Antonio L Eubanks v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-CR-3317 | October 21, 2026 	Page 1 of 13
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is
certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Antonio L. Eubanks,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 21, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CR-3317
Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court
The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D01-2502-F5-25
Memorandum Decision by Judge Altice

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Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Following a jury trial, Antonio L. Eubanks was convicted of ten counts, only
some of which are at issue on appeal. Eubanks presents the following restated
issues for review:
1. Do his multiple convictions for resisting law enforcement
violate substantive double jeopardy?
2. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support his
convictions for auto theft?
[2] 	We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] 	On February 9, 2025, Lafayette Police Officer Jacob Kelly was patrolling near
Lewis Motor Sales when he heard a vehicle alarm and observed flashing lights
positioned high off the ground. Officer Kelly realized that the flashing lights
were coming from a large SUV positioned on top of a flatbed truck that had its
lights off. As he turned into the lot, Officer Kelly saw a man in dark clothing
running and the flatbed truck pull away. He activated his emergency lights and
siren and pursued the truck through the car dealership, but the truck, which was
being driven by Eubanks, did not stop.

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[4] 	Pursuant to department policy, Officer Kelly ended the pursuit when Eubanks
exited the dealership and headed toward West Lafayette. Officer Kelly radioed
a description of the truck and turned his vehicle toward the man fleeing in the
other direction on foot. Officer Kelly then observed that there were, in fact, two
men running together to a white vehicle parked on the other side of Sagamore
Parkway South and less than a block from the dealership. Officer Kelly, along
with other officers, stopped and apprehended a total of four men in that vehicle,
two of whom were sons of Eubanks.
[5] 	Meanwhile Sergeant Sanford Swanson of the West Lafayette Police
Department quickly located the flatbed truck. As he sped up to it, the truck
turned multiple times and drove at an excessive speed, eventually entering a
curve too fast and striking a curb. This caused the SUV to roll off the truck and
into the median. At that point Sergeant Swanson activated his police lights, but
Eubanks did not stop. Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Deputy Nicole Dornan also
joined the pursuit. Eubanks drove the truck through a residential yard, causing
damage, and stopped only when the truck became stuck on the edge of a ravine.
Eubanks then fled on foot down the ravine and tried to hide under branches.
[6] 	When Sergeant Sanford and Deputy Doran apprehended Eubanks in the
ravine, he initially provided them with false information regarding his identity.
He then correctly identified himself after Deputy Doran discovered paperwork
in his pocket with a different name. Eubanks was arrested and handed over to
the Lafayette Police Department.

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[7] 	Thereafter, Sergeant Sanford investigated the crash that he witnessed in West
Lafayette involving the SUV rolling off the flatbed truck. He determined that
the license plate on the truck belonged to a different vehicle. He then ran the
truck’s VIN and learned that it had been reported stolen out of Osgood,
Indiana, and its owner was Russell McKay.
[8] 	The State charged Eubanks, as amended after several counts were dismissed,
with false informing, criminal recklessness, and multiple counts each of
resisting law enforcement, auto theft, and criminal mischief. The State also
alleged that Eubanks was a habitual offender.
[9] 	At the October 2025 jury trial, the law enforcement officers set out above each
testified, and police dash and body cam footage was admitted into evidence.
Casey Lewis, the owner of Lewis Motor Sales, provided proof of ownership
and testified that the SUV, a black GMC Yukon, had been taken from the
dealership without permission. Lewis testified that he did not know Eubanks
and that the SUV was severely damaged when it rolled off the flatbed truck.
McKay, a mechanic, also testified regarding his ownership of the truck, a white
Ford F-650, and its theft, which occurred “around” February 9. Transcript at
128. McKay similarly testified that he did not know Eubanks and that the truck
was damaged after the theft.
[10] 	Eubanks testified in his own defense. He noted that he was a mechanic and tow
truck driver from Indianapolis, and he acknowledged that he had a prior auto
theft conviction. Eubanks claimed that on the night of February 8, 2025, he met

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with a man named “John” at an AutoZone store in Indianapolis and agreed, for
$200, to drive a tow truck to Lafayette to pick up a car that John had just
purchased. Eubanks said that John provided him with the keys to the flatbed
truck, which Eubanks drove as he followed John to Lafayette. According to
Eubanks, John was driving a black Chevy Impala, and John was the one who
loaded the SUV onto the flatbed truck. Eubanks acknowledged that he “took
off” when he saw Officer Kelly turn into the lot but claimed he did so only
because he “had two warrants.” Transcript at 133. In sum, Eubanks disputed the
auto theft charges, arguing that he did not know the vehicles were stolen and
that he never touched the SUV.
[11] 	On cross-examination, Eubanks was asked about his sons, who were also from
Indianapolis, being near the same location as Eubanks “about 60 miles away
from home” around 1:00 a.m. Id. at 137. He claimed that he did not know they
were in Lafayette at the time. Further, when asked about John, Eubanks could
not provide a last name and provided only a vague physical description of him.
Eubanks agreed that John was not one of the four men apprehended from the
white vehicle parked near the dealership.
[12] 	The jury found Eubanks guilty as charged of each underlying offense, and he
then waived a jury trial as to the second phase of trial on the various
enhancements and the habitual offender allegation. After receiving evidence of
Eubanks’s prior convictions, the trial court found each enhancement applicable
and adjudicated him a habitual offender. The trial court vacated certain lesser
included charges and entered judgments of conviction as follows: one count

