Commonwealth v. Mitchell

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20-P-747 Appeals Court
20-P-767
20-P-808

COMMONWEALTH vs. MARKEESE MITCHELL (and two companion cases1).

Nos. 20-P-747, 20-P-767, & 20-P-808.

Suffolk. December 2, 2022. – July 10, 2023.

Present: Wolohojian, Henry, & Hershfang, JJ.

Homicide. Jury and Jurors. Evidence, Bias, Disclosure of
evidence. Practice, Criminal, New trial, Jury and jurors,
Voir dire, Challenge to jurors, Investigation of jurors,
Conduct of juror, Disqualification of judge.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on April 18, 2008.

Motions for a new trial, filed on June 11 and July 5, 2018,
were heard by Judith Fabricant, J., and a motion for
disqualification, filed on June 18, 2020, was considered by her.

Cathryn A. Neaves for Markeese Mitchell.
Richard B. Klibaner for Pedro Ortiz.
Brooke Hartley, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
Richard L. Goldman, for Terrance Pabon, was present but did
not argue.

1 One against Terrance Pabon and one against Pedro Ortiz.
2

WOLOHOJIAN, J. In these gang-related retaliatory murder

cases, a juror did not disclose that she had a half-brother who

was serving a sentence for a similar crime. The posttrial

discovery of this information eventually led to so-called Fidler

motions, see Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192, 200-201

(1979), and to motions for a new trial. The main question

presented here is whether the judge, who had also been the trial

judge, erred in denying the motions for a new trial after

crediting the juror's explanation, made under oath during an

evidentiary hearing, for her nondisclosure. In addition, the

defendants argue that the judge should have disqualified herself

from hearing the motions because she had written a letter in

support of the lead trial prosecutor's application to become a

Superior Court judge, and because of her interactions with him

after he was appointed to the bench. We conclude that the judge

did not err in denying the motions for a new trial given the

judge's credibility determinations concerning the juror's

testimony at the Fidler hearing, and given the judge's other

findings of fact. We also affirm the judge's order denying the

motion to disqualify. The performance of the prosecutor was not

at issue in any of the matters pending before the judge.

Background. The facts as they could have been found at

trial are set forth in this court's opinion affirming the

judgments. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 13,
3

cert. denied, 580 U.S. 899 (2016) (Mitchell I). In brief, the

defendants were friends and relatives of Jaleek Leary, whose

face had been slashed by Terrance Jacobs, who was associated

with the M.O.B. gang. In retaliation for that event, a fight

was arranged between a group associated with the Wilcock Street

area, which included the defendants, and Jacobs, who was lured

to the spot. The defendants stabbed and beat Jacobs to death.

The defendants, together with Paul Goode (who is not a

party to this appeal), were charged with murder in the first

degree for Jacobs's death. The case went to trial in April

2010, and began with a multiday jury empanelment process about

which the defendants claim no procedural error. Juror no. 15

(juror) was seated on the fifth day of empanelment. As part of

that process, the judge carefully explored a multitude of

sources of possible bias. Among other things, the judge

described the case to see whether anything about it would cause

any member of the venire to have difficulty being fair and

impartial to both sides:2

2 The judge defined the concept of fairness and impartiality
for the venire as follows:

"Being fair and impartial doesn't necessarily require
that you've never had any experiences, or read anything or
heard anything, or had any thoughts or opinion on any
subject that might be relevant. There probably wouldn't be
a lot of people who would fit that description. Being fair
and impartial requires that you can, and you will, put
aside any experiences or anything you may have read, or
4

"This case arises from an incident that occurred on May
22nd of 2007, on Havelock Street in Dorchester. The
Commonwealth alleges that on that date, in that place, that
each of these four defendants participated in stabbing
Terrance Jacobs, causing his death."

The judge also informed the venire that there "may be evidence

with respect to the events in issue here relating to retaliation

for another incident of violence that may have occurred at an

earlier time" and asked whether that would affect anyone's

ability to be fair and impartial. In addition, the judge

inquired whether any venire member would have difficulty being

fair and impartial if there were "evidence regarding

interactions among certain individuals in the Mattapan and

Dorchester areas of Boston, and particularly in the areas of

Columbia Road, Wilcock Street, Havelock Street and Blue Hill

Avenue."

The judge also explored the topic of the juror

questionnaire, which the members of the venire had completed

heard, or thought about relevant subject matter and that
you will decide the facts of this case based solely on the
evidence that will be presented in the trial of this case.

"Being fair and impartial also requires that you can,
and you will, apply to the facts that you will find from
the evidence, the law as I will instruct you, even if that
isn't what you thought the law was, even if it isn't what
you think the law should be, that you can, and you will,
apply the law as I will instruct you to the facts that you
will find from the evidence presented in this trial.
That's what we mean by being fair and impartial to all
parties in this case."
5

before being called up to the court room or learning anything

about the case. The judge repeated the questions on the

questionnaire, and told the venire that if they had omitted

anything -- for whatever reason -- they should bring it to the

judge's attention when questioned individually. Of relevance

here, the judge focused on the question that asked, "Have you,

or anyone in your household or family, ever had any of the

following experiences with the law," and listed, among other

things, being arrested, being convicted of a crime, and being a

witness in a civil or criminal case. The juror answered this

question "no." With respect to this question, the judge

emphasized the need for full disclosure, and specifically

stressed that responsive information should not be omitted

simply because the venire member believed the information was

irrelevant.3

3 The judge explained:

"This is an area where a lot of people leave something
out, perhaps because something happened a very long time
ago, or it seems completely irrelevant, or it was
dismissed, or it was when you were a juvenile, or for any
of a number of reasons people leave something out.

"It is very important that we have a complete and
accurate answer to this question, even if you think it's
really irrelevant. Indeed, it may be irrelevant, but we
need to know the information so that we can make a judgment
about whether it has any relevance."
6

The juror did not indicate an affirmative response to any

of the judge's questions to the venire. When the juror was

called to sidebar for individual questioning, she confirmed that

she could be fair and impartial to both sides, and stated that

she had nothing further to disclose. When asked whether the

location of the crime on Havelock Street would have any bearing

on her ability to be fair and impartial, she responded that it

would not. And she explained that she lived "on the other side,

more on the street side so it's nowhere near there." The judge

found the juror indifferent, and all parties stated that they

were content with the juror.

Shortly thereafter, the judge received information from the

Commonwealth's investigator that the juror had been involved in

a minor motor vehicle criminal matter in the Dorchester Division

of the District Court Department in 2008 that had resulted in a

fine, which she had not disclosed on the juror questionnaire.

When asked by the judge why she had not disclosed the

information on the questionnaire, the juror explained that she

did not believe the information was relevant since the earlier

matter had been dismissed, and that she did not think "it would

affect anything." In response to follow-up questioning by the

judge, the juror again stated that she believed that she could

be fair and impartial to all parties in this case. The judge

determined that there was no reason to excuse the juror for
7

cause,4 neither side requested that she do so, and no one

exercised a peremptory challenge. The juror was accordingly

seated and, after a lengthy trial, was a member of the jury

that, in May 2010, convicted all four defendants of the lesser

charge of murder in the second degree.

Two and one-half years later, in December 2012, the

defendants filed a joint motion pursuant to Fidler, 377 Mass. at

200-201 (first Fidler motion), seeking to subpoena the juror.

The basis for the motion was that the juror had failed to

disclose that (1) her half-brother, Karl, was incarcerated and

was associated with the Lucerne Street Doggz, a gang that had an

alliance with M.O.B., the gang with which the victim in this

case was associated; (2) she had a half-sister, Shantel, who had

served as a witness in a murder trial a year before the trial in

this case; (3) her answer regarding her familiarity with the

location of the crime was "oblique" and not forthcoming; and (4)

she had waved during the trial to an aunt of Terrance Jacobs,

who was a spectator at the trial and with whom she had attended

high school. The defendants argued that the juror was biased

against them and that she concealed information during

empanelment in a deliberate effort to be seated so as to convict

4 The judge noted that the juror had not been arrested, that
she did not understand she had been charged with a crime, and
that the judge was persuaded that the juror could be fair and
impartial.
8

them. The defendants had learned about the juror's connection

to Karl after the trial when defendant Ortiz and Karl had

exchanged words while incarcerated at the same prison, and Karl

had said something to the effect that "that's why my sister

convicted you."

After an evidentiary hearing, the judge denied the first

Fidler motion, concluding:

"Overall, the evidence fails to establish any basis to
believe either that the juror had any bias against the
defendants, or that she concealed anything from the Court
during [e]mpanelment. If she shares a biological father
with Karl and Shantel . . . , nothing indicates either that
she could fairly be expected to consider them members of
her 'household or family' for purposes of the question on
the juror questionnaire, or that she had any awareness of
their experiences with the legal system. As to [Jacobs's
aunt], even if she and the juror attended the same high
school for some period of time, and even if the juror waved
to her in the court room, nothing indicates that the juror
had any awareness of any relationship she might have had
with Terrance Jacobs, or that their acquaintance would have
given rise to any bias in the juror. Nor does the juror's
residence approximately a mile from the location of the
incident suggest any bias."

The judge's denial of the first Fidler motion was affirmed in an

appeal that was consolidated with the direct appeals of

Mitchell's, Pabon's, and Ortiz's convictions.5 See Mitchell I,

89 Mass. App. Ct. at 30-31.

Thereafter, in 2017 and 2018, Mitchell, Pabon, and Ortiz

each renewed their Fidler motion based on newly-discovered

5 Goode's appeal was severed.
9

information, and also filed motions for a new trial. The new

information was in the form of social media postings that

postdated the trial by several years and tended to show that the

juror considered herself to have a family relationship with Karl

and Shantel. Based on this new information, the judge brought

the juror into court for questioning, which the judge conducted

herself based on questions previously submitted by the

defendants -- the procedure endorsed in Fidler, 377 Mass. at

202-203.6

In a detailed memorandum of decision, the judge set out her

findings and rulings on the motions for a new trial. She found

"the juror's testimony to be a candid and honest presentation of

the facts as she believe[d] them to be," and the judge credited

and relied on the juror's testimony in making her findings.

Those findings were:

"The juror has several younger half-siblings on
her father's side, including two who are relevant
here, Karl . . . , and Shantel . . . . Karl and
Shantel have the same mother, and grew up living with
their mother, while the juror lived with her own
mother. The juror has never shared a household with
either Karl or Shantel. Shantel is some fourteen
months younger than the juror, and Karl is almost four
years younger than the juror. During their childhood,

6 Before deciding to call the juror in for questioning, the
judge conducted a nonevidentiary hearing and requested that
further nonintrusive investigation be conducted cooperatively
between the district attorney's office and defense counsel.
This cautious step-by-step approach reflected the judge's effort
to develop the necessary facts while avoiding harassment or
exploitation of the juror. See Fidler, 377 Mass. at 202.
10

their father made efforts to bring his children
together and encouraged them to form relationships.
Those efforts achieved some degree of success, more as
between the juror and Shantel, who were close at
times, than between the juror and Karl, whose
relationship, in the juror's words, was 'on and off.'
Karl has at times used a nickname of 'Pops.'

"In September of 2007, Karl was arrested in
connection with a shooting in Dorchester. An article
in the Boston Herald [newspaper], dated September 29,
2007, reported the following:

'A police source identified one of the
[juvenile shooter's] accomplices, Karl . . . ,
18, of Dorchester, as leader of the Lucerne
Street Doggz, which earlier this year was hit by
federal authorities who arrested more than a
dozen members in a sweep. However, since the
raid, Lucerne Street has remained active, with
cops linking several shootings to the gang
including an Aug. 18 hit on Morse Street that
left three teens wounded.

'Police sources said [Karl], who was
arrested in July for a daylight brawl on the
steps of Dorchester District Court, has been
linked to four recent shootings.

'He was held on $100,000 cash bail yesterday
and had his bail revoked for the July assault and
battery charge.'

"The juror read the article at or about the time
it appeared. She had not previously heard of the
Lucerne Street Doggz, and had no awareness of it or of
any involvement Karl may have had with it. Sometime
after she read the article she discussed it with
Karl's mother, who confirmed that Karl was
incarcerated and shared some information about the
charges against him. The juror did not receive any
information from Karl's mother, or from any other
source other than the Herald article, about any
involvement Karl may have had with the Lucerne Street
Doggz, or any other gang-related activity. Nor did
she learn of any connection, either friendly or
11

hostile, between the Lucerne Street Doggz and any
other gang or group.

"Paul [B.], the father of the juror's child, came
to know and to be friends with Karl through the juror.
As of the time of [e]mpanelment in April of 2010, the
juror's intimate relationship with [Paul B.] had
ended, although she still had some interaction with
him related to their child. As of the time of
[e]mpanelment, the juror had never heard anything from
[Paul B.] regarding any gang activity, or any
involvement of Karl in any such activity. After the
trial had concluded, the juror told [Paul B.] and
others that she had served on a murder trial. She did
not discuss with [Paul B.] any further details about
the trial, or about the event that gave rise to it,
until years later.

"Karl was convicted of various offenses on August
19, 2009, and sentenced to 4-5 years in state prison,
where he remained through the time of this trial. The
juror never visited him in any facility or otherwise
communicated with him at any time during his
incarceration. As of April 19, 2010, when she
appeared for [e]mpanelment, the juror had not seen,
corresponded with, spoken with, or communicated in any
form with Karl since prior to his arrest in September
of 2007. She knew that he was incarcerated, and had
heard some information about his offenses, but her
only information regarding any gang involvement that
he may have had was from the reference to the Lucerne
Street Doggz in the Herald article some two and one-
half years before. At the time of empanelment, the
juror had no bias or opinion or loyalty relating to
the Lucerne Street Doggz, anyone associated with
Wilcock Street, or any other gang or group. She had
never heard of MOB, had no information about it, and
had no bias or opinion or loyalty relating to it.

"The juror and her half-sister Shantel were
relatively close at times as they were growing up, but
grew apart in their teenage years, first when the
juror became a mother, and then when Shantel went to
college in Florida in around 2006. At the time of
[e]mpanelment in this case, Shantel had returned from
Florida, and the juror was in communication with
Shantel 'here and there.' Shantel testified under a
12

grant of immunity at the trial of a homicide case in
Suffolk Superior Court in 2009, arising from an event
that occurred on December 31, 2006. The juror was not
aware of that case, or of Shantel's involvement,
either at the time it occurred or at the time of
[e]mpanelment in this case. She learned about it,
although not in detail, some years later.

