Indianhead Penny LP v. Board of Assessors of the Town of Edgartown (June 24, 2011)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD



INDIANHEAD PENNY LP			v.	  BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 								  THE TOWN OF EDGARTOWN


Docket Nos.: F298945, F298948 (FY 08)
             F304194, F304196 (FY 09)
             F308987, F308990 (FY 10)   
    Promulgated:	  
	                                 June 24, 2011
  

		     
	These are appeals under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 and G.L. c. 59, § 7, from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the Town of Edgartown (the "assessors" or "appellee") to abate taxes on two adjacent parcels of real estate located at 8 Ocean View Avenue and 6 Menamsha Avenue in the Town of Edgartown (collectively, the "subject assessing parcels"), owned by and assessed to Indianhead Penny LP (the "appellant") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010.  
	Commissioner Rose heard these appeals.  Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Egan, and Mulhern joined him in the decisions for the appellee.  
	

The Appellate Tax Board (the "Board") promulgates these findings of fact and report on its own motion under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.  The Board's decisions are promulgated simultaneously herewith.    

	Donald P. Quinn, P.C., Esq. and Danielle Justo, Esq. for the appellant.

	Ellen M. Hutchinson, Esq. for the appellee.


FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
Introduction
	The two subject assessing parcels are owned by and assessed to the appellant and are located at 8 Ocean View Avenue and 6 Menamsha Avenue in the Town of Edgartown on Martha's Vineyard.  They are part of a larger tract of land which is identified on more recent deeds as "Parcel Two: Unregistered Land" ("Parcel Two").  The 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel is unimproved and contains approximately 2.45 acres; the assessors identify it as Parcel ID 29-145. The 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel is also unimproved, and it contains approximately 1.50 acres of land.  The assessors identify this assessing parcel as Parcel ID 29-151.  Parcel Two also contains two additional unimproved assessing parcels: the 9 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel (Parcel ID 29-152), which contains 1.38 acres and the 15 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel (Parcel ID 29-153), which contains 1.38 acres.  The parties settled the appeals related to these two additional assessing parcels, and they are not before the Board (the "settled parcels").    
The subject assessing parcels -- as well as the two settled parcels that form the rest of Parcel Two -- are located in a neighborhood that is close to Edgartown Harbor in the Tower Hill area of town and is less than one mile from the historic downtown.  The neighborhood is comprised of mostly large, luxurious homes on parcels ranging from 1.5 to 3 acres in size.  The area is predominantly wooded and contains the unpaved roads that are typical of areas outside of the island town centers.  The beach is approximately two miles away.
The relevant assessment information for the subject assessing parcels for the fiscal years at issue is contained in the following two tables.

The 8 Ocean View Avenue Assessing Parcel

Docket Number
	Fiscal Year	
Assessment	Tax Rate /$1,000	Tax Assessed*	
F298945	2008	$807,900	$ 2.73	$2,263.55	
F304196	2009	$807,900	$ 2.91	$2,417.79	
F308987	2010	$781,200	$ 3.09	$2,477.06	
*The tax assessed includes a Community Preservation Act ("CPA") charge.

The 6 Menamsha Avenue Assessing Parcel

Docket Number
	Fiscal Year	
Assessment	Tax Rate /$1,000	Tax Assessed*	
F298948	2008	$1,274,300	$ 2.73	$3,575.02	
F304194	2009	$1,274,300	$ 2.91	$3,815.73	
F308990	2010	$1,227,900	$ 3.09	$3,898.77	
*The tax assessed includes a CPA charge.

	The pertinent payment and other jurisdictional information, including relevant filing dates, for the subject assessing parcels for the fiscal years at issue are contained in the following table.
The 8 Ocean View Avenue & 6 Menamsha Avenue
Assessing Parcels

Docket Number	Fiscal Year	Tax Bill Mailed	Tax Payment	Abatement Application	Assessors'
Denial	Petition to Board	
F298945/48	 2008	05/06/2008	timely	06/04/2008	10/30/2008	01/26/2009	
F304196/94	 2009	12/30/2008	timely	01/28/2009	04/28/2009	07/24/2009	
F308987/90	 2010	12/30/2009	timely	01/21/2010	04/20/2010	07/15/2010	

