John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 523875 v. Sex Offender Registry Board.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

21-P-1036

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 523875

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe, appeals from a Superior Court

judgment that affirmed his classification by the Sex Offender

Registry Board (SORB or board) as a level three sex offender.

Doe contends that the hearing examiner erred in applying certain

factors, engaged in a checklist approach which was arbitrary and

capricious and was not supported by substantial evidence, and

that his liberty and privacy interests outweigh the public's

right to his information via publication. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the essential facts as set forth

in the hearing examiner's decision, "supplemented by undisputed

facts from the record" and reserving some facts for later

discussion. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 606 (2011).
In August 2014, a woman reported that Doe sexually

assaulted her in July 2014. The woman (victim one) alleged

that, while at a bar, Doe attempted to persuade her to engage in

sexual activity in exchange for heroin and crack cocaine. After

the woman refused, Doe led her into an alley, lifted her shirt

and bra, pulled down her pants, and digitally penetrated her

vagina. Doe told her he could "easily slice her throat, rape

her and dump her body and no one would know." Doe then put a

sharp object against her, forced her to fellate him, and

ejaculated in her mouth. At the time of the assault, Doe was on

probation and was wearing a global positioning system (GPS)

ankle monitor.

Just over a month later, in September 2014, another woman

reported a similar assault to the police. She stated that Doe

approached her and asked if she wanted to accompany him to "get

high" on heroin or cocaine. Doe led her to an alley, pressed a

sharp object against her neck, pushed her head down, and forced

his penis into her mouth until he ejaculated.

Doe was indicted in Superior Court on charges arising from

his attacks on both women. As to the first victim, Doe pleaded

guilty to two counts of rape, in violation of G. L. c. 265,

§ 22, and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person

over fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H. He was

sentenced to six to seven years for the two counts of rape, and

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three years of probation for the two counts of indecent assault

and battery. As part of the plea deal regarding the first

victim, the charges involving the second victim were dismissed.

Subsequently, SORB preliminarily classified Doe as a level

three sex offender. Doe requested a hearing to challenge SORB's

classification; after a de novo classification hearing, the

hearing examiner found by clear and convincing evidence that Doe

presented a high risk to reoffend and a high degree of

dangerousness and affirmed the classification. Doe sought

judicial review, and a Superior Court judge affirmed the level

three classification. This appeal followed.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. To support a level

three sex offender classification, SORB must prove by clear and

convincing evidence: (1) that the risk of reoffense is high;

(2) that the offender’s dangerousness, as measured by the

severity and extent of harm the offender would present to the

public in the event of reoffense, is high; and (3) that a public

safety interest is served by Internet publication of the

offender’s registry information. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 644, 657

(2019) ("requirement of explicit findings regarding all three

elements applies not only to level two classifications, but also

to level three classifications").

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"In reviewing SORB's decisions, we 'give due weight to the

experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of

the agency.'" Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013), quoting G. L.

c. 30A, § 14 (7). However, we may "set aside or modify SORB's

classification decision where . . . the decision is in excess of

SORB's statutory authority or jurisdiction, violates

constitutional provisions, is based on an error of law, or is

not supported by substantial evidence." Doe No. 496501, 482

Mass. at 649.

"[T]he proper standard of review when an offender

successfully challenges the application of a regulatory factor

is to ask whether the error may have affected the classification

and, if so, to remand to SORB." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 797,

804 (2022) (Doe No. 22188). If the underlying facts "clearly

dictate the appropriate classification level," then the

classification may stand and remand is unnecessary. Id. at 804,

quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356315 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 301 (2021). If

the facts do not clearly dictate the result, then the court must

"examine whether the examiner's decision itself relied on the

erroneous factor," and if so, remand to SORB. Id. at 805.

