Crawford v. State

David Michael Crawford v. State of Maryland, No. 0856, September Term, 2023.
Opinion by Albright, J.

ARSON – EVIDENCE – IN GENERAL

Arson is likely to be a clandestine offense and frequently must be proven by
circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn therefrom.

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
OTHER MISCONDUCT AS EVIDENCE OF OFFENSE CHARGED IN
GENERAL – IN GENERAL

Evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts is only admissible if: (1) the evidence is offered
for a non-propensity purpose that is specially relevant to the case; (2) the defendant’s
involvement in the other bad acts is established by clear and convincing evidence; and
(3) the necessity for and probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed
by the danger of any unfair prejudice likely to result from admitting it. Md. Rule
5-404(b).

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
OTHER MISCONDUCT AS EVIDENCE OF OFFENSE CHARGED IN
GENERAL – FACTORS AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY – PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT AND PROBATIVE VALUE

The circuit court’s analysis of whether the necessity for and probative value of other bad
act evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice implicates the
exercise of the trial court’s discretion, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Md.
Rules 5-403, 5-404(b).

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
OTHER MISCONDUCT AS EVIDENCE OF OFFENSE CHARGED IN
GENERAL – FACTORS AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY – NECESSITY FOR
EVIDENCE

The “necessity” for evidence of multiple other bad acts may increase when the evidence
is circumstantial in nature and the other bad acts together strengthen the overall probative
value of the other bad act evidence. Md. Rule 5-404(b).

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
NATURE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF OTHER MISCONDUCT AFFECTING
ADMISSIBILITY – FACTORS AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY

Admissibility of evidence of multiple other bad acts requires a case-specific analysis and
the number of other bad acts is not determinative of their admissibility. Md. Rules 5-403,
5-404(b).
CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
OTHER MISCONDUCT SHOWING KNOWLEDGE – ARSON AND
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

Evidence of other bad acts is generally admissible in arson cases if it tends to show
identity or motive. Md. Rule 5-404(b).

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
OTHER MISCONDUCT SHOWING IDENTITY – ARSON

Evidence of eight other fires was admissible to prove that defendant set the four fires
with which he was charged, especially where all twelve fires were connected to a list
found on the defendant’s cellphone. Md. Rule 5-404(b).

CRIMINAL LAW – EVIDENCE – OTHER MISCONDUCT BY ACCUSED –
OTHER MISCONDUCT SHOWING MOTIVE – ARSON

Evidence of eight other fires was admissible to prove the defendant’s motive for setting
the four fires with which he was charged, especially where the defendant was acquainted
with each of the victims but only had inconsequential grievances with them. Md. Rule
5-404(b).

COURTS – ESTABLISHMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND PROCEDURE –
OPINIONS – OPERATION AND EFFECT IN GENERAL

A citation to an out-of-state unreported or unpublished opinion that does not indicate
“whether the opinion is precedent in the issuing jurisdiction” does not comply with
Maryland Rule 1-104(b). Md. Rule 1-104(b).

CRIMINAL LAW – TRIAL – ISSUES RELATING TO JURY TRIAL –
DISCHARGE OF JURY WITHOUT VERDICT; MISTRIAL – WITNESSES –
EXAMINATION

When determining whether a mistrial is required because of a witness’s improper
testimony, courts consider: (1) whether reference to inadmissible evidence was repeated
or was a single, isolated statement; (2) whether the reference was solicited by counsel, or
was an inadvertent and unresponsive statement; (3) whether the witness making the
reference to inadmissible evidence is the principal witness for the prosecution;
(4) whether credibility of that witness is a crucial issue; and (5) whether a great deal of
other evidence exists.
CRIMINAL LAW – MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL – DISCRETION OF COURT
AS TO NEW TRIAL

A motion for a new trial premised on errors during trial is either granted or denied in an
exercise of the trial court’s discretion and is thus reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL LAW – TRIAL – ISSUES RELATING TO JURY TRIAL –
DISCHARGE OF JURY WITHOUT VERDICT – WITNESSES –
UNRESPONSIVE, UNSOLICITED, AND UNEXPECTED TESTIMONY

