Adoption of Dajon.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1380

ADOPTION OF DAJON. 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a

petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother to her

child, Dajon. Following a trial, a Juvenile Court judge found

the mother unfit to parent Dajon, terminated her parental

rights, and concluded that adoption by the maternal great aunt

would be in the child's best interests. On appeal, the mother

does not challenge the court's determination of her parental

unfitness or the termination of her parental rights. Rather,

the mother claims that the judge abused her discretion by

failing to adequately consider the mother's proposed plan for

guardianship by the maternal grandmother. We affirm.

1 A pseudonym.
Background. We summarize the trial judge's findings of

fact. 2 The child was born in 2014, and she was nine years old at

the time of trial. The child's paternity is unestablished and

not relevant to this appeal. The child's maternal grandmother

(grandmother) and great aunt (aunt) were proposed as guardians

in competing permanency plans, and each has been heavily

involved in the child's upbringing thus far. 3

Throughout the child's life, the mother consistently

struggled with substance use, mental illness, and housing

instability. In 2015, the aunt took custody of the child after

she was removed from her mother's care. Five months later, the

grandmother took custody of the child. The grandmother

maintained legal guardianship and physical custody of the child

for roughly seven years, until April of 2022.

During the grandmother's guardianship, she struggled to

maintain a stable, safe environment for the child. She

experienced a combination of housing instability, substance use

for which she refused treatment, and domestic violence. As a

result, the aunt filed a petition for guardianship of the child.

2The parties are not challenging the judge's findings of
fact as erroneous. The findings "demonstrate that close
attention has been given the evidence." Custody of Eleanor, 414
Mass. 795, 799 (1993).

3 The grandmother and the great aunt are sisters.

2
In April 2022, following receipt of a report pursuant to

G. L. c. 119, § 51A (51A report), DCF conducted an investigation

that revealed that the grandmother had gone to Dajon's school

and demanded that Dajon be dismissed early "because she could,

because she had custody." The aunt testified that from January

to April 2022, she did not allow the grandmother to live in her

house because of the grandmother's substance abuse.

Consequently, the grandmother had not actually seen the child

for months, despite still having legal guardianship of her.

During this time, the aunt cared for Dajon while the grandmother

struggled to maintain stable housing. DCF filed this care and

protection petition on April 12, 2022, and was granted emergency

temporary custody. The grandmother was removed as the child's

legal guardian in July 2022.

The child has been living with the aunt exclusively since

January 2022. The child is happy, healthy, and thriving under

the aunt's care. She has many friends, plays sports and the

flute, does well in school, and wants to start gymnastics. The

child needed dental surgery to fill six cavities that had been

neglected while she was in the grandmother's care but is now up

to date on her medical visits and dental care. The aunt works

full time as a nurse and is financially stable. The aunt and

the child reside together in a three-bedroom apartment, along

with the aunt's twenty year old son. The child has her own room

3
in the apartment. DCF has approved the aunt as an adoptive

placement for the child, and the child wishes to be adopted by

her aunt.

The grandmother sought to be reinstated as the child's

guardian, and she filed a private petition for guardianship that

was joined and heard with this care and protection petition.

The mother also desired that the grandmother be reappointed as

Dajon's guardian.

At trial, the judge found the mother unfit to parent Dajon

and terminated her parental rights. The judge also found that

DCF's adoption plan -- that Dajon be adopted by the aunt --

served Dajon's best interests. The judge dismissed the

grandmother's private petition for guardianship.

On appeal, the mother does not contest her unfitness or the

termination of her parental rights. Rather, the mother argues

that the trial judge committed clear error by failing to

properly consider the grandmother's petition for guardianship. 4

The grandmother has not appealed the dismissal of her private

guardianship petition or the order striking her from the care

and protection petition and is not a party to this appeal.

4 As explained below, the correct standard of review for
this decision is whether the judge abused her discretion.

4
Discussion. 1. Standard of review. After a determination

of parental unfitness and termination of parental rights, the

judge is required to assess all placement plans for the children

and "determine which placement will serve the best interests of

the child." Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474-475

(2001). The judge's assessment of each plan must be "even

handed," regardless of which party offered the plan. See

Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 226 n.8 (1998), cert. denied

sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999). "A judge

should consider the wishes of the child in making custodial

determinations, and those wishes 'are entitled to weight in

custody proceedings.'" Care and Protection of Vick, 89 Mass.

App. Ct. 704, 710 (2016), quoting Care & Protection of

Georgette, 439 Mass. 28, 36 (2003). However, the child's

wishes, while important, are not outcome determinative. See

Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 126 (2005).

"In choosing among placement plans, it falls to the sound

discretion of the trial judge to determine what is in the best

interests of the child, and our review on appeal is one of

'substantial deference.'" Adoption of Bianca, 91 Mass. App. Ct.

428, 434 (2017), quoting Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. at 225. We

determine whether "the trial judge abused [her] discretion."

Adoption of Hugo, supra. "[A] judge's discretionary decision

constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge

5
made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors

relevant to the decision such that the decision falls outside

the range of reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted). L.L.

v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

2. Placement plans. The mother argues that the trial

judge failed to adequately evaluate her preferred placement plan

for the child. She takes issue with the evidentiary support for

the judge's findings and specifically argues that the judge

erroneously found that the child would suffer psychological harm

if removed from the aunt's care. She also claims that the judge

failed to make adequate findings to support the choice she made.

DCF counters that the judge properly considered both placement

plans, made sufficient findings on relevant factors that were

supported by the evidence, and appropriately chose adoption by

the aunt because that was, in fact, in the child's best

interests. The child's position is substantially similar to

DCF's. 5

5 Dajon also argues that the grandmother is an indispensable
party to the mother's appeal, and, therefore, because the
grandmother has not appealed the dismissal of her guardianship
petition or joined the mother's appeal, the mother's appeal
should be dismissed. See Guardianship of Wilson, 496 Mass. 60,
61 (2025). This issue does not appear to be jurisdictional.
See Guardianship of Tara, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 11, 13-14 (2020)
(recognizing there are circumstances in which Appeals Court has
reached issues in which court can order no effective relief).
In any event, because we find that the judge's ruling was
sufficiently supported by the evidence, we decline to address
the mother's standing to appeal under Guardianship of Wilson.

6
We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her

discretion by choosing the placement plan advanced by DCF and

the child. She gave the mother's plan adequate consideration.

Most significant, the judge found "that awarding guardianship of

[the child] to Maternal Grandmother is [not] in [the child's]

best interests. Maternal Grandmother lacks stability in her

home life and her sobriety that render her an unsuitable

guardian for [the child]." As described below, the factual

conclusions in the second quoted sentence are adequately

supported. Given the judge's supported conclusion about the

maternal grandmother's suitability, no further evaluation of the

plan for her guardianship was required.

Beyond that, the grandmother filed a guardianship petition

but did not propose a guardianship plan or outline how she

planned to care for the child. Thus, the only information the

judge could consider in connection with that petition was

testimony from the mother, the aunt, and the grandmother, and

evidence of the grandmother's past conduct. During trial, the

grandmother testified that she intended to rent the child a

separate room in the multi-bedroom home she was living in with a

man she had met through work. The grandmother did not offer any

evidence regarding how her housing situation might affect the

child's school placement or any plans for childcare during the

summers and weekends. DCF's plan, on the other hand, was

7
detailed, clear, and supported by the fact that the child had

thrived during the years she lived with the aunt. The judge

properly evaluated the plans based on the information she had in

front of her. See Adoption of Helga, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 529

(2020).

Second, the judge's ultimate determination was sufficiently

supported by the evidence and the judge's findings. The judge

properly considered the grandmother's history of housing

instability, substance use for which she refused treatment, and

domestic violence, in determining the best interests of the

child. The judge also considered the fact that the aunt had

been Dajon's caretaker for the previous two years, that Dajon

had thrived in her care, and that Dajon had expressed a desire

to be adopted by her aunt. The judge's findings of fact and

conclusions of law were consistent with the record evidence.

Her finding that the child would suffer psychological harm if

separated from the aunt was supported by the fact that the aunt

has been the child's most stable parental figure. The judge was

not required to describe the specific nature of the bond between

the child and the aunt or explain why serious harm would flow

from the severance of that bond where it was not the decisive

factor in the judge's decision. See Adoption of Katharine, 42

Mass. App. Ct. 25, 30-31 (1997) (holding that in termination

case, judge is only required to make specific findings about

8
cause and nature of psychological harm that will flow from

child's removal from substitute caretaker when it is decisive

factor in court's decision [emphasis added]).

We find no "clear error of judgment" in the judge's

weighing of the relevant factors here, and her determination

that the DCF adoption plan was in [Dajon's] best interests was

not "outside the range of reasonable alternatives." See L.L.,

470 Mass. at 185 n.27. Because we discern no abuse of

discretion and conclude that the judge's evaluation of the

competing plan was adequate and that the judge's decision is

supported by the evidence, we affirm.

Decree affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin,
Brennan & Wood, JJ. 6),

Clerk

Entered: December 29, 2025.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

9