SHU HUA LIN v. HSIANG YING LIN & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-802

SHU HUA LIN

vs.

HSIANG YING LIN & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff brought suit for unjust enrichment, among

other claims, seeking to recover from the defendants the

monetary contributions she made toward the purchase and

maintenance of a condominium in Brighton. After a jury-waived

trial, a Superior Court judge found for the plaintiff on her

unjust enrichment claim and awarded her $50,000 with prejudgment

interest. The defendants appeal, arguing that the plaintiff's

claim is barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine

of unclean hands and that the judge erred in determining the

1 Michael Pang.
amount of the award and by adding prejudgment interest. We

affirm.2

Background. The plaintiff and defendant Hsiang Ying Lin

(Lin) are two of seven sisters. In 2005 the plaintiff, Lin, and

another sister Amy discussed purchasing the condominium for Lin

to occupy with their mother. When Lin expressed hesitance to

assume the financial burden of home ownership, the plaintiff and

Amy assured her they would help with the mortgage, condominium

fees, and some of the utilities and expenses.

Thereafter, Lin alone executed the purchase and sale

agreement, which reflected a purchase price of $230,690. The

plaintiff and Amy each provided $10,000 toward the down payment.

Lin took title to the condominium in June 2005 and then lived

there with the sisters' mother for the next two to two and one-

half years. During that time the plaintiff and Amy each paid

approximately one third of the monthly bill for the mortgage and

condominium fees and contributed toward various living expenses.

In 2008 the plaintiff and her family lived in the

condominium for a few months. Lin moved in again in 2009 and at

some point was joined by defendant Michael Pang, who is now

2 The judge found in favor of the defendants on their
counterclaim for breach of contract and awarded them $30,750 in
damages with prejudgment interest. The plaintiff did not appeal
from that judgment, nor did she appeal from so much of the
judgment as dismissed the remaining counts of her complaint.

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Lin's husband. In 2010 they moved out and began leasing the

condominium. The last payment that the plaintiff made to Lin in

relation to the condominium was on August 20, 2009.

In 2018, during discussions about the plaintiff's repayment

of a loan, a dispute arose among the parties regarding their

respective interests in the condominium. The plaintiff claimed

in an e-mail message that she owned part of the condominium and

that Lin still owed her and Amy "all the profit" Lin had

realized "since [they] purchased the apartment back in 2005."

In a series of e-mail messages dated June 21, 2018, Lin replied

that the plaintiff had no interest in the condominium and that

she (Lin) "own[ed] the property 100%" and did not "owe [the

plaintiff] anything."

The plaintiff filed this suit on July 23, 2019.

Discussion. 1. Statute of limitations. The parties agree

that the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim is subject to the

six-year statute of limitations governing contract actions. See

G. L. c. 260, § 2; Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Benchmark Mechanical

Sys., Inc., 475 Mass. 150, 156 (2016). The defendants assert

that this six-year period began running on August 20, 2009 --

the date that the plaintiff made her last payment relating to

the condominium -- and that her claim, filed almost ten years

later, is therefore untimely. The trial judge concluded to the

contrary that the claim accrued under the discovery rule on June

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21, 2018, when Lin first claimed that she owned one hundred

percent of the condominium and owed the plaintiff nothing. We

agree with the judge.

"Unjust enrichment is defined as retention of money or

property of another against the fundamental principles of

justice or equity and good conscience." Sacks v. Dissinger, 488

Mass. 780, 789 (2021), quoting Santagate v. Tower, 64 Mass. App.

Ct. 324, 329 (2005). Thus, because the retention of something

belonging to another is the crux of the cause of action, the

plaintiff's claim did not accrue until she knew, or reasonably

should have known, that the defendants intended to retain the

money she paid toward the purchase and maintenance of the

condominium. See Harrington v. Costello, 467 Mass. 720, 727

(2014) ("a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers

or with reasonable diligence should have discovered that [1] he

has suffered harm; [2] his harm was caused by the conduct of

another; and [3] the defendant is the person who caused that

harm"). The record shows that the plaintiff did not realize

this harm (that the defendants intended to retain her money)

until June 21, 2018, when Lin sent her e-mail messages claiming

that she owned one hundred percent of the condominium and owed

the plaintiff nothing. The defendants raise no argument that

the plaintiff with reasonable diligence could have discovered

the harm sooner.