For fiscal year 2008, there is no evidence that the appellant granted the assessors an extension of time, under G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 & 65, within which to act on its abatement applications.  Consequently, the appellant's applications were deemed denied on September 4, 2008, and the assessors' purported denials on October 30, 2008 are ineffectual.  There is also no evidence that the assessors sent timely notices of inaction to the appellant under G.L. c. 59, § 63 or that the appellant filed Petitions for Late Entry under G.L. c. 59, § 65C.  However, where, as here, the assessors fail to send written notice of their inaction to a taxpayer within ten days of the deemed denial date, this Board, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 65C, may extend the deadline for filing an appeal by two months.  See American House, LLC v. Assessors of Greenfield, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2005-41-42, 54-59. 
In the present appeals, extension of the appeal period by two months results in a filing deadline of February 4, 2009.  The appellant filed its petitions on January 26, 2009, well within the two-month extension period allowed under § 65C.  Accordingly, the Board finds that the filing of the fiscal year 2008 petitions is seasonable. See Attilio F. Cardaropoli v. Assessors of Springfield, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2001-913, 925 ("If it is determined that the conditions for allowing a petition for late entry exist, then the Board [will allow] the petition[s] to be entered nunc pro tunc and exercise jurisdiction over the appeal[s].").
Based on these subsidiary findings and rulings and the jurisdictional information contained in the above table, the Board finds and rules that it has jurisdiction over these appeals.
Summary of the Evidence
	The appellant entered numerous exhibits and called two witnesses to testify in these appeals.  The appellant called attorney Dennis Crimmins as its first witness to testify in support of its position that the subject assessing parcels should be valued and taxed as part of a single parcel which also includes the two settled parcels.  Responding to the assessors' attorney's objection and testimony on voir dire, the Board refused to qualify Mr. Crimmins as an expert witness in the field of conveyancing.  Among the reasons supporting this ruling include: the witness's lack of independence and the proposed testimony concerned a legal issue for which expert testimony was not necessary.  
First, it was established on voir dire that Mr. Crimmins has worked and continues to work with appellant's co-counsel on matters litigated and currently before the Board concerning assessments on other properties on Martha's Vineyard and in Edgartown.  The Board found that Mr. Crimmins's on-going association with appellant's counsel on other Martha's Vineyard and Edgartown appeals called his independence into question.  Second, the Board did not believe that it was necessary to receive testimony from an expert witness to assist it in determining whether, as a matter of law, the two subject assessing parcels coupled with the two settled parcels should be valued and taxed as a single assessing parcel.  The Board is capable of deciding this question without the aid of an expert witness in the field of conveyancing.  The Board, however, did allow Mr. Crimmins to testify conditionally as a fact witness.  
After examining the various deeds, plans, and zoning regulations, but not having spoken with any town zoning, planning, building, or assessing officials, Mr. Crimmins concluded that Parcel Two should be treated as a single lot for purposes of building a residence and assessing it.  He believed that the continuous description of Parcel Two as a single tract of land since 1965 was the primary reason for this conclusion, as well as his determination that Parcel Two could not now be divided into and conveyed as smaller parcels with what he termed "marketable title."  
	Mr. Crimmins also testified that the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel (Parcel ID 29-151) was not a buildable lot, without a zoning variance or a waiver of certain deed restrictions, because this assessing parcel's dimensions did not conform to the relevant zoning set-back requirements or certain deed restrictions.  Mr. Crimmins did believe, however, that it would be possible to obtain a building permit for the 8 Ocean Avenue assessing parcel  (Parcel ID 29-149), but if obtained, it would likely be subjected to a lengthy legal challenge by abutters. 
	The appellant called Jo-Ann Resendes, the assistant assessor in Edgartown, as its second and final witness.  Ms. Resendes verified certain information on the subject assessing parcels' property record cards, including the area encompassed by the primary site designation, the sea factors for the first and second landlines, the unit value for excess land, and the neighborhood adjustments.  
The assessors' case-in-chief consisted of an appraisal report that Ms. Resendes had prepared, which contained three comparable-sales analyses for estimating the value of the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessment parcel for each of the fiscal years at issue.  In her analysis for fiscal year 2008, she used three purportedly comparable sale properties and derived an adjusted value of $1,075,000, and for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, she used three other purportedly comparable sale properties and derived adjusted values of $1,075,000 and $1,000,000, respectively. 
Summaries of her analyses are contained in the following three tables.

