HEIDI A. CONNELLY, Trustee, & Others v. JODEE C. DOYLE, Trustee, & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1049

HEIDI A. CONNELLY, trustee, 1 & others 2

vs.

JODEE C. DOYLE, trustee, 3 & others. 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Defendant JoDee C. Doyle, trustee of the Four Ninety-Four

NEB Realty Trust (Doyle), owns an oceanfront parcel of

registered land (locus) in Salisbury. In consolidated actions

pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 114, a Land Court judge concluded

that each of the lots owned by the plaintiffs benefits from an

implied easement to pass and re-pass over the locus by foot, and

that the easement appurtenant to the lot owned by plaintiffs

1 Of the Girls' Realty Trust.

2 Natalie S. Lucas and Donna M. Bates, trustees of the 5-D Realty
Trust; Diane M. LaRocque, trustee of the Diane M. LaRocque
Revocable Living Trust; Michael C. Faro; and Elizabeth Ann Faro,
individually and as trustee of the Navanod Revocable Living
Trust under declaration of trust dated January 9, 2004.

3 Of the Four Ninety-Four NEB Realty Trust.

4 Alfred Fisichelli, Joseph Fisichelli, and Steven A. Fisichelli,
none of whom participated in this appeal.
Natalie S. Lucas and Donna M. Bates, trustees of the 5-D Realty

Trust (Lucas and Bates), also permits passage over the locus by

vehicle. Doyle appeals, arguing that the judge erred in

concluding that the plaintiffs' lots benefit from those

easements. We affirm.

Background. "Because the judge issued h[is] decision on a

case stated basis, we review it de novo, drawing our own

inferences of fact and reaching our own conclusions of law."

Hickey v. Pathways Ass'n, 472 Mass. 735, 743 (2015). We set

forth the facts found by the judge, supplemented by our own

review of the documentary evidence.

In Doyle v. Commonwealth, 444 Mass. 686, 687-690 (2005), a

case involving among others these same parties, the court set

forth in detail the development by the Salisbury Beach

Associates (SBA), a trust, of the properties involved in this

case. As relevant here, in 1913 the Land Court issued a decree

of registration to the SBA for a tract of land along Salisbury

Beach, as depicted on twenty-seven sheets comprising Land Court

Plan 3200A. That plan depicted the locus as a single numbered

lot -- lot number 344 on sheet 3.

In 1920, the SBA filed a series of plans which removed

particular lots and replaced them with a consistent pattern of

side streets running east and west from the State highway. The

eastern streets led to the sandy beach and Atlantic Ocean, and

2
the western streets led inland. One of those plans, numbered

3200XV (1920 plan), depicted certain numbered lots in Blocks G,

P, and Q that became the plaintiffs' lots. The 1920 plan bore

an instruction that "[s]eparate certificates of title may be

issued for . . . the numbered lots in Blocks G, H, O, P & Q as

shown hereon." As to the locus, the 1920 plan did not depict it

as a lot, but as "8th St. East," one of the side streets leading

to the beach from the State highway. On the 1920 plan, the

locus had no lot number and was between blocks G and H and not

within any block.

In 1992, Doyle bought the locus from the SBA for $25,000.

The deed denoted the locus as "8th Street East," and stated that

its boundaries were located as shown on the 1920 plan. The 1920

plan depicts the northern boundary of the locus as abutting a

lot fronting on the State highway that is now owned by plaintiff

Heidi A. Connelly, trustee of the Girls' Realty Trust

(Connelly), as well as the oceanfront lot now owned by Lucas and

Bates. As depicted on the 1920 plan, the locus had no eastern

boundary, but faces Salisbury Beach and the Atlantic Ocean. To

the south the locus abuts lots now owned by Alfred Fisichelli,

Joseph D. Fisichelli, and Steven A. Fisichelli (the

Fisichellis). As depicted on the 1920 plan, the locus had no

western boundary, but faces the State highway.