"At [e]mpanelment in this case on April 19, 2010,
the juror checked the 'no' box on the juror
questionnaire in response to the question whether she
or any member of her 'household or family' had had any
experience with the law. As to Shantel, the juror
gave that answer because she had no knowledge at the
time that Shantel had had any involvement in any case.
As to Karl, the juror gave that answer because he was
not a member of her household, and because, although
he was a member of her family, as she testified, she
'didn't think he had any relation to this trial.' The
Court credits this answer as a true reflection of the
juror's thinking when she filled out her jury
questionnaire.

"Karl was released from incarceration some time
in 2011 or 2012. After Karl's release, the juror's
relationship with him resumed, as before, 'on and
off.' He would, in her words, 'check up on' her and
her daughter from time to time. At some point Karl
became a father, which increased the juror's
interaction with him. They communicated at times by
telephone or text, and saw each other occasionally at
gatherings, such as a baby shower in approximately
2015, a child's birthday party, and the like. The
juror posted photographs of such gatherings on social
media. At some point after Karl's release, the juror
heard through 'word on the street' that Karl had been
involved in gang activity; she received no more
detailed information than that." (Footnotes omitted.)

The judge credited the juror's testimony that she had no actual

bias and that the juror had no knowledge of anyone who was

connected to her having any connection to the victim in this

case or to any gang with which the victim may have been
13

affiliated. The judge concluded that the three defendants

failed to show actual or implied bias on the part of the juror.

The judge acknowledged that the juror's answer on the juror

questionnaire was inaccurate because it failed to disclose that

two members of her family, although they were not part of her

household, had experience with the law. But the judge found

that the inaccuracy was not dishonest because "it did not arise

from any motive to mislead or conceal, but was based on the

juror's independent evaluation of relevance." The judge noted

that the juror's independent evaluation in this regard had

violated the judge's instruction to disclose all responsive

information regardless of the juror's view of relevance. But

the judge concluded that the juror's judgment was not

unreasonable given the limited information the juror had about

her half-brother and about the facts of this case at the time

she answered the juror questionnaire.

In addition, the judge found that, even if the juror had

answered the questionnaire correctly, the accurate disclosure

would not have given rise to a viable challenge for cause. The

judge determined that, in light of the juror's limited knowledge

at the time, an accurate disclosure would have revealed only

that the juror's half-brother, with whom she had an on and off

relationship, had been convicted of crimes. Although the judge

acknowledged that the juror might have related what she had read
14

about her half-brother in the Boston Herald two and one-half

years earlier, the judge stated that she "would not likely have

relied on [the juror's] recitation of a media report, and

nothing before the [judge] at the time indicated any relevance

the Lucerne Street Doggz might have had to the case."

The judge also discredited defendant Ortiz's affidavit in

which he asserted that "there was a violent rivalry between

members of the Lucerne Street/MOB gang and residents of Wilcock

Street," because Ortiz provided no basis of knowledge for this

assertion and had distanced himself from gang activity at trial.

The judge accepted that Paul B. had a basis of knowledge for the

assertion in his affidavit that Lucerne Street Doggz and M.O.B.

"have always been cool with each other," but concluded that this

assertion would not have supported a challenge for cause. On

August 10, 2018, the judge denied the motions for a new trial,

and concluded that the renewed Fidler motions were moot because

she had already afforded the relief they sought. The defendants

timely appealed.7

7 The appeals from the August 10, 2018 order were stayed
pending the defendants' subsequent motions for juror contact and
to disqualify the judge. Ultimately, the appeals from the
August 10, 2018 order were consolidated with the defendants'
appeals from a June 23, 2020 order denying their motions that
the judge disqualify herself and for a new hearing concerning
the jury before a different judge.
15

Thereafter, in 2019, the codefendant, Goode, filed a motion

for a new trial, in which he raised a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct by the lead trial prosecutor, who had become a

Superior Court judge in 2017 (seven years after the trial, and

after the defendants' convictions were affirmed by this court).

After receiving the motion, the judge notified Goode that, in

her capacity as chief justice of the Superior Court, she had had

substantial interaction with the prosecutor after he had become

a judge and that she had submitted a letter to the judicial

nominating commission in support of his application for a

judgeship based on her knowledge of his work. The judge invited

submissions on whether she should disqualify herself from

considering Goode's motion for a new trial. On January 13,

2020, after receiving Goode's motion to recuse, the judge

recused herself from further involvement in Goode's case.

Spurred by the judge's recusal from Goode's case, the three

defendants here then filed, in 2020, a joint motion to

disqualify the judge and for a new Fidler hearing before a

different judge. The defendants argued that the judge should

have disclosed her posttrial interactions with the trial

prosecutor before acting on the defendants' renewed Fidler

motions, which were filed in 2017,8 that she should have

8 The defendants did not claim that there was any basis for
disqualification before the judge ruled on the first Fidler
16

disqualified herself at that point, and that their Fidler

motions should be reheard by a different judge. The judge

denied the motion, explaining that, unlike Goode, the three

defendants here raised no issue of prosecutorial misconduct and

that their Fidler motions were fully resolved before any such

allegation had been made. The defendants' timely appeals from

this order are before us, as are their appeals from the 2018

order denying their motions for a new trial.

Discussion. The defendants argue that they are entitled to

a new trial because, had the juror accurately disclosed the

information about her half-siblings Karl and Shantel, she would

have been viably challenged for cause. In addition, defendant

Ortiz argues that the juror's inaccurate disclosures deprived

him of the intelligent exercise of his right to peremptory

challenges, thus entitling him to a new trial. Separately, the

defendants argue that the judge abused her discretion in denying

their motion to disqualify her.

1. Motions for a new trial; juror nondisclosure of

information bearing on bias. When, as here, it is discovered

after trial that a juror failed to disclose information during

voir dire and that failure raises a nonspeculative question

motion, the denial of which was affirmed in this court's 2016
opinion affirming the convictions. See Mitchell I, 89 Mass.
App. Ct. at 30-31.
17

about the juror's impartiality, the remedy "is a hearing in

which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias."

Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 625 (1987), quoting

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (Phillips). If the

hearing includes examination of the juror (a Fidler hearing), it

is to be supervised and directed by the judge so as prevent

interrogation of the juror from exceeding its proper scope. See

Fidler, 377 Mass. at 202. A judge may (as the judge here did)

decide to conduct the questioning herself, allowing counsel for

both parties to submit proposed questions and object to any

questions the judge intends to ask. Id. at 203. "A [Fidler]

hearing permits counsel to probe the juror's memory, his reasons

for acting as he did, and [his] understanding of the

consequences of [his] actions. A hearing also permits the trial

judge to observe the juror's demeanor under cross-examination

and to evaluate [his] answers in light of the particular

circumstances of the case." Amirault, supra at 626-627, quoting

Phillips, supra at 222 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

The "crucial inquiry" at a Fidler hearing is whether the

juror's answers during empanelment were honest. Amirault, 399

Mass. at 626. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,

464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (McDonough). Honesty in this context

is not the same as accuracy. An answer may be inaccurate while

still being honest, depending on the juror's motivation when
18

giving the inaccurate answer. A lack of memory, a

misunderstanding of the scope or meaning of the question, or a

mistaken view that information is irrelevant, are some examples

of reasons why a particular nondisclosure -- even if material --

is benign in the sense that it does not reveal juror bias.

