Richard E. Savoy v. Geraldine S. Savoy.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1358

RICHARD E. SAVOY

vs.

GERALDINE S. SAVOY.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a multiday trial, a judge of the Probate and

Family Court (contempt judge) issued a judgment (contempt

judgment) adjudicating Richard E. Savoy (husband), the former

spouse of Geraldine S. Savoy (wife), guilty of civil contempt

for failing to timely comply with several orders pertaining to

the division of assets set forth in the March 2019 judgment of

divorce nisi (divorce judgment) and the June 2021 amended

judgment of divorce nisi after remand (amended divorce

judgment). The contempt judge also awarded the wife statutory

interest, attorney's fees and costs, and ordered the husband to

1As is our custom, we use the names appearing on the
complaint for divorce, notwithstanding that the wife has resumed
using her former surname of Atkins.
reimburse the wife for her portion of fees paid to a special

master. The husband appeals from the contempt judgment on

several grounds. We reverse in part and affirm in part.2

Background. The parties have litigated various aspects of

the end of their marriage for several years and, consequently,

the factual and procedural history is lengthy. For the purpose

of this appeal, we include only those facts necessary to provide

context for our discussion.

The divorce judgment, which was issued on March 19, 2019 by

a different judge (divorce judge), provided in relevant part

that (1) the husband shall pay $209,000 to the wife for her

share of the marital home equity; (2) the husband shall remove

the wife from all encumbrances related to the marital home by

July 1, 2019, or, if he is unable to do so, make arrangements to

sell the home; (3) the parties' joint Capital One account shall

be closed by May 1, 2019, and the remaining balance shall be

transferred to the wife; (4) the parties' jointly held corporate

2 After the husband filed a notice of appeal, the wife
obtained leave to file a motion to amend the contempt judgment
and findings of fact. The motion was allowed by the trial judge
to the extent that it sought correction of a scrivener's error
in the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the wife (the amount
set forth in the findings of fact did not match the amount
contained in the judgment). The judge found that the correct
amount was $178,810, and not $153,810. Amended findings of fact
issued on September 13, 2024, nunc pro tunc to the original date
of July 14, 2023. The amount of attorney's fees was the only
substantive change made to the findings of fact, and no changes
were made to the judgment.

2
stocks in Arkema, Medtronic, and Regions shall be divided sixty

percent to the husband and forty percent to the wife, and the

accounts shall be closed by July 1, 2019; (5) the husband shall

ensure that fifty percent of the marital coverture3 portion of

his retirement accounts (including his Bank of America Defined

Benefit Plan, Ameritrade IRA, Fidelity Rollover IRA, and

Fidelity Roth IRA) is transferred to the wife by July 1, 2019;

(6) the husband shall transfer forty percent of his investment

account assets in Ameritrade, Wells Fargo, Fidelity BPFH, and JP

Morgan / Becton Dickson to the wife by July 1, 2019; (7) the

wife shall transfer sixty percent of her Fidelity stock account

to the husband by July 1, 2019; and (8) both parties shall

divide their remaining personal property including gold coins,

art, antiques, and home furnishings within thirty days of the

judgment.

The husband appealed from the divorce judgment and, while

his appeal was pending, filed various motions to stay the

judgment, none of which were successful.4 During this time, the

3 The divorce judgment originally omitted the word "marital"
from the phrase "marital coverture," which appeared to be a
scrivener's error that was corrected in the amended divorce
judgment.

4 An appeal does not stay a division of marital assets. See
Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 62(g)(i). The husband's motions for a
stay were denied by the trial judge and by a single justice of
this court.

3
husband made little to no progress in complying with the

property division described above. Consequently, the wife filed

two complaints for contempt: one on July 22, 2019 (first

complaint), and another on February 13, 2020 (second complaint).5

5 The judge described the allegations set forth in the
wife's first complaint as follows:

"[the husband] (i) [f]ailed to make a lump sum payment to
[the wife] of $209,000; (ii) [f]ailed to remove [the wife]
from mortgage and home equity line by July 1, 2019 and
further failed to place the property on the market for
sale; (iii) [r]emoved $5,000 from the Capital One joint
account on April 25, 2019; (iv) [f]ailed or refused to
divide the Arkema, Medtronic and Regions stocks
transferring [forty percent] in kind to [the wife];
(v) [f]ailed to transfer in kind a [forty percent] interest
to [the wife] of [the husband's investment accounts]; and
(vi) [f]ailed or refused to provide [the wife] with account
information so that she may comply with paragraph 14 of the
[divorce] [j]udgment."