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2. Application of risk factors. The hearing examiner

determined that Doe's risk was heightened based on the

application of ten risk factors. In addition to factor 2

(repetitive and compulsive behavior), which the hearing examiner

applied as a high risk factor, the examiner also applied nine

risk elevating factors. The examiner also considered and

weighed the risk mitigating factors.1 Doe argues the examiner

erroneously applied factors 2, 9, 10, and 11.2 We conclude that

factors 9, 10, and 11 were properly applied, and thus were not

arbitrarily or capriciously applied. And while we agree with

Doe that factor 2 was misapplied, the underlying facts of the

case clearly dictate that the appropriate classification is

level three such that remand is not warranted.

1 The examiner gave Doe moderate mitigating weight to factor 28
(supervision by probation or parole), factor 32 (sex offender
treatment), and factor 33 (home situation and support systems).
2 The examiner also found that Doe sexually assaulted stranger

victims, applying factor 7 (relationship between the offender
and victim); used a weapon during the sex offenses, applying
factor 8 (weapons, violence or infliction of bodily injury);
used drugs during the commission of the offenses, applying
factor 9 (alcohol and substance abuse); possessed drugs and
accumulated twelve disciplinary reports while incarcerated,
applying factor 12 (behavior while incarcerated or civilly
committed); had violated his probation twice in the past,
applying factor 13 (noncompliance with community supervision);
penetrated the first victim with his fingers and penetrated her
mouth with his penis, and penetrated the second victim with his
penis, applying factor 19 (level of physical contact); and that
he sexually assaulted two victims, applying factor 22 (number of
victims).

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a. Factor 9. Factor 9 is applicable when (1) the sex

offender has a "history of substance abuse," (2) the sex

offender "demonstrates active substance abuse," or (3) when the

substance abuse "was a contributing factor in the sexual

misconduct." 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(9)(a) (2016). Doe

contends that the hearing examiner erred in applying this factor

because it does not apply to an offender's use of drugs to lure

the victim to a place where a sex offense may occur, that the

hearing examiner ignored relevant evidence, such as Doe's

participation in substance abuse treatment, and that the hearing

examiner made a factual error in finding that Doe was found in

possession of an opioid during incarceration.3 SORB acknowledges

that if the offer of heroin and cocaine to lure victims to a

situation where he could sexually assault them was the only

evidence of drug use, factor 9 would not apply.

Doe concedes that he was under the influence of drugs at

the time of the offenses, admitted that he sold and used drugs

prior to incarceration, and that he "had no other options but to

sell and use drugs to maintain his lifestyle." Doe also admits

that he was found in possession of an illegal drug, "K2," while

incarcerated. Further, while Doe completed one substance abuse

course, there was no evidence that he engaged in prolonged

3 Doe also argues that the hearing examiner utilized a "checklist
approach," which we address infra.

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treatment. While the hearing examiner should have mentioned

Doe's participation in substance abuse treatment, on this

record, the hearing examiner's application of this factor was

not arbitrary or capricious. See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 486 Mass. 749, 759 n.12

(2021) (affirming hearing examiner's finding that petitioner's

substance abuse increased his risk of reoffense and degree of

dangerousness when sexual misconduct was worse when drinking and

where he had lengthy history of "substance-related crime"). We

discern no error with the application of this factor.

b. Factor 10. Doe contends the hearing examiner also

erred in applying factor 10 (contact with criminal justice

system). The hearing examiner noted that between 2007 and 2014

Doe was charged with thirteen offenses,4 and had two probation

violations.5 Doe does not contest the accuracy of the

information in the examiner's summary of his criminal history,

merely that the examiner did not make it clear that the

4 The hearing examiner listed all nonsexual charges in the
underlying sex offense case as well as charges relating to a
2012 incident that resulted in a 2012 District Court case and
2013 Superior Court case. In total, Doe accumulated the
following charges: two charges for threatening, two for assault
and battery, three for assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon (including, in one case, a firearm), one for armed
robbery, one for possession of a loaded firearm, one for
possession of ammunition, and one for driving a car without
permission.
5 In addition to the criminal charges that Doe accrued, he also

received multiple disciplinary reports while incarcerated.