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial where the
defendant was not prejudiced by detective’s single unsolicited statement that the
defendant had refused consent to a warrantless search of his phone where the detective
also mentioned that the defendant provided the phone’s passcode, the defendant’s
knowledge of the contents of his phone were not crucial to proving the charges against
him, credibility was not a crucial issue in the case, and the trial court offered a curative
instruction.
Circuit Court for Howard County
Case No. C-13-CR-21-000152
REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 0856

September Term, 2023
______________________________________

DAVID MICHAEL CRAWFORD

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________

Nazarian,
Albright,
Sharer, J. Frederick,
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Albright, J.
______________________________________

Filed: May 5, 2025

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.05.05
15:26:52 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
A jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County found David Michael Crawford,

Appellant, guilty of eight counts of attempted first-degree murder, three counts of first-

degree arson, and one count of malicious burning in connection with four separate fires

committed in Howard County. Mr. Crawford was sentenced to two consecutive life terms

plus a consecutive term of seventy-five years. In this appeal, Mr. Crawford raises two

questions for our review, which we rephrase as follows: 1

I. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of
eight other fires against Mr. Crawford?

II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Crawford’s
motion for mistrial after testimony was elicited that Mr. Crawford
refused a search of his phone?

We shall affirm the judgments.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Howard County Fires

Over the course of a police investigation, David Michael Crawford—a retired

police chief—was connected to four separate fires that occurred in Howard County,

Maryland, between March 2017 and September 2018. These were:

1
Mr. Crawford phrases his questions as:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to limit the number
of the eight additional other fires admitted in an arson trial that already
joined four separate fires?
2. Did the trial court err in admitting testimony that Crawford refused to
consent to a search of his phone, and if so, did the trial court abuse its
discretion by declining to grant a mistrial on that basis?
1. The Byrne Fire (March 5, 2017)

Ellicott City, Howard County 2

Around 3:00 a.m. on the morning of March 5, 2017, Erica Byrne was woken up by

her husband alerting her to a series of popping noises and a fire in the driveway.

Ms. Byrne, her husband, and their children left their house immediately and alerted 911.

A car, owned by Ms. Byrne’s mother-in-law, was completely ablaze in the driveway in “a

huge ball of flames.” The flames had ignited in the rear of the vehicle, which had been

parked about five feet away from the house.

Ms. Byrne knew Ms. Crawford (Mr. Crawford’s wife) through Ms. Byrne’s role as

executive director of a court-appointed special advocates (“CASA”) program.

Ms. Crawford had applied to volunteer with CASA and attended a training for volunteers

led by Ms. Byrne. During the portion of training on white privilege and implicit bias,

however, Ms. Crawford challenged Ms. Byrne regarding the training material. On

November 1, 2016, Ms. Byrne sent Ms. Crawford an email following up with her about

whether CASA would be a good fit; Ms. Crawford replied with an angry phone call.

When Ms. Crawford did not complete the training, she was dismissed from the program.

2. The Antico Fire (June 23, 2017)

Elkridge, Howard County

Around 4:00 to 4:15 a.m. on June 23, 2017, Russell Antico awoke to the smell of

burning; he was confronted by a “haze all around the first floor.” His garage was filled

2
For the sake of the victims’ privacy, we omit the street addresses where the fires
were set.
2
with “pure black smoke.” He alerted his wife, their minor children, and his mother-in-law

and evacuated the house immediately. The bottom corner of the attached garage was

already charred, and smoke was pouring out. In the fire marshal’s investigation,

Lieutenant Frizzell concluded that the fire had been initiated by “an ignitable liquid [that]

was poured on the ground and ignited by an open flame[]” on the exterior of the garage—

just a few feet away from the bedroom of Mr. Antico’s mother-in-law.

Dr. Antico and his wife, also Dr. Antico, were Mr. Crawford’s chiropractors. Dr.

