Commonwealth v. Messiah Leggett.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-143

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MESSIAH LEGGETT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial the defendant was found guilty of

involuntary manslaughter, G. L. c. 265, § 13, and possession of

a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), in the

shooting death of Nalijah Andrade, a high school senior with

whom the defendant and his friends had been partying in a hotel

room. The victim and the defendant had been "play fighting"

with a "ghost gun" in a corner of the room when the gun

discharged, sending a fatal bullet through the victim's head.

We affirm.

Background. The jury could have found that four young men

-- the defendant and his friend Kenny Jnley, along with two of

Jnley's friends -- came to Boston one night to gather, drink,
hang out, and consume marijuana in two hotel rooms they had

rented. Jnley and his friends went to the hotel just before

7 P.M; the defendant arrived separately. The four spent time in

the room "[c]hilling, talking, smoking," playing with a gun, and

making video recordings.

A "selfie" video recording taken around 9:30 P.M. depicted

Jnley dancing, playing with a black and gray gun, which he

pointed both at the recording device and at his own neck,

displaying a paper cup full of a yellow-brown liquid, and

singing. (The version of the video recording played for the

jury was muted on the order of the judge to prevent possible

prejudice to the defendant. The other "selfie" video recording

discussed infra was also muted.) In the video recording the

defendant approaches from behind Jnley and joins in the dancing

and singing. From his position, the defendant had an

unobstructed view of the gun. While the defendant was in the

frame, standing behind Jnley, Jnley removed a magazine from the

handle of the gun and pointed the top of the magazine at the

camera, revealing a gold-colored bullet inside. The defendant's

face was visible behind Jnley while Jnley, with the gun lifted

to shoulder height, replaced the magazine in the gun's handle.

A group of four young women, including the victim, later

joined the young men, and the eight continued drinking, smoking

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marijuana, and playing with the gun. The victim was among the

people playing with the gun. Eventually, the defendant, the

victim, and three other people ended up in one of the two hotel

rooms. The defendant and the victim were in a corner of the

room outside the bathroom, "play fighting" with their hands and

talking. The mood in the room was "[n]ormal." There was no

"rustling" or "grappling" noise from the corner where the

defendant and victim were alone together.

A witness heard a gunshot from the corner. The witness saw

the victim on the floor with the defendant looking at her

saying, "What did I do? What did I do? Oh, my God. What did I

do?" According to the defendant, before the victim was shot,

she was playing with the gun again. He and Jnley told her to

"chill." The victim said, "I know you guys wouldn't really like

wouldn't shoot it or stuff like that." When asked by

investigating officers, "Who had the gun when she was shot," the

defendant responded, "Me, but like, well, she did first but then

me." Asked what happened to the gun after the shooting, the

defendant responded, "I think I had it or I picked it up," and

he "put it in the bathroom."

The gun was recovered. It was a nine millimeter Polymer80

semiautomatic pistol with no serial number, a "ghost gun"

modeled after a Glock. Test-firing confirmed that it was a

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working firearm that could fire a round fed from the magazine

found near the victim. It had a trigger safety, a small tab

that had to be depressed at the same time the trigger was pulled

to allow the firearm to fire. The firearm did not have a

"hairpin trigger," one that required only one to two pounds of

pressure to fire.

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. We review

the defendant's insufficiency claims, considering the evidence

introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, to determine whether any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-

678 (1979), bearing in mind that guilt may be established by

circumstantial evidence "and that the inferences a jury may draw

from the evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible and need

not be necessary or inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Linton, 456

Mass. 534, 544 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass.

770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007). In so doing, we

are mindful that, "[w]ith few exceptions, the task of assessing

the cogency of evidence and resolving conflicting testimony is

the exclusive province of the fact finder." Commonwealth v.

Tanner, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 432, 437 (2006).

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a. Involuntary manslaughter: "wanton and reckless"

conduct. "Involuntary manslaughter arises where death is caused

by wanton or reckless conduct -- that is, 'intentional conduct

that create[s] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm

will result to another person.'" Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495

Mass. 770, 781 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 494

Mass. 288, 297 (2024). Proof of involuntary manslaughter does

not require that the defendant "inten[d] to cause the specific

harm," but only "inten[d] to engage in the wanton or reckless

conduct itself." Njuguna, supra. The Commonwealth can prove

intent "either subjectively, based on the defendant's specific

knowledge, or objectively, based on what a reasonable person

should have known in the circumstances." Id. "[T]he relevant

inquiry is whether a defendant knew of facts that would cause a

reasonable person to know of the relevant danger, or whether the

defendant in fact knew of the danger." Commonwealth v. Horne,

466 Mass. 440, 444 (2013).

The defendant stresses the absence of evidence conclusively

demonstrating that he put the gun to the victim's head, knowing

or suspecting it to be loaded, and pulled the trigger. Instead,

he emphasizes evidence from which the jury could have concluded

that the victim herself held the gun and accidentally shot

herself while he attempted to intervene and remove the gun for

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her safety. But in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence,

we must assess it in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, rather than to the defendant. See Latimore, 378

