Commonwealth v. Christopher J. Clayton.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-812

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

CHRISTOPHER J. CLAYTON.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Christopher J. Clayton, was charged with one

count of possessing child pornography in violation of G. L.

c. 272, § 29C. The Commonwealth appeals from an order of a

District Court judge suppressing evidence that police discovered

while executing a search warrant.1 The Commonwealth argues that

the search of the defendant's cell phone was permissible because

it was performed pursuant to a valid search warrant. We agree

and reverse.

Background. As the judge did not make any findings of

fact, we summarize the relevant facts from the affidavit

1The Commonwealth also appeals from the judge's denial of
its motion to reconsider. In light of our ruling, we need not
reach that issue.
submitted by State police Trooper Gerald F. Donovan in support

of his application for a search warrant. Donovan has been a

State police trooper since 2006 and has worked as a member of

the State police Internet crimes against children (ICAC) task

force since around 2013. He investigates the sexual

exploitation of children where computers or technology are used

in the commission of the crime. He has received specialized

ICAC training including training on crimes associated with child

sexual exploitation.

In December 2021 and January 2022, Donovan received reports

from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children2 of

six digital uploads of images containing suspected child

pornography from Snapchat, Dropbox, and Kik accounts. Donovan

viewed the images and, based on his training and experience,

believed the images were of child pornography. Donovan was

provided Internet protocol (IP) addresses, e-mail addresses, and

usernames associated with the uploading of the child

pornography, and the date of birth associated with one of the

user accounts. The usernames from the Snapchat and Dropbox

contained variations of the name "Chris." Next, with the

2 The report was from the "CyberTipline," a national
clearinghouse for tips and leads regarding sexual exploitation
of children. It permits the public as well as electronic
service providers to submit online reports of potential child
exploitation media. These reports are then provided to law
enforcement.

2
assistance of the Office of the Attorney General, administrative

subpoenas were issued to Comcast, an Internet service provider,

for the subscriber information linked to the IP addresses.

Comcast's records identified a person (not the defendant) as the

subscriber for the designated IP addresses and provided a

service address of a residence in Marion (residence). The

subpoenaed IP addresses matched the IP addresses listed in the

CyberTipline reports from the Snapchat, Dropbox, and Kik

accounts. As part of his investigation, Donovan submitted a

query to the registry of motor vehicles and learned that, in

addition to the Internet subscriber, five additional adults may

have been living at the residence. After speaking with members

of the Marion police department, Donovan learned that the

defendant was also associated with the residence.3

On February 8, 2022, Donovan applied for a search warrant

for any computers, cell phones, or digital devices at the

residence, and for evidence related to child pornography. In

his affidavit, Donovan averred that a person who possesses child

pornography often keeps the images secreted but "readily at

hand" and that the images are often copied and stored on

computer hard drives and digital devices such as cell phones and

3 Donovan drove to the residence, but the home was set back
from the street, and he was unable to observe the residence
without driving down a long driveway.

3
tablets. Based on Donovan's training and experience, he opined

that a collector of child pornography materials is unlikely to

destroy or delete them. Donovan stated that today's computers

and digital devices are smaller in design and portable, allowing

a person to more easily transport their electronics, and that

these items would likely be carried on the person or found in

the person's residence or motor vehicle. The affidavit

specifically identified and named seven adult occupants of the

residence, including the defendant, along with their

corresponding dates of birth. It requested a warrant allowing

the search and seizure of "the items at the residence and/or

property occupied" by the seven named adults for evidence of

possession and dissemination of child pornography. Finally, the

affidavit sought permission to seize and search any digital

devices including cell phones of the persons present at the

residence during the search.4

Members of the State police executed the search warrant the

same day it was granted and seized the defendant's cell phone.

A subsequent search of the defendant's cell phone revealed two

video recordings containing child pornography, and he was

4 Donovan also specifically requested permission for a
forensics expert to search the computer system at the residence
and to copy digital evidence stored on any servers.

4
charged with one count of possession of child pornography in

violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence

obtained from executing the search warrant. A District Court

judge allowed the motion to suppress, stating in a margin

notation that "the seizure of the def[endant's] property was

lawful, however the search of the phone was without probable

cause and therefore unlawful." The Commonwealth promptly filed

a motion for clarification and reconsideration. The judge

denied the motion and, again in a margin notation, stated, "The

court finds that probable cause exists to seize the defendant's

phone while at the target address. However, there is

insufficient information giving probable cause to search the

contents of the seized phone. Motion is denied."