Russell Antico was unable to recall any disagreements with Mr. Crawford.

3. The First Henderson Fire (December 9, 2017)

Ellicott City, Howard County

Ringing smoke detectors woke up Evelyn and Scott Henderson around 3:00 a.m.

on December 9, 2017. Their house was “full of smoke,” and the garage was on fire. There

were “flames coming through one of the walls” that Mr. Henderson tried to put out but

could not. The Hendersons 3 fled the house and called 911. The garage and large portions

of the house were destroyed, and both of the Hendersons’ cars, which had been sitting in

their driveway, were melted by the fire.

Ms. Henderson met Mr. Crawford, who lived about a half mile away from the

Hendersons, in 2013. She was walking her dog in the neighborhood where both families

lived when Mr. Crawford approached her regarding her use of a “pinch collar.” They

again crossed paths during community meetings to discuss a major redistricting effort in

3
Mr. and Mrs. Henderson were at home with their minor child and dog.
3
their neighborhood. During a presentation Mr. Crawford gave in a meeting on August 31,

2017, Ms. Henderson, as she described it, “interrupted the presentation” to address people

herself when she “could kind of tell that he was losing the crowd a little bit.”

4. The Second Henderson Fire (September 22, 2018)

Ellicott City, Howard County

Around 3:30 a.m. on September 22, 2018, Mr. Henderson received a call from a

neighbor alerting him to a second fire at the Hendersons’ home. This was just a week

before the Hendersons were set to move back in after rebuilding from the first fire. By the

time the Hendersons drove over from the rental house where they had been staying, their

house was “[f]ully engulfed in flames.” The odor of gasoline was detected at the scene,

and the presence of gasoline was confirmed by forensic testing.

B. The Case Against Mr. Crawford

Investigators eventually linked each of the fires to Mr. Crawford, and a valid

search warrant was executed on his home on January 5, 2021. Found in Mr. Crawford’s

garage were gloves, a black hat, and a lighter. Additional lighters and gloves were found

in the back of Mr. Crawford’s vehicle. Several of these items tested positive for gasoline.

Mr. Crawford’s vehicle also had a custom license plate reading “SURECAN.” 4

Digital evidence uncovered on Mr. Crawford’s electronic devices implicated him

further in the Howard County fires. On his phone and computer were numerous internet

search queries regarding the victims of the fires and their homes (both before and after

4
SureCan is the company that manufactured the red portable gas containers that
were found in Mr. Crawford’s garage.
4
the fires), as well as photographs of their homes (before and after the fires). A note on

Mr. Crawford’s phone listed the following:

Expedition Unknown[5]

Adventure
Josh Gates

Josh Gates
Martin
Mark
Price
Hawkins
Scott
Justin (3)
McLaughlin
Chiro
White Privilege
Evelyn (2)

As counsel has, we will refer to this note as “the List.”

Investigators determined that the last three entries on the List seemed connected in

some way to the victims of the four Howard County fires:

(1) “Chiro” | Antico Fire: The “Chiro” entry pertained to the fact that the
Anticos were Mr. Crawford’s chiropractors;
(2) “White Privilege” | Byrne Fire: The “White Privilege” entry could be
explained by Ms. Crawford’s disagreement with Ms. Byrne regarding
CASA’s training materials; and
(3) “Evelyn (2)” | Henderson Fires: The “Evelyn (2)” entry correlated to
the two separate fires inflicted on Evelyn Henderson and her family.

5
“Expedition Unknown” was also the title of a television show. It was hosted by
Josh Gates. Here, we reproduce the text of the List. We have reformatted it to remove
some of the white space that appeared on the admitted exhibit.
5
Other entries on the list confirmed Mr. Crawford’s connection to the Howard

County fires. Six of the other entries referred to victims of eight separate fires in other

Maryland counties. 6 As we discuss below, all of these other fire victims had some kind of

relationship with Mr. Crawford.

