Commonwealth v. Luis Alberto Delvalle-Rodriguez.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1468

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

LUIS ALBERTO DELVALLE-RODRIGUEZ.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the

defendant, Luis Alberto Delvalle-Rodriguez, was convicted of

numerous crimes arising from a violent incident in the town of

Washington. On appeal, he argues that the judge erred in

denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty on

three charges of kidnapping under G. L. c. 265, § 26. We

affirm.

Background. "Because the defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence presented, we summarize the facts

the jury could have found in the light most favorable to the

1As is our custom, we set forth the defendant's name as it
appears in the indictments.
Commonwealth." Commonwealth v. Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 431

(2015).

On the night of August 20, 2018, and the early morning of

the next day, the defendant was at a party at a location

referred to as Washington Mountain. Dozens of young adults

gathered to drink, smoke, and socialize. They sat on wooden

pallets around a firepit and stood on a wall overlooking the

area. Carrying a firearm, the defendant arrived at the party

around 11:00 or 11:30 P.M.

Around 1:00 A.M., the three victims decided to leave the

party and got in the truck of the first victim, Nicholas

Carnevale. The truck was parked at the bottom of a muddy trail.

As the first victim started the truck in reverse, a group of

men, including the defendant, walked down the trail from the

firepit toward the truck. The first victim accelerated in an

attempt to get away, but the truck got stuck in the mud. When

the men reached the truck, they beat on it with their hands,

sticks, and slats from the pallets and tried to open its doors.

They shouted and yelled "fucking stab him" and "[g]et out before

we start shooting."

At some point, the truck's doors were unlocked and some of

the men, including the defendant, pulled out the first victim by

his leg. They punched the first victim and hit him with sticks

and slats. After the second victim got out of the truck through

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the passenger side window to try and help the first victim, he

was also punched and hit with sticks and slats. Then, several

gunshots rang out. As the first victim ran away, the defendant

shot him in the head. Meanwhile, the third victim remained in

the backseat of the truck and took cover on its floor. Once the

incident was over, the second victim tried to move the truck,

but it remained stuck in the mud.

A grand jury indicted the defendant on eleven counts

arising from the incident: armed assault with intent to murder,

G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury, G. L. c. 265,

§ 15A (c) (i); assault and battery by means of a dangerous

weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); armed kidnapping causing

serious bodily injury as to the first victim, G. L. c. 265,

§ 26; two counts of kidnapping while armed with a firearm as to

the second and third victims, G. L. c. 265, § 26; two counts of

assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13A (a); illegal possession

of a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony, G. L. c. 265, § 18B; and

malicious damage to a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a).

The Commonwealth entered nolle prosequis as to the two firearm

indictments. A jury trial was held on the remaining nine

counts. During the trial, the defendant filed a motion for a

required finding of not guilty as to all counts, which the judge

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denied. After the close of evidence, the defendant renewed his

motion as to the two counts of kidnapping while armed with a

firearm, which the judge also denied. The jury convicted the

defendant on all nine remaining counts.

Discussion. The defendant contends that the judge erred in

denying his motions for a required finding of not guilty as to

the three kidnapping offenses because there was insufficient

evidence that he intended to or in fact did confine or restrain

the liberty of the victims. In reviewing the denial of a motion

for a required finding of not guilty, "we assess the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether

any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 493

Mass. 303, 307 (2024), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378

Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979). "A conviction may rest exclusively

on circumstantial evidence, and, in evaluating that evidence, we

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth"

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 275

(2022). "The relevant question is whether the evidence would

permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires

such a finding." Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747

(1988).

A person is guilty of kidnapping if they, "without lawful

authority, forcibly or secretly confine[] or imprison[] another

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person . . . against [that person's] will." G. L. c. 265,

§ 26. "Confinement is broadly interpreted to mean any restraint

of a person's movement" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 548 (2017). Confinement

may be effectuated by actual force, but "if the victim is

subdued by the display of potential force, [that] is [also]

sufficient" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97

Mass. App. Ct. 206, 214 (2020). Because the Commonwealth

proceeded against the defendant both as a principal and as a

part of a joint venture, sufficient evidence as to either theory

is enough to sustain the convictions. Commonwealth v. Zanetti,

454 Mass. 449, 464 (2009).

Although the defendant maintains that his convictions

cannot be sustained because the muddy trail, not his actions,

prevented the victims from leaving the scene in the truck, that

is not the relevant inquiry. The question under the statute is

whether the defendant forcibly confined the victims inside the

truck. See Oberle, 476 Mass. at 548. The evidence here would

permit a rational trier of fact to find that he did. See Brown,

401 Mass. at 747. Multiple witnesses testified that the group

of men, including the defendant, banged on the truck with their

hands and objects. The men shouted and yelled threats at the

victims and threatened to shoot them. These facts, viewed in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, provided

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sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the

"threatening words [and] gestures" from the group of men,

including the defendant, were a display of force or potential

force that kept the victims confined inside the truck.

Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 717 (2021). See

Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 214. Contrary to the defendant's

contention, whether the victims were physically able to remove

themselves from the truck is not dispositive of whether their

movement was restrained by the threat of harm. See Commonwealth

v. Lent, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 710 n.5 (1999).

The Commonwealth did not have to prove that the defendant

had the specific intent to confine or imprison the victims. See

Commonwealth v. Saylor, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 121-122 (1989).

General Laws c. 265, § 26, sets forth three relevant clauses,

which read:

"Whoever, without lawful authority, [1] forcibly or
secretly confines or imprisons another person within this
commonwealth against his will, or [2] forcibly carries or
sends such person out of this commonwealth, or [3] forcibly
seizes and confines or inveigles or kidnaps another person,
with intent either to cause him to be secretly confined or
imprisoned in this commonwealth against his will, or to
cause him to be sent out of this commonwealth against his
will or in any way held to service against his will, shall
be punished . . . ."

See Commonwealth v. Bibby, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 158, 160 (2002),

citing G. L. c. 265, § 26. Here, the relevant indictments

charged the defendant with all three theories of kidnapping, in

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the alternative.2 At trial, the Commonwealth relied only on the

first theory under G. L. c. 265, § 26, and that is the theory on

which the jury was instructed. That theory does not require the

Commonwealth to prove that the defendant had a specific intent.

See Saylor, supra. Accordingly, it was enough for the

Commonwealth to prove that the defendant confined the victims

"by force and against [their] will, and that the sequence of

events [was not] accidental." Id. at 122. See Commonwealth v.

Traylor, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 243 n.7 (1997). As discussed,

2 The indictments alleged that the defendant, "without
lawful authority, did forcibly or secretly confine or imprison
[victim] within this Commonwealth against such person's will, or
did forcibly carry or send such person out of this Commonwealth,
or did forcibly seize and confine or inveigle or kidnap such
person, with intent either to cause such person to be secretly
confined or imprisoned in this Commonwealth against such
person's will, or to cause such person to be sent out of this
Commonwealth against such person's will or in some way held to
service against such person's will . . ." (emphasis added).

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the evidence was sufficient to support such a finding.3

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Henry, Shin &
Toone, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: April 2, 2026.

3 Had the defendant been tried under the third theory, the
Commonwealth would have had to prove that he had the requisite
specific intent. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 375 Mass. 118, 120
(1978); Bibby, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 160-161.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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