The Commonwealth filed this interlocutory appeal,5 arguing

that the judge was correct in upholding the initial seizure of

the defendant's cell phone but that he erred in finding that the

subsequent search of the defendant's cell phone was not

supported by probable cause. The defendant argues the inverse -

- that the cell phone search did lack probable cause, but also

that the initial seizure was unlawful because there was an

5 The Commonwealth filed an application for leave to appeal
before the single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, which
was granted on May 28, 2024.

5
insufficient nexus linking the defendant's cell phone to the

suspected criminal activity at the residence.6

Discussion. The sole issue to be decided in this appeal is

whether probable cause existed for the police to search the

defendant's cell phone for evidence of child pornography. It is

well settled that our review of whether a search warrant was

supported by probable cause is limited to the four corners of

the affidavit. See Commonwealth v. Snow, 486 Mass. 582, 586

(2021). An affidavit supporting a search warrant should be

interpreted "in a commonsense and realistic fashion," and the

affidavit should be "read as a whole, not parsed, severed, and

subjected to hypercritical analysis" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Molina, 476 Mass. 388, 394 (2017). "Whether an

affidavit supplied probable cause is a fact-intensive inquiry"

and the supporting affidavit must establish "a sufficient nexus

between the suspected criminal activity, the items sought, and

the place to be searched" (quotations and citations omitted).

6 On appeal, the Commonwealth's only argument is that,
because the judge found that the seizure of the defendant's cell
phone was lawful, the subsequent search of that phone was also
permissible pursuant to the warrant and did not require an
additional warrant. The defendant did not file a cross appeal
challenging the judge's decision that the seizure of the
defendant's cell phone was lawful and therefore his arguments
challenging the seizure of the cell phone are not properly
before us. See Superintendent of Pub. Works of Attleboro v.
Attleboro Contributory Retirement Bd., 38 Mass. App. Ct. 130,
132 n.6 (1995).

6
Commonwealth v. Dunn, 494 Mass. 42, 48 (2024). Because the

determination of probable cause is a conclusion of law, our

review of the search warrant affidavit is de novo. See

Commonwealth v. Camuti, 495 Mass. 630, 637 (2025).

In determining whether the affidavit in support of the

search warrant in this case established probable cause, the

cases of Molina, 476 Mass. 388, and Commonwealth v. Martinez,

476 Mass. 410 (2017), are instructive. In Molina, supra at 390-

391, members of the State police determined that images of child

pornography were being sent and received through a computer

connected to an IP address. Police officers then learned that

the IP address was assigned to an Internet subscriber at an

apartment where the police saw a mailbox with five names on it,

including the defendant in that case. Id. at 391. A search

warrant was issued which authorized the police to search the

apartment for electronic devices contained in the apartment but

did not name any person to be searched. Id. During the

execution of the search warrant, police saw a computer located

in the defendant's bedroom displaying downloads and uploads of

child pornography files in progress.7 Id. at 391-392.

7 The police seized the defendant's laptop computer, and a
subsequent search revealed over one hundred files containing
suspected child pornography. Id. at 393.

7
In rejecting the defendant's argument that the search

warrant was overbroad because the apartment was the shared

living space of several occupants, the court noted that the

Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places" against

unreasonable searches and seizures (citation omitted). Id. at

394. However, the court acknowledged that "warrants authorize

the searches of particular places, and do so properly wherever

there is a sufficient nexus between the items sought and the

place to be searched." Id. "That nexus may be based on the

type of crime, the nature of the missing items, the extent of

the suspect's opportunity for concealment, and normal inferences

as to where a criminal would be likely to hide evidence of the

crime." Id. The Molina defendant argued that the nexus was

insufficient because, although the police had information about

child pornography at the apartment, they had no information

about the individuals residing at the apartment and had no

information about the electronic devices. Id. at 395. The

court rejected the notion that the focus of the probable cause

inquiry was on the occupants of the apartment. Id. Rather,

probable cause is supported "where the warrant appropriately

substantiated a connection between the apartment and the

evidence of child pornography reasonably expected to be located

therein." Id. The court also rejected the argument that the

search warrant was unlawful because it allowed the police to

8
seize "all computing devices found in the apartment regardless

to whom they belonged to or where they may have been found."

Id. at 396. Because evidence of child pornography could be

easily transferred from one device to another, the police did

not have to limit their search, and the seizure of over a dozen

electronic devices found in the apartment, including the

defendant's computer, was lawful. Id. at 396-397.