7
convictions stemmed from only three cases, and that Doe's record

does not reflect a "persistent disregard for rules, laws, and

the violations of the rights of others" or "ongoing criminal

behavior."

We discern no error in the application of factor 10. Doe

has extensive contacts with the criminal justice system and was

on probation when he committed his sex offenses. Examiners are

required to consider the number and type of criminal charges,

the disposition on the charges, and the dates of the criminal

conduct, but there is no requirement to list the dates that the

events occurred. See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(10)(a). Here,

the examiner appropriately recounted Doe's criminal record,

including the dates and disposition of the charges. Given Doe's

substantial contacts with the criminal justice system, and that

the summary of the charges was accurate, there was no error in

the application of this factor.

c. Factor 11. Doe contends that the hearing examiner

erred in applying factor 11 (violence unrelated to sexual

assaults). He argues that the hearing examiner improperly

included assaultive charges that were part of the index sex

offense cases, made no mention of the frequency of nonsexual

violence, and that the hearing examiner did not properly address

Doe's conviction for armed robbery and related firearm charges.

8
Doe is correct that the examiner improperly included the

charges related to the underlying sexual offenses, as factor 11

only applies to violence unrelated to sexual assault. The

hearing examiner found that, "Aside from his sexual charges,

[Doe] has [nonsexual] charges for violence including

threatening, assault and battery, assault and battery with [a]

dangerous weapon (including one involving a firearm), armed

robbery, and possession of a loaded firearm." The threatening,

assault and battery, and one of the assault and battery by means

of a dangerous weapon charges were related to the sexual

assaults. However, setting aside those charges, Doe was still

charged with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon,

and he was convicted of armed robbery, one count of possession

of a firearm, and one count of possession of a loaded firearm,

stemming from a 2012 incident. During an altercation, Doe

brandished a loaded firearm which, during an ensuing struggle,

was discharged, striking the individual in the shoulder. Even

though the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon

charge did not result in a conviction, the hearing examiner was

still permitted to consider the facts underlying the charge.

See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 79 (2015). The violent

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conduct, which resulted in multiple convictions,6 amply supports

the application of factor 11, as it shows Doe's tendency to act

violently and without regard to the safety of others. We

discern no error in the application of this factor.

d. Factor 2. Finally, Doe argues, and the Commonwealth

concedes, that the hearing examiner improperly applied factor 2

(repetitive and compulsive behavior) "because the defendant was

not discovered, confronted, or investigated between the two

rapes, much less charged or convicted." Doe No. 22188, 101

Mass. App. Ct. at 799.7 However, we conclude that the

misapplication of factor 2 would not have affected the

6 The hearing examiner did not rely on Doe's violent conduct
while incarcerated, which included being disciplined for
possession of a gun, firearm, weapon, sharpened instrument, or
knife and fighting with a person in the visitation area during
visitation and engaging in an unauthorized visit while on a work
crew.
7 The hearing examiner held that, to be separate, there must be

time and opportunity for the offending party to reflect upon the
wrongfulness of his conduct between offenses. He then applied
the factor to Doe, as there were two sexual assaults months
apart, though there was no intervening arrest or indictment.
However, after the hearing examiner made their decision, a
Middlesex Superior Court judge issued a declaratory judgment
stating that the second and third sentences of factor 2
unlawfully exceeded SORB's authority and violated due process by
attributing a high risk of reoffense without an intervening
indictment or conviction. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.
22188 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., Middlesex Sup. Ct. No. 20-
1130-B, slip op. at 1, 17-22 (April 16, 2021). SORB has not
challenged that holding and accepts that SORB is bound by the
declaratory judgment.

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classification and therefore does not require remand. See Id.

at 804.

"[W]e start by asking whether the underlying facts of the

case . . . clearly dictate the appropriate classification level"

(quotation omitted). Doe No. 22188, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 804.

