Randall, Michelle v. Bates

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Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No. C-03-FM-24-005243
UNREPORTED*

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1304

September Term, 2025

MICHELLE RANDALL
V.

DARREN BATES, JR.

Graeff,
Friedman,
Zic,

JJ.

Opinion by Friedman, J.

Filed: October 14, 2026

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to MD.
RULE 1-104(a)(2)(B).

— Unreported Opinion —
Michelle Randall, appellant, and Darren Bates, Jr., appellee, are the parents of two
minor children. Following a divorce hearing on July 28, 2025, the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County granted the parties an absolute divorce. The court awarded Randall sole
legal 	custody, 	established 	parenting 	time 	for 	Bates, 	reduced 	Bates’s 	child-support
obligation, and denied Randall’s request for alimony.
Randall, representing herself, challenges the parenting-time schedule, the amount
of child support, and the denial of alimony. We conclude that two legal errors require
further proceedings. First, in deciding child support, the circuit court used a 35% threshold
for shared physical custody even though Maryland law now uses a lower threshold. Second,
in deciding alimony, the court stated that Randall’s bills were “not a consideration” and
treated unconscionable disparity as the purpose of alimony generally.
Those errors require us to vacate the financial rulings. Because the child-support
calculation depends directly on the number of overnights awarded to each parent, we also
vacate the parenting-time provisions so that the circuit court may reconsider those
interrelated matters on remand. We otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
The case began as a child-support proceeding, and the circuit court entered a
pendente lite order requiring Bates to pay $2,522 per month. At the outset of the subsequent
divorce hearing, the court identified the remaining disputed issues as custody, child
support, marital property, and alimony. Randall confirmed that she was seeking alimony,
and Bates sought modification of the existing child-support obligation.

— Unreported Opinion —
2
The parties’ daughter has particular needs relevant to parenting time. She is autistic
and participates in an Applied Behavior Analysis program. Randall opposed joint legal
custody but generally agreed that Bates should have parenting time on weekends. She
expressed concern about extended summer parenting time because regular attendance in
the daughter’s program was important and excessive absences could jeopardize her
placement. The court took that concern into account, awarded Randall sole legal custody,
and awarded Bates parenting time each week from Friday at 6:00 p.m. through Sunday at
6:00 p.m., two weeks during the summer that would not interfere with the daughter’s
program, and alternating birthdays and holidays.
The court then addressed Bates’s request to modify child support. The prior
calculation for child support included $600 per month in work-related child-care expenses
that the parties were no longer incurring. The court removed that expense, retained the prior
allocation of the parties’ incomes at 28.2% to Randall and 71.8% to Bates, and reduced
Bates’s monthly child-support obligation from $2,522 to $2,092.
In deciding whether the parenting-time award required a different child-support
calculation, the court stated:
I have calculated that this parenting time does not exceed 35 percent of all
overnights, the magic number being 127.75. I find that the overnights would
be less than 127 per year, ergo less than 35 percent, and therefore do not
require a recalculation of the child support obligations.
The court also addressed Randall’s alimony request. Randall testified that her
expenses exceeded her income and described her recurring household expenses. When the

— Unreported Opinion —
3
court asked her to identify the amount and duration she sought, Randall requested $1,000
per month for five years.
The court began its alimony analysis by stating:
Maryland recognizes that alimony is not simply a postmarital award of
money. It’s for the sole purpose of avoiding any unconscionable disparity
between the standard of living a party enjoyed during the marriage and a
standard of living the party would enjoy post marriage.
The court also stated that Randall’s bills were “not a consideration” in determining
alimony. The court then worked through the statutory factors. It noted an approximate
72%-to-28% 	division 	of 	the 	parties’ 	incomes, 	but 	found 	that 	difference 	“not
unconscionable.” It credited evidence of domestic violence and infidelity as circumstances
contributing to the parties’ estrangement. The court ultimately denied the request for
alimony.
Randall noted this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. 	P RESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Preservation
Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides that, ordinarily, an appellate court will not decide
an issue unless it plainly appears from the record to have been raised in or decided by the
trial court. M D . R. 8-131(a). Maryland law, however, distinguishes between a new issue
that was not previously before the court and an additional legal argument concerning an
issue already before the court. Crown Oil & Wax Co. of Del., Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co. of
Va., Inc., 320 Md. 546, 560–61 (1990).

