Commonwealth v. Lorenzo Jones.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-834

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

LORENZO JONES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In February 2023, following a jury trial in the Superior

Court, the defendant, Lorenzo Jones, was found guilty of

possession of a firearm without a license, subsequent offense,

in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).1 Police recovered the

firearm the defendant was convicted of possessing after

conducting a stop of a vehicle on the morning of January 27,

2014 (January 27 stop). On appeal, the defendant argues that

reversal of his conviction is required for the following

reasons: (1) the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that

1The defendant pleaded guilty to the subsequent offense
portion of the indictment following the trial. The defendant
was acquitted of two charges of murder in violation of G. L.
c. 265, § 1.
the Commonwealth must prove that he lacked a firearms license as

required by Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666 (2023)

(Guardado I), S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023) (Guardado II), cert.

denied, 144 S. Ct. 2683 (2024); (2) due to an ambiguous jury

instruction, the defendant was convicted of a crime for which he

was never indicted; (3) the evidence was insufficient to prove

that the defendant possessed the firearm; and (4) the fruits of

the January 27 stop, including the firearm, should have been

suppressed. Because the Commonwealth failed to prove the

absence of licensure, we vacate the defendant's conviction.

Background. 1. Motion to suppress. The motion judge

found the following facts after the evidentiary hearing on the

motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the January 27

stop. On January 26, 2014, Boston police Officer John Burrows

received a tip from a confidential informant (CI) that Steven

Stephen, who was known to Boston police to be involved in

ongoing gang feuds and to have a prior firearm conviction, had a

gun. The CI informed Burrows that Stephen, Tony Evans, with

whom Burrows also was familiar, and a woman (female passenger)

would be in a red Chevrolet Cruze in a parking lot behind Flames

restaurant that evening. The CI also provided the registration

number of the car.

2
Burrows was off duty when he received the information, but

relayed the tip to the Boston police department's youth violence

strike force. Around 10:00 P.M. and within ten minutes of

receiving the tip from Burrows, officers went to the restaurant

to look for Stephen and the vehicle. Upon locating the Cruze

behind the Flames restaurant, the officers ordered its three

occupants, Stephen, Evans, and the female passenger, out of the

vehicle, pat frisked Stephen and Evans, and searched the car for

a firearm. It is undisputed that the officers did not pat frisk

the female passenger. The officers did not recover a firearm

and the three occupants left in the Cruze. Approximately two

hours after the officers conducted their search, Burrows

testified that the CI called him back and informed him that the

officers had "missed" the gun.

The following morning, January 27, Burrows reported to work

and learned that three people were fatally shot overnight.

Burrows recognized the names of two of the victims through his

work with the youth violence strike force. While on patrol with

Officer Joseph Connolly at 10:43 A.M., Burrows saw the Cruze and

initiated a stop using the blue lights and siren. After the

Cruze stopped, the officers approached the car, but could not

see inside to identify the occupants. As they approached,

Burrows saw Evans lying on the back seat of the Cruze. The car

3
then drove off. The officers got back into their unmarked

cruiser and followed the Cruze until it stopped in the middle of

Wayland Street. The driver, a Black man, immediately fled on

foot and the officers were not able to catch him. Evans and the

female passenger were removed from the Cruze, handcuffed, and

briefly detained, but ultimately allowed to leave. Officers

found a firearm a short distance from the Cruze on the side of

the road. The Cruze was towed and a warrant was later obtained

to search the vehicle.

2. Trial. The following evidence was presented at trial.

At approximately 2:44 A.M. on January 27, the "Shotspotter"

system2 detected a series of gunshots on Rosewood Street in the

Mattapan section of Boston. When Boston police officers

responded to the scene, they found Clarence McGregor who had

suffered fifteen gunshot wounds and Teasia Montgomery who had

suffered two gunshot wounds. Both McGregor and Montgomery were

transported to the hospital where they were pronounced dead.3

From the area, the officers ultimately recovered twenty-six

2 ShotSpotter is "a system that identifies firearm
discharges by sound and directs officers to the general location
of the shots." Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 694
(2020).

3 On that same evening, a third person was a victim of
homicide. However, no connection between McGregor and
Montgomery's murders and the murder of that victim was offered
at trial.

4
shell casings from two different firearms and concluded that

there were two shooters.

