a defendant’s fundamental rights, this Court can review this issue to determine whether
the imposition of consecutive sentences constitutes plain error.”
¶ 55 The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved claim (1) if
a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that this error alone
threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the
error, or (2) if a clear or obvious error occurred and the error is so serious that it affected the

-- 20 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
21
fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless
of the closeness of the evidence at the defendant’s trial. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48;
People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). In both cases, the burden of persuasion
remains with the defendant. People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 50. Defendant in the instant
case does not specify whether he is seeking review under the first or second prong of the plain-
error doctrine. The first question in any plain-error analysis, however, is whether any error
occurred. Id. ¶ 51.
¶ 56 As noted, consecutive sentences are mandated where “[o]ne of the offenses for which the
defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class 1 felony and the
defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2022). The
determination by a trial court that a particular injury is “severe” is a question of fact which will
be reversed only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Deleon, 227 Ill.
2d 322, 332 (2008); People v. Langston, 2024 IL App (5th) 220296, ¶ 38. See also People v.
Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269, 280-81 (2001) (determination of whether consecutive sentences
would be imposed was properly made by the sentencing court and not the jury).
¶ 57 In this case, defendant contends that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences
was based on its misapprehension that a finding of severe bodily injury had been made.
Specifically, defendant claims that the jury’s finding of great bodily harm was not synonymous
with a finding of severe bodily injury and further claims that the trial court did not make such
a finding itself.
¶ 58 While different appellate districts have reached differing results, the First District has
previously held that “severe bodily injury” requires a degree of harm to the victim which is
something more than that constituting “great bodily harm.” See People v. Williams, 335 Ill.

-- 21 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
22
App. 3d 596, 599-600 (2002); see also People v. Alvarez, 2016 IL App (2d) 140364, ¶¶ 22-23;
Langston, 2024 IL App (5th) 220296, ¶ 37. But see People v. Witherspoon, 379 Ill. App. 3d
298, 308 (2008) (Fourth District held that the difference between the terms is “merely
semantic”). Thus, defendant is correct that the jury’s finding that defendant had caused Scott
great bodily harm does not necessarily mean that defendant inflicted severe bodily injury for
purposes of consecutive sentencing.
¶ 59 We disagree, however, with defendant’s suggestion that the trial court itself did not make
a finding of severe bodily injury. In setting forth the sentencing structure defendant faced, the
trial court indicated:
“The sentence will be on Count No. 10, the home invasion with Jason Scott as the
victim. The sentencing range is 6 to 30 years, plus a mandatory add-on penalty of 25
years based on that. The court is making the finding that the home invasion, Class X
offense, is the triggering offense under the law.
Great bodily harm has been alleged under certainly severe bodily injury. And that
mandates an 85 percent serving of the sentence, so that’s as to Count No. 10, 7 is
merged in.”
Shortly thereafter, when the State argued in aggravation, the assistant state’s attorney observed
that, “I know the court had already made the finding,” but then set forth the evidence which
supported a finding that Scott had suffered severe bodily injury.
¶ 60 In imposing sentence on defendant, the trial court indicated that it was imposing the
minimum sentence under the law and stated, in relevant part:
“So as we have already discussed, Count No. 7 merges into Count No. 10, which is
the home invasion of Jason Scott, I will sentence you to 6 years in the Illinois

-- 22 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
23
Department of Corrections on the Home Invasion. There’s been a finding of severe
bodily injury. It must be served at 85 percent and there is a mandatory add-on penalty
of 25 years to Count No. 10 so that brings Count No. 10 to 31 years.”
In the half-sheet documenting the sentencing hearing, the sentence for the home invasion count
similarly contains a notation providing “severe bodily injury.”
¶ 61 The record thus establishes that the trial court made a finding of severe bodily injury for
purposes of consecutive sentencing. We recognize that the actual finding— “Great bodily harm
has been alleged under certainly severe bodily injury”—is less than clear, which the State
suggests could be the result of a scrivener’s error in the transcript. We cannot, however, agree
with defendant’s position that no finding was made at all or that the trial court improperly
equated the jury’s finding of great bodily harm with severe bodily injury. The record
demonstrates that the trial court was well aware of the requirements for imposing consecutive
sentences, including the necessity of a finding of severe bodily injury. The record further
confirms that the trial court’s statement was understood by all involved as a finding of severe
bodily injury based on the same facts underlying the jury’s great bodily harm finding—the
State expressly noted that the trial court “had already made the finding” when arguing in
aggravation, and the defense did not challenge the severity of Scott’s injuries. Moreover, in
imposing sentence, the trial court specifically indicated that “[t]here’s been a finding of severe
bodily injury” and further memorialized the finding on the half-sheet. Accepting defendant’s
position would require us to presume that the trial court was unaware of its own findings, made
only minutes earlier, which we decline to do.
¶ 62 Defendant does not contend that a finding that Scott suffered severe bodily injury was
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we agree that the trial court’s finding was

-- 23 of 24 --

No. 1-23-0816
24
amply supported by the evidence. Consequently, where there was no error in the trial court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences, there can be no plain error. See Hartfield, 2022 IL
126729, ¶ 51.
¶ 63 CONCLUSION
¶ 64 For the reasons set forth above, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. The trial court did
not improperly expand the scope of defendant’s Krankel hearing, nor did it err in imposing a
25-year sentencing enhancement for defendant’s home invasion conviction or in ordering the
sentences to run consecutively.
¶ 65 Affirmed.

-- 24 of 24 --