Agwu, Nancy v. Rosenberg

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within
the rule of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms
to Md. Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. C-15-CV-22-004287
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND*
No. 1370
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
NANCY AGWU
v.
DIANE S. ROSENBERG, ET AL.
______________________________________
Graeff,
Zic,
Zarnoch, Robert A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Graeff, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 13, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
Nancy Agwu, appellant, challenges the foreclosure sale of her property, 2106
Thompson Hill Court, in Silver Spring, Maryland (the “Property”). After the Property was
sold by Diane S. Rosenberg and Mark D. Meyer (“the Substitute Trustees”), appellees, Ms.
Agwu filed exceptions to the sale. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied the
exceptions and ratified the sale.
On appeal, Ms. Agwu presents one question for this Court’s review, which we have
rephrased slightly, as follows:
Did the circuit court err in denying Ms. Agwu’s post-sale exceptions and
ratifying the foreclosure sale?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit
court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 8, 2007, Ms. Agwu purchased the Property. She executed a promissory
note (the “Note”), in the amount of $655,100, which was secured by a Purchase Money
Deed of Trust on the Property. Ms. Agwu subsequently executed two loan modifications.
In 2019, she executed a loan modification that extended the maturity date on the loan from
2037 to 2047, reduced the interest rate on the loan from 6.25% to 4.50%, and reduced the
monthly payment. In 2021, Ms. Agwu executed another loan modification, which further
reduced the interest rate to 2.875%. In March 2022, Ms. Agwu defaulted on the loan and
failed to make further payment.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
On August 10, 2022, a Notice of Intent to Foreclose on the Property was sent to Ms.
Agwu. On October 13, 2022, Citibank appointed appellees as Substitute Trustees under the
Deed of Trust. On November 16, 2022, appellees filed an order to docket foreclosure in
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On September 18, 2023, the court issued a
Notification to Plaintiff Trustee of Noncompliant Foreclosure Filing and Contemplated
Dismissal. 1 On November 9, 2023, appellees filed a Final Loss Mitigation Affidavit, which
stated:
Borrower(s) was evaluated for all loss mitigation options and was sent a
decision letter on 12/19/2022. Borrower(s) was contingently approved for a
short sale and deed-in-lieu, but didn’t accept either offer. In the same decision
letter, borrower(s) was denied for all retention options as they didn’t meet
the requirements for any of the programs.
On December 4, 2023, Ms. Agwu requested foreclosure mediation. The parties
mediated without success on January 17, 2024. Appellees scheduled a foreclosure sale for
the Property for April 26, 2024.
On April 25, 2024, the day before the scheduled sale, Ms. Agwu filed a Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland,
and she filed a notice in the circuit court that this petition stayed all proceedings against
her. On February 27, 2025, the bankruptcy court granted her request to dismiss the
1 The notification provided that various items were missing or insufficient, including
the Final Loss Mitigation Affidavit.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
bankruptcy case and terminate the automatic stay. 2 Appellees filed a line in the circuit court
advising that the stay had been terminated and the case could proceed in its normal course.
On March 12, 2025, appellees sent notice to Ms. Agwu and other interested parties,
by both certified and first class mail, that they intended to sell the Property at a sale on
April 4, 2025. Appellees also published notice of the sale in the Washington Post once a
week for three consecutive weeks, beginning on March 18, 2025.
On April 3, 2025, the day before the scheduled foreclosure sale, Ms. Agwu filed in
the bankruptcy court a Verified Emergency Motion to Vacate Order Dismissing Case on
Request of Debtor and Notice that Automatic Stay is Terminated, and to Vacate Default
Order Granting Relief from Automatic Stay. The motion asserted that Ms. Agwu had
dismissed her bankruptcy case because she could not pay post-petition mortgage payments
and was trying to “work out matters outside the bankruptcy case.” She was unable to do
that, and a foreclosure sale was set for April 4, 2025, but she recently had learned of an
interest she possessed in real property owned by her family, which could be sold to allow
her “to get current or substantially current on the post-petition mortgage arrears.” The
motion requested an emergency hearing in light of the impending foreclosure sale.