According to the judge, the second complaint alleged as
follows:

"[the husband] [f]ailed to divide the Bank of America
Defined Benefit Plan equally with [the wife]. [The
husband] disclosed this asset on his Financial Statement
with a value of $141,593 and the Court made a Finding (75)
of the same amount based upon [the husband's]
representations to the Court. On March 18, 2019, [the
husband] converted and transferred this asset to an annuity
thereby changing the nature of the asset and increasing his
share while reducing [the wife's] interest in the asset.
[The husband] also failed to seek timely relief from the
Court once he elected to convert the asset to an annuity.
[The husband] violated the automatic restraining order,
which went into effect on February 10, 2017, in accordance
with Suppl. Pr. and F. Ct. R. 411(a), by transferring the
asset. Further, on April 1, 2019, [the husband] began to
receive monthly benefits under the annuity and failed to
inform [the wife] of these payments."

4
Meanwhile, the husband's appeal from the divorce judgment

proceeded. In an unpublished memorandum and order, a different

panel of this court reversed so much of the divorce judgment

that treated the wife's interest in a certain trust as a

nonmarital asset and remanded for further proceedings on that

one issue. The remainder of the divorce judgment was affirmed.

See Savoy v. Savoy, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (2020). Ultimately,

the divorce judge issued the amended divorce judgment on June

16, 2021 (nunc pro tunc to March 19, 2019, the date of the

original divorce judgment). Apart from minor adjustments that

are not at issue in this appeal, the division of the marital

assets did not change. However, because the deadlines for

certain transfers of assets had passed, the divorce judge

specified new dates for compliance, which ranged from June to

September 2021.

After the amended divorce judgment issued, the contempt

judge appointed a special master to "effectuate transfers

ordered by the [amended divorce judgment]." The special master

met with the parties on numerous occasions and filed progress

reports on October 5, 2021, December 8, 2021, and April 12,

2022.

In her first report, the special master informed the

contempt judge that the parties were in agreement regarding the

division of some accounts, and provided recommendations

5
regarding the allocation of the remaining assets. The special

master also specified that one asset, the husband's Bank of

America Defined Benefit Plan account, had been converted into an

annuity on his seventieth birthday, making its division "more

difficult." In addition, the special master reported that the

husband claimed a gold coin collection had been stolen or lost

in a move following the divorce, and recommended that the

husband be required to pay the wife for her share of the

collection's value at the time of the divorce.

In her second report, the special master relayed that after

a meeting held on November 30, 2021, the parties had agreed on

the allocation of many of their assets and "[a]ll but two issues

were resolved."6 The two remaining issues concerned the division

of the Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan and the gold coin

collection. According to the special master, the parties,

having not reached their own resolution, "agreed to submit to

and abide by the [s]pecial [m]aster's decision."

The special master's third and final report was preceded by

an order dated March 28, 2022, in which the contempt judge

stated, "[i]n the event compliance [regarding the two unresolved

issues] has not been achieved, the [s]pecial [m]aster shall

6 However, as the judge subsequently found, the husband did
not abide by their agreement and certain assets were neither
divided nor transferred within the agreed on timeframe.

6
indicate how the allocation / division / transfer shall be

achieved and a proposed timeline for same." The special master

did so, and in her third report, recommended the following

allocation with respect to the Bank of America Defined Benefit

Plan:

"Wife should receive the sum of $16,425.90 representing one
half of the annuity payments received by Husband of $912.55
per month for 36 months. Payment to be made by cashier's
check on . . . May 6, 2022.