"[O]nly those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can

truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial." McDonough,

supra. See Amirault, supra at 625. The determination of

whether the juror's answer was honest is a question of fact that

rests with the judge. Id. at 626.

It is the defendant's burden to show, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the juror was not impartial. Amirault, 399

Mass. at 626. See Faria v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., 852

F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2017). To obtain a new trial based on a

juror's failure to provide accurate information, the defendant

"must first demonstrate that [the] juror failed to answer

honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show

that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a

challenge for cause." McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556. See

Commonwealth v. Emerson, 430 Mass. 378, 384 (1999), cert.

denied, 529 U.S. 1030 (2000); Amirault, supra; Commonwealth v.

Murphy, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 118, 126 (2014). "For this purpose, a

voir dire question is material if a response to it 'has a

natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing,'
19

the judge's impartiality determination" (citation omitted).

Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165 (1st Cir. 2013).

"If the judge finds that the juror answered voir dire questions

mistakenly, but honestly, the analysis as to actual bias ends,

and the judge must find the juror impartial." Murphy, supra.

"In the absence of clear abuse of discretion or a showing that

the judge's findings were clearly erroneous, the judge's ruling

[on the motion for a new trial] will not be disturbed on

appeal." Amirault, supra.

With this analytical framework in mind, we turn to the

specifics of this case. It is undisputed that the juror

inaccurately answered "no" to the question whether anyone in her

family or household had been arrested or convicted of a crime or

had been a witness in a civil or criminal case; her half-sister

Shantel had been a witness in a murder trial the year before,

and her half-brother Karl was serving a sentence for serious

crimes. But there was no affirmative evidence that the juror

knew that Shantel had been a witness in another case, and the

judge was entitled to credit the juror's testimony that she did

not know that Shantel had been so. The defendants thus failed

to demonstrate that the juror's answer was not honest with

respect to Shantel; juror bias is not established when a juror

fails to disclose a material piece of information if the reason

for the nondisclosure is that she did not know it.
20

The judge also credited the juror's testimony about Karl.

The juror knew that Karl was incarcerated, and she had some

knowledge of the nature of his offenses from having read an

article in the Boston Herald over two years earlier. That

article described Karl as a leader of the Lucerne Street Doggz

gang. But the judge credited the juror's testimony that the

juror had never shared a household with Karl, that their

relationship was on-and-off, and that she had had no contact of

any sort with him while he was incarcerated. The judge also

credited the juror's testimony that the juror had no bias or

opinion or loyalty relating to the Lucerne Street Doggz or any

other gang or group. It should be noted that, at the time of

empanelment, neither the judge nor the jurors had been informed

that the Lucerne Street Doggz had any connection to this case.

Although the jurors were asked about their knowledge of a group

called M.O.B., the judge credited the juror's testimony that she

had never heard of M.O.B., had no information about M.O.B., and

had no bias or opinion or loyalty relating to it.

Of critical importance, the judge credited the juror's

explanation for why she answered the juror questionnaire as she

did. The juror explained that she did not disclose information

about Karl both because he was not a member of her household and
21

because she did not "think he had any relations to this case."9

It bears noting in this regard that the juror filled out the

questionnaire before coming to the court room and before knowing

anything about the case, and that this timing supports the

judge's finding that the juror's nondisclosure was due to a

mistaken idea that she need not disclose information she

considered irrelevant. Although the juror subsequently heard a

description of the case during empanelment, that description did

not mention the Lucerne Street Doggz, any connection between

M.O.B. and the Lucerne Street Doggz, or that the case involved

gangs. Thus, any connection between Karl's activities and the

case at hand would not have been readily apparent, let alone

explicit, to the juror. These facts, too, support the judge's

credibility determination.

The fact that the juror seems to have used the same

erroneous relevancy filter across the board also supports the

judge's decision to credit the juror's explanation that

relevancy -- and not bias -- was the reason the juror failed to

disclose the information about Karl. When it was discovered

9 The questionnaire sought information concerning members of
the juror's "family" or "household," without defining either
term. Karl had never been a member of the juror's "household."
Although Karl and the juror were related by blood, the juror and
Karl had never lived together, even as children, and had never
been close, leaving it unclear whether they were "family," as
that term was intended by the juror questionnaire.
22

during voir dire that the juror had failed to disclose that she

herself had previously been involved in a relatively minor

criminal proceeding, she explained, "I didn't think that was

that relevant because it was dismissed, so I wasn't thinking

that it would affect anything." Moreover, this explanation was

accepted as truthful by the judge and defense counsel, all of

whom assessed the juror's credibility firsthand and concluded

that the fact that she had failed to disclose the information

about her own minor criminal history was not a basis to

challenge her for cause or peremptorily.

Undoubtedly, the juror should not have filtered her answer

on the questionnaire based on her view of whether responsive

information was relevant, in contravention of the judge's

instruction. But the question here is not whether the juror

provided incorrect answers, but whether the judge's finding that

the juror did so honestly is clearly erroneous. Given the

judge's subsidiary findings, which are well grounded in the

evidence she credited from the Fidler hearing, we see no error

in the judge's conclusions that the juror answered the

questionnaire inaccurately but honestly and that, as a result,

the defendants failed to establish that the juror was actually

biased.

For three reasons, the dissent would allow a new trial

based on the juror's failure to disclose the information
23

regarding Karl. First, the dissent asserts that a juror who

"knowingly decide[s] not to disclose information called for by

[a] juror questionnaire or a voir dire question" cannot, as a

matter of law, be found to have been "honest." Post at . To

begin with, the determination of whether a juror has been

"honest" in answering voir dire questions "is a question of fact

[that] rests with the trial judge." Amirault, 399 Mass. at 626.

Here, the record does not support the assertion that the juror

"knowingly" or "consciously" made a decision to not disclose

information in the sense that the dissent suggests, namely, for

the purpose of concealing bias. Instead, the evidence was that

the juror failed to disclose the information because she

mistakenly decided it was not relevant. Clearly, the juror's

assessment in this regard was incorrect. But, for all the

reasons we have already set out and therefore do not repeat

here, that does not mean that the judge could not credit the

juror's explanation. The juror's credibility was assessed

firsthand by the judge twice -- once during voir dire and again

during the Fidler hearing -- and the judge accepted the juror's

truthfulness both times. Surely, we are in no position to make

a contrary credibility assessment retrospectively. See

Commonwealth v. Day, 387 Mass. 915, 919 (1983) ("it is

inappropriate to ask us to reverse a judge's findings involving
24

credibility, since he saw the witnesses and we did not"

[citation omitted]).

Second, the dissent believes that the judge misapplied

Amirault by considering the juror's motivation in determining

whether the juror was "honest." We do not read Amirault to

create a rigid sequence of considerations the judge must use,

let alone to confine consideration of the juror's motivation

only to deciding whether to grant a for-cause challenge. The

dissent's reading appears to be based on the use of the word

"first" in the following passage, which the court in Amirault

quoted from McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556:

"[T]o obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party
must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire, and then
further show that a correct response would have
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."