The bankruptcy court did not grant Ms. Agwu relief, and the Property was sold at
the April 4, 2025, sale. On April 7, 2025, Appellees filed a Report of Sale in the circuit
2 Ms. Agwu explained the background to this in her pleadings, stating that Citibank
filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay after she failed to make post-petition
mortgage payments on the Property and the Bankruptcy Court denied confirmation of her
Chapter 13 plan, leaving her with the choice to pay her post-petition arrears and amend her
plan or dismiss her bankruptcy case. She chose the latter option.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
4
court, accompanied by an affidavit stating that appellees had mailed notice, as required by
law, to Ms. Agwu and other interested parties prior to the foreclosure sale. The affidavit
listed the persons notified to include Ms. Agwu at 2106 Thompson Hill Court, as well as
the P.O. box listed as her mailing address on the two loan modifications.
On May 7, 2025, Ms. Agwu filed an Objection to Ratification of the sale. 3 She
alleged 	that, 	despite 	appellees’ 	“affidavit 	stating 	that 	they 	complied 	with” 	notice
requirements, “[Ms. Agwu] never received the notice of sale and only became aware the
property had been sold a few days after April 4, 2025 as a result of an investor calling her
to notify her.”
In appellees’ opposition to Ms. Agwu’s exceptions to the sale, they asserted that
they “fully complied with [applicable notice requirements] by causing notice of the sale to
be sent” to Ms. Agwu, by both first class and certified mail, at 2106 Thompson Hill Court.
In support, appellees attached a Declaration of Mailing (exhibit 3), first-class mail tracking
information (exhibit 4), and certified mail delivery receipt (exhibit 5). The first-class mail
tracking information showed that notice was mailed to Ms. Agwu at the Property, 2106
Thompson Hill Court, on March 12, 2025, with an anticipated delivery date of March 15.
The certified mail delivery receipt provided that notice was delivered to an individual at
3 	Ms. Agwu titled her filing “Objection to Ratification.” It operated as an
“exception[] to the sale” pursuant to Rule 14-305(e)(1), and appellees’ response was titled
“Opposition to Defendants’ Exceptions to Sale.”

‒Unreported Opinion‒
5
the Property on March 15, 2025. Appellees requested that the court overrule Ms. Agwu’s
exceptions to ratification of the sale.
On August 7, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on Ms. Agwu’s Objection to
Ratification. Counsel for Ms. Agwu argued that Ms. Agwu “was not notified of the sale
date.” When the court noted that she had filed a pleading under oath in the bankruptcy court
saying that she knew of the sale, counsel asked that Ms. Agwu be permitted to testify. Ms.
Agwu stated that she did know about the sale before it occurred when an unknown person
called and told her that her property was scheduled for sale on April 4. She was not served,
however, through the proper source, the Substitute Trustees. The court noted that the
trustees provided evidence that the notice was mailed on March 12 and delivered on March
15, and the evidence indicated that she was aware of the foreclosure sale. The court stated
that it did not understand what the exception was to the sale. Ms. Agwu stated that the
exception was that she was not served properly. Appellees responded that they had,
pursuant to Rule 14-210, properly sent notice of the sale to Ms. Agwu via both certified
and first-class mail, Ms. Agwu had been aware of the foreclosure sale date before the sale
occurred, and they asked the court to overrule the exceptions. 4
The court issued its ruling from the bench, stating:
[B]ased upon the motion to the objection to ratification in the case,
which is based upon a claim that [Ms. Agwu] did not receive appropriate
4 On September 1, 2025, Ms. Agwu filed a two-page affidavit to correct the record,
explaining that her Objection to Ratification was mistaken when it stated that she did not
become aware of the sale until after April 4. She stated that she “learned of the sale date
on March 5, 2025 around 1:50 p.m. because an investor called [her] to alert [her].”