Fiscal Year 2008
	Subject
8 Ocean View Ave.
	Comp. 1
31 Slough Cove Rd.	Comp. 2
242 Katama Rd.	Comp. 3
96 Edgartown Bay Rd.	
Sale Price*	$807,900	$831,250	$535,000	$830,000	
Sale Date*	01/01/2007	05/19/2006	11/28/2006	10/21/2005	
Proximity to Subject 	n/a	1.5 miles SW	0.3 miles	1.8 miles S	
Verification	Deed	Deed	Deed	Deed	
Time Adjustment	n/a	 4%	0.5%	 8%	
Time Adjusted Sales Price	n/a	$864,500	$537,675	$896,400	
Location	Tower Hill
Edgartown Harbor	Katama	Katama	Edgartown Bay Road	
Location Adjustment	n/a	 30%	 20%	 15%	
Lot Size (acres)	2.45	1.5	0.59	0.54	
Lot Size Adjustment	n/a	 20%	 30%	 30%	
Shape Adjustment	n/a	-25%	-25%	-25%	
Net Adjustment (excl. time)		 25%	 25%	 20%	
Net Dollar Adjustment (")		$216,125	$134,419	$179,280	
Adjusted Value		$1,080,625	$672,094	$1,075,680	
* For the subject, the sale price and date are the assessed value and assessment date
 

Fiscal Year 2009

	Subject
8 Ocean View Ave.
	Comp. 1
12 Coffins Field Rd.	Comp. 2
3 Bitter-sweet Lane	Comp. 3
128 Herring Creek Rd.	
Sale Price*	$807,900	$745,000	$795,000	$885,000	
Sale Date*	01/01/2008	05/10/2007	05/30/2008	12/04/2008	
Proximity to Subject 	n/a	5 miles W	1.1 miles SW	1.1 miles SW	
Verification	Deed	Deed	Deed	Deed	
Time Adjustment	n/a	 0%	2.5%	5.5%	
Time Adjusted Sales Price	n/a	$745,000	$814,875	$933,675	
Location	Tower Hill
Edgar Harbor	Coffins Field	Katama	Katama	
Location Adjustment	n/a	 40%	 30%	 30%	
Lot Size (acres)	2.45	0.85	1.5	1.56	
Lot Size Adjustment	n/a	 30%	 20%	 20%	
Shape Adjustment		-25%	-25%	-25%	
Net Adjustment (excl. time)		 45%	 25%	 25%	
Net Dollar Adjustment (")		$335,250	$203,719	$233,419	
Adjusted Value		$1,080,250	$1,018,594	$1,167,094	
* For the subject, the sale price and date are the assessed value and assessment date


Fiscal Year 2010
	Subject
8 Ocean View Ave.
	Comp. 1
12 Coffins Field Rd.	Comp. 2
3 Bitter-sweet Lane	Comp. 3
128 Herring Creek Rd.	
Sale Price*	$807,900	$745,000	$795,000	$885,000	
Sale Date*	01/01/2009	05/10/2007	05/30/2008	12/04/2008	
Proximity to Subject 	n/a	5 miles W	1.1 miles SW	1.1 miles SW	
Verification	Deed	Deed	Deed	Deed	
Time Adjustment	n/a	-6%	-3.5%	-0.5%	
Time Adjusted Sales Price	n/a	$700,300	$767,175	$880,575	
Location	Tower Hill
Edgar Harbor	Coffins Field	Katama	Katama	
Location Adjustment	n/a	 40%	 30%	 30%	
Lot Size (acres)	2.45	0.85	1.5	1.56	
Lot Size Adjustment	n/a	 30%	 20%	 20%	
Shape Adjustment		-25%	-25%	-25%	
Net Adjustment (excl. time)		 45%	 25%	 25%	
Net Dollar Adjustment (")		$315,135	$191,794	$220,114	
Adjusted Value		$1,015,435	$958,969	$1,100,719	
* For the subject, the sale price and date are the assessed value and assessment date