Amirault, 399 Mass. at 625. It strains the language to read

this passage as creating sequential burdens of proof (i.e., a

party must prove one thing before proving the next) rather than

additive ones (i.e., a party must prove both). Such a reading

also ignores the very next sentence, to which the court in

Amirault deliberately added emphasis:

"The motives for concealing information may vary, but
only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality
can truly be said to affect the fairness of a
trial . . . ."
25

Id., quoting McDonough, supra. Thus, even were we to accept

that McDonough created a two-step sequential test, under

Amirault, the question of the juror's motive is the crux of the

inquiry. This makes sense because no assessment of whether an

answer is "honest" can be made without looking at motivation.

Otherwise, "honest" becomes a synonym for "accurate," and a new

trial would automatically be required in any case where a

potential juror fails to disclose responsive information within

the juror's possession.

Our reading of Amirault is confirmed by its application of

the test it articulated. First, the court accepted the trial

judge's findings that the juror's misstatements were "honest

mistakes" and that the juror "did not intend to conceal the

information and did not know that defense counsel was misled."

Amirault, 399 Mass. at 626. Based on the trial judge's

subsidiary findings regarding the juror's reasons for the

inaccurate statements, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that

the juror had answered "honestly" and affirmed the order denying

the motion for a new trial.

Third, the dissent argues in favor of changing the law to

create a rebuttable presumption of prejudice whenever a juror

fails to disclose responsive information during voir dire or on

a juror questionnaire. We offer no opinion on the advisability

of changing the law in the manner the dissent advocates.
26

However, we note that, although in Amirault the court

acknowledged that "in certain exceptional circumstances[,]

implied bias may be applicable," it rejected the argument that

juror bias "should be presumed . . . as a matter of law"

whenever there is a nondisclosure. Amirault, 399 Mass. at 628.

2. Juror nondisclosure of information bearing on bias;

peremptory challenge. Ortiz alone argues that, even if the

juror's failure to answer accurately the juror questionnaire

would not have resulted in a viable challenge for cause, it

deprived him of his right to intelligently use his peremptory

challenges, which is a structural error entitling him to a new

trial without a showing of prejudice. "Although the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the

Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution

guarantee the right to be tried by an impartial jury, there is

no Federal or State constitutional right to exercise peremptory

challenges." Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 396 (1995).

Instead, peremptory challenges are creatures of statute. See

Commonwealth v. Berardi, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 472 (2015).

We accept that Ortiz would have exercised a peremptory

challenge had the juror accurately disclosed the information

about Karl and her relationship to him, and that Ortiz was thus

deprived of the intelligent exercise of that right. But this

does not mean that he has shown that he is entitled to a new
27

trial. Contrary to Ortiz's claim of structural error, in the

absence of actual or implied bias, the deprivation of the

nonconstitutional right to peremptory challenges based on juror

misconduct is not reversible error without a showing of

prejudice.

"The right to peremptory challenges is simply a means
of selecting an impartial jury. If the remedy of a
new trial is not available for violation of the
constitutional right to an impartial jury because of
juror misconduct unless a court finds that the juror
was actually or impliedly prejudiced, it cannot follow
that denial of a nonconstitutional right involving
jury selection is reversible error without a showing
of prejudice."

Amirault, 399 Mass. at 630-631. Ortiz has not argued, let alone

demonstrated, prejudice, and therefore he is not entitled to a

new trial based on the infringement of his right to

intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges.

3. Disqualification. Article 29 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights states that judges must be "as free,

impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit."

This means "maintaining not only fairness but also the

appearance of fairness in every judicial proceeding" (citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Morgan RV Resorts, LLC, 84 Mass. App.

Ct. 1, 9 (2013). "[A]ctual impartiality alone is not

enough . . . . In order to preserve and protect the integrity

of the judiciary and the judicial process, and the necessary

public confidence in both, even the appearance of partiality
28

must be avoided" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Cousin,

484 Mass. 1042, 1046 (2020). See S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 2,

Rule 2.11 (2016).

A judge must engage in a two-prong analysis to decide

whether she should recuse herself. See Lena v. Commonwealth,

369 Mass. 571, 575 (1976). The first prong entails a subjective

determination that the judge believes she can be impartial in

the circumstances. Cousin, 484 Mass. at 1045. If the judge

answers this prong in the affirmative, "[she] must next attempt

an objective appraisal of whether this was a proceeding in which

[her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned" (citation

omitted). Id. At its core, the second prong asks whether an

objective observer would "reasonably believe that the judge's

impartiality may have been compromised." Id. at 1045-1046. To

require disqualification, "the bias or prejudice must spring

from an extrajudicial source, and not from matters learned from

participation in the case." Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass.

103, 111 (1989). We review a judge's decision not to recuse

herself for abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Eddington,

71 Mass. App. Ct. 138, 143 (2008).

The defendants argue that the judge should have recused

herself from ruling on their 2017 renewed Fidler motions and

their motions for a new trial. They contend that an objective

observer would reasonably believe that the judge's impartiality
29

may have been compromised by the fact that she had written a

letter of support for the trial prosecutor before he was

appointed to the bench and that, after his appointment in 2017,

the judge (in her capacity as chief justice of the Superior

Court) had had significant professional contact with him.

We see no abuse of discretion in the judge's careful

decision to deny the motion for disqualification here. To begin

with, as the judge noted, the defendants' Fidler motions and

motions for a new trial raised no claim of prosecutorial

misconduct. Instead, the focus was entirely on the misconduct

of the juror. Second, no claim of prosecutorial misconduct had

been suggested -- even by codefendant Goode -- before the

motions had been decided. For both of these reasons, the

situation here is entirely different from that in Cousin, 484

Mass. at 1045-1046, on which the defendants rely.

Conclusion. We affirm the order denying the defendants'

motions for a new trial and the order denying their motion for

disqualification.

So ordered.
HENRY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). The

juror questionnaire calls for all jurors to answer the following

question: "Have you or anyone in your household or family ever

had any of the following experiences with the law?" and lists

the following: "[b]een arrested"; "[b]een charged with a

crime"; "[b]een convicted of a crime"; or "[b]een a witness in a

civil/criminal case." This juror (juror) answered the question

"no" even though she considered her half-brother, Karl, family

and she knew that he was then incarcerated for violent crimes.

The juror made a second decision not to disclose Karl's

experience with the law when the judge cautioned all jurors not

to decide the relevance of their or their family's experience

with the law. Rather than heed the judge's instruction, the

juror again intentionally decided to not disclose this

information.

