A.M. v. C.J.M.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1071

A.M.

vs.

C.J.M.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

This is an appeal from an order extending an abuse

prevention order issued under G. L. c. 209A. The extension

order under appeal was issued on August 16, 2023, after a

hearing at which both parties appeared and testified. The

initial 209A order issued in July of 2021. In connection with

her request for the initial order in 2021, the plaintiff

submitted an affidavit detailing several instances of physical

abuse by the defendant.

On appeal the defendant argues that the judge erred in

extending the 209A order, because at the 2023 hearing the

plaintiff did not introduce new evidence of abuse, or that she

was in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm. To the extent
the defendant is arguing as a matter of law that the plaintiff

was required to show fear of imminent physical harm to obtain

the extension order, the defendant is incorrect. Where, as

here, the plaintiff has previously suffered actual physical harm

at the hands of the defendant, all the plaintiff needed to show

was a continuing need for the order. As we said in Callahan v.

Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 374 (2014):

"Although a person seeking an abuse prevention order (and
extension) based on 'fear of imminent serious physical
harm' must always show that he or she is currently in fear
of imminent serious physical harm, and that such fear is
reasonable, . . . the same is not true of a person who
seeks an order (or extension) based on having already been
subject to physical harm. In that circumstance, the
'abuse' is the physical harm caused, and a judge may
reasonably conclude that there is a continued need for the
order because the damage resulting from that physical harm
affects the victim even when further physical attack is not
reasonably imminent because the perpetrator is
incarcerated.

"That is not to say that a judge must always extend an
order predicated on physical abuse on request. It simply
means that the failure of the plaintiff to have an
objectively reasonable fear of imminent serious physical
harm does not by itself preclude extension of an abuse
prevention order. Faced with an extension request in such
a circumstance, the judge must make a discerning appraisal
of the continued need for an abuse prevention order to
protect the plaintiff from the impact of the violence
already inflicted."

That leaves a second question, which is whether the judge

nevertheless abused her discretion in extending the order, under

the particular facts of this case. Put differently, did the

judge conduct the required "discerning appraisal of the

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continued need" for the order? S.V. v. R.V., 94 Mass. App. Ct.

811, 814 (2019), quoting Callahan, 85 Mass. App. Ct. at 374.

The defendant emphasizes that he has stayed away from the

plaintiff and her friends, that he has not seen the plaintiff in

years, and that he does not even know the plaintiff's

whereabouts.

Nevertheless, after reviewing the record, we discern no

abuse of discretion. The judge heard from both parties in

connection with the extension order, and did in fact carefully

question the defendant. Matters of credibility are for the

trial judge, Johnston v. Johnston, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536

(1995), and generally, we also will defer to the judge's

weighing of the facts. Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 741

(2005) (and cases cited). Here, the judge's concerns are

evident from the record, as the defendant conceded the truth of

some of the plaintiff's prior allegations of stalking and

physical contact, yet didn't "recall," or denied, the more

serious physical abuse that, for example, required the plaintiff

to go to the hospital. The plaintiff testified that she

remained in fear of the defendant. On hearing this testimony

and viewing the witnesses, the judge was within her discretion

in concluding that there was a continuing need for the order.

No specific findings of fact were required. G.B. v. C.A., 94

Mass. App. Ct. 389, 396 (2018).

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Finally, at oral argument the defendant challenged the

District Court's subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the

parties had lived together in Rhode Island, not Massachusetts,

and that all the operative acts asserted in the plaintiff's

affidavit had occurred in Rhode Island. This argument was not

made in the defendant's appellate brief, but it is in any event

unavailing. The plaintiff's 2021 court filings show an address

in Massachusetts (the plaintiff also worked in Massachusetts at

the time). There is no question that Massachusetts has a

sufficient interest to establish constitutional jurisdiction

where it is acting to protect a person living within its borders

from physical abuse, regardless of where the prior contact

between the parties occurred. This is not a criminal case,

where the place of the crime might limit a court's criminal

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jurisdiction. See Vasquez, petitioner, 428 Mass. 842, 848

(1999).

Nothing in G. L. c. 209A is to the contrary, and indeed,

venue was clearly proper in the District Court pursuant to

c. 209A, § 2.

Order entered August 16,
2023, extending abuse
prevention order affirmed.

By the Court (Milkey, Shin &
Englander, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: July 30, 2024.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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