	The two witnesses' testimony and the various exhibits, including deeds, plans, and property record cards, reveal that in 1998, the two subject assessing parcels were conveyed to the appellant by David Brown for nominal consideration.  The descriptions in that deed refer to two larger parcels: "Parcel One: Registered Land" and "Parcel Two: Unregistered Land," which were mentioned, supra.  It is the description for Parcel Two that contains not only the two subject assessing parcels, but also the two settled parcels on which the parties previously reached a settlement.  The metes and bounds description in the deed for Parcel Two describes the perimeter of these four contiguous assessing parcels without defining them as separate and distinct.          
	From a historical perspective, it was in January, 1876, that an 1875 "Plan of Ocean View Cliffs" by John H. Mullin (the "Mullin Plan") was recorded in the Dukes County Registry of Deeds.  This plan, which shows the area where Parcel One and Parcel Two (and some neighboring parcels) are now located, does not define the subject assessing parcels, the two settled parcels or Parcel One or Parcel Two.  Rather, it defines the boundaries of numerous contiguous camp-ground parcels, which, for the most part, are only 50-by-100 feet in size.  Various roads, including Ocean View and Menamsha Avenues, are also shown on this plan.  According to the Mullin Plan, the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel is composed of 21 contiguous camp-ground lots (numbered 92 through 112) which are configured in the shape of the number "7," and the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel is composed of 13 such lots (numbered 16 through 28) which extend, side-by-side, in the shape of a long, thin ruler.  Both of the subject assessing parcels are only 1 camp-ground parcel (or 100 feet) in depth.  The two settled parcels, which form the rest of Parcel Two but are not subject to these appeals, are each approximately 1.38 acres in size and each contains 12 contiguous camp-ground lots configured as 2 rows of 6 lots, in the shape of an approximately 200-by-300 foot rectangle.  
	In September, 1993, David Brown acquired both Parcel One, the registered land, and Parcel Two, the unregistered land, from Katama Kyles Properties, Inc. for $2,050,000.  The description of Parcel Two in this deed is the same perimeter description contained in the deed from Mr. Brown to the appellant.  In December, 1985, Katama Kyles Properties, Inc. acquired Parcels One and Two from the estate of Margaret Jones Purvis for $1,088,500. The description of Parcel Two in this deed is the same perimeter description as the one contained in the deeds from Katama Kyles Properties, Inc. to Mr. Brown and from Mr. Brown to the appellant.
	Ms. Purvis acquired title to Parcel Two by deed from George Coffin dated December, 1965 for "consideration paid" (the "Coffin deed").  The Coffin deed appears to be the first deed to assemble the 58 camp-ground lots from the Mullin Plan into a single tract of land, using the perimeter metes and bounds description which is later referred to, in the aforementioned deeds, as Parcel Two.  The Coffin deed does not mention Parcel One or any of the smaller camp lots that become part of Parcel One.  The Coffin deed does, however, refer to Plan 11887A which was likely prepared in the 1920s in connection with the assemblage of other camp-ground lots for registered Parcel One.  There are no additional deeds in the record reflecting how Ms. Purvis acquired title to the registered parcel termed Parcel One.  
The Coffin deed for Parcel Two also contains, among other things, numerous conditions and restrictions which prohibit the construction of any building within 50 feet of the enveloping boundary -- that is, the perimeter -- of Parcel Two.  There is a similar restriction for the construction or use of cesspools or septic systems.  The evidence does not reveal any amendments or modifications to these restrictions.  The Coffin deed also provides that the restrictions "shall remain in effect for a period of ninety-nine (99) years from the date hereof," which extends the effective period to 2064. 
In September, 1993, apparently in conjunction with Katama Kyles, Inc.'s sale of Parcel Two -- along with Parcel One -- to Mr. Brown, Douglas Hoehn, a professional land surveyor, prepared a plan of land for Mr. Brown, which not only defined Parcel One and Parcel Two, but also labeled the four assessing parcels and private ways that comprise Parcel Two, delineated the relevant camp-ground lots and the private ways shown on the Mullin plan, and traced a narrow right-of-way meandering through Parcel Two to property owned by an unrelated abutter.  This plan was never recorded, and although the appellant used it as a chalk, it was not admitted into evidence.
For all of the fiscal years at issue, the subject assessing parcels were located in a residential "R60" zone, which requires a minimum of 1.5 acres for a buildable parcel.  Setbacks are 50 feet for the front yard and 25 feet for the back and side yards.  All lots created after 1985 must have a minimum 50 feet of frontage on a street.  The Zoning By-laws define "street" as "a public way or a way, having in the opinion of the Planning Board, sufficient width, suitable grades and adequate construction to provide for the proposed use of the land abutting thereon or served thereby."        
The property record cards and Ms. Resendes' testimony reveal that the assessors use a two-line land assessment model for assessment purposes.  After accounting for an approximately 1.5-acre primary building site in the first line, any additional land is valued in the second line at $25,000 per acre, and then adjusted for various factors.  If the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel were to be valued using only the second line land valuation with the same adjustments which the assessors had used in the actual first-line land valuation, its second-line land value would be $123,750.  The evidence, however, does not establish that the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel would or should necessarily be valued and assessed for this amount if considered unbuildable.          
Discussion and the Board's Ultimate Findings
(1)
The appellant urges the Board to consider and value the two subject assessing parcels, along with the two settled parcels, as part of a single tract of land, termed Parcel Two.  The appellant claims that, for assessment purposes, Parcel Two should be valued as a single primary lot with the remainder regarded as excess land.  The predominant reason upon which the appellant relies for deeming the four assessing parcels a single tract of land is the perimeter description of Parcel Two contained in a series of deeds beginning in 1965.  Based on all of the evidence, its subsidiary findings, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Board finds that the appellant failed to prove that the assessors were obliged to value and assess the subject assessing parcels as part of a single tract of land, termed Parcel Two.   