The majority concludes that we should confirm the orders

denying the defendants' motions for a new trial on the basis

that the juror answered the jury questionnaire and voir dire

honestly. I cannot agree. The juror consciously withheld

information about Karl for which she knew the questionnaire

called and then disregarded an instruction of the judge to

disclose this same information even if the juror did not think

it was relevant.
2

And while this respected judge thoughtfully analyzed prong

two of the applicable test, her conclusion that an "accurate

disclosure by the juror would not have given rise to a viable

challenge for cause" is clearly erroneous, as explained more

fully infra. See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 399 Mass. 617, 626

(1987) ("In the absence of clear abuse of discretion or a

showing that the judge's findings were clearly erroneous, the

judge's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal"). If that

finding is not clearly erroneous, then it is time to adopt a new

standard: namely, when a defendant proves by a preponderance of

the evidence that a juror intentionally failed to disclose

information she knew she had been asked to disclose in voir

dire, it should create a presumption that, if unrebutted by the

Commonwealth, is sufficient to warrant a new trial. The

information that the juror made a deliberate choice not to

disclose, regardless of the reason for the nondisclosure, was so

close to the subject matter of this trial that the defendants

were entitled to a new trial.1

Discussion. As the majority correctly explains, to obtain

a new trial, a party (1) "must first demonstrate that a juror

failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire," and

1 I dissent only to section one of the majority opinion. I
join the majority in sections two and three.
3

(2) "then further show that a correct response would have

provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." Amirault,

399 Mass. at 625, quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v.

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (McDonough). As to the

first prong, "the crucial inquiry is whether the juror's answer

was honest; that is, whether the juror was aware that the answer

was false" (emphasis added). Amirault, supra at 626. I address

each prong in turn and then propose a new rule that better

balances the right to an impartial jury with the important need

for finality and the practical necessities of judicial

management.

1. Whether the juror answered voir dire honestly. The

juror checked the "no" box to the question asking if the juror

or anyone in her "household or family ever had any of the

following experiences with the law?" When the juror checked

"no," she knew that Karl, her family member, was incarcerated at

the time of this trial, had read in the Boston Herald newspaper

about his alleged crimes,2 and had discussed them with Karl's

2 The newspaper article stated that Karl, then eighteen, was
a "leader of the Lucerne Street Doggz" gang, that "more than a
dozen members" had been arrested "in a sweep," "with cops
linking several shootings to the gang," including one the prior
month "that left three teens wounded." The article also stated
that Karl was arrested "for a daylight brawl on the steps of the
Dorchester District Court" and "has been linked to four recent
shootings."
4

mother and his sister (the juror's half-sister).3 The juror

decided not to disclose information that she knew the

questionnaire called for her to disclose.

The juror made a second decision not to disclose Karl's

experience with the law. During voir dire, the judge

highlighted the importance of the question whether the juror or

a household or family member had specified experience with the

law. She stated, "This is an area where a lot of people leave

something out, perhaps because something happened a very long

time ago, or it seems completely irrelevant, or it was

dismissed, or it was when you were a juvenile, or for any of a

number of reasons people leave something out." She then

specifically instructed the jurors that they should not make

personal judgments as to relevancy, stating, "It is very

important that we have a complete and accurate answer to this

question, even if you think it's really irrelevant. Indeed, it

may be irrelevant, but we need to know the information so that

we can make a judgment about whether it has any relevance."

The father of the juror's child also was in a gang
3

affiliated with the victim's gang. He explained in an affidavit
that he was in the "group" BMB, that M.O.B. was "the younger
generation of BMB," and that these two groups and the Lucerne
Street Doggz "are all acquainted with each other and have always
been cool with each other." Indeed, "[t]wo [of his]
cousins . . . are or at some time were members of the Lucerne
Street Doggz." He "was acquainted with" the victim in this
case, having met him "in [or] around 2005" and "heard about" the
"murder when it happened."
5

Again, the juror disregarded the judge's detailed and explicit

instruction and made a deliberate decision not to disclose her

half-brother's experience with the law.4,5

4 The juror also learned during voir dire that her relevancy
filter was wrong. She omitted information about her own
criminal record, failing to disclose charges for driving without
insurance. This was yet a third time when the juror might have
disclosed her half-brother's experience with the law. Indeed,
every time a judge or trial counsel learns that a juror has
withheld information they should have disclosed, the better
practice would be to ask the juror if there was any other
information the juror withheld, such as a family member's
arrest, trial, or incarceration. Here, once the judge and
counsel knew the juror had failed to disclose her own criminal
history, nobody asked this follow up question.

5 Even at the evidentiary hearing on the motions for a new
trial, the juror continued to evade. After the juror admitted
at the evidentiary hearing that she thought of Karl as a member
of her family, that she knew at the time of this trial that he
was incarcerated, that she had read the Boston Herald newspaper
article, and that she had discussed Karl's situation with his
mother and their sister, the juror had the following exchange
with the judge:

The judge: "At the time of this trial when you came in as
a juror, did you have any awareness of Karl being
affiliated with any group or any gang or any organization
or any other group of people that might be allied in some
way?"

The juror: "No, not at the time of trial. No, I did not."

This answer is not true. The juror had an "awareness" at the
time of trial that Karl was a gang leader. The judge pressed
again.

The judge: "At any time later on or before, did you have
any awareness of that?"

The juror: "Later on, like after he got released and
stuff, that's what the word on the street was. But he
6

The standard set forth in Amirault, 399 Mass. at 626, is

clear: was the juror "aware that the answer was false." See

United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984)

("the first prong of the McDonough test requires a determination

of whether [the juror's] answers were honest, that is, whether

he was aware of the fact that his answers were false"). "The

determination of this issue is a question of fact and rests with

the trial judge." Amirault, supra. "In the absence of clear

abuse of discretion or a showing that the judge's findings were

clearly erroneous, the judge's ruling will not be disturbed on

appeal." Id. "[A] finding of fact by the trial judge will not

be deemed clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed" (quotation omitted). Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass. 140, 156, cert. denied, 457

U.S. 1137 (1982).

This is not a situation where the juror had no memory of an

event, see Amirault, 399 Mass. at 622, or where she answered

"mistakenly, but honestly," Commonwealth v. Murphy, 86 Mass.

App. Ct. 118, 126 (2014). In fact, the judge correctly

didn't tell me personally that's whoever he used to hang
out with, no."

Again, the juror denied "awareness" before trial that Karl was
part of a gang.
7

concluded that the juror's answer was "inaccurate," and that the

juror "knew it was inaccurate."6

The judge's conclusion that the answer was "not dishonest,"

because "it did not arise from any motive to mislead or conceal,

but was based on the juror's independent evaluation of

relevance" is an error of law. This conclusion conflated the

two-part standard established in McDonough and followed in

Amirault, by considering the rationale of the juror for

intentionally withholding information during voir dire when

applying the first prong of the standard. Instead, the judge

must first determine if the juror's answer was honest, that is,

if the juror knew their answer was false. Amirault, 399 Mass.

at 625. If the judge finds that the juror knew their answer was

false, only then should the judge consider the juror's "motives

for concealing information," McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, as the

"reason behind the juror's dishonesty is important when

considering whether a reasonable judge would strike the juror

for cause" (quotation omitted), United States v. French, 977

6 For an answer during voir dire to be dishonest it must be
more than inaccurate -- it must be knowingly inaccurate. That
is why I agree with the judge and the majority that the juror's
nondisclosure of her half-sister Shantel's experience with the
law –- experience the juror did not know at the time of
empanelment in this case –- cannot be the basis for a new trial.
The juror's disclosure was inaccurate as to her half-sister's
experience but it was not dishonest, as the juror was not aware
of the inaccuracy during voir dire.
8

F.3d 114, 126 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2601

(2021).7 Because the juror knew her answer was inaccurate, she

was "aware that the answer was false," Amirault, 399 Mass. at

626, and as a result the judge's determination otherwise was an

error of law.8

The judge's conclusion that "the juror's judgment of

relevance was not, in the circumstances, unreasonable, in light

of the limited information she had, both about Karl and about

7 The majority is correct that Amirault, while quoting
McDonough, states that "[t]he motives for concealing information
may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's
impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a
trial" (emphasis omitted). 399 Mass. at 625. However, the
first prong of Amirault is whether the voir dire answers are
honest. If the answers are not honest, motive is relevant to
the second prong or element of the test. See French, 977 F.3d
at 125 (considering motive for lying under second prong of
McDonough); Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 167 (2013)
(discussing second element of McDonough and "reason behind the
juror's dishonesty").