3
The 1920 plan also depicts the lots now owned by plaintiffs

Diane M. LaRocque, trustee of the Diane M. LaRocque Revocable

Living Trust (LaRocque), and Michael C. Faro and Elizabeth Ann

Faro, trustee of the Navanod Revocable Trust (the Faros), which

are on the other side of the State highway, also called North

End Boulevard. Each of the five plaintiffs' certificates of

title describes their lots with reference to the 1920 plan.

None of the plaintiffs' certificates of title contain express

language documenting an easement across the locus.

Apparently based on Doyle's 1992 deed and without

examination of the 1920 plan, an assistant recorder issued a

transfer certificate of title for the locus. See Doyle, 444

Mass. at 688-689 & n.5. The Land Court subsequently determined

that the transfer certificate of title was "clearly erroneous"

because it purported to set forth boundaries for the locus based

on the 1920 plan, which did not delineate any eastern or western

boundaries. Id. at 690. The Supreme Judicial Court concurred.

Id. at 696-697.

On July 8, 1998, a new plan was registered (1998 plan) that

depicts the locus with eastern and western boundaries and the

lot number 843, and bears an instruction, dated February 5,

2016, that "[s]eparate certificates of title may be issued for

land shown hereon as Lot 843." On February 16, 2016, the

recorder issued a new transfer certificate of title to Doyle

4
which describes the locus with reference to the 1998 plan and

states that Doyle's ownership of the locus "is subject to the

rights of others, if any, to pass and re-pass over said land."

Connelly, Lucas, and Bates then petitioned the Land Court

pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 114, to amend Doyle's certificate of

title to reflect their rights "to pass and repass and to utilize

the [locus] as a road." LaRocque and the Faros filed a similar

petition, seeking to amend Doyle's certificate of title to

recognize their right "to pass and re-pass over the Locus to

access Salisbury Beach and the Atlantic Ocean," without

reference to vehicular access.

By agreement of the parties, the consolidated cases were

tried on the documentary evidence. The judge also took a view.

After trial, the judge allowed the plaintiffs' motion to

supplement the record with documents including a 1917 pamphlet

advertising the SBA development. The judge determined that the

plaintiffs had proven that they had implied easements to pass

and re-pass over the locus by foot. 5

5 The judge concluded that the lots owned by the Fisichellis, who
were named as defendants in the action brought by Connelly,
Lucas, and Bates, which abut the locus to the south, also
benefited from easements over the locus. Doyle moved for
reconsideration of that ruling on the grounds that the
Fisichellis had voluntarily terminated their easement over the
locus. The judge allowed the motion, concluding that the
Fisichellis' lots were excluded from the group of lots which
enjoy easement rights over the locus. The Fisichellis have not
appealed, and so we do not consider that issue.

5
Abutters Connelly, Lucas, and Bates moved for relief from

the judgment, or in the alternative to amend the judgment,

arguing that their lots' easements should permit vehicular as

well as pedestrian access over the locus. After Doyle filed a

proposed order that would limit pedestrian access to two four-

foot wide pathways along either side of the locus, LaRocque and

the Faros objected to that proposed layout and supported the

abutters' motion for reconsideration. The judge allowed the

abutters' motion in part, amending the judgment to provide that

the lot owned by plaintiffs Lucas and Bates is benefited by an

appurtenant right to pass and re-pass over the locus both by

foot and by vehicle, but not including the right to park

vehicles on the locus. As to the lots owned by Connelly,

LaRocque, and the Faros, the judge concluded that they enjoy "an

appurtenant right to pass and re-pass by foot over" the locus.

Doyle appealed.

Discussion. Implied easements over the locus appurtenant

to plaintiffs' lots. As those claiming the benefit of easements

over the locus, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the

existence of the easements appurtenant to their lots. Hickey,

472 Mass. at 753-754, citing Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 452,

458 (2006). Generally, a holder of a certificate of title to

registered land takes "free from all encumbrances except those

noted on the certificate." G. L. c. 185, § 46. See Doyle, 444

6
Mass. at 693. Massachusetts courts have recognized two

exceptions to this rule: "(1) if there were facts described on

[Doyle's] certificate of title which would prompt a reasonable

purchaser to investigate further other certificates of title,

documents, or plans in the registration system; or (2) if the

purchaser has actual knowledge of a prior unregistered

interest." Id., quoting Jackson v. Knott, 418 Mass. 704, 711

(1994). In the Land Court, the parties agreed that the second

Jackson exception did not apply, and the judge did not consider

it. 6 We similarly focus on the first Jackson exception.