First, from a conveyancing standpoint, none of the deeds conveying Parcel Two refers to any plan actually depicting Parcel Two.  The only relevant plan of land on record and in evidence is the 1875 Mullin Plan which shows camp-ground lots along with actual and paper streets.  Because no plan depicting Parcel Two is on record in the appropriate Registry and for the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that the appellant did not sufficiently demonstrate that the camp-ground lots had been properly assembled into one new parcel.  The Board also finds that the appellant failed to demonstrate that it no longer retains the right to convey even individual camp-ground lots that it owns in accordance with the Mullin Plan.  
Second, there is little, if any, evidence to establish that the appellant's or any of its predecessors' actual use of the assessing parcels that comprise Parcel Two indicates a use consistent with the appellant's single-parcel theory.  A representative or partner of the appellant never testified, Mr. Crimmins had no first-hand knowledge, and Ms. Resendes' testimony was silent on this issue.  If such a single use could have been established, the Board finds that it would be a factor that it could consider for valuation purposes.  
Third, the assessors elected to value Parcel Two as four separate assessing parcels, two of which are the subject of these appeals.  The assessors used what appear to be actual and paper streets shown on the Mullin Plan as assessing parcel demarcation lines or borders.  Because of these streets, the apparent vitality of the Mullin Plan, and the lack of evidence on the use to which the appellant and its predecessors have put Parcel Two, the Board finds that neither the camp-ground lots, nor the assessing parcels have necessarily merged for valuation purposes, notwithstanding common ownership.  The assessors must value property according to its highest and best use, and they may make reasonable assumptions and determinations in that regard.  In the present appeals, the assessors determined, consistent with the Mullin Plan, that the appellant could convey or develop the camp-ground lots as four separate primary parcels, which the assessors defined as four separate assessing parcels.  
Lastly, the parties settled the appeals relating to two of the four assessing parcels that comprise Parcel Two, leaving appeals relating only to the remaining two subject assessing parcels.  If, arguendo, the Board were to find that the appellant's proposition of valuing Parcel Two as a single assessment parcel were correct, based on the existing record, the Board would be unable to determine a reliable value for the two subject assessing parcels and an appropriate abatement.  The absence of the two settled parcels, which are not subject to these appeals but nonetheless comprise the remainder of Parcel Two, precludes the Board from being able to reliably value Parcel Two and then allocate values to, or separately value, the two subject assessing parcels.   
Based on all the evidence, its subsidiary findings, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Board further finds that the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel, which is 2.45 acres in size and has a small area, at the bend in its 7-shape, that is more than one hundred feet in depth and more than 50 feet from the perimeter boundary of Parcel Two, is a buildable lot, as even Mr. Crimmins seemed to concede.  The Board also finds, however, that the appellant established that the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel, which is 1.5 acres in size and in the shape of a ruler, is not a buildable lot without a waiver of deed and possibly zoning restrictions because it is dimensionally substandard.  The Board therefore finds that the assessors, by valuing the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel as a buildable lot, have erred.  The Board finds, under the circumstances here, that this assessing parcel is more appropriately valued as an unbuildable lot.  But, the Board also finds that the appellant did not establish a value for this assessing parcel as an unbuildable lot.  Neither Mr. Crimmins' nor Ms. Resendes' testimony nor the exhibits provide adequate evidence in this regard.  The appellant did not introduce evidence from a real estate valuation expert or a partner or representative of the appellant on this or any valuation question.  Consequently, the Board finds that it is unable to determine a reliable value different from the presumptively valid assessed value for this assessing parcel. 
Based on the adjusted values that Ms. Resendes derived in her appraisal report, she concluded that the assessments for the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel were appropriate.  The Board, however, did not find the properties that she selected for her comparable sales analyses to be particularly comparable to the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel.  Her gross adjustments for these properties, not including any modifications for time, totaled between 70% and 95%, and even this range may not be adequate to account for their apparent differences with the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel.  Consequently, the Board finds that Ms. Resendes' adjusted values are not reliable indicators of the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel's value for the fiscal years at issue.        
(2)
	Mr. Crimmins is an attorney who testified that he specializes, at least to some extent, in conveyancing.  The Board did not qualify him as an expert in these appeals because he lacked the requisite independence and his testimony concerned a question of law for which expert testimony was unnecessary.  The Board nonetheless allowed him to testify conditionally about the relevant deeds, plans, zoning, and assessment parcel configuration.  The Board considers Mr. Crimmins's opinions or interpretations of the facts and evidence to be merely argument, and the Board therefore finds them to be persuasive only to the extent that the Board also finds facts from the available evidence proving them.  Otherwise the Board accords them no evidentiary weight.  
Conclusion
	In conclusion, the Board finds that the appellant did not prove that the assessors were obliged to value and assess the subject assessing parcels together with the two settled parcels, as a single assessing parcel -- Parcel Two.  The Board also finds that while the evidence supports the conclusion that the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel is a buildable lot, it also establishes that the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel is not.  However, the appellant did not provide the Board with adequate evidence upon which to rely to merge it into the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel or otherwise or to value the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel as an unbuildable lot.  The appellant introduced virtually no relevant valuation evidence for the subject assessing parcels.  Accordingly, the Board finds that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that the subject assessing parcels were overvalued for the fiscal years at issue.  The Board, therefore, decides these appeals for the appellee.