8 It also is concerning that when the juror was brought in
for questioning, the judge assured her that she was "not in any
trouble." In fact, the juror questionnaire states "that a
willful misrepresentation or omission of a material fact on this
form is a crime" and subjects the violator to a fine. Compare
Massachusetts Court System, Confidential Juror Questionnaire
(November 6, 2017), https://www.mass.gov/doc/confidential-juror-
questionnaire/download [perma.cc/PRMB-QQQ2], and Commonwealth v.
Cousin, 449 Mass. 809, 813 n.9 (2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S.
1007 (2008) (quoting form). Indeed, in Cousin, the Supreme
Judicial Court indicated it may not be practicable to examine a
juror on whether their nondisclosure -- in that case
misrepresentation of their criminal records -- was intentional
or inadvertent, "without risking a violation of their privilege
against self-incrimination." Cousin, 449 Mass. at 822.
9

any gang activity underlying the incident that was the subject

of the case" also is error. The juror's judgment was

unreasonable precisely because she had limited information about

the facts of this case and she repeatedly ignored the directions

on the form, the threat of criminal prosecution, and the judge's

additional instruction explaining the obligation to disclose.

The juror usurped the role of the judge and counsel, who did

have the broader perspective of the case.

Once it is established that a juror has knowingly decided

not to disclose information called for by the juror

questionnaire or a voir dire question, a defendant has satisfied

prong one.9

2. Whether defendants could have met their burden by

showing a correct response would have provided a valid basis for

a challenge for cause. "The second element -- whether a correct

response would have given rise to a valid basis for a challenge

for cause -- depends on whether 'a reasonable judge, armed with

the information that the dishonest juror failed to disclose and

the reason behind the juror's dishonesty, would conclude . . .

that the juror lacked the capacity and the will to decide the

9 Contrary to the majority's contention, once a defendant
has demonstrated that a juror failed to disclose responsive
information within the juror's possession, the defendant is not
automatically entitled to a new trial. The defendant faces the
additional hurdle of prong two: showing that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
10

case based on the evidence.'" French, 977 F.3d at 124-125,

quoting Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165-166 (2013).10

Judges are afforded significant deference as to their findings

on juror bias. Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 493-494

(2010) ("Because [t]he determination of a juror's impartiality

is essentially one of credibility, and therefore largely one of

demeanor, we give a trial judge's determination of impartiality

great deference. We will not disturb a judge's findings that a

juror is unbiased absent a showing that the judge's conclusion

was clearly erroneous" [quotation and citations omitted]). See

Commonwealth v. Jaime J., 56 Mass. App. Ct. 268, 272 (2002).

The judge found that "accurate disclosure by the juror

would not have given rise to a viable challenge for cause." She

concluded that "[t]he information the juror would have

disclosed, if she had answered the question accurately, would

have been that [Karl], with whom she had an 'off and on'

relationship, had been charged with and convicted of crimes.

Follow-up questions could have elicited little more, since the

juror knew little more." The judge's conclusion could only

10"This inquiry is both context-specific and fact-specific
and must be based on the 'totality of the circumstances,'
including: 'the juror's interpersonal relationships; the
juror's ability to separate her emotions from her duties; the
similarity between the juror's experiences and important facts
presented at trial; the scope and severity of the juror's
dishonesty; and the juror's motive for lying.'" French, 977
F.3d at 125, quoting Sampson, 724 F.3d at 165-166.
11

conceivably be correct if we engage in an inappropriately

restrictive reading of McDonough -- that the correct response in

and of itself would reveal grounds for challenge for cause.11

11As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in State v. Wyss,
"[a] narrow reading of the McDonough language ('and then further
show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis
for a challenge for cause') suggests that the correct response
in and of itself must demonstrate the basis for a challenge for
cause." State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 728 (1985), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 505-
506 (1990). There, the court discussed how the "harshness of
this approach" is easily demonstrated:

"Take for example a personal injury case where all
prospective jurors are asked if they have any children. A
juror who has a child fails to respond, but not only does
she have a child, but her child had recently been badly
injured in an automobile accident. If a litigant sought to
have a new trial ordered once having learned of the juror's
incorrect answer, that litigant would not prevail if the
language of the McDonough opinion was applied narrowly. A
correct answer on voir dire would have been that the
prospective juror did have a child. However, applying the
McDonough language literally, this correct answer would not
prove to be sufficient to provide a basis to strike this
juror for cause. The correct answer ('yes, I have a
child') would not in and of itself provide a basis for a
challenge for cause. However, if further inquiry were
allowed, it would reveal that not only did she have a
child, but that that child had been seriously injured in an
automobile accident and, possibly that she harbored
antagonistic feelings against drivers of automobiles who
caused accidents and insurance companies that contested
benefits. A complete inquiry would have revealed that the
prospective juror was sufficiently biased to provide a
valid basis for a challenge for cause."

Id. at 728-729. As the court in Wyss noted, while a "correct
and/or complete answer" may not provide a basis for a for cause
challenge itself, it "may well provide the basis for further
questions and responses that do uncover bias." Id. at 729.
12

The parties should be able to ask natural follow-up questions

and perform further research on answers a juror gives.

Even assuming the juror was not trying to deceive the judge

and even ignoring that the juror demonstrated she would not

follow an explicit instruction from the judge, the judge's

conclusion is clearly erroneous. An accurate disclosure should

have elicited Karl's name and that he was incarcerated for

similar crimes (also being a teen in a gang who committed crimes

of violence against other teens in this same community). A

basic Internet search would have revealed the details, as would

a check of Karl's record. See Commonwealth v. Hampton, 457

Mass. 152, 160 (2010) (prosecutor checked background of

immediate family member of juror). Information that the juror

who lived "blocks over" from where the crime occurred and was

the half-sister of a gang leader of the "most violent gang" in

Boston who was incarcerated for similar crimes would have been a

basis for a challenge for cause.12 Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462

12Moreover, while it may not have been clear to the judge
during voir dire how M.O.B. and Lucerne Street Doggz were
related, the Commonwealth, defense counsel, or one of the four
defendants could have realized the connection. In the eighteen
months leading up to the time of the murder at issue here, the
Lucerne Street Doggz were "the most violent gang in Boston,"
"was the suspect group in 30 gang-involved shootings" in 2006
(nearly ten percent of all Boston shootings in 2006), was "the
victim group in 7 gang-involved shootings in 2006," and "by the
end of May 2007, was the suspect group in another 21 gang-
involved shootings and the victim group in another 6 gang-
involved shootings." Anthony Braga, Hureau, and Papachristos,
13

Mass. 295, 305 (2012), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 261 (9th

ed. 2009) (challenge for cause is challenge "supported by a

specified reason, such as bias or prejudice, that would

disqualify that potential juror"). The information the juror

chose not to disclose –- regardless of the reason for her

nondisclosure –- cast a taint on her ability to be impartial

without calling the integrity of the process into question.

