Julie C. Locklear v. Argenx US, Inc.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-184

JULIE C. LOCKLEAR

vs.

ARGENX US, INC.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Julie C. Locklear, filed a complaint against

the defendant, her former employer argenx US, Inc., asserting

employment discrimination on the basis of disability or being

regarded as a person with a disability. A judge of the Superior

Court granted argenx summary judgment, concluding Locklear

failed to "demonstrate or introduce questions of fact by way of

direct or circumstantial evidence" that argenx's

nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Locklear were

pretextual (emphasis omitted). We affirm.

Background. We summarize the material facts in the light

most favorable to Locklear with additional facts reserved for

later discussion. In September 2019, argenx, a pharmaceutical
company based in Belgium and with an office in Boston, hired

Locklear as head of health economics and outcomes research.

While Locklear was based in argenx's Boston office, her

supervisor, Trevor Leighton, was based in Belgium. Leighton and

Locklear's working relationship began on a positive note. For

instance, argenx's chief operating officer (COO), Robert Keith

Woods, reported that Leighton was Locklear's "biggest fan in the

company" on her hire. Leighton was complimentary and

"impressed" by Locklear's work product during the first few

months after her hire.

In early January of 2020, Locklear informed Leighton that

she suffered from hypersomnia.1 Locklear did not state either

that she had a disability or that the condition would impact her

work performance. In response, Leighton told Locklear that she

"cannot use [her] disability as an excuse not to deliver" and

"[she has] to come up with strategies to overcome it." In mid-

January, Leighton met with argenx's head of human resources,

Sara Mannle, to discuss how to improve his working relationship

with Locklear. At this meeting, Leighton expressed concerns

about Locklear's understanding of his expectations and the

quality of her work. On January 20, Leighton communicated this

displeasure to Locklear by telling her that slides she had

1 Hypersomnia is a condition characterized by excessive
daytime sleepiness.

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created were "far from what [they] discussed and [he]

envisaged."

On February 6, Locklear described her hypersomnia to

Leighton as a "disability." Leighton notified Mannle. On the

same day, Locklear spoke to Mannle and "made some claims about

mistreatment" by Leighton and "expressed concerns about

Leighton's management style." On February 10, Mannle and Julia

Dumaux, argenx's human resources business partner, met with

Locklear to discuss her concerns. On February 11, Locklear

again met with Dumaux, where she stated that Leighton was "not

used to working with a strong woman" and did not understand

"some of the projects she [was] working on." On the same day,

Mannle sent an e-mail message to Leighton informing him of

Locklear's concerns and provided him feedback on improving his

relationship with Locklear. On February 13, Mannle met with

Locklear and Leighton, and following the meeting, provided

feedback to both of them on improving their communication.

On February 25, Locklear wrote an e-mail message to Mannle

and requested that she no longer be required to report directly

to Leighton. Locklear wrote, "[Leighton], therefore argenx, is

making me ill. I go home every day not believing in myself, my

work and whether or not I should even stay with argenx. This

has taken a toll on me professionally and personally. . . . I

am dealing with a personal illness." Later that day, Locklear

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wrote an e-mail message to Leighton informing him she would not

be attending their scheduled one-on-one meeting the following

day, nor would she be attending any future one-on-one meetings

with him. In response, Mannle wrote to Locklear, stating "it is

not ok to just decline this meeting and more importantly future

meetings," and suggesting the three of them meet the following

day. Locklear then requested a meeting with Mannle and Woods,

indicating she was free to meet the following day. In response,

Mannle again suggested Locklear, Leighton, and herself meet.

Woods also responded, that he was willing to meet and "committed

to help."

On the following day, Locklear did not attend a scheduled

meeting with Mannle and Leighton. Locklear also failed to

attend the meeting she had requested with Mannle and Woods.

Mannle attempted to reach Locklear by calling and sending text

messages to her; Locklear did not respond. On or about February

26, Mannle and Woods discussed Locklear's actions and decided to

terminate her. On February 27, Mannle wrote Locklear an e-mail

message informing her that she was terminated and articulating

argenx's reasons for the decision. Locklear did not respond to

this message.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. On appeal, "[w]e

review a grant of summary judgment de novo." Miller v. Cotter,

448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007). "We view the evidence in the light

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most favorable to the nonmoving party." Federal Nat'l Mtge.

Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635, 637 (2012). "Summary

judgment is appropriate where there is no material issue of fact

in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Berry v. Commerce Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 633, 636

(2021). Summary judgment is "a disfavored remedy in the context

of discrimination cases based on disparate treatment . . .

because the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a factual

question" (citation omitted). Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473

Mass. 672, 689 (2016).

2. McDonnell Douglas framework. General Laws c. 151B,

§ 4 (16), bars employment discrimination on the basis of

disability or perceived disability:

"It shall be an unlawful practice . . . [f]or any employer,
personally or through an agent, to dismiss from employment
or refuse to hire, rehire or advance in employment or
otherwise discriminate against, because of . . . handicap,
any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person,
capable of performing the essential functions of the
position involved with reasonable accommodation."2

To survive summary judgment on a claim brought under this

provision, "an employee-plaintiff must produce evidence from

which a reasonable jury may infer 'four elements: membership in

a protected class, harm, discriminatory animus, and causation'"

2 "The statute uses the outdated terms 'handicap' and
'handicapped person.' . . . We employ the outdated language
only when quoting from the statute." Geezil v. White Cliffs
Condominium Four Ass'n, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 103 n.3 (2024).

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(citation omitted). Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,

Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396 (2016). Employees may

produce "indirect or circumstantial evidence [of these elements]

using the familiar three-stage, burden-shifting paradigm first

set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-

805 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas)." Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 444 Mass. 34, 38 (2005). First, the plaintiff must make

out a "prima facie case of discrimination"; second, "the

employer can rebut the presumption created by the prima facie

case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its [employment] decision"; and third, the employee must provide

evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason is a pretext (citation omitted). Bulwer, 473 Mass. at

681.

As did the motion judge, we assume without deciding that

Locklear's evidence supports a prima facie case of disability

discrimination. Turning to the second stage, Mannle articulated

argenx's reasons for Locklear's termination in her e-mail

message to Locklear informing her of the decision to terminate

her employ:

"Within the last twenty-four hours, you have declined to
meet with your immediate supervisor and Human Resources,
you have not attended a meeting you requested with the
Chief Operating officer and you have not communicated with
me, even though I have called and texted you. [A]rgenx has
no choice but to take your refusal to speak with your
manager, HR, the COO and your refusal to respond to written

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communications to mean that you are leaving your role at
argenx and therefore the company is terminating you,
effective immediately."

Locklear's abandonment of her obligations constitutes a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for argenx's decision to

terminate Locklear. See Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 50 (employer has

burden of production, not persuasion, at stage two of McDonnell

Douglas framework and therefore "need not prove that the reasons

were nondiscriminatory" [citation omitted]). Thus, argenx met

their burden of rebutting Locklear's prima facie case of

discrimination. At the third stage, to survive summary

judgment, Locklear bears the burden to show that the evidence is

sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer argenx's

justification is pretext; she does not have to prove that the

real reason was discrimination. See Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 397

("Massachusetts is a pretext only jurisdiction" [citation

omitted]); Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 672 (employee need only present

evidence to allow for inference that "reasons given for

[employer's] action against him were not the real reasons for

that action" [citation omitted]). To meet this showing,

Locklear asserts that a combination of circumstances -- her

"hair-trigger" termination, inconsistencies in the statements

and actions of Mannle, and Leighton's hostility toward her

disability -- exists such that a reasonable juror could find "a

suspicion of mendacity." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

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U.S. 502, 511 (1993). See Bulwer, supra at 684 (concluding

pretext supported by number of factors, including performance

evaluations inconsistent with supervisor's criticisms, similarly

situated individuals treated differently than plaintiff,

stereotype-based comments by supervisors, and failure to follow

written procedures).

First, Locklear asserts that argenx's quick decision to

terminate her, without giving her notice that she was facing

potential termination or asking if she wanted to stay at the

company, demonstrates pretext. Argenx's account is doubtful,

Locklear argues, because of its "quick trigger" termination and

lack of evidence that she abandoned her position as argenx

claims. She points to her own deposition testimony as evidence

that on the night before her termination, she had no intention

of leaving her role. Without more, Locklear fails to meet her

burden.