— Unreported Opinion —
4
Randall challenges the amount of child support and the denial of alimony in her
informal brief. She does not identify the statutory errors we discuss. Those errors, however,
bear directly on the correctness of the rulings she asks us to review. The circuit court itself
decided 	whether 	the 	parenting-time 	award 	triggered 	the 	shared-physical-custody
provisions requiring recalculation of child-support obligations. The court also expressly
stated the legal standard it was applying to Randall’s alimony request. We therefore address
those legal questions in resolving the issues Randall has placed before us. See id.
B. Standard of Review
We review factual findings in an action tried without a jury for clear error. M D . R.
8-131(c). We review the circuit court’s ultimate custody and parenting-time determinations
for abuse of discretion, provided that the decision rests on sound legal principles and non-
clearly erroneous factual findings. In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 586 (2003).
A child-support award ordinarily is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Reichert v.
Hornbeck, 210 Md. App. 282, 316 (2013). Questions concerning the interpretation and
application of Maryland’s child-support statutes are reviewed for legal correctness. Id.
An alimony determination is committed to the circuit court’s discretion. Boemio v.
Boemio, 414 Md. 118, 124-25 (2010). That discretion must be exercised within the
framework established by Section 11-106 of the Family Law Article. MD . CODE , FAM.
L AW (“FL”) § 11-106; see Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md. App. 317, 336-42 (2007).
II. 	C HILD SUPPORT
The child-support ruling must be vacated because the circuit court applied a 35%
shared-custody threshold rather than the threshold governing this case. Under current

— Unreported Opinion —
5
Maryland law, “shared physical custody” generally means an arrangement in which each
parent keeps the child or children overnight for more than 25% of the year and both parents
contribute to the children’s expenses in addition to paying child support. FL § 12-201(o)(1).
A parent who keeps the children overnight for more than 25% of the year, or at least 92
overnights, but less than 30% of the year is subject to the graduated shared-physical-
custody adjustment prescribed by the statute. FL §§ 12-201(p), 12-204(m)(2)(ii). Before
2020, Maryland law used a 35% threshold. 2020 Md. Laws ch. 142 (H.B. 269); 2020 Md.
Laws ch. 143 (S.B. 579). The General Assembly reduced that threshold and made the
change applicable to cases filed on or after October 1, 2020. 2020 Md. Laws ch. 142 (H.B.
269); 2020 Md. Laws ch. 143 (S.B. 579).
The circuit court applied the 35% rule. It found that Bates would have fewer than
127 annual overnights, identified 127.75 overnights as the “magic number,” and concluded
that the parenting arrangement did not require recalculation because Bates would have less
than 35% of the overnights. The applicable statute required a different calculation.
FL §§ 12-201(o), (p), 12-204(m). That error matters here because the court awarded Bates
parenting time every week from Friday evening through Sunday evening. That schedule
alone would account for approximately 104 overnights each year, which surpasses the 25%
prescribed by the statute. FL §§ 12-201(o), (p), 12-204(m). The additional two weeks of
summer parenting time increase that number further, even after accounting for overlap with
weekends. The precise number of overnights, and the calculation that follows from that
number, are matters for the circuit court to determine on remand. We therefore vacate the
child-support 	determination 	and 	remand 	for 	a 	new 	calculation 	under 	the 	statutory