Indeed, this whole sordid situation arose because Karl, when

subsequently incarcerated with defendant Ortiz, taunted Ortiz

with the fact that Karl's sister was on the jury that convicted

him.13

This conclusion is further bolstered by how the judge

handled another juror (juror no. 5) during voir dire who omitted

his own criminal experience from the juror questionnaire. Juror

no. 5 knowingly failed to disclose juvenile adjudications, which

was discovered when the criminal offender record information

(CORI) of each juror was run. The juror did not disclose his

juvenile record because he thought it was sealed. The judge was

sympathetic to the questionnaire putting jurors in a difficult,

Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence: Measuring the Impact of
Boston's Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 30 J.
Quantitative Criminology 113, 131-132 (March 2014).

13The judge found that Karl spoke to Ortiz "in a hostile
manner" and "made some reference to his sister having been a
juror on Ortiz's trial, and showed a photograph of a woman."
14

potentially embarrassing position, but concluded that juror

no. 5 "made a conscious decision not to disclose," and she later

concluded, "I think it was a deliberate decision not to

disclose. So, I am going to excuse him."14 The judge reached

this conclusion even though juror no. 5 was relying on being

told that his juvenile record was sealed. The judge's

interpretation of the nondisclosure was consistent with case

law. Cousin, 449 Mass. at 822 (once it was verified that juror

did not disclose their criminal history, "judge permissibly

could have drawn the inference that the jurors had concealed

their criminal histories purposefully, and thus could not be

expected to be impartial or to follow the court's

instructions"). Like juror no. 5, the juror central to this

appeal made "a deliberate decision not to disclose."

Because the defendants demonstrated that the juror "failed

to answer honestly a material question on voir dire," and also

For juror no. 5, the defendants objected to his excusal,
14

and the Commonwealth argued about juror no. 5 what the
defendants now argue about the juror at issue in this case:
that juror no. 5 should be excused for cause because he did not
answer the written questionnaire properly, he did not disclose
the information when the judge asked for it, he made an effort
to intentionally mislead, and he did not follow instructions.
See Cousin, 449 Mass. at 814 ("The prosecutor also maintained
that it was reasonable to assume that falsification of the
questionnaire was an indication that the juror could not follow
the rule of law in the charge and could not be fair and
impartial during deliberations").
15

"show[ed] that a correct response would have provided a valid

basis for a challenge for cause," Amirault, 399 Mass. at 625,

quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, I would allow the

defendants' motions for a new trial.

3. Juror dishonesty should create a rebuttable presumption

of unfairness. Although I believe that the defendants met the

Amirault standard, this case raises the question whether juror

dishonesty should create a rebuttable presumption of unfairness

in criminal cases. The right to an impartial jury is "the

cornerstone of a fair trial; '[t]he failure to grant a defendant

a fair hearing before an impartial jury violates even minimal

standards of due process.'" Amirault, 399 Mass. at 624, quoting

Commonwealth v. Susi, 394 Mass. 784, 786 (1985). Voir dire is

intended to protect this "right by exposing possible biases,

both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. . . .

The necessity of truthful answers . . . is obvious." McDonough,

464 U.S. at 554. A juror who subverts the voir dire process by

failing to disclose information is a grave threat to heart of

our justice system -- the right to an impartial jury.

A rule that better balances the right to an impartial jury

with the important need for finality and the practical

necessities of judicial management, see McDonough, 464 U.S. at

555-556, is that if a criminal defendant has demonstrated that a

deliberating juror knowingly did not disclose information called
16

for during voir dire, it raises a rebuttable presumption

sufficient to warrant a new trial.15 Once a defendant makes this

showing, they have established an affront to the integrity of

the process. At that point, the misbehaving juror is the party

in control of the information, not the defendants, and it simply

is not fair to put the burden of proof on them. Demonstrating a

valid basis for a challenge for cause can be difficult. A juror

may face criminal penalties if they (or their family) admit

their deception and otherwise have their own motives to conceal

that they have withheld information to be seated in the jury

box. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-222 (1982)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Determining whether a juror is

biased or has prejudged a case is difficult, partly because the

juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and partly

because the juror may be unaware of it").

The majority "note[s] that, although in Amirault the
15

court acknowledged that 'in certain exceptional circumstances[,]
implied bias may be applicable,' it rejected the argument that
juror bias 'should be presumed as . . . a matter of law'
whenever there is a nondisclosure." Ante at . The Supreme
Judicial Court rejected the argument "in the circumstances"
presented in Amirault, where the juror voir dire answer was
honest (because she genuinely did not remember the information
she should have disclosed). That is not this case. This juror
made a deliberate choice to withhold information she was asked
to disclose. Further, in Amirault the court was discussing
implied bias, which bypasses the two-part test in Amirault, and
is not at issue here. See Amirault, 399 Mass. at 628 & n.5.
17

Placing the burden of proof on the Commonwealth also is

consistent with how we handle exposure of the jury to racial

prejudice. In that situation, the defendant "bears the initial

burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

jury were exposed to statements that infected the deliberative

process with racially or ethnically charged language or

stereotypes." McCowen, 458 Mass. at 497. "If the defendant

meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to

show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not

prejudiced by the jury's exposure to these statements." Id.

As unpalatable as it is to re-do a murder trial, there

comes a point where we cannot deny a new trial without damaging

the integrity of the system. The juror lived within "blocks" of

this violent murder. She had a family member convicted of

similar crimes in the same neighborhood who was incarcerated at

the time of voir dire in this case. Her family member was

reported to be the leader of a gang that was "cool with" M.O.B.

(the gang in which the victim was a member). The theory of the

Commonwealth's case was gang retaliation against a member of

M.O.B.16 In the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

16At the start of voir dire, the Commonwealth explained to
the judge and defense counsel that the victim was affiliated
with a gang known as M.O.B. and "some of the defendants were
affiliated with" a gang known as Wilcock Street or Ten Block
gang.
18

jury verdicts were based on the theory that the victim came or

was lured to Wilcock Street and the defendants and others at

Wilcock Street killed the victim, who was a member of M.O.B., in

retaliation for him having severely sliced the face of a

fourteen year old relative of one of the defendants.17 The juror

knew Karl's experience with the law and yet she made a

deliberate decision not to disclose this on the jury

questionnaire. She then "violated" an express instruction from

the judge "to disclose all responsive information regardless of

the juror's view of relevance." The juror got caught applying

her own erroneous relevancy filter to her own criminal record.

Still, she did not share the criminal history known to her,

persistently refusing to disclose the information requested. At

some point, for the integrity of the system, we reach a bridge

too far. This is a bridge too far for me.

Accordingly, to this extent, I dissent.

17The judge found that "the evidence presented to the jury
did not make reference to any gang affiliation of anyone." This
finding was clearly erroneous. At trial, there was evidence
that someone from M.O.B. cut the face of the cousin of defendant
Ortiz and that that person was the victim, and there were
numerous references to the "MOB" "group," "member[s]," "crowd,"
"associates," and even once "the MOB gang or group" and an
explanation that M.O.B. stood for "Money Over Bitches," which
could hardly be mistaken for a fraternal organization. Our
earlier decision in these matters referred to testimony about
the M.O.B. gang. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 89 Mass. App.
Ct. 13, 15-16, cert. denied, 580 U.S. 899 (2016).