In Martinez, 476 Mass. at 412-413, police officers

discovered that a particular IP address was used to share child

pornography and, on further investigation, learned the name of

the Internet subscriber and the specific apartment associated

with the IP address. Police went to the apartment and

discovered that another person (not the Internet subscriber)

leased the apartment. Id. at 413. Based on this information, a

police officer sought and received a search warrant to search

the apartment for computers and related items connected to child

pornography. Id. During the execution of the search warrant,

police discovered two laptop computers located underneath a

basket of laundry. Id. A subsequent search of the computers

resulted in the discovery of child pornography files on one of

the defendant's laptop computers. Id. at 413-414.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the search

warrant affidavit lacked probable cause because the named

Internet subscriber was not confirmed to be living in the

9
apartment and police had no information linking the defendant to

the apartment. Id. at 414. The affidavit that "averred that a

particular IP address was used to share child pornography and

that this IP address had been assigned at the time in question

to an Internet subscriber at the specific physical address to be

searched" was sufficient to establish probable cause to search

the apartment. Id. A sufficient nexus existed between the

suspected criminal activity (child pornography), the items

sought (computers), and the location to be searched (apartment),

even though the named Internet subscriber was not listed or

confirmed to be living at the apartment and even though the

defendant was not linked to the apartment. Id. at 415-416. "A

showing of probable cause to search a place (as opposed to

arrest a person) need not identify a specific criminal suspect -

- although frequently it does." Id. at 419. While

acknowledging that a sufficient nexus may be easier to prove if

the police link a specific person to the criminal activity, the

court reasoned that probable cause does not require the identity

of the specific criminal suspect. Id. "[T]he critical element

in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is

suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe

that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are

located on the property to which entry is sought." Id., quoting

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978).

10
Here, in his brief, the defendant acknowledges that, in the

context of a search warrant affidavit for child pornography,

Martinez and Molina "unqualifiedly" create authority to seize

and search any device and any person present at a search

location based on computer activity linked to that physical

address. In an attempt to distinguish Martinez and Molina, the

defendant argues that the facts in this case are different

because the item seized was located on the defendant's person

and because Martinez and Morales each involved an ongoing

violation of the law using a peer-to-peer network. We are not

persuaded that these distinctions result in a different outcome.

Here, the search warrant established a sufficient nexus between

the crimes of possession and dissemination of child pornography,

the items sought, and the place to be searched.

While it is true, as it was in Martinez, 476 Mass. at 419,

that the police did not have any specific information that the

defendant possessed child pornography or that the defendant was

the individual who used the IP address in question -- here, to

upload child pornography from the Snapchat and Dropbox accounts

under usernames that included some variation of the name "Chris"

-- those facts do not invalidate probable cause. This is

because the proper focus of the probable cause analysis is not

whether the defendant possessed child pornography but whether

the address associated with the IP address likely contained

11
evidence of criminal activity. See Martinez, 476 Mass. at 417.

The affidavit sufficiently established that child pornography

was uploaded from a device connected to a specific IP address

and that the IP address was registered to a particular

residence.8 Thus, the search warrant properly permitted the

search of the entire residence associated with the IP address

for any evidence of child pornography.9

8 Two of the accounts used to upload the child pornography
were associated with usernames containing the name "Chris," and
the defendant, Christopher Clayton, was associated with the
residence to which the IP addresses that the child pornography
was uploaded with were registered.

9 Even though the judge determined that the seizure of the
defendant's cell phone was supported by probable cause, the
defendant now argues that the search of his person (and the
subsequent seizure of his cell phone) was unlawful as an "any
persons present" search. We again note that the defendant did
not file a cross appeal challenging the judge's conclusion that
the seizure of the defendant's cell phone was lawful, and, as
such, this issue is not properly before us. We also note that
Commonwealth v. Brown, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 261 (2007), a drug
distribution case on which the defendant relies, is
distinguishable. There, we held that the "any persons present"
clause of the warrant could not stand because the affidavit
described controlled buys that occurred entirely outside the
apartment and did not suggest that there were "visitors to the
apartment who came and went in ways indicative of criminal
activity within." Id. at 267. Here, in contrast, the affidavit
established probable cause that the electronic devices inside
the residence contained child pornography, identified multiple
adults, including the defendant, associated with the residence,
and contained information that the child pornography that was
downloaded was connected to an account holder using the name
"Chris." Because cell phones are devices capable of storing and
disseminating child pornography, and are routinely carried on
one's person, and evidence, in the form of electronic files,
could be easily transferred between electronic devices at the

12
In conclusion, interpreting the search warrant affidavit in

"a commonsense and realistic fashion" the police could both

seize the electronic devices and then search them for evidence

of child pornography. Molina, 476 Mass. at 394. Thus, the

police acted lawfully pursuant to the search warrant when they

examined the defendant's cell phone for evidence of child

pornography.

Order entered January 25,
2024, reversed.

By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Shin & Walsh, JJ.10),

Clerk

Entered: July 14, 2025.

location, a sufficient nexus existed between the suspected crime
and the defendant's person as a place to be searched.

10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

13