In contrast to Doe No. 22188, in which we vacated the

petitioner's classification after concluding that factor 2 did

not apply, we conclude that the facts here do "clearly dictate"

Doe's classification as a level three sex offender. Here, the

underlying sex offenses involved violent rapes, where Doe lured

the victims away with the promise of drugs and then committed

the rapes with threats of violence and the use of a sharp

object.8 The hearing examiner also found that nine additional

risk elevating factors applied. Contrast id. at 804-805 (where

inapplicability of factor 2 negated many other risk elevating

factors). Furthermore, contrary to the circumstances in Doe No.

22188, where we highlighted the petitioner's "considerable

mitigation," both while incarcerated and in his four years in

the community,9 there is little evidence of any progress Doe has

8 In addition to the two sexual assaults, Doe has been charged
with nonsexual violence, accumulated twelve infractions while
incarcerated, has a history of substance abuse, and has twice
violated his probation, including by perpetrating the sexual
assault against the first victim.
9 The petitioner in Doe No. 22188 was an "active participant in

[sex offender] treatment," "expressed remorse" for his offense,
and "obtained a college degree and certificates in welding and

11
made since his offenses. Id. at 805. As the hearing examiner

noted in the present matter, at the time of hearing Doe had not

yet completed sex offender treatment, only had a supporting

letter from his mother that did not discuss if she or other

family members were aware of the details of Doe's sexual crimes

or if other family might support him in not reoffending in the

future, and Doe did not have a job ready after leaving

incarceration. Further, Doe here is younger than the offender

in Doe No. 22188 and he committed his offenses more recently.10

Ultimately, the underlying facts here dictate Doe's high

risk of dangerousness and reoffense. Doe raped two strangers

with a weapon while he was wearing a GPS monitor on probation

from armed robbery and firearm violations, has substance use

issues, and continued his infractions while incarcerated.

Contrast Doe No. 22188, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 805. We conclude

that even without the application of factor 2, Doe's level three

classification is appropriate.

commercial driving, regularly attend[ed] religious services,
work[ed] full time at a hospital as a pipefitter, [was] married,
and own[ed] a home." 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 805.
10 Doe was thirty-one years old when the hearing examiner issued

her decision and had committed the offenses approximately six
years prior to the decision, whereas the offender in Doe No.
22188 was fifty-five years old at the time of the classification
and committed the original offenses approximately thirty years
prior to the decision. Doe No. 22188, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at
798, 805.

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3. Weight of regulatory factors. Doe is correct when he

argues that a hearing examiner cannot show merely the mechanical

application of a checklist. Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No.

11204 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 564, 574

(2020). However, we are satisfied that Doe's level three

classification was supported by substantial evidence, which is

"such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 68549

v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109 (2014), quoting

G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6). Here, the hearing examiner explained how

much weight she ascribed to each applicable aggravating and

mitigating factor and provided a justification for each

decision. It is apparent from the hearing examiner's careful

weighing of the factors that "the classification is based on a

sound exercise of informed discretion rather than the mechanical

application of a checklist or some other reflex." Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 136652 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

81 Mass. App. Ct. 639, 651 (2012).11

4. Internet publication. Doe argues that this is a

relatively weak case such that his liberty and privacy interests

11For the same reasons, we find that the examiner's decision was
not arbitrary and capricious as the grounds upon which it was
based are those that "reasonable [persons] might deem proper to
support it" (quotation omitted). FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc.
v. Conservation Comm'n of Blackstone, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 681,
684-685 (1996).

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outweigh the public's need to have access to his sex offender

registration information. We disagree. As discussed supra, Doe

has a history of violence, has substance use issues, and

continued to exhibit antisocial behavior while incarcerated, all

of which supported his level three classification. The Supreme

Judicial Court explicitly has observed that "[w]here a sexually

violent offender presents a moderate risk to reoffend and a

moderate degree of dangerousness, Internet publication will

almost invariably serve a public safety interest by notifying

potential victims of the risks presented by the offender in

their geographic area." Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 655. The

same holds true with respect to a violent high risk offender.

The hearing examiner's conclusion was well supported.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J.,
Henry & Englander, JJ.12),

Clerk

Entered: April 28, 2023.

12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

14