Commonwealth v. Jeffrey Rivard.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1080

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JEFFREY RIVARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In June 2024, a District Court judge denied the defendant's

motion to expunge two entries on his criminal record.1 On

appeal, the defendant argues the judge abused his discretion in

denying the defendant's motion for reason-based expungement as

to his assault and battery charge against his daughter and

claims to have produced clear and convincing evidence of perjury

by a police officer. We affirm.

1A panel of this court affirmed the denial of three earlier
petitions to expunge the same two entries based on similar
grounds in an unpublished decision under Rule 23.0 of the Rules
of the Appeals Court, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017
(2020). Commonwealth v. Rivard, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 1103 (2022).
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's argument that
expungement was warranted because the police report
mischaracterized what he and his wife told responding officers.
Background. In March 2012, Framingham police responded to

a report of domestic assault by the defendant at the defendant's

apartment. Officer Thomas McCarthy spoke with the defendant's

wife and daughter, who were the named victims of the assault.

According to McCarthy, the wife reported that the defendant

struck her on the arm "at least three or four times" with a

Wiffle ball bat. McCarthy saw several red marks on the wife's

arm. In addition, the wife and the defendant's daughter told

McCarthy that the defendant had grabbed the daughter by the arm

and pushed her to the ground. The defendant was charged with

one count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon2

against the wife and one count of assault and battery3 against

his daughter. The defendant received a disposition of pretrial

probation, and, in May 2016, both charges were dismissed.

In December 2019, the wife testified at a motion hearing to

modify the defendant's conditions of release in a criminal case

in Vermont. When questioned about the March 2012 incident that

led to the above-described charges against the defendant, the

wife maintained that the defendant hit her with a Wiffle ball

bat. However, the wife stated that the defendant "did not grab

2 G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b).

3 G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a).

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and throw [the daughter] down to the ground. That is a

misrepresentation in the record."

In June 2024, the defendant filed a petition to expunge his

March 2012 assault and battery charges. At a hearing on this

petition in the District Court, the defendant, in reference to

the assault and battery against his daughter, stated, "I have

basically said that this claim of assaulting a child is wrong

anytime anybody asked."

Discussion. "Expungement goes further [than sealing a

record], as it entails 'the permanent erasure or destruction of

a record so that the record is no longer accessible to, or

maintained by, the court, any criminal justice agencies or any

other state agency, municipal agency or county agency.'" Matter

of Expungement, 489 Mass. 67, 68 n.1 (2022), quoting G. L.

c. 276, § 100E. A judge, based on clear and convincing

evidence, may order the expungement of a criminal record based

on six statutorily prescribed grounds, including, as relevant

here, either that the record was created as a result of

"demonstrable errors by law enforcement" or "demonstrable fraud

perpetrated upon the court." See G. L. c. 276,

§§ 100K (a) (3), (5). "In reviewing a decision on a motion to

expunge, we consider whether the judge abused his or her

discretion." Commonwealth v. K.W., 490 Mass. 619, 624 (2022).

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The defendant argues that, because his wife's testimony at

the December 2019 motion hearing refutes details regarding the

March 2012 incident, and the defendant testified under oath at

the June 2024 hearing that the assault against his daughter

never happened, he has shown perjury on behalf of the reporting

police officer. The officer's perjury, the defendant contends,

is demonstrable error resulting in the defendant being

improperly charged with assault and battery. See G. L. c. 276,

§ 100K (a) (3). We disagree.

A person has committed perjury when, in a position where

they are lawfully required to tell the truth, the person

"wilfully swears or affirms falsely in a matter material to the

issue or point in question." G. L. c. 268, § 1. On the night

of the March 2012 incident, Officer McCarthy spoke with the

defendant's wife and daughter, and he reported that both

independently said that the defendant had "grabbed [the

daughter] by the arm and pushed her to the ground." Two

objections to this aspect of the report, seven and twelve years

after the incident, one made by the defendant himself, are not

adequate to establish that the reporting officer was "wilfully

swear[ing] or affirm[ing] falsely" as to the incident. G. L.

c. 268, § 1. See Commonwealth v. Steve S., 103 Mass. App. Ct.

691, 700 (2024) ("Proof by clear and convincing evidence is not

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without teeth[,] . . . [and] [t]he evidence must be sufficient

to convey a high degree of probability that the contested

proposition is true" [quotation and citation omitted]).

Therefore, the judge did not abuse his discretion in determining

that the defendant's charge of assault and battery against his

daughter was not a result of "demonstrable error" by law

enforcement. See G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (3).

The defendant also argues that the judge abused his

discretion in denying his expungement petition because the same

statements from him and his wife show "demonstrable fraud

perpetrated upon the court." See G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a) (6).

Fraud perpetrated upon the court "is only that species of fraud

which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a

fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial

machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task

of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication"

(quotation and citation omitted). MacDonald v. MacDonald, 407

Mass. 196, 202 (1990). "[T]o set aside a judgment or order

because of fraud upon the court . . . it is necessary to show an

unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly

influence the court in its decision." Id.

Here, even assuming arguendo that we credit the wife's

testimony that the report that the defendant assaulted his

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daughter constituted a misrepresentation, the defendant makes no

showing of an "unconscionable plan or scheme" that "does, or

attempts to, defile the court." MacDonald, 407 Mass. at 202.

See Wojcicki v. Caragher, 447 Mass. 200, 210–211 (2006), quoting

Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 632-633 (D.D.C. 1969) ("The

possibility of a witness testifying falsely is always a risk in

our judicial process, but there are safeguards within the system

to guard against such risks. The most basic of these is cross-

examination of witnesses . . . .").

In assessing a scenario involving potential fraud, "it [is]

important to distinguish between a false allegation, on the one

hand, and a deliberate scheme, on the other, typically involving

others in the court system, combined with a larger pattern of

harassment." M.C.D. v. D.E.D., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 342

(2016). The defendant does not make that distinction here. The

record supports the judge's finding that there was not clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant's relevant criminal

record was created because of one or more of the reasons listed

in G. L. c. 276, § 100K (a). Therefore, because the judge's

decision was within "the range of reasonable alternatives," the

judge acted within his discretion in denying the defendant's

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petition for expungement. See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass.

169, 185 n.27 (2014).4

Order denying petition for
expungement affirmed.

By the Court (Ditkoff,
Singh & Smyth, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: September 5, 2025.

4 The defendant also claims expungement is warranted because
of demonstrable errors by court employees under G. L. c. 276,
§ 100K (a) (5), but does not identify specific behavior that
falls under this category. Therefore, this contention does not
rise to the level of appellate argument, and we decline to
consider the point further. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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