Following this investigation, Mr. Crawford was indicted on: (1) eight counts of

attempted first-degree murder; (2) three counts of first-degree arson; and (3) four counts

of first-degree malicious burning. He was arrested on March 4, 2021. He moved to sever

the counts against him, but the circuit court denied the motion. 7

Before trial, the State moved to admit evidence, under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), of

the eight other fires that had occurred outside Howard County. The State asserted that

Mr. Crawford was responsible for the eight fires and connected him to them through the

List, among other evidence. The purpose for introducing the eight, argued the State, was

to prove Mr. Crawford’s common scheme, motive, and identity as the perpetrator of the

Howard County fires. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on

September 26, 2022. The circuit court found that evidence of the eight other fires was

admissible to prove identity and motive and that the State had proven that the fires were

set by Mr. Crawford by clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the circuit court

concluded that “the effect of this evidence is to identify [Mr. Crawford] as the

perpetrator,” and thus concluded that “there is a significant necessity [for the admission

The eight other fires matched the entries of: “Martin,” “Justin (3),” “Price,”
6

“Hawkins,” “McLaughlin,” and “Scott.”
7
Mr. Crawford does not challenge the denial of his severance motion.
6
of evidence of these fires] that outweighs any prejudice[.]” Accordingly, the circuit court

granted the State’s motion to permit evidence of all eight other fires.

At the ensuing jury trial, the State called twenty-nine witnesses, including police

officers, fire marshal investigators, forensic scientists, and the victims of the fires and

their neighbors. 8 The jury deliberated and found Mr. Crawford guilty of the crimes

detailed above. After sentencing, Mr. Crawford noted this timely appeal.

Additional facts are included in our discussion of the issues, as needed.

DISCUSSION

I. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of eight
other fires committed by Mr. Crawford.

A. Evidence of the Eight Other Fires

During the motions hearing on September 26, 2022, and at trial, the State

presented evidence of the eight other fires allegedly set by Mr. Crawford, all of which

occurred in other Maryland counties between May 2011 and November 2020 and none of

which were the subject of the Howard County indictment Mr. Crawford faced. 9 In

moving that this evidence be permitted, the State theorized that the “persons/families” on

the List were the victims of incendiary 10 fires set by Mr. Crawford and that “[t]he

8
Mr. Crawford presented no defense case.
9
All of the eight other fires were in Maryland, but they did not occur in Howard
County, where the indictment in the present case was lodged.
10
During trial, Lieutenant Ruch of the Frederick County Fire Marshal’s Office
explained that fires could be classified in three different ways: “incendiary, accidental, or
undetermined.”
7
evidence from [those eight other] incendiary fires confirms [Mr. Crawford’s] identity as

the arsonist; it establishes his motive and his common scheme and plan.” As to

Mr. Crawford’s motive, the State added that “[Mr. Crawford], believing people had

wronged him, sought to exact revenge by committing arson. Out of the nine

victims/families, eight allege, at best, an unpleasant relationship with [Mr. Crawford],

ranging from family frictions to work confrontations to school redistricting skirmishes.”

Each of the eight other fires, the State argued, matched an entry on the List. These

matches were the Flemion fire (“Martin”), the three Scherstrom fires (“Justin (3)”), the

Price fire (“Price”), the Hawkins fire (“Hawkins”), the McLaughlin fire (“McLaughlin”),

and the Scott fire (“Scott”).

1. The Flemion Fire (May 20, 2011)

Laurel, Prince George’s County

Martin Flemion was woken up by a neighbor at 1:30 a.m. on May 20, 2011. His

car, sitting in his driveway, had been lit on fire. Surveillance footage showed a

perpetrator, but not their face. A piece of burned pants was discovered by the police in a

storm grate near Mr. Flemion’s house; Mr. Crawford, two weeks later, posted online

inquiring about treatment for a recent second-degree burn. At trial, the State entered a

photograph into evidence showing a scar on Mr. Crawford’s lower leg.

Mr. Flemion was serving as the City Administrator for Laurel when he met

Mr. Crawford in 2018. He interviewed Mr. Crawford for the position of Deputy Police

Chief and believed he was not a fit, so he recommended Richard McLaughlin instead.

