Termination: R R v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1136 | October 16, 2026 	Page 1 of 11
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.R.
Jr. (Minor Child) and
R.R. (Father),
Appellant-Respondent
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-1136
Appeal from the Steuben Circuit Court
The Honorable Wendy Williams, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
76C01-2509-JT-000105

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Memorandum Decision by Judge Felix
Judges Foley and DeBoer concur.
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] 	R.R. Jr. (“Child”) was born exposed to methamphetamine and amphetamines.
Child is the biological child of R.R. (“Father”) and C.R. (“Mother”)
(collectively, “Parents”). Parents admitted Child was a child in need of services
(“CHINS”). Father failed to meaningfully engage in services, so a petition to
terminate his parental rights was filed and granted. Father now challenges the
termination1 and presents three issues for our review, which we revise and
restate as the following single issue: Whether the trial court’s decision to
terminate Father’s parental rights was clearly erroneous.
[2] 	We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] 	On August 25, 2024, in Allen County, Indiana, Child was born “positive for
illegal substances.” Tr. Vol. III at 94. At that time, Parents did not have stable
housing and “struggle[d] with substance abuse addiction.” Id. The Indiana
Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Parents’ care and
1 Mother’s parental rights to Child were also terminated, but she does not participate in this appeal.

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filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS. In January 2025, the trial court
adjudicated Child a CHINS on Parents’ admissions. Although the trial court
had not yet entered a dispositional order, DCS “put in referrals for substance
abuse treatment, random drug screening, [a] domestic violence assessment,”
and visitation with Child. Tr. Vol. II at 117. Father did not “consistently”
participate in any services. Id. at 118.
[4] 	In February 2025, Father was charged with theft as a Class A misdemeanor. In
March, Father was incarcerated because he failed to appear for a pretrial
conference on a May 2024 charge for auto theft as a Level 6 felony. Father was
convicted of both offenses and sentenced to a total of three years of
incarceration.
[5] 	On April 12, the trial court entered its dispositional order requiring Father to (1)
refrain from using illegal substances, (2) complete a substance abuse evaluation,
(3) submit to random drug screens, (4) complete a domestic violence
assessment, and (5) attend all appointments related to the CHINS matter.
Father failed to meaningfully engage in these services, so on September 17,
DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.
[6] 	After a factfinding hearing in January 2026, the trial court terminated Father’s
parental rights to Child. The trial court entered the following relevant findings
and conclusions in support of that termination:
b. Father never completed a substance abuse evaluation.

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c. Father attended approximately ten (10) supervised visits with
Mother.
d. Father never completed a parenting assessment.
e. Father never completed a domestic violence assessment.
f. Father became incarcerated and served a sentence at the
Department of Corrections (DOC) for Auto Theft, a Level 6
Felony under cause number 76D01-2405-F6-688 . . . .
g. Father is now consecutively serving a sentence at the Steuben
County Jail for an offense committed after [Child]’s birth for
Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor under cause number 76D01-2502-
CM-310 . . . .
* * *
i. Father also has [eight additional] criminal convictions.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 26–27. Additionally, Father (1) would “be on
parole until January 2027,” id. at 27; (2) had “never obtained a valid driver’s
license,” id.; (3) “did not participate in any services in the six and one-half (6 ½)
months between the time of removal of [Child] until he became incarcerated,”
id. at 28; (4) visited Child 9 times but missed or canceled 31 other visits prior to
his incarceration, id.; (5) had three of eight drug screens return positive for
“THC,” id.; and (6) had not been employed since February 2024, id. The trial
court further found that Father “intended to participate in” a 6-month
“program at the Salvation Army upon his release from the Steuben County

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Jail”; Father had only recently applied to that program, was awaiting
acceptance, and would not be able to leave the facility or work for the first 30
days. Id.
[I]f accepted and if completed, following the release from the
Rehabilitation Center, Father would still need to complete all
recommendations, including but not limited to: obtaining stable
housing; obtaining stable employment; obtaining stable
transportation; completing a substance abuse assessment;
completing a parenting assessment; completing drug screens
upon request; and restarting supervised visitation with the Child.
Id. at 28–29. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
The Trial Court’s Decision to Terminate Father’s Parental Rights to
Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous
[7] 	Father challenges the trial court’s termination of his parental rights over Child.
“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not
absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,
their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46
(Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225,
1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.
[8] 	We will affirm a trial court’s termination of parental rights unless that decision
is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636,
642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the
evidence supports the court’s findings and whether those findings support the

