Sedlak, Sarah Rispin v. Sedlak

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule
1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. C-24-FM-24-000075
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1868
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
SARAH RISPIN SEDLAK
v.
THOMAS W. SEDLAK, JR.
______________________________________
Shaw,
Ripken,
Tang,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Ripken, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 9, 2026

— Unreported Opinion —
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Sarah Sedlak (“Wife”), appellant, filed a
complaint for absolute divorce against Thomas Sedlak, Jr. (“Husband”), appellee, and
requested, among other relief, primary physical and sole legal custody of the parties’ then
8-year-old child (“Child”). Husband filed a counter complaint, which he later amended and
supplemented, seeking shared physical and sole legal custody of Child. The court entered
a consent order appointing Robert K. Erdman, Jr., Esq., to serve as best interest attorney
for Child (“the BIA”).
Five months later, the BIA moved to withdraw based, in part, upon Wife’s alleged
refusal to pay the entirety of her share of the BIA’s fees. Husband opposed the motion to
withdraw and asked the court to enter a money judgment against Wife. The circuit court
denied the BIA’s motion to withdraw and ordered Wife to pay the BIA $1,956 within three
business days. Wife appealed from that order. Wife presents a single issue, which we
rephrase 1 :
Did the circuit court err by ordering Wife to pay the BIA fee?
For the following reasons, we conclude that this issue is moot and dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wife and Husband were married in November of 2015. There was one child born
during the marriage. Wife filed for divorce in May 2024. Husband filed a counter complaint
in July 2024.
1 The issue as presented by Wife in her informal brief is: “The Circuit Court erred in
ordering Appellant to make an immediate monetary payment to the Best Interest Attorney
with no underlying factual basis or legal authority, and insufficient opportunity to
respond.”

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
2
In March of 2025, the parties jointly moved for the appointment of Mr. Erdman as
the BIA to represent Child’s interests, asserting that the case was high conflict and that
Child’s mental health was at issue. Mr. Erdman had agreed to accept the appointment
provided that the initial retainer was $5,000 and his compensation was at a rate of $405 per
hour. The parties attached a draft consent order to the motion.
In April of 2025, the court entered the consent order appointing the BIA (“the
Consent Order”). The order provided, in pertinent part, that
[B]oth 	parties 	shall 	each 	pay 	Two 	Thousand 	Five 	Hundred 	Dollars
($2,500.00) as an initial retainer to the [BIA] subject to reallocation of those
fees at the trial in this matter. Once the initial retainer is consumed, the parties
shall cooperate with the [BIA]’s requests to replenish the retainer in a timely
fashion and they shall continue to pay all fees equally for the remainder of
the [BIA]’s appointment, subject to reapportionment by the Court at a
hearing on the merits[.]
The court was empowered to “hold the parties jointly and severally liable for all fees due
to the [BIA], subject to the parties’ rights to seek indemnification from each other to the
extent that either party pays more than his/her allocated share[.]”
The BIA was obligated to provide “monthly itemized statements of work completed,
time spent, expenses incurred, and total fees incurred” to the parties’ counsel or, if either
party were unrepresented, to the party directly. If a party objected “to an entry on a monthly
itemized statement, the party shall indicate that in writing to the [BIA] not later than [thirty]
days from the date of the statement.” If the thirty-day period elapsed without objection,
“the amount billed [would] be deemed fair and reasonable and the [BIA] [was] authorized
to draw the amount billed from his or her trust account[.]” If either party failed “to make
payment in accordance with [the Consent Order],” that failure could subject the party to a

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
3
finding of contempt and would be “cause for the [BIA] to request withdrawal of his/her
representation, upon written Motion to the [c]ourt[.]”
The BIA sent monthly statements to the parties and submitted copies to the court in
May, June, and July totaling $1,877.50.
On August 5, 2025, the BIA filed his monthly billing statement for July 2025 with
the parties and the court (“the July Statement”). The invoice reflected that the BIA had
billed $5,000 over the prior month, which exhausted the $3,122.50 remaining in escrow
and resulted in an outstanding balance of $1,877.50 ($938.75 each).
That same day, the BIA wrote to counsel for Husband and to Wife, who was then
unrepresented, requesting that each party submit $3,500 to him, which would cover the
balance and replenish the escrow account. Husband made payment the following day.
Three weeks later, on August 26, 2025, Wife emailed the BIA that she was surprised
by the total of the last invoice and asked for “time to review [the] invoice carefully.” The
BIA responded the next day that though he was sympathetic to the financial strain, Wife
was obligated under the Consent Order to pay half of his fees and the BIA requested
assurance that she would comply. Wife responded that she would not be able to review the
July Statement until “early next week[.]” The BIA agreed that “[t]his time next week”
would be acceptable.
Meanwhile, on September 3, 2025, the BIA filed his statement for August 2025
(“the August Statement”), reflecting new charges of $3,345.