The judge determined that based on the 1920 plan referenced

in the deed for the locus, Doyle "would have and should have

[been] prompted . . . to consider whether the [SBA] had intended

to give rights to others in the subdivisions over the land she

was buying from the successors to the [SBA] -- a parcel plainly

labeled on the guiding Land Court plan as a street." The judge

concluded, "The inference is strong, and I draw it, that in this

6 We note that, by the time her valid certificate of title was
registered in 2016, Doyle certainly knew that the plaintiffs
claimed easements over the locus: they had objected to her
petition to register her prior invalid certificate of title.
See Doyle, 444 Mass. at 687. Moreover, the 2016 certificate of
title noted that the locus "is subject to the rights of others,
if any, to pass and re-pass over said land." As neither the
parties nor the judge relied on the second Jackson exception, we
do not reach the question whether it would have required proof
of Doyle's actual knowledge in 1992 when she obtained the deed
for the locus, or in 2016 when her certificate of title was
registered.

7
community of lots sold for beach-focused vacation and

recreational residential use, proximate and convenient beach

access afforded to all the nearby lots was a driving factor in

the development and sale of all the lots shown on the 1920

Plan."

Doyle contends that the judge erred, arguing strenuously

that G. L. c. 185, § 46, prohibits an easement over registered

land unless the easement is shown on the certificate of title.

That is generally true, but the judge concluded that this case

fell within the first Jackson exception, and we agree. Based on

the information in the registration system, including the 1920

plan referenced in Doyle's deed, Doyle would have been expected

to investigate whether others had easement rights over the

locus. See Hickey, 472 Mass. at 759. The 1920 plan on its face

would have given a purchaser reason to believe that others had

easement rights over the locus. The 1920 plan labeled the locus

as "8th St. East." The 1920 plan depicted, as the judge

described it, "a network of roads, including a ladder-like

carefully patterned system of side streets, at regular intervals

interrupting the sequence of private lots and extending from the

state highway to the beach"; the judge concluded that the layout

was "akin to an easement by common scheme." Cf. Conway v.

Caragliano, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 773, 783-784 (2023) (in context

of plans depicting development of lots with evenly spaced ways

8
to the beach, deed referring to lot as benefiting from easement

rather than being encumbered by it sufficient to put purchaser

on notice of others' easement rights). The 1920 plan included

the instruction that "[s]eparate certificates of title may be

issued for . . . the numbered lots in Blocks G [and] H . . . as

shown hereon," which would have led prospective buyers,

including Doyle and the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-

title, to believe that the locus was not subject to the issuance

of a certificate of title because it was depicted on the 1920

plan as lying between Blocks G and H and had no lot number.

Doyle argues that because none of the plaintiffs'

certificates of title mention an easement over the locus, they

cannot meet their burden. 7 "[E]ven on registered land, there is

no requirement that easements appurtenant, benefiting a lot,

must be listed on the certificate of title." Hickey, 472 Mass.

at 753 n.26. General Laws "c. 185 requires only easements to

which the registered land is subject be set out in the

7 For similar reasons, Doyle argues that an implied easement
across the locus would violate the statute of frauds, which
requires "an instrument in writing signed by the grantor" to
assign an interest in land "unless . . . by operation of law."
G. L. c. 183, § 3. The argument is unavailing. The 1920 plan,
which was incorporated by reference into the deed for the locus
and the deeds and certificates of title for the plaintiffs'
lots, was "an instrument in writing"; further, implied easements
were permitted "by operation of law" under cases including
Hickey.

9
certificate of title. Easements [benefiting] the property need

not be noted." Id., quoting Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 56-

57 (1927).

