Leon A. Brownell v. Commissioner of Revenue (July 8, 2003)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD


LEON A. BROWNELL			v.	 COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE

Docket No. C263324				 Promulgated:
							 July 8, 2003


	This is an appeal filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 62C, § 39, from the refusal of the appellee Commissioner of Revenue ("Commissioner") to abate personal income taxes for the years ended December 31, 1998 and December 31, 1999.
Commissioner Scharaffa heard the appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and was joined in the decision for the appellee by Chairman Burns and Commissioners Gorton, Egan and Rose.
	These findings of fact and report are made at the request of the appellant pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32. 

	Leon A. Brownell, pro se, for the appellant.
	Kevin M. Daly, Esq. and Andrew Vilkis, Esq., for the appellee.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
During calendar years 1998 and 1999, Leon A. Brownell ("the appellant") was a resident of the Commonwealth.  Mr. Brownell was employed as a construction worker during these years and received compensation from several employers.  The appellant filed Massachusetts resident personal income tax returns for 1998 and 1999 on which he reported gross income of zero.  However, attached to the returns were W-2 forms, which reported total wages of $53,188 for 1998 and $45,902 for 1999, and also state income taxes withheld in each year.  As a result of his reported gross income of zero and the reported income tax withheld, the appellant claimed, and subsequently received, refunds for both years.  
On July 26, 2000, the Commissioner issued to the appellant a Notice of Intention to Assess personal income taxes in the amount of $2,761 for 1998 and $2,350 for 1999.  On or about August 23, 2001, the Commissioner issued to the appellant a Notice of Assessment of the personal income taxes.  On January 3, 2002 the appellant timely filed an application for abatement, which was denied by the Commissioner on March 14, 2002.  On May 10, 2002, the appellant seasonably filed an appeal with the Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  Based on these facts, the Board found that it had jurisdiction over the subject appeal.
The appellant argued that the remuneration paid to him during years 1998 and 1999 did not constitute "wages" for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") and imposition of the Massachusetts income tax.
	On October 18, 2002, the Commissioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  After a hearing on the motion, the Board found that there existed no material issues of fact but only matters of law to be decided by the Board.  For the reasons explained in the following Opinion, the Board allowed the Commissioner's motion and entered a decision for the appellee.

OPINION
	Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 831 CMR 1.22, "[i]ssues sufficient in themselves to determine the decision of the Board or to narrow the scope of the hearing may be separately heard and disposed of in the discretion of the Board."  In the present appeal, the Commissioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the Commissioner was entitled to judgment in his favor.  Although the Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 56 dealing with Summary Judgment, are not applicable to Board proceedings (see G.L. c. 58A, § 8A), the Board looks to 831 CMR 1.22 to hear and decide cases where there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Omer v. Commissioner of Revenue, 25 App. Tax Bd. Rep. 609 (1999).  Accordingly, because the present appeal raised no issue of material fact but only issues of law, the Board ruled that resolution of this appeal pursuant to 831 CMR 1.22 was appropriate.	
	At the hearing, the appellant argued that for Massachusetts personal income tax purposes, the monies that he received from employment in 1998 and 1999 were not "wages," "gross income," or "taxable income" as defined by the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") and incorporated into Massachusetts law at G.L. c. 62, § 2.  For the reasons explained in detail in Joseph R. Olson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 26 App. Tax Bd. Rep. 477, 478 (2001), the Board found and ruled that the appellant's claim was without merit and entered a decision for the appellee.  
"Gross income" is defined as "all income from whatever source derived, including but not limited to (1) [c]ompensation for services . . . ."  I.R.C. § 61(a)(1).  See also G.L. c. 62, § 2(a).  The W-2 Form, which the appellant received from the Commonwealth, reported the appellant's receipt of "[w]ages, tips, other compensation" for 1998 and 1999.  "The phrase 'gross income' is intended to be comprehensive:  it encompasses all income from whatever source . . . .  There is no ambiguity and no room for semantic maneuver."  Olson, 26 Mass. App. Tax Bd. Rep. at 478.  The Board noted that the taxpayer's wages, as reported on the Forms W-2 were "definitionally 'compensation for services', and well within the statutory ambit of 'income' and 'gross income'."  Id.  
	Accordingly, the Board allowed the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment and issued a Decision for the appellee.

						APPELLATE TAX BOARD

			By:						
				 	   Abigail A. Burns, Chairman


A true copy,



Attest:					
		Clerk of the Board

		
	

ATB 2003-328