Husband should provide the balance of the Bank of America
[account] as of . . . April 29, 2022. . . . Husband should
bring a cashier's check, payable to Wife in an amount equal
to one half of the value held in the account along with the
proof of value to Wife on . . . May 6, 2022."

Regarding the gold coins, the special master supplemented her
earlier recommendation as follows:

"The Court found at the time of trial the gold coins had a
value of $17,000.00 and the price of gold was $1,190.60 per
'unit.' Dividing the gross value by the price, the
multiplier is 14.27. The value of a unit [] as of noon on
April 12, 2022 was $1,978.00 x 14.27 = $14,121.45 to Wife."7

The March 28, 2022 order also permitted the parties to file

amended pleadings on the pending complaints for contempt. The

wife filed an amended complaint for contempt on April 1, 2022

(amended complaint), which incorporated all the allegations

contained in the first and second complaints, and included new

allegations that the husband (1) failed to divide an asset

7 The special master also reported on the status of frozen
Fidelity accounts, but those assets are not at issue in this
appeal.

7
(Prothena stock) acquired after the divorce judgment, which he

agreed to transfer to the wife during a meeting with the special

master; and (2) failed to divide personal property, including

various prints and the gold coin collection. The wife also

filed a motion requesting attorney's fees and costs, which the

husband opposed. The husband filed an answer to the wife's

amended complaint and affirmative defenses on April 7 and

October 18, 2022.

Thereafter, the matter proceeded to trial. Over three

nonconsecutive days, the contempt judge heard testimony from

four witnesses: the wife, the husband, the special master, and

the wife's attorney (on the issue of fees). Numerous exhibits,

including a joint stipulation on the transfer of assets and

dates of compliance, were admitted in evidence. In the contempt

judgment dated July 14, 2023, the judge found the husband in

contempt with respect to several provisions of the divorce

judgment and amended divorce judgment, and ordered the husband

to pay the statutory interest in connection with certain

provisions, as well as the wife's attorney's fees and the

special master's fees.

We summarize the contempt judgment, which consists of

eleven numbered paragraphs as follows:8

8 The numbered paragraphs of our summary correspond to the
numbered paragraphs set forth in the contempt judgment. The

8
1. The judge found the husband in contempt for failure to

pay the wife $209,000 by July 1, 2019.9 The husband transferred

these funds to the wife on September 24, 2019. As a result of

this unexcused delay, the judge ordered the husband to pay

(a) interest of six percent applicable to the period between the

date of the divorce judgment, and the filing of the wife's first

complaint for contempt (postjudgment interest); and (b) interest

of twelve percent applicable to the period between the filing of

the first complaint for the contempt, and the date of the

husband's compliance (contempt interest).

2. The judge found the husband in contempt for failing to

remove the wife from the encumbrances on the former marital home

by July 1, 2019. The husband did not satisfy this obligation

until September 24, 2019.

3. The judge found the husband in contempt for failing to

close the joint Capital One account and pay the remaining

balance of $6,590 to the wife first by May 1, 2019, and then by

July 30, 2021. On April 25, 2019, the husband removed $5,000

from the account, preventing its timely closure. Although the

funds were eventually replaced, the account was not closed until

contempt judgment only awarded interest as specified in
paragraphs 1, 3, and 6.

9 As noted, this payment represented the wife's share of the
equity in the marital home, ownership of which remained with the
husband.

9
December 1, 2021. The judge ordered the husband to pay

postjudgment and contempt interest based on this unexcused

delay.

4. The judge found the husband in contempt related to the

division of the Arkema, Medtronic, and Regions stock, all of

which transfers should have occurred first by July 1, 2019, and

then by July 30, 2021. The husband transferred the Arkema stock

on June 27, 2022, the Medtronic stock on January 7, 2022, and

the Regions stock on January 20, 2022.

5. The judge found the husband in contempt for his failure

to divide and transfer the Prothena stock, which he agreed to

transfer after a meeting between the parties and the special

master. The judge ordered the husband to transfer the stock

forthwith based on the parties' agreement.