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
4
On September 5, 2025, 2 Wife wrote to the BIA objecting to certain items on the July
Statement. Specifically, Wife took issue with being charged twice for the filing of the prior
month’s statement because the first filing was rejected as deficient by the court and being
billed for certain administrative tasks. Wife also raised concerns, more generally, regarding
what she characterized as duplicative billing for tasks from June through August and
whether the BIA was complying with his ethical and professional responsibilities.
The BIA responded that same day. The BIA disagreed with her objections to the
July Statement; however, “in the spirit of compromise,” he agreed to reduce the charges by
$567 to remove the billing for refiling his June statement and to eliminate an additional
hour of his billed time. The BIA advised that the credit would be reflected in the next
statement, i.e. in the September statement. He asked Wife to remit $5,111.25 3 by 5 p.m.
that day.
That afternoon, Wife sent payment in the amount of $3,155.25, covering the
$938.75 owed on the July Statement, less her share of the future $567 credit ($283.50), and
an additional $2,500 to replenish the escrow. Wife noted that under the Consent Order, she
was permitted 30 days to raise objections to each monthly statement and that the time to
object to the August Statement had not yet expired. Two days later, Wife wrote to the BIA
to advise that she had concerns regarding his ability to be an impartial advocate for Child.
2 Because the BIA submitted the statement on August 5, 2025, the 30-day period for
objections provided under the Consent Order expired on September 4, 2025.
3 This total comprised the outstanding amount due after exhaustion of the escrow account
on the July Statement ($938.75), an additional $2,500 to replenish the escrow, and the
amount that would come due on the August Statement ($1,672.50).

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
5
On September 8, 2025, the BIA moved to strike his appearance. He recounted the
above facts and attached the pertinent email correspondence and the Consent Order.
Husband opposed the motion. He argued that trial was scheduled to begin in December and
that it would be prejudicial to the interests of Child for the BIA to withdraw due solely to
Wife’s recalcitrance in paying the BIA’s fees. 4 Husband asked the court to order Wife to
pay a $20,000 retainer to the BIA or, alternatively, to enter a money judgment against her
for amounts owing. Wife did not respond to or oppose the motion to strike.
On September 29, 2025, the court entered an order denying the BIA’s motion to
strike. The court explained that the BIA asked to withdraw for two reasons: Wife had
“failed to replenish his retainer, paying $3,155.25 instead of the requested $5,111.25[;]”
and Wife had “repeatedly challenged his credibility, ethics, and professionalism.” The
court reasoned:
Either parent is free to dispute invoices of the [BIA] within the mechanism
provided in the Consent Order . . . . If those disputes are not resolved, they
may be brought to the [c]ourt for resolution. [Wife] is not free to reduce
amounts unilaterally to what she believes is fair and reasonable and to pay
only the reduced amount. [Wife] will be required to pay the difference in the
amounts above – $1,956 – promptly.
The court denied the BIA’s motion and ordered Wife to pay that amount within three
business days after the order was docketed, or by October 2, 2025.
4 The BIA replied to Husband’s opposition the next day, contending that Husband
improperly characterized the motion to strike as “a mere billing dispute.” The BIA asserted
that Wife’s “repeated attacks” on his credibility and professionalism could not be cured by
ordering Wife to pay her share of the bills.

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
6
On October 7, 2025, the BIA renewed his motion to strike his appearance. He
alleged that Wife had not paid him as directed by the court and she continued to question
his neutrality.
On October 10, 2025, the BIA filed his monthly statement for September 2025 (“the
September Statement”), which applied the $567 credit based upon Wife’s objections to the
July Statement and billed $2,909.50 in new charges. An attached payment chart reflected
that Wife made a $2,000 payment to the BIA on October 10, 2025, that she had no
outstanding balance, and that there remained $1,089.25 in escrow on her side of the ledger
(and $1,045.25 on Husband’s side).
By order entered October 20, 2025, the court granted the BIA’s motion to withdraw
from the case “based only on the difficulty of him continuing to invest time in this action
without a clear prospect of being compensated.”
On October 29, 2025, Wife noted this interlocutory appeal from the September 29,
2025, order requiring her to pay the BIA $1,956.
DISCUSSION
I. 	WIFE ’ S INTERLOCUTORY A PPEAL IS AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE .
Neither party addresses the appealability of the circuit court’s order directing Wife
to pay the BIA $1,956 within three business days. As a threshold matter, we must assess
whether this court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. “This Court does not
acquire jurisdiction over an appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment or from an
interlocutory 	order 	that 	falls 	within 	one 	of 	the 	exceptions 	to 	the 	final 	judgment
requirement.” Bartenfelder v. Bartenfelder, 248 Md. App. 213, 229 (2020) (citation

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
7
omitted). The three exceptions to the general requirement that an appeal be taken from a
final judgment are: “(1) an appeal from an interlocutory order specifically authorized by a
statute; (2) an appeal from an interlocutory order that falls under the collateral order
doctrine; and (3) an appeal permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602.” Adelakun v. Adelakun,
263 Md. App. 356, 370 (2024) (citation omitted), aff'd, 491 Md. 1 (2025). Only the first
category is pertinent here.
The order on appeal directed Wife to pay the BIA $1,956 within three business days
and denied the BIA’s motion to strike his appearance. We are satisfied that the first aspect
of this order was an “order . . . [f]or . . . the payment of money” that was immediately
appealable under Md. Code, Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJP”) section 12-303(3)(v).
In Adelakun, a mother appealed the circuit court’s order denying pendente lite child support
and pendente lite alimony, framing it as an “interlocutory appeal” pursuant to section 12-
303(3)(v). 491 Md. at 15. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that “Maryland case law
supports [the] determination that an interlocutory order is appealable as an order for the
payment of money under CJ [section] 12-303(3)(v) only if the order actually directs a party
to pay money to the other party.” Id. at 36. The Court explained that “part of the rationale
for permitting a party to appeal an order that directs the party to pay money is that, where
a party fails to comply with an order for the payment of money, the circuit court can impose
penalties for noncompliance, which may include a finding of contempt and imprisonment.”
Id. at 37.
Here, though the BIA was not a party in the traditional sense of the word, he was an
interested party representing the interests of Child. Wife was ordered to pay him a specific

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
8
sum and was subject to the court’s contempt power for failure to comply with the order.
See Adelakun, 491 Md. at 25 (concluding that “orders that direct or require the payment of
money are immediately appealable”). Thus, the order was immediately appealable. See
Md. Code, CJP § 12-303(3)(v). See also Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App. 575, 582–
83 (1990) (ruling that an order increasing support payments and granting counsel fees to
the mother in post-divorce child support proceedings was “appealable since payment of
money are involved”).
II. 	WIFE ’ S A PPEAL IS M OOT AND D OES NOT FALL WITHIN ANY R ECOGNIZED
EXCEPTIONS TO THE M OOTNESS D OCTRINE .
A. Party Contentions
In her informal brief, Wife, proceeding pro se on appeal, acknowledges that the
underlying matter may be moot, as the BIA has now been paid in full. However, Wife
submits that this appeal should be considered under the exception to the mootness doctrine
for issues that are subject to repetition yet evading review. 5
Husband argues that Wife’s informal brief fails to comply with Maryland Rules and
relies on matters outside the record. On those grounds, Husband requests that the Court
dismiss Wife’s appeal. In the alternative, Husband asserts that the trial court acted within
its discretion in ordering Wife to satisfy her outstanding obligation for the services the BIA
already rendered.
5 The bulk of Wife’s informal brief is spent recounting the factual background of Wife and
Husband’s divorce proceedings, its effect on Child, and Wife’s interpretation of the events
concerning the BIA fees. Many of these issues, though perhaps relevant to the divorce
proceedings, are, however, irrelevant to the instant appeal regarding the sole issue of the
circuit court’s order directing Wife to pay the BIA fee.

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
9
B. Analysis
As the September Statement revealed and as Wife concedes in her brief, she
ultimately paid the BIA $2,000, satisfying the outstanding bill and the court order from
which this appeal was taken. She nevertheless asks this Court to exercise our discretion to
consider the issue because it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
“The test for mootness is whether a case presents a controversy between the parties
for which the court can fashion an effective remedy.” Tempel v. Murphy, 202 Md. App. 1,
16 (2011) (citing Hamot v. Telos Corp., 185 Md. App. 352, 360 (2009)). Because Wife
paid the BIA in full and is not seeking to recoup the amounts paid, even if we agreed with
Wife’s contention that the circuit court’s order directing her to pay the BIA $1,956 by
October 2, 2025, was premature, there is no remaining controversy and no remedy this
court can fashion. Hence, Wife’s appeal is moot.
“If otherwise moot, a court may address an issue if it is capable of repetition but is
likely to evade review[.]” Tempel, 202 Md. App. at 16. Wife’s contention, that this case
falls into the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception, is without merit. That
exception applies “when (1) the challenged action was too short in its duration to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Wilson v.
Tanglewood Venture, LP, 492 Md. 590, 600 (2025) (quoting Powell v. Md. Dep’t of Health,
455 Md. 520, 541 (2017)). Here, there is no likelihood that Wife will be subjected to the
same action in this case because the Consent Order that controlled the payment of fees to

— Unreported Opinion —
________________________________________________________________________
10
the BIA is no longer in effect and the BIA no longer represents Child. 6 See In re K.B., 496
Md. 1, 22 n.7 (2026) (explaining that for the second prong of the exception to apply, “there
must 	be 	a 	‘reasonable 	expectation’ 	or 	a 	‘demonstrated 	probability’ 	that 	the 	same
controversy will recur involving the same complaining party”) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt,
455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982))). Accordingly, we dismiss Wife’s appeal as moot.
APPEAL DISMISSED. COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.
6 To the extent that Wife challenges the circuit court’s authority to order parties to pay BIA
fees more generally, we emphasize that the circuit court is empowered by statute to appoint
a BIA to represent a child’s interests in any action “in which custody, visitation rights, or
the amount of support of a minor child is contested,” and “to impose counsel fees” upon
parties to the action. Md. Code, Fam. Law § 1-202. A BIA can “effectuate a child’s unique
interest in the outcome of a custody dispute” and “in certain contexts, the failure to provide
independent representation to a child in such proceedings can be reversible error.”
Augustine v. Wolf, 264 Md. App. 1, 17 (2024).