Doyle urges us to interpret Hickey, 472 Mass. at 760, to

preclude a finding of implied easements across the locus for the

benefit of the plaintiffs' lots unless there is proof of at

least one express easement granted to a lot owner somewhere in

the subdivision. 8 The judge declined to "read Hickey as taking

such a narrow pathway through this fraught issue." After noting

that, in Hickey, there was evidence that certain lots did enjoy

8 The record before us does show at least two instances in the
registration system where the SBA seems to have recognized
easement rights over the locus to access the beach. First, in
1933, when the Commonwealth took title to the length of
Salisbury Beach, its certificate of title referred to a plan
numbered 3200-46 and specified that the Commonwealth's title to
the beach was "subject to rights of way thereover between the
respective lots shown on said plan and the Ocean." That plan is
not in the record before us, but the Supreme Judicial Court
noted that it depicted "8th St. East," the locus, as lying
"between the respective lots . . . and the Ocean." Doyle, 444
Mass. at 688 n.4.

Second, in 1965, the SBA granted to the Willows Realty
Trust "the right to use in common with others any ways to the
beach which are in the vicinity or adjacent to . . . Eighth
Street West," which would include the locus. At argument before
the Land Court judge, the parties disputed whether the Willows
Realty Trust property was within the SBA development, and the
record before us contains no deed or certificate of title
showing what property the Willows Realty Trust owned. Because
we agree with the judge's interpretation of Hickey and with his
conclusion that the evidence of the SBA's intent to convey
easements over the locus appurtenant to the plaintiffs' lots was
"strong," we need not rely on these instances.

10
some express easement rights upon other lots, the judge went on

to point out that there also existed a plan depicting "an

integral scheme of ways in a neighborhood, providing access to

the waterfront, every three or four lots." Hickey, 472 Mass. at

749. The judge then went on to observe that, in Hickey, the

purpose of that "integral scheme" -- "to provide waterfront

access to inland lots" -- was deemed by the Supreme Judicial

Court to be "obvious on the face of the plans, and would have

been [obvious] to those purchasing" the lots at issue there.

Id. After making these observations, the judge concluded that

in this case the SBA's intention to create easement rights

across the locus for the benefit of the plaintiffs' lots was

"even more obvious on the face of the plans" than in Hickey

(quotation omitted). See Bacon v. Onset Bay Grove Ass'n, 241

Mass. 417, 423 (1922) (where land conveyed by reference to plan,

easement may be created if "shown to be intended by the parties

to the deed," considering "the entire situation at the time of

the conveyance"). We concur with the judge's interpretation of

Hickey and his analysis of the documentary evidence in this

case.

Easements appurtenant to abutters' lots, including

vehicular access for lot owned by Lucas and Bates. Doyle argues

that the judge erred in concluding that the lots owned by

Connelly, Lucas, and Bates enjoy pedestrian easements over the

11
locus, and the easement appurtenant to the beachfront lot owned

by Lucas and Bates also permits vehicular access.

As discussed above, we have concluded that all five

plaintiffs' lots benefit from implied easements for pedestrian

access over the locus. As to Doyle's arguments that the lots

owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates do not enjoy easements over

the locus, we further note as follows. As abutters to the

locus, Connelly, Lucas, and Bates have even stronger claims than

the other plaintiffs to implied easements over the locus. 9 Where

"a seller conveyed registered land abutting a way, the

conveyance described the ways as a boundary, and the deed

referenced a subdivision plan on file in the land registration

office showing the way," a subsequent purchaser such as Doyle

may be estopped from "deny[ing] the existence of such street or

way." Hickey, 472 Mass. at 758 n.30, quoting Murphy v. Mart

Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass. 675, 677-678 (1965). See

Duddy v. Mankewich, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 70 n.13 (2009); Lane

v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Falmouth, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 434, 437

9 Connelly, Lucas, and Bates do not contend that they own a fee
to the midline of the locus. The judge concluded that when the
SBA sold the lots, it retained the fee in the locus. We note
that at the time of the 1920 plan, the legal question whether a
deed to land bounded by a way was presumed to extend to the
midline of the way or only to its edge was somewhat uncertain.
See Erickson v. Ames, 264 Mass. 436, 442-445 (1928) (collecting
cases). See also Conway, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 780-781.