Mass. at 677. Furthermore, the defendant asserted this accident

theory at trial, and the judge appropriately and correctly

instructed that "[t]he Commonwealth ha[d] the burden of proof to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of [the victim]

was not an accident." She further explained that an accident

"is defined as an unexpected happening that occurs without

intention or design on the defendant's part," a "sudden,

unexpected event that takes place without the defendant's

intending it." Finally, she instructed that an "accident is an

unintentional event occurring through inadvertence or mistake or

negligence," and that, if the Commonwealth failed to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt "that what occurred was not an

accident, then you must find the defendant not guilty." See

Commonwealth v. Lowe, 391 Mass. 97, 109-110 (1984). "We presume

that a jury follow all instructions given to it." Commonwealth

v. Watkins, 425 Mass. 830, 840 (1997). In delivering a verdict

of guilty, the jury necessarily considered and rejected the

accident theory.

A "person who handles a dangerous weapon in such a manner

as to make the killing or physical injury of another a natural

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and probable result of such conduct can be found guilty of

involuntary manslaughter, although he did not contemplate such a

result." Commonwealth v. Bouvier, 316 Mass. 489, 494 (1944).

See Commonwealth v. Depradine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 401, 407

(1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 416 Mass. 114, 122

(1993) ("It is of no consequence that the defendant may have

meant no harm to the victim. 'Wanton or reckless conduct does

not involve a wilful intention to cause the resulting harm'").

The evidence established that the defendant and the victim

were alone together in a corner with a loaded firearm and were

"play fighting." Based on the "selfie" video recording from

earlier in the evening, the jury could have inferred that the

defendant either was aware or should have been aware that the

gun could be loaded. The defendant admitted that he was holding

the gun when the victim was shot. The firearms expert's

testimony allowed the jury to conclude that the weapon's firing

was not accidental. The jury were also entitled to consider the

defendant's cries of "What did I do?" after the shooting when

considering his role.

The defendant makes much of the complex and contradictory

evidence presented to the jury: that the defendant, in his

statement to investigators, said that the victim had been

"pointing [the firearm] in the air and like joking and stuff"

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before the shot was fired, that the defendant had no blood on

his hands, while the victim did; that the scientific evidence

about the bullet's downward trajectory and the human hair in the

firearm's slide "equally supported the proposition" that the

discharge of the weapon was an accident, or that the victim

herself fired the weapon; and that the victim plausibly could

have believed that the gun was not loaded. A jury could have

heard this evidence and reached a different verdict, but this

jury did not. See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 100, 113

(2010)("To the extent that conflicting inferences may be drawn

from the evidence, it is for the jury to decide which version to

credit"); Lao, 443 Mass. at 779 ("If, from the evidence,

conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the jury to

determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility

of the evidence is wholly within their province").

We are also unpersuaded by the defendant's argument that,

if he was attempting to take a loaded gun from the victim, the

conviction cannot stand. First, the jury were not required to

interpret the evidence this way, and we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Lao, 443 Mass. at

779. Second, when it comes to intent, an involuntary

manslaughter conviction asks only whether "wanton [or] reckless

conduct cause[d] death." O'Brien, 494 Mass. at 297, quoting

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Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 590 (2001). It is

settled law that "[a] man may be reckless within the meaning of

the law although he himself thought he was careful."

Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 (1944). When the

defendant and victim were "play fighting" and had a loaded gun

near the victim's head, the standard has been met. See Bouvier,

316 Mass. at 494; Commonwealth v. Griffin, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 276,

279 (1979) (affirming involuntary manslaughter conviction of

defendant intending to "scare the victim" or "play a foolhardy

game" by pointing firearm at victim's head and pulling trigger).

We stress that this conclusion in no way touches on the

defendant's motivation in the moment. Whether the defendant

deliberately held the loaded firearm to the victim's head, as

the Commonwealth asserted in its opening statement, or grappled

with the victim in a well-intentioned effort to wrest the

firearm from her, the evidence was sufficient, reviewed under

the Latimore standard, to support the conviction.

b. Possession of the firearm. The defendant maintains

that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed

the firearm. We again employ the Latimore standard, 378 Mass.

at 677-678, and we again disagree.

To convict the defendant of unlawful possession of a

firearm, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the

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defendant, (1) possessed a firearm that (2) met the legal

definition of a firearm, (3) knowing that he possessed or had

control of a firearm, and (4) did not have a license to carry

firearms. G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a); Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491

Mass. 666, 690, S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S.

Ct. 2683 (2024). The defendant challenges only the first

element.