‒Unreported Opinion‒
6
notice of the sale, the Court concludes that the objection is not well founded.
It is clear from the record, as provided in the opposition to the motion for
exception sale, that notice was properly sent on March 12th, 2025, and that
the certified copy was delivered on March 15th, 2025. And it was also sent
by regular mail and presumed to have been delivered to the defendant in the
case.
Moreover, the evidence is plain that the defendant knew of, and likely
received, that notice, for they had filed in bankruptcy court matters under
oath that suggested that a new date of sale was going forward on April 4th of
2025, and sought relief from the bankruptcy court to stop that sale from
occurring.
And so based on that, the Court denies the objections to the ratification
of the sale.
On August 8, 2025, the court issued an Order of Ratification of Sale. The court
subsequently granted Ms. Agwu’s Motion to Stay Ratification and Set Supersedeas Bond, 5
setting a bond in the amount of $45,000.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“In ruling on exceptions to a foreclosure sale and whether to ratify the sale, trial
courts may consider both questions of fact and law.” Johnson v. Nadel, 217 Md. App. 455,
465 (2014) (quoting Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 68 (2008)). “[A] court shall
ratify the sale if the court is satisfied that the sale was ‘fairly and properly made.’” Fagnani
5 “A supersedeas bond is ‘[a]n appellant’s bond to stay execution on a judgment
during the pendency of the appeal.’” Mirjafari v. Cohn, 412 Md. 475, 478 n.2 (2010)
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 202 (9th ed. 2009)).

‒Unreported Opinion‒
7
v. Fisher, 418 Md. 371, 391 (2011) (quoting Md. Rule 14-305(e)). In reviewing a court’s
ratification of a foreclosure sale, “we will disturb the circuit court’s findings of fact only
when they are clearly erroneous.” Burson v. Capps, 440 Md. 328, 343 (2014) (quoting
Fagnani, 418 Md. at 384). We review the circuit court’s legal determinations de novo.
Johnson, 217 Md. App. at 465.
When reviewing a foreclosure sale “there is a presumption that the sale was fairly
made and that the antecedent proceedings, if regular on the face of the record, were
adequate and proper.” Hood v. Driscoll, 227 Md. App. 689, 696-97 (2016) (quoting
Burson, 440 Md. at 342-43). “The party excepting to the sale has the twin burden of
showing that the sale was invalid and that any claimed errors caused prejudice.” Id. at 697.
II.
Sufficiency of Notice
Ms. Agwu contends that appellees failed to comply with the requirement of
Maryland Rule 14-210 that notice of a foreclosure sale be sent to the borrower by certified
and first-class mail. 6 She argues that the signed electronic record reflects that the mailing
was delivered to 2108 Thompson, not 2106 Thompson Hill Court, and therefore, the
mandatory certified mailing was misdelivered.
6 Ms. Agwu also criticizes other actions taken by appellees, but they were not
included in the exceptions filed below, are not included in the questions presented or the
argument heading, and appear to be a mere listing of general grievances as opposed to
issues presented for resolution by this Court. We will, therefore, confine our opinion to the
notice issue raised for review.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
8
Appellees contend that the court properly overruled Ms. Agwu’s exceptions
regarding the notice of sale. They argue that the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in
its factual finding that the notices were sent and “Ms. Agwu was aware of the date of the
foreclosure sale.” With respect to the certified mail tracking receipt, they argue that Ms.
Agwu did not raise this issue below, and in any event, she was the one who wrote “2108
Thompson” on the receipt.