— Unreported Opinion —
6
provisions applicable to this case. Reichert, 210 Md. App. at 316. Because Randall
requested alimony in the same proceeding, the circuit court must decide that issue before
recalculating child support. FL § 12-204(a)(2). Any alimony awarded must then be
reflected in the parties’ incomes for purposes of the child-support guidelines. Id.
Randall also argues that the court did not fully account for Bates’s income from his
several sources of employment. At trial, evidence was presented concerning Bates’s
principal employment, additional work, and prior gig work. Because child support must be
recalculated in any event, the circuit court may determine the parties’ actual and adjusted
actual incomes under Section 12-201(b) and (c). FL § 12-201(b), (c). We express no view
concerning the income that should be attributed to either party.
III. 	A LIMONY
The alimony ruling must also be vacated. Randall requested $1,000 per month for
five years. She therefore sought alimony for a fixed term, not indefinite alimony.
Section 11-106 governs whether alimony should be awarded and, if so, its amount
and duration. FL § 11-106(a), (b). It requires the court to consider all factors necessary for
a fair and equitable award, including the parties’ financial needs and resources and “the
nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party.” FL § 11-106(b)(11).
Randall testified that her expenses exceeded her income and described her recurring
household expenses. The court stated that those bills were “not a consideration” in
determining alimony. Section 11-106(b)(11), however, expressly makes financial needs
and obligations relevant to the determination. Id. The court later addressed many of the
statutory factors, including financial needs and resources. Even so, its statement concerning

— Unreported Opinion —
7
Randall’s bills leaves us uncertain whether her financial obligations were considered as
Section 11-106(b) requires.
The court also applied the concept of unconscionable disparity to Randall’s request.
It stated that alimony was “for the sole purpose of avoiding any unconscionable disparity”
between the parties’ marital and post-marital standards of living and later found the parties’
income disparity “not unconscionable.” But unconscionable disparity is one basis for
awarding indefinite alimony under Section 11-106(c)(2). FL § 11-106(c)(2); Whittington,
172 Md. App. at 337–38. Randall did not request indefinite alimony.
We therefore vacate the denial of alimony and remand for reconsideration under
Section 11-106(b). FL § 11-106(b). On remand, the court should consider Randall’s
request for definite alimony under the statutory factors, including her financial needs and
obligations, without treating unconscionable disparity as a prerequisite to an award. We
express no opinion whether Randall is entitled to alimony or, if so, concerning the amount
or duration.
IV. 	P ARENTING TIME AND SCOPE OF R EMAND
Because the child-support calculation turns on the number of overnights awarded to
each parent, parenting time and child support are directly linked. FL §§ 12-201(o), (p), 12-
204(m). The circuit court fashioned the parenting-time schedule and then used the resulting
number of overnights to determine the applicable child-support calculation. Maryland Rule
8-604(d)(1) permits a remand when justice will be served by further proceedings. M D . R.
8-604(d)(1). Because the court made its child support determination under an incorrect
statutory threshold, we vacate the parenting-time provisions as well so that the circuit court

— Unreported Opinion —
8
may reconsider the schedule in light of the child-support consequences that follow from
the number of overnights awarded.
The 	circuit 	court 	properly 	considered 	the 	children’s 	needs, 	the 	parties’
circumstances, the daughter’s Applied Behavior Analysis program, and the evidence
concerning Bates’s relationship with the children before fashioning that schedule. On
remand, however, the circuit court may consider the parties’ circumstances as then
presented in deciding whether to retain or modify that schedule.
On remand, the circuit court should reconsider alimony, retain or modify the
parenting-time schedule and determine the resulting number of overnights, and then
recalculate child support using the parties’ incomes as adjusted by any alimony award and
the applicable child-support provisions. We do not disturb the award of sole legal custody
to Randall. The circuit court separately considered the parties’ ability to communicate and
make shared decisions and concluded that joint legal custody was not appropriate. Randall
does not seek reversal of the award of sole legal custody to her.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we vacate the portions of the judgment concerning parenting
time, child support, and alimony and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We otherwise affirm.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR BALTIMORE 	COUNTY VACATED
AS 	TO 	PARENTING 	TIME, 	CHILD
SUPPORT, AND ALIMONY. JUDGMENT
OTHERWISE 	AFFIRMED. 	CASE
REMANDED 	FOR 	FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS 	CONSISTENT 	WITH

— Unreported Opinion —

THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED
EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.