8
2. The First Scherstrom Fire (September 5, 2016)

Clarksburg, Montgomery County

Justin Scherstrom and his wife, Miriam, were, for the first time, victims of a fire

on September 5, 2016. They were out of town at the time. The fire “started at the garage

and went all the way up the back of the townhouse up to the beams in the roof, and also

impacted the units on either end of [the Scherstroms’].” Samples taken from the scene of

the fire tested positive for gasoline, and the fire was classified as incendiary.

Mr. Scherstrom suggested Mr. Crawford as a suspect to investigators at the time.

Mr. Scherstrom is Mr. Crawford’s stepson (Ms. Crawford’s son), and the

Scherstroms and Crawfords had a “very rocky” and “tumultuous” relationship for several

years. Mr. Scherstrom recalled several particular points of conflict in their relationship,

for example, when Mr. Scherstrom’s father (Ms. Crawford’s first husband) was involved

in the Scherstroms’ wedding ceremony, and when the Scherstroms did not baptize their

children. In general, Mr. Scherstrom described Mr. Crawford as “a very antagonistic

person.” Ms. Scherstrom, too, described a tumultuous relationship with both

Mr. Crawford and Ms. Crawford.

3. The Second Scherstrom Fire (September 29, 2017)

Clarksburg, Montgomery County

The Scherstroms were the victims of a second fire on September 29, 2017. They

were not living at the house at the time but had renters lined up who “were supposed to

move in within a week or week and a half after [the] fire happened.” Fortunately, “the

fire put itself out, so the damage was not as much as the first fire[,]” but it “still caused

9
significant damage[.]” For the second time, a portion of the Scherstroms’ garage was

burned; and, again, testing on portions of the garage door showed the presence of

gasoline. The search of Mr. Crawford’s electronic devices uncovered web searches of the

Scherstroms’ street several days before the fire. Mr. Crawford’s Apple Health Data

recorded that Mr. Crawford had been active and taking steps in the early morning hours

of September 29, too. When presented with surveillance footage of the incident,

Ms. Scherstrom testified that the perpetrator wore similar pants as Mr. Crawford, and had

a similar gait as him, too.

Ms. Scherstrom testified to more incidences of friction between the Scherstroms

and Crawfords prior to the fire on September 29, 2017. Rather than asking the Crawfords

to watch their son on a few occasions when the Scherstroms went out of town, the

Scherstroms asked other family members to do so instead, including when the

Scherstroms went on vacation in March 2017 and attended a wedding at the beginning of

September 2017. The second Scherstrom fire occurred a day before the Scherstroms

departed for another out-of-town family wedding.

4. The Price Fire (April 3, 2018)

Jefferson, Frederick County

Clark Price woke up around 3:40 a.m. on April 3, 2018, to a fire in his garage. An

investigation deemed the fire to be incendiary, and several items from the scene tested

positive for gasoline. Web searches for Mr. Price’s home address (from January 2018)

were on Mr. Crawford’s devices. In a response to a Facebook post Mr. Price made about

the fire, Mr. Crawford direct messaged Mr. Price to request photos of the fire.

10
Mr. Price was one of Mr. Crawford’s previous coworkers, but the two had not

spoken for nearly eighteen years. Mr. Price described his relationship with Mr. Crawford

and how Mr. Price, twice, had not recommended Mr. Crawford for a promotion. On a

separate occasion, he had overruled Mr. Crawford during an employee dispute and

Mr. Crawford “immediately became agitated and upset.” Mr. Price also recommended

changing the qualifications to a position within the department to “civilianize” it. As a

result, Mr. Crawford was no longer in contention for the position.

5. The Hawkins Fire (March 3, 2019)

Waldorf, Charles County

Alphonso Hawkins, Jr. woke up around 3:00 a.m. on March 3, 2019, to his truck

burning out in the driveway of his house. “[T]he whole truck was in flames.” The address

where he lived was in Mr. Crawford’s search history from both June and August of 2018.