12
(2006). The lots owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates fit that

description.

To try to rebut the easement by estoppel theory as to the

abutting lots owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates, Doyle makes

two arguments. First, she contends that because the two lots

now owned by Connelly, Lucas, and Bates were deeded by the SBA

in 1936 to a single owner, Albert Alexander, who had access

across those lots both to the beach and to the road, the SBA

could not have intended also to grant him a "duplicate" easement

over the locus. Until 1997, both of those lots were owned by

William and Natalie Donahue, the parents of Connelly, Lucas, and

Bates, and during the Donahues' ownership each of those lots had

access both to the beach and to the road by crossing the other

lot, if necessary. 10 As the judge noted, in the 1920 plan the

SBA chose to lay out the two lots as distinct lots, with

different restrictions for each, and contemplating the

construction of a house and garage on each, which "naturally

implies an intention to treat each lot, from the time of their

creation, as separate for the purpose of access." The mere fact

that two lots were previously owned in common, or that the

10In the Land Court, Doyle argued that by separating the lots
and conveying them to different daughters, Natalie Donahue
"caused" the "problem," "effectively landlocking" the oceanfront
lot owned by Lucas and Bates. Doyle does not raise that
argument on appeal, and so we do not consider it.

13
owners may have had other ways to access the beach, does not

preclude the lots from enjoying easements over the locus. See

Melrose Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 89

Mass. App. Ct. 594, 597 (2016). "A way created by

estoppel . . . 'is not a way by necessity, and the right exists,

even if there be other ways, either public or private, leading

to the land.'" Casella v. Sneirson, 325 Mass. 85, 91 (1949),

quoting New England Structural Co. v. Everett Distilling Co.,

189 Mass. 145, 152 (1905).

Second, Doyle argues that the Donahues abandoned any

easement they may have had over the locus when they erected a

chain-link fence on the boundary between their lots and the

locus. In their answers to interrogatories, Connelly and Lucas

averred that the "fence was erected in the early to mid 1980's."

The judge found that the fence was erected "in the mid-1980s,"

and that "approximately a decade" passed between its

installation and 1996, when the first case contesting Doyle's

title to the locus was filed. The judge concluded that period

was not long enough to show extinguishment of the easement by

abandonment. Having reviewed de novo the documentary evidence,

we concur.

For the construction of a fence by the owner of a lot

benefiting from an easement to cause abandonment, the fence must

be in place long enough to "conclusively and unequivocally

14
manifest[] either a present intent to relinquish the easement or

a purpose inconsistent with its further existence." Dubinsky,

261 Mass. at 57. As the judge pointed out, even the longest

duration argued by Doyle in the Land Court -- fifteen

years -- fell short of the lengths of time held sufficient by

Massachusetts courts to show abandonment. 11 See Lasell College

v. Leonard, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 390-391 (1992) (fence in

place for twenty-three years resulted in abandonment). See also

Cianciulli v. Marlowe, 330 Mass. 410, 413 (1953) (right of way

to pond extinguished by nonuse for more than twenty years,

coupled with adverse use of servient estate). Contrast 107

Manor Ave. LLC v. Fontanella, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 155, 160 (2009)

(easement abandoned, where easement holders never took steps to

remove stone wall blocking access to it since at least 1940,

engaged in conduct inconsistent with their right to use it, and

it was "useless" and "[did] not provide access to anything").

As for Doyle's claim that the judge erred in determining

that the beachfront lot owned by Lucas and Bates benefits from

an easement over the locus for vehicular access, it is

11On appeal, Doyle argues that the fence was in place for "at
least 30 years," apparently counting all of the time until 2015,
when certain photographs were taken that were admitted in
evidence at trial. We agree with the judge that by 1996, when
the first action contesting Doyle's title was filed, Doyle was
on notice that the fence was not a conclusive and unequivocal
manifestation of the abutting plaintiffs' intent to abandon the
easement. See Dubinsky, 261 Mass. at 57.