6. The husband was found in contempt for failing to divide

the Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan equally, first by July

1, 2019, and then by September 1, 2019. Pursuant to the special

master's recommendation, which the husband agreed to follow, the

wife should have received (a) $23,270.02, representing her share

of annuity payments that the husband had already received, and

(b) one-half of the value held in the account as of the close of

business on June 30, 2023. The judge ordered the husband to

10
comply with that recommendation and awarded postjudgment and

contempt interest on the $23,270.02.10

7. The husband was found in contempt for failing to divide

equally the marital coverture portion of the Ameritrade and

Fidelity retirement accounts, which should have been

accomplished first by July 1, 2019, and then by September 1,

2021. The husband accomplished the transfers of the wife's

share of the Ameritrade accounts on January 25 and 27, 2022,

respectively, and the Fidelity accounts on May 5, 2022.

8. The husband was found in contempt related to the

division of his investment accounts, which transfers were to

occur first by July 1, 2019, and then by July 30, 2021. The

parties worked with the special master to reach an agreement

regarding the calculations of the stocks within these investment

accounts and the allocation of shares. The husband failed to

make the transfers that he agreed to in a timely manner and, on

January 24, 2022, he transferred some assets but not in the

exact amount agreed on between the parties.11 The judge ordered

10These interest figures were based on the date of filing
the second complaint in February 2020 (rather than the first
complaint in July 2019).

11The judge specifically found that the husband made the
following partial transfers to the wife on January 24, 2022: JP
Morgan / Becton Dickson (152 of 181 shares), Abbott (111 of 132
shares), Bank of Hawaii (108 of 129 shares) and CVS (660 of 787
shares).

11
the husband to transfer the remaining shares in accordance with

the special master's report.

9. The judge ruled that if the parties were unable to

agree within twenty-one days as to the amount of interest owed

pursuant to the contempt judgment, the issue would be determined

by a special master.

10. The husband was found in contempt for his failure to

timely divide personal property, including various prints and

the gold coin collection, first by April 18, 2019, and then by

July 16, 2021. The husband delivered the prints to the wife on

November 30, 2021, and paid her $11,900 on June 29, 2022, for

her share of the value of the coin collection pursuant to the

special master's third report.

11. The judge ordered the husband to pay the wife $178,810

in legal fees and $861.50 in costs for a total payment of

$179,671.50. The judge also made the husband solely responsible

for the special master's fees.

Discussion. The husband first argues that the scope of the

trial should have been limited to issues related to the division

of the Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan and the gold coin

collection. Second, he contends that the contempt findings

should be vacated because the wife did not meet her burden of

proving contempt by clear and convincing evidence. Third, he

claims that the contempt judge improperly ordered him to pay

12
postjudgment and contempt interest in connection with the

delayed transfer of certain assets. Lastly, he argues that the

judge abused her discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the

wife and in requiring the husband to pay the entirety of the

special master's fees. We address each of these arguments in

turn.

1. Scope of trial. The husband argues, for the first time

on appeal, that the scope of the trial should have been limited

to the two issues that were not resolved by the special master,

namely the division of the Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan

and the gold coins. Having failed to raise this issue below,

the husband has waived it. See Weiler v. PortfolioScope, Inc.,

469 Mass. 75, 86 (2014). Consequently, we do not address the

argument.

2. Contempt findings. "[A] civil contempt finding [must]

be supported by clear and convincing evidence of disobedience of

a clear and unequivocal command." Birchall, petitioner, 454

Mass. 837, 853 (2009) (Birchall). "We review the judge's

ultimate finding of contempt for abuse of discretion, but we

review underlying conclusions of law de novo and underlying

findings of fact for clear error." Jones v. Jones, 101 Mass.

App. Ct. 673, 688 (2022), quoting Commercial Wharf E.

Condominium Ass'n v. Boston Boat Basin, LLC, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

523, 532 (2018).

13
The thrust of the husband's argument is that the wife

cannot meet her burden, where, as here, he eventually complied

with the orders contained within the original and amended

divorce judgments. Specifically, he asserts that even though he

failed to comply with all the requirements and obligations of

the divorce judgment and amended divorce judgment, as detailed

in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10 of the contempt judgment,

he purged himself of contempt before the contempt trial started.