The decision by argenx to terminate Locklear was not made

in haste. Prior to deciding to terminate Locklear, argenx made

numerous efforts over the course of two days to avoid

termination and resolve Locklear's issues with Leighton. On

February 25, 2020, after Locklear informed Leighton she would be

declining all future meetings with him, Mannle attempted to

schedule time to meet with Locklear and Leighton the following

day to "see if we can sort through this." Woods, the COO of

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argenx, also agreed to meet with Locklear at her request and

expressed his desire to resolve her issue, stating, "[w]e must

work through these differences together," "I am committed to

help," and "[l]et's find a way." The next day, on February 26,

after Locklear informed Mannle that she would not be attending

their scheduled meeting with Leighton, Mannle again tried to

come to a resolution by urging Locklear to reconsider her

decision. Later that day, Locklear again refused to meet with

Mannle and Leighton, failed to attend her requested meeting with

Mannle and Woods, and did not respond to calls and text messages

from Mannle.

Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that argenx

undertook extensive efforts to resolve Locklear's issue as

opposed to terminating her at its first opportunity. It was

only when it became clear that its efforts were unavailing, and

where Locklear repeatedly ignored meetings and communications,

that argenx decided to terminate Locklear. Therefore, pretext

cannot be reasonably inferred on this basis. See Tate v.

Department of Mental Health, 419 Mass. 356, 363 (1995)

(affirming summary judgment for employer where employee was

terminated after she ignored warnings and unilaterally addressed

her own concerns about employer's organizational structure, and

where her evidence "[did] not offer any support her contention

that the [employer]'s claim that she was insubordinate is a

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pretext"). See also Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 323

(1st Cir. 2014) (plaintiff's termination was "reasonable

business practice" and not pretextual).

Second, Locklear asserts that pretext is further

demonstrated by an inconsistency between Mannle's affidavit and

Locklear's message to Mannle prior to her termination. See

Bonefont-Igaravidez v. International Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d

120, 124 (1st Cir. 2011) ("pretext can be established by showing

. . . 'weaknesses [or] implausibilities' . . . in the employer's

offered reasons" [citation omitted]). In her affidavit, Mannle

asserts that, "[i]f Locklear had requested vacation or time off

instead of ignoring my communications, I would have allowed her

to take time off." Locklear asserts that this statement is

false, and therefore shows pretext, because Locklear informed

Mannle that she "need[s] time to consider [her] options" and was

terminated shortly thereafter. These statements are not

inconsistent. Mannle conditioned her statement on Locklear

either requesting vacation or time off. Locklear did neither.

Instead, Locklear requested more time to consider her options

only after refusing to participate in multiple meetings and

ignoring Mannle's subsequent efforts to communicate with her.

Third, Locklear argues that argenx's pretext is

demonstrated from Leighton's stereotype-based comments and

hostility toward Locklear after she informed him of her

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disability. On learning of Locklear's hypersomnia, Leighton

told her that "[she] cannot use [her] disability as an excuse

not to deliver." Further, he moved up the deadline of a major

project by one month, would not let her work with other people,

and rejected her request to travel to a work conference.

Critically, however, there is no evidence in the record showing

Leighton was involved in argenx's decision to terminate

Locklear. See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896

F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The biases of one who neither makes

nor influences the challenged personnel decision are not

probative in an employment discrimination case").

Despite Leighton's lack of involvement, Locklear argues in

the alternative that pretext can still be inferred under a

"cat's paw" theory. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411,

416 (2011) (employer can be held liable where "nondecisionmaker

exercised such 'singular influence' over the decisionmaker that

the decision to terminate was the product of 'blind reliance'"

[citation omitted]). We disagree. The contention that Leighton

influenced Mannle and Woods in their decision to terminate

Locklear is not inferable from this record such that a

reasonable juror could find pretext. See Bennett v. Saint-

Gobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[T]he plaintiff

speculates that [the decisionmaker] must have been influenced by

his subordinate. But conjecture cannot take the place of proof

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in the summary judgment calculus"). Therefore, Locklear fails

to demonstrate argenx's stated reasons for her termination were

pretext.

Because Locklear failed to produce evidence that allows for

a reasonable inference of pretext, argenx has demonstrated the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact and we conclude that

Locklear is ineligible for relief under G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (16).

See Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680, 683.3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Walsh &
Smyth, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: February 20, 2025.

3 Locklear's request for appellate costs and fees is denied.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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