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court’s judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing
Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly
erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the
judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing
Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh
the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at
123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support
the trial court’s decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d
641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Father does not challenge any of the trial court’s
findings, so we accept them all as true. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 203
N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686,
687 (Ind. 1992)).
[9] 	To terminate Father’s parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that, among other things, (a) there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal or the reasons
for placement outside Father’s home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-
4(c)(1), (d)(3), and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child’s
best interests, id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). We address each element in turn.
a. Remediation of Reasons for Removal or Placement
[10] 	Father first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal or the reasons
for placement outside Father’s home will not be remedied. To determine
whether those conditions are not likely to be remedied, the trial court first

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“identif[ies] the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine[s] whether
there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.”
K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643); see also In re I.A., 934
N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010). “The second step of the analysis requires
judgment of the parent’s fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking
into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Changed conditions are
balanced against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a
substantial probability of future neglect.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to
the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more
heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at
643 (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234).
[11] 	Child was removed from Father’s care because of Father’s substance abuse,
lack of stable housing, and unemployment. The trial court determined that
there is a reasonable probability that Father will not remedy the conditions that
resulted in Child’s removal because “his almost zero compliance prior to the
incarceration and somewhat combative behaviors don’t hold much promise of
change.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 29, 34.
[12] 	Father acknowledges the “substantial evidence of his pre-incarceration
noncompliance, including missed visitation, incomplete assessments, and
criminal history,” but he argues that the trial court’s termination order
impermissibly relied solely on the duration of the CHINS case. Appellant’s Br.
at 14. According to Father, the trial court failed to balance his historical

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shortcomings against his more recent efforts. Id. (citing K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 641;
Matter of A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)). We cannot agree with
Father’s characterization of the trial court’s termination order. Father’s
parental rights were not terminated solely because the CHINS case was open
for 17 months. Instead, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights after
considering his pattern of criminal conduct; his history of unstable housing and
employment; his failure to comply with DCS-offered services, including
visitation; and his uncertain future after his release from incarceration. Against
this backdrop, the trial court noted that after the petition to terminate his
parental rights was filed, Father participated in three classes while he was
incarcerated and had applied to join the Salvation Army program. The trial
court did not fail to balance Father’s “habitual patterns of criminal behavior
and substance abuse against his efforts to improve while incarcerated,” A.L.,
273 N.E.3d at 491. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences
that support the trial court’s decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly
erred by concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons
for Child’s removal or placement outside of Father’s care.2
2 Additionally, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Father’s parental rights to Child should be
terminated because the continuation of their parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child pursuant to
Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(4) and Father failed to substantially comply with Child’s dispositional
decree for a period of at least 12 months following Child’s removal pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
4(d)(7). Father challenges these conclusions, as well, but DCS only needed to prove one of the circumstances
listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Because we conclude that the
trial court did not clearly err by concluding the circumstances in Subsection (d)(3) existed, we need not
address Father’s arguments regarding Subsections (d)(4) and (d)(7). However, we note that Father’s

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b. Best Interests of Child
[13] 	Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of his
parental rights over Child is in Child’s best interests. To determine the best
interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and
subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199
N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh’g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v.
Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in
this determination is the child’s need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989
N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child’s emotional and
physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or
social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the
parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).
[14] 	Importantly, “the recommendation by both the case manager and child
advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions
resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.” P.B., 199
N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep’t Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Both the FCM and CASA testified that
arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we
cannot do, see In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).

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termination was in Child’s best interests, and we have already determined that
the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that Father likely will not
remedy the reasons for Child’s removal from his care. This alone is sufficient to
show that termination is in Child’s best interests.
[15] 	Father argues that his identified release date from incarceration, completion of
three classes while incarcerated, and unapproved application to the Salvation
Army program warrant reversal. This is a clear request for us to reweigh the
evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275
N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). Prior to his incarceration,
Father canceled approximately 75% of scheduled visits with Child and did not
participate in any other services. After Child was born, Father continued his
pattern of criminal conduct by committing an additional criminal offense, and
he continued using illegal substances. Considering only the evidence and
reasonable inferences that support the trial court’s decision, we cannot say that
the trial court clearly erred by concluding that termination is in Child’s best
interests.
[16] 	Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating
Father’s parental rights to Child. We affirm that decision.
[17] 	Affirmed.
Foley, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

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Michael G. Moore
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Indiana
Attorney General
Lela Rae
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana