Commonwealth v. Reginald Bowman.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1188

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

REGINALD BOWMAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant,

Reginald Bowman, sought leave from the single justice of the

Supreme Judicial Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal

pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), as amended, 476 Mass.

1501 (2017). The single justice granted his request. This

appeal followed.

The defendant was arrested outside a retail store in

Boston's Back Bay neighborhood after Boston police received an

anonymous tip from a 911 caller who purportedly witnessed an

individual pass a firearm to someone fitting the defendant's

description in broad daylight before they both entered the

store. On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge
erred by concluding (1) that the anonymous witness's tip was

reliable; and (2) that the police officer who arrested the

defendant had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him for a

weapon. We affirm.

Background. The following facts are drawn from the judge's

findings and from undisputed evidence in the record that he

implicitly credited. See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass.

645, 654-655 (2018); Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass.

429, 436 (2015). The defendant does not challenge any of the

judge's findings.

On October 30, 2021, at approximately 2:53 P.M., an

anonymous person called 911 and reported that he was outside the

Nike store at 200 Newbury Street in Boston's Back Bay

neighborhood. He stated that he had observed a Black "kid" in a

red "hood" pass a gun to another Black "kid" in a black "hood",

before they both went into the store. The 911 caller stated

that his child mentioned that the "guy" in the black hood also

wore a black ski mask, though the caller admitted he did not see

that. With that, the 911 caller hung up.

The dispatcher then called the 911 caller back and asked

for more information. The 911 caller reiterated that "the kid

in the red hood gave the gun to the kid in the black hood" and

added that the kid in the black hood "put [the gun] in his

pocket" before going into the store. The 911 caller described

2
them both as between sixteen and eighteen years old and

approximately 5'10" to 5'11" in height. The 911 caller

indicated that the male in the red hood was skinnier, while the

male in the black hood was medium-sized. The 911 caller refused

to identify himself or cooperate further. To the contrary, he

indicated that he had already left the area and hung up again.

The dispatcher immediately broadcast this information, 1 and

two Boston Police officers, Philip Kearney and his partner,

responded. They arrived at the scene within three to five

minutes of the radio call. They were among the first of

approximately twenty officers to respond. Upon arrival, they

encountered a crowded scene —- at least fifty people inside the

store and between fifty and one hundred gathered outside.

Officer Kearney entered the store, looking for a thin,

young Black male in a red hoodie and a young Black male in a

black hoodie and ski mask. Near the register, he observed two

young men matching the description provided. Officer Kearney

did not engage them. Instead, officers spoke with store

personnel who reported that nothing was amiss. Officer Kearney

then walked outside and stood by. While he was outside, Officer

Kearney turned on his body-worn camera.

1 The dispatcher referred to suspects wearing "hoodies"
rather than "hoods." We adopt that convention.

3
After some time, a thin young Black man in a red hoodie

exited the store, wearing a surgical mask. He was with a young

Black man wearing a black and gray hoodie, but no mask.

Officers stopped them and pat-frisked them but found nothing

incriminating.

Officer Kearney recognized the young man in the red hoodie

as one of the two people he had seen at the register. Because

this young man was now with a different person -- the young man

in the gray and black hoodie without a mask -– Officer Kearney

concluded that the young man in the black hoodie and ski mask

was still inside the store. Accordingly, Officer Kearney re-

entered the store to look for him. The person in the black

hoodie was seated on a bench in the middle of the store behind a

group of people. He was vigilant and looking at Officer

Kearney. Almost immediately after Kearney passed him, the

person in the black hoodie got up to leave the store and Kearney

followed. 2 The defendant turned left onto Newbury Street away

from the large group of officers who had gathered outside the

2 Officer Kearney's body-worn camera did not capture the
defendant seated near the entrance. Rather, it revealed that
Officer Kearney entered the store, immediately walked to the
register, turned around and saw the defendant walking toward the
exit. Officer Kearney followed the defendant out of the store.
See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 654-655 (2018)
(appellate court may review documentary evidence independently).
The distinction is not material to our analysis.

4
store and the young man in the red hoodie, who had been stopped

by two of those officers as he exited the store onto Exeter

Street and was being detained.

Officer Kearney's body-worn camera depicted the defendant

walking at a normal gait down Newbury Street with his hands at

his side. The defendant did not look back to see if Officer

Kearney was following him. Officer Kearney approached the

defendant on the sidewalk from behind and called out, "My man

can I just talk to you for a sec?" The defendant turned around;

he was wearing a black ski mask. Officer Kearney immediately

walked toward him. Officer Kearney testified that as he

approached the defendant, he saw a heavy object weighing down

the pocket on the front of the defendant's hoodie. Based on his

training and experience, Kearney believed the defendant "might

have a weapon." Officer Kearney quickly grabbed the defendant's

arm, asked, "Do you have anything right here?", patted his

hoodie pocket, and felt "a shape consistent with . . . a

firearm." As he did so, he saw the handle of a firearm.

Immediately after feeling the object, he pressed the defendant

against a parked car and called out for assistance from other

officers. His body-worn camera footage established that roughly

two seconds elapsed from the moment Officer Kearney grabbed the

defendant's arm, to the pat frisk and confirmation of a firearm,

to the call for assistance.

5
Officer Kearney then placed the defendant under arrest and

asked if he had a license to carry a firearm. The defendant

responded that "he was not from around here."

Discussion. "In reviewing a decision on a motion to

suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings absent clear

error but conduct an independent review of [the] ultimate

findings and conclusions of law" (quotations and citation

omitted). Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. at 431.

"To justify a warrantless investigatory stop, the police

must have reasonable suspicion that the person they stop 'has

committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.'"

Commonwealth v. Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 272 (2025),

quoting Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 405 (1974).

"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable

facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, in light of the

officer's experience" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Robinson-Van Rader, 492 Mass. 1, 8 (2023). "The

test is an objective one." Silva, supra, at 406.

"When police suspicion arises not from officers' own

observations but from an informant’s tip, . . . the Commonwealth

has the burden of establishing both the informant’s reliability

and the basis of [his] knowledge, although police corroboration

may make up for deficiencies in one or both of those factors."

Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 66 (1997),

6
citing Commonwealth v. Lyons, 409 Mass. 16, 19 (1990). "The two

prongs of this analysis may also be referred to as the basis of

knowledge test and the veracity test" (quotation and citation

omitted). Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. at 273.

The basis of knowledge prong is satisfied where the caller

"was describing [his] own firsthand observations." Commonwealth

v. Westgate, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 552 (2022). However, in a

reasonable suspicion case, "[e]stablishing the veracity prong

where an anonymous 911 caller is involved is less

straightforward, as no evidence regarding his or her past

reliability or honesty typically will be available."

Commonwealth v. Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 46 (2018).

The reliability of an anonymous tip may be established if

the caller believes that he can be identified by police.

"[C]allers who are aware that their calls are being recorded and

that their telephone numbers can be traced" are thought to be

less likely to make false reports. Manha, 479 Mass. at 47.

Conversely, "a caller who believes the call is anonymous is not

accorded the reliability of a caller who believes they can be

identified, because a caller who believes they are anonymous

will not be deterred by the risk of being charged with false

reporting." Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. at 274. "[E]ven if the

police are able to recover the telephone number and identity of

a 911 caller, . . . [i]t is the tipster's belief in anonymity,

7
not its reality, that will control his behavior" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Depeiro, 473 Mass. 450, 455

(2016). Here, we must treat the 911 caller as anonymous because

"[he] did not testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress,

and there was no evidence provided regarding [his] identity or

whether [he] knew that [he] was identifiable to police." Manha,

supra.

The motion judge found that the 911 caller's basis of

knowledge was adequately established because he was reporting

his first-hand observation that a thin young Black man in a red

hoodie passed a firearm to a medium sized Black man of roughly

the same age and height in a black hoodie. As for the veracity

prong, the motion judge acknowledged that because the officers

knew nothing about the 911 caller, they could not know whether

he was being truthful. However, he noted that the officers were

able to independently corroborate the information provided by

the caller through their investigation of the details provided

by the caller, and that independent corroboration could satisfy

the veracity prong.

The defendant challenges the judge's finding that the

anonymous witness's basis of knowledge was adequately

established. The defendant characterizes the description of the

suspects as so broad and general that it "could fit many people

in the area." We disagree.

8
We conclude that the 911 caller's basis of knowledge was

established by his report of a first-hand observation at

2:53 P.M. that a skinnier young Black man in a red hoodie had

given a gun to a medium-sized young Black man of roughly the

same age and height in a black hoodie, who put it in his pocket

before they both entered the store. The basis of knowledge

prong is satisfied because the caller "was describing [his] own

firsthand observations." Westgate, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 552.

We understand the defendant's argument here to be that the

anonymous tip was too vague "to identify a determinate person"

with sufficient particularity. Commonwealth v. Sertyl, 101

Mass. App. Ct. 836, 840 (2022). See Commonwealth v. Warren, 475

Mass. 530, 534 (2016) ("The essence of the reasonable suspicion

inquiry is whether the police have an individualized suspicion

that the person seized is the perpetrator of the suspected

crime); Commonwealth v. Depina, 456 Mass. 238, 243 (2010) (stop

based on dispatch is lawful if "the description of the suspect

conveyed by the dispatch had sufficient particularity that it

was reasonable for the police to suspect a person matching that

description").

Here, four factors allowed Officer Kearney to identify a

person matching the description in the tip with "sufficient

particularity." First, the tip described a 5'10", skinny, young

Black male in a red hoodie together with a medium-sized, young

9
Black male approximately the same age and height in a black

hoodie, wearing a ski mask. Officer Kearney identified two

suspects together fitting every aspect of that description.

Contrast Warren, 475 Mass. at 535 (suspects described as three

black males, two wearing dark clothing and one wearing a red

hoodie; no description of facial features, height, weight, or

other physical characteristics). Second, because Officer

Kearney responded very quickly -- within three to five

minutes -- his initial identification of the suspects was very

close in time to the 911 call. See id. at 536 ("proximity of

the stop to the time and location of the crime is a relevant

factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis" and "[p]roximity is

accorded greater probative value in the reasonable suspicion

calculus when the distance is short and the timing is close").

Third, because the tip indicated that the suspects went into a

specific store, Officer Kearney identified the suspects in the

precise location the caller said they would be. See id.

Fourth, Officer Kearney's quick investigation, creating a tight

and consistent relationship between the time and location of

both the tip and the identification, corroborated the

particularity of the tip. Contrast Warren, 475 Mass. at 535-537

(victim described three suspects carrying his stolen backpack;

defendant was one of two people stopped, and neither was

carrying a backpack; suspects' flight path was "mere

10
conjecture"; defendant was stopped a mile from the crime scene

and approximately twenty-five minutes after the crime; "timing

and location of the stop lacked a rational relationship to each

other"); Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 72 (report that "one of

[a] group of [B]lack youths had a gun did not serve to narrow

the range of suspects" to anyone in the group, much less the

defendant). At that point, Officer Kearney had properly

narrowed his investigation to the defendant.

As noted above, police must also establish the reliability

of an anonymous tip through investigation before they may seize

and search a suspect. "Corroboration by police of an

informant's predictions as to what the police will find,

particularly predictive information regarding nonobvious details

beyond those apparent to a casual bystander, is perhaps of

greatest significance in justifying police inquiries in reliance

on the tip" (quotation and citation omitted). Grinkley, 44

Mass. App. Ct. at 70. See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 458 Mass.

1017, 1018-1019 (2010) (stop and search based on unverified

anonymous tip unreasonable because there were "no predictions by

the caller of facts later confirmed by the police, to show the

caller had inside knowledge; and no evidence of corroboration by

the police of more than innocent details"); Morales, 106 Mass.

App. Ct. at 275 (same); Sertyl, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 840 (stop

11
and search based on anonymous 911 call unreasonable because no

evidence of caller's reliability).

For purposes of determining the reliability of the tip, the

motion judge cited Officer Kearney's testimony that when he

first entered the store, he saw a thin Black male wearing a red

hoodie with a Black male wearing a black hoodie and a ski mask.

On its own, this was at best an "obvious nonincriminating fact[]

that would be easily observable to any bystander" and not

"inside information that provides a legitimate inference of

personal knowledge" of criminal conduct. Grinkley, 44 Mass.

App. Ct. at 67. However, Officer Kearney was able to

corroborate the veracity of the 911 caller's tip with additional

details he observed.

After police stopped the young man in the red hoodie,

Officer Kearney went into the store, located the defendant, and

followed him. As the motion judge noted, Officer Kearney

testified that when he followed the defendant outside the store,

he noticed "something was weighing down the front of his

sweatshirt pocket" that was at least consistent with a firearm.

Officer Kearney testified that he carried a firearm every day

and was familiar with its weight. 3 His observation corroborated

3 The parties agree that the seizure occurred when Officer
Kearney grabbed the defendant's arm. Officer Kearney testified
that he observed the heavy object weighing down the defendant's
front hoodie pocket before the seizure.

12
the 911 caller's report that the medium sized young black man in

the black hoodie put the firearm in his pocket. Together, these

observations suggested that the 911 caller had "inside

information that provides a legitimate inference of personal

knowledge" of criminal conduct. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at

67.

Finally, the fact that both the young man in the red hoodie

and the defendant were wearing masks added something to the

veracity of the 911 caller's tip. The fact that both young men

were wearing masks, after allegedly transferring a firearm, and

immediately before walking into a retail store, was consistent

with an intent to conceal their identity during the commission

of a crime. 4

In total, these facts established the veracity of the 911

caller's tip. Therefore, the tip became a specific and

articulable fact that, combined with the other evidence Officer

4We note that masking was a common practice in October
2021, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. See
https://www.who.int/europe/emergencies/situations/covid-19 (The
World Health Organization declared an end to the global COVID-19
pandemic on May 5, 2023). As Officer Kearney's body-worn camera
footage illustrated, several shoppers in the store and several
police officers, were wearing masks. Accordingly, the fact that
the defendant was wearing a mask, by itself, would not have
corroborated the anonymous tip.

13
Kearney had developed, supported an objective basis to form a

reasonable suspicion that the defendant possessed a firearm.

The defense also challenges the reliability of the 911

caller's tip on the grounds that it did not establish a basis

for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because "the mere

possession and carrying of a gun is not a crime." Grinkley, 44

Mass. App. Ct. at 70. The defendant argues that this case is

analogous to Gomes, 458 Mass. at 1017. In that case, the

Supreme Judicial Court concluded that an anonymous tip that a

man was standing on a street pointing a gun in the air did not

supply police with reasonable suspicion to conduct an

investigatory stop where "[t]here was no evidence that the gun

had been fired, pointed at another person, or otherwise handled

in a way that posed a threat to someone." Id. at 1019.

This case is distinguishable from Gomes because Officer

Kearney's investigation corroborated the 911 caller's report

that one person who appeared to be under twenty-one years old

had passed a gun to a second, masked person, who also appeared

to be under twenty-one, before they both walked into a retail

store. Therefore, at the time Officer Kearney seized the

defendant, there was an objective basis to form a reasonable

suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the

defendant planned to commit an armed robbery, in violation of

G. L. c. 265, § 17, when he walked into the store. See

14
Commonwealth v. Benitez, 464 Mass. 686, 689-690 (2013) (listing

elements of armed robbery). Moreover, because the defendant

appeared to be under twenty-one, 5 the evidence supported a

reasonable suspicion that the defendant illegally possessed a

firearm. See G. L. c. 140, § 131 (d) (persons under twenty-one

are prohibited from carrying a firearm). In short, there was

objective evidence that the suspect "[had] committed, [was]

committing, or [was] about to commit a crime" (citation

omitted). Morales, 106 Mass. App. Ct. at 272. 6 Contrast Id. at

276 (finding anonymous tip did not warrant reasonable suspicion

where "the police were unable to corroborate the witness's tip

in its assertion of potential illegality").

Conclusion. Officer Kearney's seizure and pat frisk of the

defendant were reasonable. The motion judge's orders denying

the defendant's motion to suppress and motion for

reconsideration are affirmed.

So ordered.

5 In fact, the defendant had just turned twenty-one two
months before his arrest.

6 Because Officer Kearney's corroboration of the anonymous
tip established an objective basis to form a reasonable
suspicion that the defendant illegally possessed a firearm and
planned to commit an armed robbery, there was also an objective
basis to conclude that the defendant was armed and dangerous,
justifying a pat frisk. See Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484
Mass. 34, 36 (2020).

15
By the Court (Meade,
Desmond & Wood, JJ. 7),

Clerk

Entered: February 11, 2026.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

16