OPINION
(1)
	The assessors have a statutory and constitutional obligation to assess all real property at its full and fair cash value.  Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth; art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights; G.L. c. 59, §§ 38, 52.  See Coomey v. Assessors of Sandwich, 367 Mass. 836, 837 (1975)(citations omitted).  Fair cash value means fair market value, which is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).  
	The appellant has the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed. "'The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the tax.'" Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974)(quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)). "[T]he board is entitled to 'presume that the valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the taxpayer[] . . . prov[es] the contrary.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984)(quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass.    at 245).
In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer "may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation."  General Electric Co., 393 Mass. at 600 (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)).  
In the present appeals, the appellant attempted to demonstrate that the assessors should not have separately valued the subject assessing parcels as two buildable lots, but should instead have valued them as part of a larger parcel that had one primary building site and excess land.  The Board found, however, that the appellant failed to adequately demonstrate that the assessors should have treated the subject assessing parcels as part of Parcel Two.  The Board found that there was no recorded plan depicting Parcel Two, and there was essentially no evidence relating to the use of the subject or settled assessing parcels or Parcel Two.  Consequently, the Board found no persuasive evidence to support a finding that the affected camp-ground lots, defined in the Mullin Plan, had been properly assembled into one new parcel.  Further, on this record, it appears that the appellant retains the right to convey even individual camp-ground lots that it owns in accordance with the Mullin Plan.  See Siddharth v. Reid, 21 Mass. L. Rep. 715 (2006) ("The crucial inquiry . . . is whether the lot[s] retain[] separate identit[ies].").  
In addition, the assessors elected to value Parcel Two as four separate assessing parcels, two of which are the subject of these appeals.  The assessors used what appear to be actual and paper streets shown on the Mullin Plan as assessing parcel demarcation lines or borders.  Because of these streets, the apparent vitality of the Mullin Plan, and the lack of evidence on the use to which the appellant and its predecessors have put Parcel Two, the Board found that neither the camp-ground lots, nor the assessing parcels have necessarily merged for valuation purposes, notwithstanding common ownership.  The assessors must value property according to its highest and best use, and they may make reasonable assumptions and determinations in that regard.  See Irving Saunders Trust v. Assessors of Boston, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 843 (1989).  In the present appeals, the assessors determined, consistent with the Mullin Plan, that the appellant could convey or develop the camp-ground lots as four separate primary parcels, which the assessors defined as four separate assessing parcels.  See Town of Lenox v. Oglesby, 311 Mass. 269, (1942)(holding that "[t]here is no hard and fast rule to be applied universally to guide assessors in determining whether parcels of land were to be assessed separately or together"; it is essentially a question of fact).  Based on all of the evidence, its subsidiary findings, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the Board finds and rules that the appellant failed to prove that the assessors should have valued the subject assessing parcels as part of a larger parcel that had one primary building site with the remainder consisered excess land. 
In determining a property's fair cash value, it is important initially to consider all uses to which the property was or could reasonably be adapted on the relevant assessment dates.  Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authy., 335 Mass. 189, 193 (1956); Irving Saunders Trust, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 843.  The goal is to ascertain the maximum value of the property for any legitimate and reasonable use.  Id.   The Board found that the evidence supporting the assessor's determination regarding the highest and best use of the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel as a buildable lot was credible and substantial; however, the Board also found that the evidence did not support such a determination regarding the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel.  Rather, the Board finds and rules that the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel would be better valued as not buildable as a matter of right.    
Real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely primarily upon three approaches to determine a property's fair cash value: income-capitalization, sales comparison, and depreciated reproduction or replacement cost.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  "The board is not required to adopt any particular method of valuation."  Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 397 Mass. 447, 449 (1986).  The fair cash value of property may often best be determined by recent sales of comparable properties in the market.  See Correia,       375 Mass. at 362; McCabe v. Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494, 496 (1929).  Actual sales generally "furnish strong evidence of market value, provided they are arm's-length transactions and thus fairly represent what a buyer has been willing to pay for the property to a willing seller."           Foxboro Associates v. Assessors of Foxborough, 385 Mass. 679, 682 (1982); New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 469 (1981); First National Stores, Inc. v. Assessors of Somerville, 358 Mass. 554, 560 (1971).  Sales of comparable realty in the same geographic area and within a reasonable time of the assessment date contain credible data and information for determining the value of the property at issue.  See McCabe, 265 Mass. at 496.  "A major premise of the sales comparison approach is that an opinion of the market value of a property can be supported by studying the market's reaction to comparable and competitive properties."  Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real estate 297 (13th ed., 2008).  When comparable sales are used, however, allowance must be made for various factors which would otherwise cause disparities in the comparable prices.  See Pembroke Industrial Park Co., Inc. v. Assessors of Pembroke, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1998-1072, 1082.  "Comparative analysis of properties focuses on similarities and differences that affect value. . . . [T]he appraiser adjusts for any differences."  The Appraisal of real estate at 297, 307.  