As outlined above, the evidence was sufficient for a jury

rationally to conclude that the defendant was holding the

firearm at the time of the shooting. The defendant quoted the

victim as saying she knew "they" would not shoot her, allowing

an inference that he, not she, was holding the firearm when they

were alone in the corner. His reaction to the shooting was to

ask, "Oh, my God. What did I do?," a question the jury could

have concluded established possession of the firearm.

Furthermore, the defendant told the police interviewers that he

had possession of the firearm right before the shooting. Taken

together and viewed in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to

conclude that the defendant possessed the firearm. See

Depradine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. at 405-406 (affirming conviction

for involuntary manslaughter where defendant admitted possession

of firearm when it discharged; defendant and victim "were close

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to each other" at moment of discharge; only two people were

present in room; and testimony established that firearm could

not have been fired without pulling trigger). See also

Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 232, 234-237 (2007)

(defendant's incriminating statements admitting to possession

and independent evidence corroborating crime sufficient to

establish defendant's possession of firearm).

2. Detective's testimony. The defendant challenges

testimony by the lead investigator (detective) in response to

the defendant's Bowden defense. See Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379

Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980). As the defendant timely objected, we

review any error under the prejudicial error standard.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445 Mass. 589, 591 (2005). "This requires

a two-part analysis: (1) was there error; and (2) if so, was

that error prejudicial." Id. "An error is not prejudicial if

it 'did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect

. . . .'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348,

353 (1994).

"A Bowden claim refers to defendants' right to base their

defense on the failure of police adequately to investigate [the

crime] in order to raise the issue of reasonable doubt as to the

defendant's guilt in the minds of the jury" (quotation and

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 186

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(2019). When a defendant raises a defense under Bowden, "the

Commonwealth may offer testimony about why the investigators

chose the particular investigative path they did, in order to

rebut that defense" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 478 (2019). "The

permissible scope of rebuttal evidence depends, in part, on the

issues raised by the defense; the more wide-ranging the

defendant's attack on the police investigation, the broader the

Commonwealth's response may be" (quotation and citation

omitted). Colon, supra at 187.

A central theme of the defense was attacking the law

enforcement conclusion that the defendant had been handling the

firearm when it discharged. Unsurprisingly, the cross-

examination of the detective explored his failure to pursue

certain investigative steps that might have supported or

conflicted with this conclusion, including distance

determination testing, a shooting reconstruction, and gunshot

residue testing of the victim's hands and clothing. The

redirect limned these same topics. The detective testified

that, based in part on his education and experience, the

"stellate pattern" of the wound on the victim's head signified

to him that the firearm was against her head when it discharged,

so he had not requested the additional tests.

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As the defendant argues, this testimony was inconsistent

with the medical examiner's opinion that a star-shaped wound

does not indicate "anything in particular as it relates to a

head wound," and that she made no observations of either the

exit or entrance wounds that "would be able to tell [her]

whether or not this was a closer-contact wound." The defendant

attacks the detective's testimony as inadmissible expert opinion

testimony, lacking a proper evidentiary basis, that the

detective was unqualified to offer, even as part of a Bowden

response.

When the "defendant has inserted into the case the

relevance of the police judgment and decisions . . . the officer

must be allowed to defend that judgment." Commonwealth v.

Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 467 (2000). In such a case, "the

prosecutor may proceed by inquiring of the officer the reason

for each specific omission or decision." Id. "[T]he government

cannot be precluded entirely from explaining why the action

taken was correct in the circumstances." Id.

This is what the prosecutor did here. She followed the

cross-examination by questioning the detective about why he did

not take the additional investigative steps. The experienced

trial judge provided appropriate contemporaneous limiting

instructions on several occasions in connection with the

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detective's Bowden rebuttal testimony. "[J]urors are presumed

to have followed the judge's instructions to disregard the

evidence." Commonwealth v. Durand, 475 Mass. 657, 669 (2016).

Even if some of this testimony came close to or crossed the

line into improper expert opinion -- a matter as to which we

take no position -- there was no prejudice. "[I]n response to

the jury's exposure to inadmissible evidence, the judge may

correctly rel[y] on curative instructions as an adequate means

to correct any error and to remedy any prejudice to the

defendant" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Torres, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 272, 280 (2014). "Generally, provided

the instructions are reasonably prompt and the jury do not hear

the inadmissible evidence again, the error will be considered

cured." Commonwealth v. Roe, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 801, 804 (2016),

citing Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 38 (1997). So it

was here.

3. Admission of exhibit 73; exclusion of other video

evidence. Exhibit 73 was a "selfie" video recording taken the

day before the shooting. It depicted both Jnley and the

defendant in the front seat of a car, with Jnley waving a

firearm that looked similar to the nine millimeter firearm used

in the shooting. The defendant challenged its admission as

prior bad act evidence, arguing that the fact that the defendant

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had been present while Jnley brandished the firearm had little

or no probative value and was simply propensity evidence. We

review for abuse of discretion and reverse only if we encounter

palpable error. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 470 Mass. 443, 450

(2015), and cases cited.