Burrows and Connolly testified at trial about the stop of

the Cruze later that morning described above. In addition,

Connolly testified that he chased after the driver of the

vehicle, who Connolly described as a six-foot muscular Black man

wearing all gray and a black knit hat. Burrows, who stayed with

the Cruze, and another officer pat frisked the female passenger

and Evans, but recovered no contraband. Burrows then found the

firearm lying under a nearby car on Wayland Street in close

proximity to the Cruze. After the Cruze was towed to a Boston

police facility,4 two cell phones were also recovered from the

car.

The police soon learned that the Cruze, and one of the cell

phones found in the vehicle, belonged to a woman who was dating

the defendant at the time (girlfriend). The girlfriend

testified that the defendant had free access to her apartment

and used her car often. The girlfriend also testified that the

defendant freely used her cell phone including times when she

was not with him and times when she left her phone in the Cruze.

The girlfriend did not have the Cruze the night of January 26.

The Cruze was towed because neither Evans nor the female
4

passenger owned the vehicle.

5
Ballistics linked the gun found by the Cruze to eighteen

shell casings recovered from the murder scene where McGregor and

Montgomery were killed. The gun was tested for deoxyribonucleic

acid (DNA) evidence and the results indicated a "mixture" from

several people. Evans and Stephen were excluded from the

mixture, but the defendant was not. The Commonwealth

subsequently sent the DNA samples to a private laboratory which

concluded that an evidence match between the gun and the

defendant was "[fifty thousand] times more probable than a

coincidental match to an unrelated African American person." A

jacket bearing the defendant's name was also recovered from the

Cruze, and the defendant's fingerprints were found on an energy

drink can and other items located in the interior of the car.

Cell site location information (CSLI) records showed that

the cell phone associated with the girlfriend, which was

purportedly used by the defendant, and the cell phone associated

with Evans, used the same cellular tower from 2:15 A.M. to

2:40 A.M., the minutes immediately prior to the murders. The

cell phones associated with the girlfriend, the female

passenger, and Evans utilized cellular towers traveling away

from the area of the murders immediately after the shooting.

Two photographs that were taken just after 4:00 A.M. were

subsequently discovered on the female passenger's cell phone and

6
depicted the defendant and Evans together at a Dunkin Donuts

located in Braintree. The cell phones associated with the

girlfriend, the female passenger, and Evans all used the same

cell tower from 8:30 A.M. to 9:30 A.M. on the morning of January

27, 2014, approximately one hour before the Cruze was stopped by

Burrows and Connolly.

3. Procedural history. On March 29, 2016, the defendant

was indicted on two counts of murder and one count of unlawful

possession of a firearm, subsequent offense. On May 18, 2017,

the defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the January 27

stop, including the firearm. After an evidentiary hearing in

January of 2018, the motion judge denied the motion on November

5, 2018, via a written decision. Prior to trial, on December

14, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to disclose the identity

of the CI who provided Burrows with the tip that led to the

January 26, 2014, stop of the Cruze at Flames restaurant. A

different judge (trial judge) conducted an in camera interview

of the CI, and on February 13, 2023, denied the defendant's

motion. Ultimately, following a jury trial that commenced on

January 17, 2023, and concluded on February 23, 2023, the

defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm

but was acquitted of the murder charges. After the jury were

dismissed, the defendant pleaded guilty to the subsequent

7
offense portion of the unlawful possession of a firearm

indictment. The defendant filed a timely appeal.

Discussion. 1. Guardado error. The defendant argues that

reversal of his conviction is required because the trial judge,

who did not have the benefit of Guardado I, failed to instruct

the jury that the Commonwealth was obliged to prove that the

defendant lacked a firearms license.5 In Commonwealth v.

Crowder, 495 Mass. 552, 559 (2025), petition for cert. filed,

U.S. Supreme Ct., No. 24-7498 (June 25, 2025), a case which was

pending at the time the defendant submitted this appeal, the

Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a new trial is the proper

remedy in circumstances where a defendant's trial occurred

between the issuing of the United States Supreme Court's

decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597

U.S. 1 (2022), and the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in

Guardado I, 491 Mass. 666. Because the defendant's trial

occurred during the interim, a new trial is the appropriate

remedy.