The appellant introduced little affirmative evidence of the subject assessing parcels' fair cash values as of the relevant assessment dates.  The appellant offered no opinions of fair cash value of its own through representatives or partners, and it did not introduce testimony or appraisal reports from real estate valuation expert witnesses proposing fair cash values for Parcel Two or the subject assessing parcels for the fiscal years at issue.  The appellant's limited valuation submissions consisted of equivocal testimony from Ms. Resendes and data on property record cards.  From this information, the Board is not able to ascertain a value for an unbuildable lot like the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel.  
The assessors submitted an appraisal report prepared by Ms. Resendes into evidence, which used a comparable-sales approach to value the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel for the fiscal years at issue.  The Board found, however, that the magnitude of the adjustments applied to the purportedly comparable properties that Ms. Resendes used in her report strongly suggested that the properties were not comparable to the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel.  "[E]xcessive adjustments 'raise serious questions regarding initial comparability.'"  The May Department Store Co. v. Assessors of Newton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2009-153, 191 (quoting The Trustee of the Charles Cotesworth Pinckney Trust v. Assessors of West Tisbury, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-621, 630-31).  The Board therefore finds and rules that the properties chosen for the Resendes' comparable-sales analysis were not comparable and the values derived from them were unreliable.        
The Board is not required to believe the testimony of any particular witness or to adopt any particular method of valuation that a witness suggested.  Rather, the Board can accept those portions of the evidence that the Board determines has more convincing weight.  Foxboro Associates, 385 Mass. at 683; New Boston Garden Corp., 383 Mass. at 473; Board of Assessors of Lynnfield v. New England Oyster House, Inc., 362 Mass. 696, 701-702 (1972).  In evaluating the evidence before it in these appeals, the Board formed its own independent judgment that the fair cash value of the subject assessing parcels could not be reliably ascertained. See General Electric Co., 393 Mass. at 605; North American Philips Lighting Corp. v. Assessors of Lynn, 392 Mass. 296, 300 (1984).  Accordingly, the Board finds and rules that the appellant did not overcome the presumed validity of the assessments.
The fair cash value of property cannot be proven with "mathematical certainty and must ultimately rest in the realm of opinion, estimate and judgment."  Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 309 Mass. 60, 72 (1941).  "The credibility of witnesses, the weight of evidence, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence are matters for the board."   Cummington School of the Arts, Inc. v. Assessors of Cummington, 373 Mass. 597, 605 (1977).
(2)
 	The Board found that, at all relevant times, Mr. Crimmins was an attorney who testified that he specialized, at least to some extent, in conveyancing.  The Board did not qualify him as an expert in these appeals for several reasons.  First, it was established on voir dire that Mr. Crimmins had worked and continues to work with appellant's attorney as co-counsel on matters litigated and currently before the Board concerning assessments of other properties on Martha's Vineyard and Edgartown.  See generally Turners Falls, L.P. v. Assessors of Montague, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 732, 738 (2002)("[an expert witness must not be] a party or an agent for the party that employ[s] the expert . . . . [or] under the control of the party . . . [because the expert must] testif[y] impartially to assist the trier of fact about matters not in common knowledge.").  On this basis, the Board rules that Mr. Crimmins's on-going association with appellant's counsel called his independence into question.  See Haynes v. Assessors of Middleton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2011-143, 188 (finding and ruling that the testimony and appraisal report submitted by a real estate valuation witness who was also acting as appellant's agent "were imbued with bias which adversely impacted her credibility and rendered her estimates of value less reliable.").  Cf. Pappas v. Assessors of Ipswich, Mass. ATB Findings of Facts and Reports, 1997-599, 629-30 (ruling that, in that case, a real estate valuation witness's testimony was not tainted or biased because she had demonstrated to the Board that she was no longer acting as that appellant's agent and did not have a potential interest in that case).  
Second, the witness was called to offer an opinion regarding whether, as a matter of law, the two subject assessing parcels coupled with the two settled parcels should be valued and taxed as a single assessing parcel.  The Board is capable of determining this issue without the aid of an expert witness.  See Hon. Paul J. Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 382 (6th ed. 1994)("[E]xpert testimony may be essential in some areas; in others it may not be necessary although appropriate.  In these latter situations the discretion of the trial judge seems to be given great weight on the question of the propriety of such evidence.").  
Even agreeing with Mr. Crimmins concerning the conveyancing history of the parcels, the Board determined, based on, among other things, the lack of evidence as to use, the absence of a recorded plan depicting Parcel Two, the apparent vitality of the Mullin Plan, the appellant's likely retained ability to convey individual camp-ground lots, and the discretion given to assessors in drawing parcel lines, that the appellant failed to prove that the subject assessing parcels, along with the two settled parcels, were merged into a single parcel for purposes of valuation and assessment.        
Finally and as a result of its findings and rulings regarding Mr. Crimmins's status as a non-expert witness, the Board considers any of Mr. Crimmins's testimony that contains opinions or interpretations of the facts and evidence to be merely argument, and the Board therefore finds them to be persuasive only to the extent that the Board also finds facts from the available evidence proving them.  Otherwise the Board rules that they are entitled to no evidentiary weight.  