15
unavailing. 12 The judge concluded that the SBA would not have

intended to create a beachfront lot without vehicular access

over the locus it abutted and which was labeled on the 1920 plan

as a "street," "a term which naturally and traditionally implies

passage by vehicle." The record does not support Doyle's

argument that the SBA did not intend for the lot now owned by

Lucas and Bates to have vehicular access over the locus. See

Conway, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 787 n.13 (evidence supporting

easement for vehicular access included the "width of the

shoreway, its proximity to the ocean, . . . and the fact that

vehicular use was common when the right of way was granted").

Admission of 1917 advertisement. Doyle also contends that

the judge erred in admitting in evidence a 1917 advertisement

for the SBA development because it was not contained within the

registration system.

At trial, Doyle argued that cases interpreting whether

implied easements existed for beach access turned on whether

12Connelly, who owns the lot abutting the locus that fronts the
State highway, joins Lucas and Bates in arguing that the fifty-
foot width of the locus and the "1920 . . . advent of the State
Highway and the affordable automobile" show that the SBA
intended for the easement appurtenant to her lot to include
vehicular as well as foot access over the locus. However,
Connelly did not appeal from the judge's denial of her motion to
reconsider so much of his order as denied her vehicular access.
"As [Connelly] failed to file a cross appeal, we will not
consider [her] arguments in this regard." Scott v. Boston Hous.
Auth., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 693, 695 (2005).

16
there were advertisements for the property that mentioned the

beach. See Reagan, 446 Mass. at 459 (easement based on evidence

including advertisements); Houghton v. Johnson, 71 Mass. App.

Ct. 825, 832-835 (2008) (no easement; no advertisements in

evidence). In response, the plaintiffs argued that the

information in the registration system, including the word

"beach" in the name of the development and the depiction of the

Atlantic Ocean on the 1920 plan, sufficed to prove that the SBA

intended to provide lot owners with beach access across the

locus.

After trial, the plaintiffs moved for leave to supplement

the record with documents including a 1917 advertisement. After

a hearing, the judge allowed the motion. Neither the

plaintiffs' motion nor the transcript of the hearing is included

in the appendix, and so the record before us does not contain

any evidence as to where that advertisement came from. 13 The

1917 advertisement described the SBA development as "[f]our

miles of brilliant, dazzling surf on clean white sand. Hundreds

of summer cottages with waves breaking almost at the doorsteps."

The judge quoted that language in his memorandum of decision.

13As appellant, it was Doyle's obligation under Mass. R. A. P.
18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019), to include
materials "which are essential for review of the issues raised
on appeal." Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 84
(1995), quoting Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 30 Mass.
App. Ct. 371, 372-373 (1991), S.C., 411 Mass. 807 (1992).

17
We review the judge's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of

discretion, i.e., "a clear error of judgment in weighing the

factors relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls

outside the range of reasonable alternatives" (quotation and

citation omitted). L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185

n.27 (2014). Even assuming that the 1917 advertisement came

from outside the registration system, we cannot say that the

judge abused his discretion in admitting it in evidence. See

St. George's Ebenezer Primitive Methodist Church of Methuen v.

Primitive Methodist Church of the U.S. of Am., E. Conference,

318 Mass. 723, 725-726 (1945) (to rebut claim that former

owner's conveyance of registered land was scrivener's error,

Land Court properly admitted letter from former owner stating

his intent for use of locus). See also Mass. G. Evid.

§ 803 (17), (20) (2023). In any event, the 1917 advertisement

was not particularly prejudicial. It conveyed, in somewhat more

flowery language, what was apparent from the face of the 1920

plan: that the SBA was selling hundreds of lots in proximity

18
to -- and with access to -- the Atlantic Ocean and Salisbury

Beach.

Decision entered October 15,
2019, affirmed.

Order on motions for
reconsideration entered
July 1, 2022, affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks, Grant &
Smyth, JJ. 14),

Clerk

Entered: September 6, 2023.

14 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

19