The core of the defendant's argument is that the evidence

was inadmissible because the central question before the jury

"was whether [the defendant] would understand that attempting to

take the firearm from [the victim] was more unsafe than allowing

her to hold the gun to her head." This mischaracterizes the

central jury question and ignores the Latimore standard under

which we conduct our review.

We are not persuaded that the judge erred in assessing the

prejudice in light of the probative value of the evidence. She

concluded that exhibit 73 was admissible "for the limited

purpose of demonstrating the defendant's access to and knowledge

of firearms," and announced that she would give a limiting

instruction. So she did; after exhibit 73 was played, the judge

instructed the jury not to consider the video recording "as

evidence or proof that [the defendant] has any kind of a

criminal propensity or personality or bad character," but

"solely on the limited issue of the defendant['s] . . . access

to or knowledge of firearms." See Commonwealth v. Ridge, 455

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Mass. 307, 323 (2009). She repeated these instructions in her

final charge. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court has "often

held that such evidence may be admissible to demonstrate the

defendant's access to or familiarity with firearms."

Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414-415 (2020). The

limited admission, combined with the judge's contemporaneous and

final instructions, did not give rise to error.

The defendant also contends that the judge erred by

excluding other video evidence that showed Jnley with a firearm

similar to the one used in the shooting. The defendant was not

depicted in these recordings. Asserting that, without these

video recordings, he "could not demonstrate that the firearm was

[Jnley's]," the defendant claims that he was deprived of the

ability to "paint a full picture of the events for the jury,"

including that he did not bring the gun to the hotel.

The judge committed no error in excluding this evidence.

The ownership of the firearm was not at issue in the case and

was legally irrelevant to the charges being tried. While the

defendant was charged with possessing the firearm, this charge

related to the moments surrounding the victim's shooting, rather

than his ownership.

4. Errors in closing. The defendant identifies what he

views as three misstatements in the prosecutor's closing.

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First, we agree that the prosecutor's attribution to the medical

examiner of the testimony that a "stellate wound" signaled a

close-contact wound was error. This was the detective's

testimony. Second, the defendant is incorrect that there was no

evidence to suggest that the victim's left hand was nondominant.

Her cousin testified that the victim was right-handed. Third,

the defendant challenges the prosector's argument that, after

the shooting, the defendant "would have had to unwrap [the

victim's] dead hand from" around the weapon to move it.

In analyzing a claim of an improper closing argument, we

review for prejudicial error those statements as to which the

defendant objected, Commonwealth v. Rosario, 430 Mass. 505, 515

(1999), and, as to the unpreserved claims, we review to

determine whether any error created a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 20

(1999). "[T]he prosecutor's remarks must be viewed in light of

the 'entire argument, as well as in light of the judge's

instruction to the jury and the evidence at trial.'"

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 565 (2002), quoting

Commonwealth v. Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 432 (1984).

"Prosecutors may 'argue forcefully for the defendant's

conviction.'" Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 199

(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350

17
(1998). "The jury are presumed to understand that a prosecutor

is an advocate, and statements that are '[e]nthusiastic

rhetoric, strong advocacy, and excusable hyperbole' will not

require reversal." Martinez, supra, quoting Wilson, supra at

351.

The defendant objected to the "stellate defect" testimony,

and we therefore review the prosecutor's error for prejudice.

We see none. The jury were instructed that their memory of the

facts controlled and, further, that the statements of the

lawyers were not evidence. Furthermore, there was ample other

evidence of close contact between the firearm and the victim's

head, which mitigated any prejudicial effect of this

misstatement.

We similarly perceive no error in the prosecutor's

statement about the defendant's removing the gun from the

victim's hand. This statement was part of the prosecutor's

argument about how the gun was removed from the hotel room after

the shooting. The defendant had admitted to the police that he

took the firearm from the room, and the prosecutor was

responding to a defense argument that, consistent with the

defense theory, the victim had been holding the gun when it

discharged. The prosecutor's response was intended to cast

doubt on this version of the shooting.

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A prosecutor may "respond to the defense argument and also

comment on the . . . weakness of the defense, as long as

argument is directed at the defendant's defense and not at the

defendant's failure to testify" (quotation and citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 686 (2021).

Furthermore, "[i]n closing argument, prosecutors are entitled to

marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury may

draw from it. Those inferences need only be reasonable and

possible" (quotation and citations omitted). Commonwealth v.

Roy, 464 Mass. 818, 829 (2013). We perceive no error, and

certainly no error that would give rise to a substantial risk of

a miscarriage of justice.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Desmond,
Hershfang & Brennan, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: June 12, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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