In her reply, Ms. Agwu rejects appellees’ assertion that the signature on the certified
mail tracking receipt was written by her. She states that “[t]here is nothing in the record
that suggests that Ms. Agwu signed the receipt or wrote any address on it.” 7
Rule 14-210 provides that, prior to conducting a foreclosure sale, the foreclosing
party must send notice of the sale to the property owner and other interested parties. Rule
14-210 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) By certified and first-class mail. Before selling the property
subject to the lien, the individual authorized to make the sale shall also send
notice of the time, place, and terms of sale (1) by certified mail and by first-
class mail to (A) the borrower, (B) the record owner of the property, [and]
(C) the holder of any subordinate interest in the property subject to the lien.
Here, appellees submitted evidence showing that they mailed notice to Ms. Agwu’s
address via first class and certified mail, and it was delivered to that address. The circuit
court noted that there is a presumption of delivery that attaches to a mailed letter, finding
7 The handwritten signature on the tracking receipt is illegible. It is not our role to
resolve this factual dispute, nor would its resolution impact our conclusion that Ms. Agwu
was properly served.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
9
that the notice “was . . . sent by regular mail and presumed to have been delivered to [Ms.
Agwu].” This Court has explained that:
In Maryland, a finding that an individual properly mailed a letter raises a
presumption that the letter “reached its destination at the regular time and
was received by the person to whom it was addressed.” Testimony that the
addressee 	did 	not 	receive 	the 	letter 	does 	not 	conclusively 	rebut 	the
presumption of receipt. Instead, the trier of fact must consider that evidence
along with all of the other evidence in the case to determine whether the
individual mailed the letter and whether the addressee subsequently received
it.
Bock v. Ins. Comm’r of State of Md., 84 Md. App. 724, 733-34 (1990) (citations modified).
Ms. Agwu argues that the presumption of delivery was defeated here because the
electronic signature says 2108 Thompson, instead of 2106 Thompson Hill Court, which
put appellees “on notice that the mailing ha[d] been misdelivered.” That argument fails for
two reasons. First, it was not raised below, and therefore, it is not preserved for this Court’s
review. See Taylor v. State, 381 Md. 602, 612 (2004) (appellate courts ordinarily will not
decide issues not raised in or decided by the trial court). Second, even if it was preserved,
that would present a factual finding for the circuit court. The typed destination delivery
address on the proof of delivery document is Ms. Agwu’s address. The circuit court’s
factual finding that “notice was properly sent on March 12th, 2025, and that the certified
copy was delivered on March 15th, 2025,” is supported by the shipping receipt, and it is
not clearly erroneous.
Even if Ms. Agwu could demonstrate that the court’s finding regarding the
sufficiency of the notice was clearly erroneous, she has not shown that any error caused
prejudice. Hood, 227 Md. App. at 697. Ms. Agwu does not dispute that, even if the certified

‒Unreported Opinion‒
10
mail was delivered to the wrong address, she had actual notice of the foreclosure sale. She
acknowledges that she learned the date of the sale on March 5, 2025, a month in advance,
when an investor called to inform her of the sale. Moreover, she presented no evidence that
the notice sent via first class mail—which is presumed properly delivered—did not arrive
at the Property. Ms. Agwu has presented no evidence that any error in delivery of the notice
sent via certified mail caused prejudice when she had actual notice a month in advance of
the foreclosure sale. 8 	The circuit 	court properly denied Ms. 	Agwu’s Objection to
Ratification of the sale.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 	MONTGOMERY 	COUNTY
AFFIRMED. 	COSTS 	TO 	BE 	PAID 	BY
APPELLANT.
8 Ms. Agwu asserts only that “it cannot be overstated that there is a difference
between knowing the proposed date of the auction and being given the notice required
under the law. The notice which is required includes significantly more tha[n] just the date
of the sale. Md. Rule 14-210.” Ms. Agwu is correct that Rule 14-210(b) requires more than
notice of the date; specifically, the Rule requires notice of the “time, place, and terms of
sale.” Ms. Agwu concedes, however, that she was sent a link with information about the
foreclosure sale and had a month in which to obtain further information. The mere fact that
her initial source of information was a phone call from an investor, rather than a mailing
from appellees, does not meet her burden of showing prejudice.