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each of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Level 6 felony
criminal recklessness, and Class B misdemeanor false informing; two counts
each of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief and Level 5 felony auto theft;
and three counts of Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement.
[13] 	At the sentencing hearing on December 4, 2025, the trial court ordered the
sentences all to be served concurrently with the lengthiest sentence being
imposed on Count XVI, one of the Level 5 resisting offenses, for which
Eubanks received five years with a five-year habitual enhancement. Thus, he
received an aggregate sentence of ten years in prison.
[14] 	Eubanks now appeals, arguing that his multiple convictions for resisting law
enforcement constitute double jeopardy and that his auto theft convictions are
not supported by sufficient evidence. Additional information will be provided
below as needed.
Discussion & Decision
1. Double Jeopardy
[15] 	Eubanks contends that his multiple convictions for Level 5 felony resisting law
enforcement violate Indiana prohibitions against substantive double jeopardy.
Indiana’s protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple
convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” A.W. v. State, 229
N.E.3d 1060, 1066 (Ind. 2024). On appeal, we review such claims de novo. Id.
at 1064.

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[16] 	Here, the three charges for Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement were
identical except for the name of the officer from whom he fled. That is,
Eubanks was separately charged and convicted for fleeing – while using a
vehicle and having a prior – from Officer Kelly (Count XVI), Sergeant Swanson
(Count XVII), and Deputy Dornon (Count XVIII). Further, under Count VII,
Eubanks was convicted of the same base offense, a Class A misdemeanor,
related to his flight from Sergeant Swanson. See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1)
(“A person who knowingly or intentionally [] flees from a law enforcement
officer after the officer has … identified himself or herself and ordered the
person to stop [] commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor,
except as provided in subsection (c).”).1
[17] 	Because Eubanks’s convictions for resisting law enforcement all stem from
multiple violations of the same base offense, we apply the analysis set forth in
Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263-64 (Ind. 2020). See Moyers v. State, 277
N.E.3d 33, 39 (Ind. 2026) (“When a statute defines a common base offense that
can be elevated to higher penalty levels through attendant circumstances or
results, the base offense and its elevated forms together constitute one statutory
offense.”); Robinson v. State, 280 N.E.3d 858, 865 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026)
1 The felony charges were elevated based on I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(c)(2)(B), which at the time of the offenses
provided for elevation to a Level 5 felony where the defendant “uses a vehicle to commit the offense and …
has a prior unrelated conviction under this section involving the use of a vehicle in the commission of the
offense.” The statute has since been amended, and this enhancing circumstance is now found in subsection
(c)(3)(B) and serves to elevate the base offense to a Level 4 felony.

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(discussing Moyers and concluding that Powell applied where dual convictions
for resisting law enforcement “consist[ed] of the same base offense”).
[18] 	In Moyers, the Supreme Court discussed the mechanics of the Powell test:
At step one of the test, we determine if the statute, whether
expressly or by judicial construction, indicates a unit of
prosecution. A unit of prosecution, in simple terms, is the specific
act or conduct our Legislature intended to treat as one punishable
offense under a criminal statute. A statute may expressly define
the unit of prosecution. But if not, we identify the unit of
prosecution by determining whether the statute is conduct-based
or result-based. A conduct-based statute defines an offense by
certain actions or behavior, and the crime is complete once the
offender engages in the prohibited conduct, regardless of whether
that conduct produces a specific result. Under such statutes, a
single discrete incident can be the basis for only one conviction.
By contrast, a result-based statute defines an offense by the
defendant’s actions and the results or consequences of those
actions, thus permitting multiple convictions when multiple
consequences flow from a single criminal act.
Once we identify a statute’s unit of prosecution, we turn to the
facts to determine how many discrete offenses the evidence
supports. But if the statute’s unit of prosecution remains
ambiguous, we move on to the second step of the analysis.
At step two, if necessary, we determine whether the facts—as
presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial—
indicate a single offense or whether they indicate distinguishable
offenses. The question at this stage is whether the defendant’s
actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of
purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single
transaction…. And, in conducting this analysis, any doubt