2. Jury instructions. The defendant argues that the jury

were erroneously instructed as to the time frame that the

defendant allegedly possessed the firearm in question. In

5 The Commonwealth disagrees that reversal is required but
concedes that a new trial is warranted due to its failure to
prove lack of licensure.

8
support of this argument, the defendant asserts that the

Commonwealth, during a hearing on one of the defendant's motions

to suppress, limited the defendant's possession to the time of

the murders themselves, at approximately 2:44 A.M. on January

27, 2014. Therefore, the defendant avers that the judge was

required to instruct the jury that they may only find the

defendant guilty of unlawful possession of the firearm if the

Commonwealth proved that he possessed it at the time of the

shooting. The argument is unavailing.

Because the defendant did not object to the jury

instructions during the trial, we review his claim for a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth

v. Fortini, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 706 (2007). Here, the trial

judge properly instructed the jury of the elements of unlawful

possession of a firearm (with the exception of the instruction

on licensure discussed above). Likewise, the defendant's

indictment clearly states that the defendant "on January 27,

2014, did unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession a

firearm." Furthermore, in its bill of particulars, the

Commonwealth alleged that the defendant possessed a firearm on

January 27, 2014, both "at about 2:43 A.M." as a participant in

the shootings of McGregor and Montgomery, and "continued to

possess a firearm for several hours thereafter until the firearm

9
was discarded in the vicinity of 65 Wayland Street." We discern

no error.

Additionally, contrary to the defendant's assertion, the

Commonwealth did not limit itself to a narrower time frame

during a hearing on one of the defendant's motions to suppress.

While it is true that the Commonwealth did argue at that hearing

that the defendant did not have automatic standing to move to

suppress the firearm recovered on Wayland Street because he was

only indicted for possessing a firearm at the time of the

shooting, the motion judge never addressed the Commonwealth's

standing arguments in her decision on the defendant's motion.

Furthermore, the bill of particulars, which alleged the

defendant possessed the firearm from the time of the shooting

until it was abandoned on Wayland Street, was provided to the

defendant well after the Commonwealth made this argument.6

Accordingly, the trial judge made no error in his instructions

to the jury on this issue, nor was the defendant convicted of a

crime for which he was not indicted.

3. Evidence of possession. The defendant argues that

reversal of his conviction is required because there was

6 The defendant lodged no objection to the bill of
particulars.

10
insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him of

unlawful possession of a firearm. We disagree.

When reviewing claims of insufficient evidence presented at

trial, "we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth 'to determine whether any rational trier of

fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Baez, 494 Mass. 396, 400

(2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493 Mass. 303, 307

(2024). "The evidence may be direct or circumstantial, and we

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"

(citation omitted). Baez, supra.

To sustain a conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the

Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knowingly

possessed a firearm outside of his residence or place of

business absent compliance with the relevant licensing

provisions.7 See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 486 Mass. 469, 473

(2020).

Here, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, ample evidence was presented from which a

jury could infer that the defendant possessed the firearm that

Burrows recovered near the Cruze on Wayland Street. Notably,

7 As noted above, following Guardado I, the Commonwealth
must also prove that the defendant lacked a firearms license.

11
the jury heard evidence that the DNA found on the gun was fifty

thousand times more likely to match the defendant than an

unrelated African American person. In addition to the DNA

evidence, the defendant's fingerprints were found on items in

the Cruze, and a jacket bearing the defendant's name was also

recovered from the vehicle. The jury also heard evidence that

the defendant frequently used the Cruze, which was owned by his

girlfriend.

Furthermore, the jury were presented with CSLI records and

photographic evidence from which they could reasonably infer

that the defendant and the other two occupants of the Cruze,

Evans and the female passenger, were together in the hours after

the shooting and remained together close to the time that

Burrows stopped the Cruze. Additionally, while relatively

generic and of little import standing alone, Connolly's

description of the fleeing driver did match the defendant's

build and skin color, as evidenced by the surveillance

photograph that captured the driver fleeing the scene. See

Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 468 (2021), S.C., 491

Mass. 1011 (2023), and cases cited therein. In sum, given the

totality of the evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to

infer that the defendant was the driver of the Cruze at the time

it was stopped on the morning of January 27, 2014, and possessed

12
the firearm until he abandoned it while fleeing on Wayland

Street. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a

rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant unlawfully possessed the firearm. See Baez,

494 Mass. at 400.

4. Denial of motion to suppress. Finally, the defendant

argues that the motion judge erred by failing to suppress the

fruits of the January 27 stop, including the firearm, because

the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Cruze that

morning. We are not persuaded.