Conclusion
	In conclusion, the Board finds and rules that the appellant failed to prove that the assessors were obliged to value and assess the subject assessing parcels together with the other two assessing parcels, which the parties previously settled and are not part of these appeals, as a single assessing parcel, termed Parcel Two.  The Board also finds and rules that the evidence supports a finding that the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel is a buildable lot, but the 6 Menamsha Avenue assessing parcel is not.  However, the appellant did not provide the Board with adequate evidence upon which to rely to value this latter assessing parcel as an unbuildable lot or to merge it into the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel or otherwise.  The appellant introduced virtually no relevant valuation evidence relating to the subject assessing parcels.  Accordingly, the Board rules that the appellant failed to meet its burden of proving that the subject assessing parcels were overvalued for the fiscal years at issue.  
The Board, therefore, decides these appeals for the appellee.

THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD
 		

				 By:	___________________________________
					Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman

A true copy,

Attest: _____________________________
       Clerk of the Board

 The street addresses were taken from the property records cards in evidence and the August 2, 1998 deed from David Brown to the appellant.  The appellant also owns a third other property in the area, with an Ocean View Cliffs address, that is not directly connected to these appeals and is identified by the assessors as Parcel ID 29-150.  It is referred to in more recent deeds as "Parcel One: Registered Land" ("Parcel One").
 Because the tax due for the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel for each fiscal year at issue is not more than $3,000, timely payment is not a prerequisite to the Board's jurisdiction.  G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 & 65.   
 Neither party availed themselves of the opportunity to file post-trial briefs.  
 Portions of several paper streets that appear on the 1875 Plan of Ocean View Cliffs discussed in greater detail, infra, are also included within the perimeter description.  While these streets are not delineated in the deed, the assessors nonetheless use them to help distinguish the four assessing parcels from one another.   
 There is one exception to this statement with respect to the 8 Ocean View Avenue assessing parcel.  The exception is where the property forms the bend in its 7-shape.

ATB 2011-712