WILLIAM G. LUFKIN, JR., & Another v. COMMONWEALTH & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-611

WILLIAM G. LUFKIN, JR., 1 & another 2

vs.

COMMONWEALTH & another. 3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following the death of their son, William G. Lufkin, III,

(decedent) in the Plymouth County Correctional Facility

(facility), the plaintiffs, William G. Lufkin, Jr., and Barbara

A. Lufkin, filed a complaint against the Commonwealth in the

Superior Court, alleging wrongful death, conscious pain and

suffering, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See

G. L. c. 229, §§ 2, 6. After a hearing on the Commonwealth's

1Individually and as personal representative of the estate
of William G. Lufkin, III.

2 Barbara A. Lufkin.

3Sheriff of the County of Plymouth. We refer to the
defendants collectively as the Commonwealth.
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge allowed the motion

and entered a judgment dismissing all claims, which the

plaintiffs now appeal. Because the Massachusetts Tort Claims

Act (MTCA), G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j), immunizes the Commonwealth

from the plaintiffs' claims, we affirm.

Background. We recite the following undisputed facts.

After the decedent's initial appearance in the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts on February 17,

2017, a magistrate judge ordered the decedent to be held pending

a detention hearing. He was assigned to the facility and once

there, went through a booking process that included a medical

screening.

Neither the booking officer nor the nurse who conducted the

medical screening noted that the decedent was at a risk of self

harm, based on his behaviors and his responses to questions.

The decedent answered in the negative each time he was asked if

he intended to hurt himself. The decedent reported alcohol and

drug use but showed no signs of withdrawal; the nurse

nonetheless ordered a "detox monitor," which would have involved

checks twice per day for signs of detoxification, but she did

not enter the order in the decedent's record. 4 The decedent was

not placed on suicide watch or mental health watch.

4 This error was discovered after the decedent's death, and
the order was subsequently added to his record.

2
Because the decedent "had issues with . . . gangs" in the

area and thus had to be kept separate from local gang members,

he was placed in administrative segregation, where he was housed

alone. The order to place the decedent in administrative

segregation indicated no medical issues that would preclude such

placement. Once the decedent was in administrative segregation,

none of the officers conducting his orientation or performing

rounds of the unit noticed anything concerning about his

behavior.

At approximately 2:27 P.M. on February 18, 2017, an officer

making rounds found the decedent unconscious. The decedent had

fashioned a ligature out of the laundry bag and canteen bag

given to him (and to every inmate) upon entering the facility

and had placed it around his neck. Attempts to resuscitate the

defendant were unsuccessful. The medical examiner ultimately

determined that the defendant's death was a suicide.

The plaintiffs did not see the decedent's body at any point

between 2:27 P.M., when the officers discovered the unconscious

decedent, and 6:21 P.M., when the body was secured at the

morgue. The plaintiffs were notified of their son's suicide

around 6 P.M.

3
The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Superior Court

on February 18, 2020. On August 21, 2023, the Commonwealth

moved for summary judgment, and after a hearing on the motion,

the trial judge allowed the motion.

Discussion. "Our review of a decision on a motion for

summary judgment is de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate

where there is no material issue of fact in dispute and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

(Quotations and citations omitted.) Theisz v. Massachusetts Bay

Transp. Auth., 495 Mass. 507, 511 (2025). 5

The MTCA immunizes public employers from liability for

"any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or
diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or
situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a
third person, which is not originally caused by the public
employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public
employer."

G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j). 6 "Our case law is clear that an

'original cause' must be an affirmative act; the failure to act

does not suffice." Paradis v. Frost, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 410,

5 Although we are not persuaded that the "judge failed to
apply the proper standard" or "erred by determining the
credibility of witnesses," we need not address those aspects of
the plaintiffs' argument because our review is de novo and
relies only on undisputed facts.

6 There are four statutory exceptions to § 10 (j), none of
which apply here. See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (j) (1)-(4). The
plaintiffs do not argue that any exception applies.

4
413 (2023). See Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 318-319

(2002).

In this case, the original cause of the decedent's death

was his suicidal frame of mind. See Paradis, 103 Mass. App. Ct.

at 414. See also McCarthy v. City of Waltham, 76 Mass. App. Ct.

554, 561 (2010) ("there can be no serious question that the

original cause of harm in [decedent's] taking of his own life

was his suicidal frame of mind"). Additionally, the lack of a

third-party tortfeasor in this case does not foreclose

application of § 10 (j). Theisz, 495 Mass. at 514 n.12

("immunity under § 10 [j] is not limited to the harmful

consequences caused by third persons").

The plaintiffs argue that the Commonwealth acted

affirmatively by "placing [the decedent] in administrative

segregation" and "providing him with a mesh laundry bag with a

cord closure." 7 However, those acts are not the "original cause"

of the decedent's death. See Paradis, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 414

(concluding failure to prevent decedent's suicide was not

original cause of death). Putting the decedent in

administrative segregation to protect him from enemies and

7 The plaintiffs also argue that because the decedent "was
not put on a detox monitor," the Commonwealth originally caused
the decedent's suicide. Failure to place the decedent on a
detox monitor was not an affirmative act.

5
furnishing him with basic items given to all inmates -- both

actions in the normal course for the facility -- does not amount

to causing the defendant to commit suicide. Cf. Baptista v.

Bristol County Sheriff's Dep't, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 841, 857

(2022) (finding placement of decedent in cell with arrestees was

original cause of death where such placement was illegal).

Rather, where the decedent showed no signs of any intention to

harm himself, the facility's failure to deviate from normal

practices was merely a "failure to prevent" the death, and

§ 10 (j) thus immunizes the Commonwealth from liability. See

Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 696 (1999).

Because all the claims in this case 8 stem from the

facility's failure to prevent the decedent's death, we conclude

that § 10 (j) excludes liability for each of the plaintiffs'

claims and that we need not reach the potential application of

§ 10 (b) to this case. See Brum, 428 Mass. at 691.

8 Including the claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See, e.g., Jacome v. Commonwealth, 56 Mass. App. Ct.
486, 492 (2002) (applying § 10 [j] to negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim stemming from death of plaintiff's
son). However, regardless of § 10 (j), the motion judge
correctly concluded that "[b]ecause proximity in time between
the victim's injury and the viewing of the victim's body by the
bystanders is a necessary element . . . and no facts in the
summary judgment record demonstrate when [plaintiffs] saw
[decedent's] body," summary judgment on the claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress was appropriate. See, e.g.,
Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 389 Mass. 327, 342-343 (1983).

6
Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Hand, Hodgens &
Tan, JJ. 9),

Clerk

Entered: December 8, 2025.

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7