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Instead, relying on cases concerning the cause of action

for money had and received, the defendants argue that the

plaintiff's claim accrued, as a matter of law, at the time of

her last payment and that the discovery rule does not apply

absent some showing of fraud. But the cases the defendants cite

are inapposite because they involve claims to recover payments

made by mistake. See Suffolk Constr. Co., 475 Mass. at 156; New

Bedford v. Lloyd Inv. Assocs., 363 Mass. 112, 118 (1973); State

Nat'l Bank of Lynn v. Beacon Trust Co., 267 Mass. 355, 359-360

(1929). A cause of action to recover payments made by mistake

accrues "at once" because its elements are established at the

time of the mistake. State Nat'l Bank of Lynn, supra at 360.

See Sturgis v. Preston, 134 Mass. 372, 373 (1883) ("plaintiff's

cause of action [for money had and received] arose immediately

upon the payment of the money" because "the defendant held, and

claimed as his own, from the moment it was paid to him, money

which in equity and good conscience he ought to have immediately

repaid"). In contrast here, the plaintiff made the payments to

Lin not by mistake, but with the expectation that she would

later be compensated. As it did not come to light until June

2018 that the defendants did not intend to compensate her, the

plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, filed a little over one

year later, was timely. See Sturgis, supra ("This case differs

widely from those in which the defendant is in the rightful

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possession of money, making no claim to it as his own, but ready

to pay it over to the rightful owner; in which it is held that

no right of action arises, and that the statute does not begin

to run until after a demand upon him by the party entitled to

the money, and a refusal to pay it over to the rightful

claimant"). See also Suffolk Constr. Co., supra at 157 (claim

to recover moneys paid by mistake was time barred, but claim for

unjust enrichment was not).

2. Unclean hands. The defendants next contend that the

plaintiff is foreclosed from recovering on her unjust enrichment

claim because the judge's findings on her other claims show that

the plaintiff told "major lies" to try to justify her case. We

understand the defendants to be arguing that, because the judge

found certain aspects of the plaintiff's testimony not credible,

the doctrine of unclean hands bars the plaintiff from recovering

on any of her claims. The defendants cite no legal authority in

support of this proposition, and so their argument is waived.

See Halstrom v. Dube, 481 Mass. 480, 483 n.8 (2019).

Furthermore, to the extent the defendants raised the argument

below, they did not do so in a clear enough fashion to put the

judge on notice of it. Their argument is waived for this

additional reason. See id.

3. Amount of award. The defendants challenge the amount

of the award on two grounds. They first contend that the judge

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erred by considering the current value of the condominium in

determining the value of the benefit that the plaintiff

conferred on the defendants. We are unpersuaded. Because

"measuring restitution for unjust enrichment poses special

difficulties, . . . trial judges need 'considerable discretion'

to fashion appropriate remedies." Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass.

App. Ct. 622, 626 (2017), quoting Restatement (Second) of

Contracts § 371 comment a (1981). Here, the judge found that it

was the expectation of all parties that the plaintiff (and Amy)

"would realize some form of repayment for their contributions

toward [Lin's] ownership of the unit" and noted that Lin forgave

a considerable debt that Amy owed her "based upon Amy's one

third contribution and in light of the unit's potential sale

value." The judge further found that the plaintiff's payments,

totaling $34,048 from 2005 to 2009, contributed to the

maintenance of the condominium; that the condominium had

appreciated more than 62.5 percent since the purchase; and that,

although the plaintiff was never involved in managing the

condominium, she also did not share in the rental income, which

had recently surpassed the monthly costs. Based on these

factors and principles of equity, the judge determined that the

plaintiff was owed $50,000 for the benefit she conferred on the

defendants. The defendants have not shown this to be an abuse

of discretion. See Bonina, supra, quoting Restatement (Second)

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of Contracts § 371 comment a ("[t]o the extent that the benefit

may reasonably be measured in different ways, the choice is

within the discretion of the court").

Second, and without citing any legal authority, the

defendants contend that the judgment should not have included

prejudgment interest. The sole basis for this argument is that

the judge's order for judgment mentioned prejudgment interest

only with respect to the defendants' counterclaim. Based on

this, the defendants assert that the judge did not make a

"finding" that prejudgment interest was warranted on the

plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim and so the judgment should

be amended accordingly. This argument is meritless.

Prejudgment interest is governed by statute, see G. L. c. 231,

§§ 6B, 6C, and 6H, and "it is settled that claims for damages

based in quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, both based in

equity, are eligible for statutory prejudgment interest."

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Brennan v. Ferreira, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 319 (2023). We see

no error.3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Shin &
Toone, JJ.4),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 9, 2024.

3 The parties' requests for appellate attorney's fees, which
specify no basis therefor, are denied.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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