He is correct, as the wife agrees, with respect to the transfers

described in those paragraphs. Although we do not condone the

husband's disobedience of court orders, we agree that he could

not properly be held in contempt in the instances in which he

was in full compliance by the time of the trial.12 See Cooper v.

Cooper, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 143 (2004) ("contempt is

precluded by the judge's finding that 'the [h]usband eventually

did pay the money, and has purged his contempt prior to the

hearing'").13

12Regarding the husband's obligation to transfer investment
assets to the wife as outlined in paragraph 8 of the contempt
judgment, we conclude, as the wife concedes, that although he
did not divide the assets as required, his overall compliance
was sufficient to purge him of contempt.

13Given our conclusion, we need not address the husband's
argument that the new deadlines for compliance contained in the
amended divorce judgment replaced those in the original divorce
judgment.

14
That said, the husband was properly adjudicated in contempt

for failing to transfer the Prothena stock and for failing to

divide the Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan. As noted in

paragraph 5 of the contempt judgment, the husband did not

transfer the Prothena stock pursuant to his agreement with the

special master. Also, in paragraph 6 of the contempt judgment,

the judge found that the husband did not follow the special

master's recommendations as to the Bank of America Defined

Benefit Plan despite agreeing to do so. The husband's argument

that these obligations were not subject to enforcement by a

contempt action because they were recommended by the special

master and were not explicitly ordered by the judge is

unavailing.

While it is true that "[c]ivil contempt 'can be used as an

enforcement mechanism only if the underlying order is

sufficiently clear, so that the party to be bound is provided

with adequate notice of the required or prohibited activity'"

(citation omitted), Lynch v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 51 Mass.

App. Ct. 772, 776 (2001), we discern no significance in the fact

that the underlying orders were issued by a special master

appointed by a judge as opposed to the judge herself. Even if

we were to assume otherwise, it is clear here that the special

master was appointed to "effectuate transfers ordered by the

[amended divorce judgment]." Furthermore, the record

15
demonstrates that the husband had adequate notice in each

instance.

With respect to the transfer of the Prothena stock

(paragraph 5), the record establishes that on meeting with the

special master, the husband agreed to the transfer. The judge

did not err in finding that this agreement was "within the

charge of the [s]pecial [m]aster." Further, the husband cannot

legitimately claim that he had no notice of his obligation to

transfer the stock when he agreed to do so and the transfer was

addressed in the special master's first report, raised by the

wife in her amended complaint, and explicitly referenced by the

judge in a scheduling order. It was within the judge's

discretion to conclude that the husband's failure to adhere to

the agreement constituted disobedience of a clear and

unequivocal command and we discern no abuse of discretion here.

See Birchall, 454 Mass. at 853; Jones, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at

688.

For similar reasons, the judge did not abuse her discretion

when she adjudicated the husband in contempt for failing to

divide his Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan (paragraph 6).

As noted, the divorce judgment entitled the wife to fifty

percent of the marital coverture portion of the husband's Bank

of America Defined Benefit Plan, and, after the postdivorce

conversion of that asset into an annuity, the parties agreed to

16
allow the special master to determine the appropriate method for

effectuating the division of the converted asset, which she did

in her third report. Furthermore, despite the husband's

argument that the special master's determination exceeded her

authority, we agree with the judge that the recommendation

"rest[ed] squarely within the generalized charge the Court

entered on July 16, 2021, 'to effectuate the transfers ordered

by the [amended divorce judgment].'" The husband had adequate

notice of the special master's recommendations with respect to

the Bank of America Defined Benefit Plan, and he failed to

adhere to those recommendations despite agreeing to do so. We

therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision

to adjudicate the husband in contempt relative to that asset.

See Birchall, 454 Mass. at 853; Jones, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at

688.

3. Interest. The husband argues that the judge abused her

discretion by requiring him to pay interest in connection with

his late payment for the wife's share of equity in the marital

home (paragraph 1),14 his delay in transferring the remaining

Regarding the husband's $209,000 payment for the wife's
14

share of equity in the marital home, the judge ordered that he
pay interest at the rate of six percent per year between the
date of the divorce judgment (March 19, 2019) and the date of
the first complaint (July 22, 2019), and twelve percent per year
from the date of the first complaint to the date of compliance
(September 24, 2019).