"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept

the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but

conduct an independent review of [the judge's] ultimate findings

and conclusions of law" (citation omitted). Crowder, 495 Mass.

at 565.

The defendant argues that the police lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct the January 27 stop on the basis that the

CI, when interviewed in camera by the trial judge in February of

2023, supplied information that purportedly contradicted

Burrows's testimony five years earlier at the January 2018

hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. Importantly, at

the suppression hearing the motion judge did not hear testimony

from the CI but heard testimony from Burrows who relayed what

13
the CI had told him on January 26, 2014. For example, Burrows

testified that the CI informed him that Stephen had a gun, while

the CI recalled during the 2023 interview that the CI informed

Burrows that Evans and Stephen "were looking for a gun."

Burrows also testified that the CI called him back a few hours

after the search of the Cruze on the evening of January 26 and

told him that the officers had "missed" the gun. Conversely,

the CI said during the in camera interview that the CI "does not

recall contacting Burrows again that night [after providing him

with the original tip on January 26, 2014,] and does not recall

telling Burrows that they missed the gun."

The defendant argues that because the version of the CI's

tip from the 2023 interview would not supply the police with

reasonable suspicion to conduct the January 27 stop, the stop

was unconstitutional.8 This argument is flawed in multiple

respects.

First, nine years passed between when the CI gave the tip

about the Cruze to Burrows in 2014, and when the CI was

interviewed by the trial judge in 2023. It is therefore

understandable that the CI's memory of events in 2023 may differ

from what the CI told Burrows nine years earlier, or that the CI

8 Based on the CI's interview responses, the defendant filed
a motion to reverse the order denying the motion to suppress.
The defendant's motion was denied after a hearing.

14
may not recall contacting Burrows a second time on the evening

of January 26 to let him know that he missed the gun. Second,

the interview with the CI that the trial judge conducted

concerned whether the CI's identity should be disclosed to the

defendant. The trial judge did not interview the CI to make his

own determination regarding whether the police had reasonable

suspicion to conduct the January 27 stop, and did not have the

benefit of an evidentiary hearing to evaluate Burrows's

credibility in light of the CI's interview responses.

Accordingly, the defendant's argument fails.

We further conclude that there was no error in the motion

judge's determination that Burrows and Connolly had reasonable

suspicion to conduct the January 27 stop based on the evidence

adduced at the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress.

To justify a warrantless investigatory stop, the police must

have reasonable suspicion that the individual they stop "has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime."

Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405 (1974). "Reasonable

suspicion 'must be based on specific and articulable facts and

reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the officer's

experience.'" Commonwealth v. Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1,

8 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 511

(2009).

15
Here, while on patrol on the morning of January 27, Burrows

saw the same vehicle that police had searched the evening before

for an illegal firearm based on a tip that Stephen possessed a

firearm. After the officers failed to recover the firearm

during that search on the evening of January 26, Burrows

received a follow up call from the CI that the officers who

performed the search had "missed" the gun. While Burrows could

not identify the three occupants of the vehicle before

initiating the stop the following morning, he knew that two of

the occupants of the vehicle from the night before, Stephen and

Evans, had gang affiliations, and that Stephen was involved in

ongoing gang feuds and had a prior firearm conviction. Given

these facts, Burrows and Connolly could reasonably suspect that

Stephen was present in the Cruze and possessed an illegal

firearm.9 See Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. at 8.

Conclusion. Because the trial judge did not instruct the

jury that the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant lacked

a firearms license, and the Commonwealth did not prove the same,

9 Because we conclude that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct the January 27 stop, we need not address
the defendant's argument concerning whether he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the firearm found on Wayland Street.

16
we vacate the judgment and set aside the verdict and the

subsequent offense finding.10

So ordered.

By the Court (Desmond,
Smyth & Tan, JJ.11),

Clerk

Entered: September 8, 2025.

10The Commonwealth may retry the defendant on the
indictment charging possession of a firearm without a license as
a subsequent offense if it so choses. See Crowder, 495 Mass. at
559.

11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

17