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counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple
offenses.
Moyers, 277 N.E.3d at 43 (cleaned up).
[19] 	As the State properly concedes, the parts of the statute applicable in this case do
not expressly define a unit of prosecution and are conduct-based, not result-
based.2 See Hill v. State, 260 N.E.3d 993, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“Here, the
relevant portion of the resisting law enforcement statute does not indicate a unit
of prosecution”), trans. denied; Robinson, 280 N.E.3d at 865 (holding that the
resisting law enforcement statute is conduct-based). Thus, we turn to the second
step to determine whether Eubanks committed multiple discrete instances of
resisting law enforcement or one continuous offense. Again, the State concedes
this point. That is, Eubanks’s flight from the three officers was “closely
compressed in terms of time and place, shared a single purpose to elude police,
and constituted a single transaction.” Appellee’s Brief at 11. Accordingly,
Eubanks’s multiple convictions for resisting law enforcement constitute a
substantive double jeopardy violation.
[20] 	To remedy the double jeopardy violation, we remand with instructions for the
trial court to vacate Eubanks’s convictions and sentences for Counts VII, XVII,
2 I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(h), which is not applicable here, provides: “A person who commits an offense described
in subsection (c) commits a separate offense for each person whose bodily injury, serious bodily injury,
catastrophic injury, or death is caused by a violation of subsection (c).” The State argues that this provision,
when applicable, expressly defines a separate unit of prosecution for each injured person. While this seems an
apt observation, the issue is not before us today, so we do not decide it.

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and XVIII. The conviction and sentence for Count XVI, to which the trial court
attached the habitual offender enhancement, shall remain standing.3
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[21] 	Eubanks also claims the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
auto theft. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction,
we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, instead
leaving those matters to the province of the jury. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235
N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024); see also Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176
(Ind. 2022) (“When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve
them.”). With this deferential review in mind, we will consider only the
probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the conviction.
Sorgdrager v. State, 208 N.E.3d 646, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. And
we will affirm “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1138
(Ind. 2022) (Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016)). In sum, the
evidence does not need to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence;
it is sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from the evidence to
support the conviction. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007).
3 Because all counts were ordered to be served concurrently, Eubanks’s aggregate ten-year sentence will not
change.

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[22] 	To convict Eubanks of the two counts of auto theft, as charged, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, having a prior unrelated
conviction for auto theft, he “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized
control” over McKay’s truck and Lewis’s SUV with the intent to deprive each
of them of their vehicle’s use or value. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(2)(C). While
the mere unexplained possession of recently stolen property standing alone does
not automatically support a conviction for theft, such may be considered along
with other evidence, such as how recent in time the possession was from the
moment the item was stolen and the circumstances of the possession. Bond v.
State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 782 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
[23] 	Eubanks does not dispute that he exerted unauthorized control over the stolen
vehicles or that he had the requisite prior conviction. He challenges only the
intent element, arguing that the State presented “little or no evidence that he
knew [the vehicles] were stolen or participated in the theft” and that “the
evidence suggests, at most, that he possessed or transported vehicles without
knowledge of their status.” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
[24] 	The jury was presented with this same argument and rejected it. As Eubanks
acknowledges, the evidence shows that McKay’s truck was stolen “somewhere
around February 9, 2020.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Thus, the truck had just been
stolen and its license plate switched, when Eubanks drove it alone from

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Indianapolis to Lafayette in the middle of the night to pick up another vehicle.4
Around 1:00 a.m., Eubanks stayed ready in the driver’s seat of the truck while
other darkly clothed individuals, his sons and/or their companions who came
in another vehicle parked away from the dealership, loaded the SUV onto the
truck. Eubanks turned off the truck’s light during the process, but the lights on
the SUV began flashing, likely due to its alarm going off. The alarm and
flashing lights caught the attention of Officer Kelly while on patrol, and as he
pulled in to investigate, the men loading the SUV took off on foot while
Eubanks sped away in the truck with the SUV not fully secured on top.
Thereafter, while fleeing from the other officers, he drove recklessly at high
speeds, hitting a curb and causing the SUV to roll off the truck, and then drove
into a residential yard before fleeing on foot down a steep ravine.5 From all of
this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Eubanks knew he was
exerting unauthorized control over both vehicles with the intent to deprive each
owner of their vehicle’s use or value.
[25] 	At trial, Eubanks offered a story about “John,” but it did not hold water with
the jury. Nor did his explanation for fleeing from law enforcement. It was the
jury’s prerogative to reject his testimony and find him guilty based on the facts
4 Even if Eubanks was not the original thief of the truck, he may still be convicted of auto theft so long as the
elements of auto theft are met. See Girdler v. State, 932 N.E.2d 769, 771-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (expressly
declining to follow Butin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), which suggested that a
defendant cannot be convicted of auto theft without evidence that he was the original thief).
5 Evidence of flight or attempts to avoid arrest may be considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. See
Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015).

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and circumstances, including reasonable inferences, surrounding his
unauthorized control over the stolen vehicles. The evidence was sufficient to
support the auto theft convictions.
[26] 	Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for vacation of the
sentences and convictions on Counts VII, XVII, and XVIII.
Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Bruce W. Graham
Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana