Commonwealth v. James I. Wilson.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-84

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JAMES I. WILSON.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

On July 17, 2020, following a probation final surrender

hearing, a District Court judge found that the defendant had

violated the conditions of his probation, revoked the

defendant's probation, and imposed a nine-month committed

sentence.2 The defendant now appeals from the orders denying his

motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts to the

crime for which he was placed on probation, his motion to amend

1 Also known as James Lyons and Jamie Lyons.

2The defendant was charged with and admitted to sufficient
facts for the offense of assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). On March 12,
2020, the District Court judge continued the case without a
finding for one year with probationary conditions.
his motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient facts, and

his motion for the court activity record information (CARI) of

the victim in the underlying offense, all of which were denied

by the same admission and probation revocation judge. The

defendant contends that plea counsel labored under a conflict of

interest in his representation of the defendant because plea

counsel had previously represented the victim in a criminal

matter some years earlier. The defendant also contends that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney

inadequately investigated how the defendant's posttraumatic

stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis related to his self-defense

claim nor advised him accordingly. We affirm.

Discussion. "A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is treated

as a motion for a new trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)

. . . ." Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 47 (2015).3

That is, "[w]e examine the motion judge's conclusion only to

determine whether there has been a significant error of law or

other abuse of discretion" (quotation and citation omitted).

Id.

3"An admission to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilty is treated as a guilty plea for the purposes of a motion
for a new trial." Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337 n.1
(2014).

2
1. Conflict of interest. a. Actual conflict of interest.

"[U]nder art. 12, if a defendant establishes an actual conflict

of interest, he is entitled to a new trial without a further

showing; he need not demonstrate that the conflict adversely

affected his lawyer's performance or resulted in actual

prejudice." Commonwealth v. Mosher, 455 Mass. 811, 819 (2010).

"An actual or genuine conflict of interest, however, must be one

in which prejudice is inherent in the situation, such that no

impartial observer could reasonably conclude that the attorney

is able to serve the defendant with undivided loyalty"

(quotation omitted). Id. at 819-820. "Courts frequently

consult standards laid out in applicable codes of professional

ethics in considering whether an actual conflict exists." Id.

at 820 n.19.

Here, the defendant argues his plea counsel labored under

an actual conflict of interest, because his plea counsel's prior

representation of the victim prevented plea counsel from

discovering and investigating criminal charges against the

victim to support the defendant's self-defense claim. The claim

is unavailing because, to the extent that plea counsel's prior

representation presented a potential conflict of interest, it

never manifested as an actual conflict of interest. See Mosher,

455 Mass. at 819-823. Discovering the victim's criminal

offender record information did not require plea counsel to

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disclose confidential information he may have received during

his representation of the victim nor use any confidential

information to discover the victim's prior criminal history.

See Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6, as amended, 490 Mass. 1302 (2022);

1.9 (c), as amended, 490 Mass. 1305 (2022).

The defendant further suggests that plea counsel was aware

of a conflict of interest and limited his representation of the

defendant only after he already began to investigate the

victim's prior criminal charges. This contention, however, not

only is unsupported by the record, but strains credulity where

plea counsel relied on the board of probation's report that the

victim did not have a criminal record.4 It therefore was not an

abuse of discretion for the judge to credit plea counsel's

account in concluding that there was no actual conflict of

interest. See Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. at 47.

4 While the judge was permitted to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether plea counsel did, in fact,
subsequently remember confidential information regarding the
victim that he abstained from using or disclosing, we cannot,
however, say it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to have
concluded that an evidentiary hearing would not have revealed an
actual conflict of interest, based on plea counsel's
representation by affidavit that he failed to recall his prior
representation of the victim and indeed had received no evidence
of his representation. See Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass.
141, 148 n.8 (2013) ("The decision to hold an evidentiary
hearing on a motion for a new trial is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge" [citation omitted]).

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b. Potential conflict of interest. Assuming without

deciding that plea counsel's prior representation of the victim

presented a potential conflict of interest that prevented his

discovery of the victim's prior acts of violence, such a claim

would require that the defendant establish that he was

prejudiced by the conflict. See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366

Mass. 89, 96 (1974) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

requires showing counsel's errors "likely deprived the defendant

of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence"). See

also Commonwealth v. Croken, 432 Mass. 266, 272 (2000) (adopting

same prejudice standard as Saferian in claims where defendant

shows potential conflict of interest). Here the defendant has

made no such showing and our review of the record evinces that

he was not.

If the defendant were able to examine the victim about

specific acts of violence allegedly initiated by the victim in

order to support the contention that the victim was the first

aggressor, such examination would have permitted the prosecution

to rebut the defendant's argument with the defendant's own past

acts of violence, to which there were several. See Commonwealth

v. Morales, 464 Mass. 302, 310-311 (2013) (defendant's prior

acts of violence admissible to rebut evidence of prior acts by

victim on first aggressor issue); Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443

Mass. 649, 650, 664 (2005) (victim's prior acts of violence

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admissible to support defendant's claim of self-defense that

victim was first aggressor if probative value of said evidence

outweighs its prejudicial effects); Mass. G. Evid.

§ 404(a)(2)(B) (2025). Indeed, while plea counsel had assisted

the victim in having charges of crimes of violence dismissed in

2011, plea counsel had also previously assisted the defendant in

having charges of crimes of violence unrelated to this appeal

dismissed in 2019. Because both the victim's and the

defendant's prior acts of violence may have been admissible, it

is doubtful that presenting evidence of the victim's prior acts

of violence would have been to the defendant's advantage, let

alone provide a substantial ground of defense.5 See Morales,

supra; Adjutant, supra at 663-664; Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.

Moreover, the evidence in the underlying case did not

support a viable claim of self-defense. Both the defendant's

wife, a percipient witness to the offense, and the victim told

the responding officers that the defendant struck the victim

with a shovel and did not state the victim was armed.6 The

5 For the same reasons, we affirm the orders denying the
defendant's motion for the victim's CARI and the defendant's
motion to amend his motion to withdraw his admission to
sufficient facts.

6 Plea counsel averred that the defendant's wife was
cooperating with the Commonwealth at the time of plea
discussions, noting that the defense strategy of accepting a
plea took into consideration that she "had come to court to
support [the victim] and to testify for the prosecution."

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defendant's wife portrayed the defendant as the aggressor, and

attributed no aggression or acts of violence to the victim.

Although the defendant denied hitting the victim with a shovel,

the police recovered a shovel after the defendant's wife showed

the police where the defendant hid the shovel in her backyard.

The police also reported the victim's injuries as consistent

with being hit with a shovel. We thus discern no prejudice

stemming from plea counsel's prior representation of the victim.

See Croken, 432 Mass. at 272.

2. The defendant's PTSD. "Where an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim is brought, 'a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all

the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to

counsel's judgments.'" Commonwealth v. Tavares, 491 Mass. 362,

366 (2023), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691

(1984). "That is, although trial counsel need not descend into

every rabbit hole, he or she 'has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes

particular investigations unnecessary.'" Tavares, supra,

quoting Strickland, supra.

Here, the defendant asserts that plea counsel was

constitutionally deficient because he should have investigated

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and explained to the defendant that the defendant's PTSD

diagnosis could be presented to the court in support of the

defendant's self-defense claim.

We first note that plea counsel did indeed present facts

about the defendant's PTSD during the admission hearing to the

judge, and that the judge was seemingly already familiar with

the defendant's mental health issues. The judge subsequently

accepted the defendant's plea recommendation and sentenced him

to one year of probation with conditions7 over the Commonwealth's

recommendation of a six-month committed sentence.

Additionally, it was reasonable for plea counsel to have

concluded, based on the evidence available, that the defendant's

PTSD diagnosis would not have presented a sufficient basis for

his self-defense claim. See Tavares, 491 Mass. at 366-367.

Plea counsel appropriately averred that "nothing indicated to

[him] that [the defendant] had a PTSD-related incident." Both

counsel and the judge were familiar with the defendant and the

types of behavior that had brought him to court on previous

occasions. Plea counsel's decision to recommend tendering a

7 Namely, that the defendant enter into and complete a
Department of Veterans Affairs dual diagnosis residential
treatment program, remain drug and alcohol free, and not commit
new criminal offenses.

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plea without further investigation into the defendant's PTSD

diagnosis, was therefore reasonable. Cf. id. at 366-367.

Conclusion. The October 23, 2024 orders denying the

defendant's motion to withdraw his admission to sufficient

facts, denying the defendant's motion to amend the motion to

withdraw admission, and denying the defendant's motion for court

activity record information of a witness are affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Desmond,
D'Angelo & Smyth, JJ.8),

Clerk

Entered: April 7, 2026.

8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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