17
balance held in the Capital One account (paragraph 3),15 and his

failure to provide the wife with a portion of his Bank of

America annuity benefits (paragraph 6).16 The husband is

incorrect.

On all the aforementioned matters, the judge ordered the

husband to pay two types of interest: postjudgment interest

pursuant to G. L. c. 235, § 8, and contempt interest pursuant to

G. L. c. 215, § 34A. Postjudgment interest is currently awarded

at the rate of six percent for "[e]very judgment for the payment

of money . . . from the day of its entry." G. L. c. 235, § 8.17

See G. L. c. 107, § 3; Karellas v. Karellas, 54 Mass. App. Ct.

469, 471-475 (2002). By contrast, contempt interest is properly

awarded on a finding of contempt at the rate of twelve percent

15The judge awarded statutory interest on the $6,590 value
of the Capital One account at the rate of six percent per year
between the date of the divorce judgment and the date of the
first complaint, and twelve percent per year from the date of
the first complaint to the date the account was closed (December
1, 2021).

16The husband was ordered to pay interest on the $23,270.02
that the wife should have received in annuity payments at the
rate of six percent per year from the date he received annuity
payments (April 2019) to the date of the second complaint
(February 13, 2020), and twelve percent per year from the date
of the second complaint to the date of compliance on the amount
owed.

17More specifically, the statute provides that "[e]very
judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest from the
day of its entry at the same rate per annum as provided for
prejudgment interest in such award, report, verdict or finding."
G. L. c. 235, § 8.

18
from the date of filing the complaint for contempt until the

date of compliance. See G. L. c. 215, § 34A; G. L. c. 231,

§ 6C.18 See also Karellas, supra at 474 ("interest . . .

available upon a finding of contempt . . . is not a substitute

for statutory interest upon a money judgment under G. L. c. 235,

§ 8. The statutes serve different purposes").

We turn first to the interest awarded in connection with

the husband's failure to timely pay the wife for her share of

the equity in the marital home and the Capital One balance.19

Contrary to the husband's assertion, postjudgment interest on

the matters began to accrue from the date of the original

divorce judgment, and not from the date of the amended divorce

judgment. As we have previously noted, the amended divorce

judgment was issued nunc pro tunc to March 19, 2019, the date of

the original judgment, and the husband did not prevail on his

motions to stay the divorce judgment pending appeal. Therefore,

under the plain language of G. L. c. 235, § 8, the award of

postjudgment interest running from the date of the divorce

judgment was proper. On the other hand, given our conclusion

that the husband should not have been held in contempt on the

"Any monetary contempt judgment shall carry with it
18

interest, from the date of filing the complaint, at the rate
determined under the provisions of [G. L. c. 231, § 6C]." G. L.
c. 215, § 34A.

19 See notes 14 and 15, supra.

19
two matters because he was in compliance before the contempt

judgment entered, the award of contempt-related interest must be

reversed. Accordingly, the wife is entitled to six percent

interest from the date of the original divorce judgment to the

date of the husband's compliance on the marital home payment and

the Capital One balance.

The judge's award of interest on the Bank of America

Defined Benefit Plan presents a more complicated issue. The

order in the divorce judgment, which assigned an equal portion

of the retirement account assets to the wife, was not one for

the payment of money. See Karellas, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 472.

And, although the judge ultimately found that the husband owed

the wife $23,270.02, this amount was not included in the divorce

judgment and instead represented one-half of the payments the

husband received once the account was converted into an annuity.

The wife is not entitled to postjudgment interest on this

amount. However, "interest under G. L. c. 215, § 34A, is

available as a remedy for ongoing failure to comply with an

order . . . that may not qualify as a 'judgment for the payment

of money' under G. L. c. 235, § 8, and might not thus carry such

statutory interest. In this sense G. L. c. 215, § 34A, fills in

a gap and provides for interest that would not be otherwise

available." Karellas, supra at 474. Based on our conclusion

that the husband was properly found in contempt on this matter,

20
the wife is entitled to twelve percent interest on the

$23,270.02 from the date she filed the second complaint until

the date of the husband's compliance.20

4. Fees. The husband first argues that the judge abused

her discretion by ordering him to pay the wife's attorney's

fees. The judge has considerable discretion in determining the

necessity and amount of attorney's fees in appropriate

circumstances. See Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 151,

159 (1996). It is well established that, under G. L. c. 208,

§ 38, a judge may award a party counsel fees for obstructionist

behavior, even in the absence of a contempt finding. See

Cooper, 62 Mass. App. Ct. at 143-144 (reversing contempt

judgment against husband while affirming fees awarded in

connection with action due to his obstructionist conduct);

Hennessey v. Sarkis, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 156 (2002) (ample

basis for attorney's fee award, despite husband's compliance, to

"mitigate expenses incurred as a result of the husband's

obstructionist conduct"). Here, the judge found that the

20We acknowledge that it is unclear whether the interest
provision set forth in G. L. c. 215, § 34A, was intended to
apply to contempt judgments involving nonsupport obligations.
While the plain language of the interest provision appears to
apply broadly to "[a]ny monetary contempt judgment," G. L.
c. 215, § 34A, our cases suggest that it was intended to be
limited to support obligations only. See Poras v. Pauling, 70
Mass. App. Ct. 535, 546 (2007); Karellas, 54 Mass. App. at 474.
We do not, however, reach that issue as it has not been raised
by either party.

21
husband "significantly delayed his distribution of marital

assets [and] unnecessarily prolonged these proceedings . . .

[his] behaviors were obstructionist and unnecessarily delayed

[the wife] from receiving her share of marital assets." Given

these findings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's

decision to award attorney's fees. In addition, there is no

basis to disturb the judge's calculation of the amount of the

fees which were adequately supported by counsel's testimony and

affidavit. We note that the judge acknowledged that some legal

fees "would have been incurred in the normal course of the

division of assets." However, as the judge further observed,

the husband's actions "unnecessarily delayed the transfer of

assets even with the assistance of the [c]ourt ordered [s]pecial

[m]aster," and therefore, an award of $178,810 in legal fees was

justified.21

Next, the husband claims that the judge abused her

discretion in requiring him to pay the entirety of the special

master's fees. We disagree. The award is supported by the

evidence which demonstrated that the husband's conduct bordered

on malfeasance. Given the circumstances, the judge did not

abuse her broad equitable power to fashion appropriate remedies.

21Given our discussion in note 2, supra, we find the
husband's argument on the inconsistency of the legal fees
awarded compared to those in the judge's findings to be without
merit.

22
See Cabot v. Cabot, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 768 (2002). The

special master testified, and the court credited, that while the

special master was working with the parties, the husband delayed

his compliance without excuse, failed to provide the special

master with certain requested documents, and changed his mind

with respect to the division of certain assets. The special

master went so far as to say that she "had never gone to such

lengths to ensure compliance as a master, ever," and suggested

in her third report that the husband "compensate [the wife] by

paying a penalty in addition to the fees associated with his

lack of compliance." Thus, the judge properly held the husband

accountable for the consequences of his "intentional and

inexcusable" behavior which "clearly caused an increase in legal

time and fees for [the wife]."

Conclusion.22 We reverse so much of the July 14, 2023

contempt judgment as (a) found the husband guilty of contempt in

paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 10; (b) awarded twelve percent

interest in paragraphs 1 and 3; and (c) awarded six percent

interest in paragraph 6. Paragraph 1 is modified to award six

percent interest from March 19, 2019, to September 24, 2019.

Paragraph 3 is modified to award six percent interest from March

22 We deny the wife's request for an award of costs and
appellate attorney's fees, pursuant to G. L. c. 211A, § 15, and
Mass. R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019).

23
19, 2019, to December 1, 2021. As so modified, the July 14,

2023 contempt judgment is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Vuono, Henry &
Wood, JJ.23),

Clerk

Entered: September 11, 2025.

23 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

24