Alphonso Hawkins, Jr. did not know Mr. Crawford. His father, Alphonso

Hawkins, Sr., on the other hand, had worked with Mr. Crawford and had known him “in

passing.” However, Mr. Hawkins, Sr. could not recall any negative interactions with

Mr. Crawford.

6. The McLaughlin Fire (March 16, 2019)

Laurel, Prince George’s County

Richard McLaughlin was awoken by his dog around 3:30 a.m. on March 16, 2019.

When he got up, he noticed “a lot of smoke and something smelled as if it was burning.”

His garage, two cars, and a side of his house were on fire. Surveillance footage of the

incident showed a perpetrator with a gait similar to that of Mr. Crawford. Searches of

11
Mr. Crawford’s electronic devices revealed web searches of Mr. McLaughlin’s home in

February 2019 and a PowerPoint presentation about Mr. McLaughlin. A calendar entry

for March 15, 2019, on Mr. Crawford’s phone was entitled “McLaughlin Fire.”

Mr. McLaughlin was another of Mr. Crawford’s previous coworkers. He described

a particular incident with Mr. Crawford at work dating back to 2009, when Mr. Crawford

was “very hostile” towards Mr. McLaughlin after a disagreement. Mr. McLaughlin was

also the individual Mr. Flemion recommended for the position of Deputy Police Chief

instead of Mr. Crawford.

7. The Scott 11 Fire (July 27, 2019)

Brooklyn, Anne Arundel County

Around 3:00 a.m. on July 27, 2019, Scott Crawford noticed an “orange glow”

outside his window. The entire deck around Scott’s pool was on fire, and “the fire was so

engulfed and so hot, that it actually, the pool rails and everything, the liner, everything

was on fire.” Investigators who responded to the fire detected “the overwhelming smell

of gasoline.”

Scott Crawford is Mr. Crawford’s nephew. Scott and Mr. Crawford had a

disagreement around 2017 or 2018 and they stopped speaking afterwards. On the day of

11
Due to the shared surname of the involved individual and Appellant, we refer to
Scott Crawford by his first name. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
12
the fire, Scott had been set to host an afternoon pool party for family and friends to

celebrate his daughter’s graduation; the Crawfords had not been invited. 12

8. The Third Scherstrom Fire (November 17, 2020)

Clarksburg, Montgomery County

The Scherstroms were the victims of a fire for the third time on November 17,

2020. This time, the Scherstroms were at home when they “got a call from a neighbor in

the middle of the night that [their] garage was on fire.” By the time they got outside, they

“were shocked to see the whole garage in flames.” The fire began on the exterior of their

garage but charred the inside of it as well. Investigators once more detected the odor of

gasoline. Mr. Crawford’s phone calendar had an entry on November 17, 2020, entitled

“Scherstrom fire.” Mr. Crawford’s Apple watch data showed him to be active between

1:42 and 4:15 a.m. on November 17.

Ms. Scherstrom noted specific disagreements that had occurred between the

Crawfords and Scherstroms prior to the third fire related to the COVID pandemic.

Ms. Scherstrom had been dealing with a “high-risk pregnancy” and explained that the

Crawfords “just didn’t have the same approach to COVID” as the Scherstroms did. In

addition to seeing the Crawfords “much less,” the Scherstroms also went on a beach trip

in August 2020 with Ms. Scherstrom’s parents and Mr. Scherstrom’s father and

12
The State also presented evidence that, as a result of the fire, Scott moved the
pool party to Mark Kratzer’s house. Search inquiries and photos of Mr. Kratzer’s home
were found on Mr. Crawford’s electronic devices in August 2019, and the State argued
that the “Mark” entry on Mr. Crawford’s List connected to Mark Kratzer.
13
stepmother (but without the Crawfords) after everyone agreed to quarantine for fourteen

days beforehand.

B. The Circuit Court’s Ruling

The circuit court granted the State’s motion to permit evidence of the eight other

fires under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). Engaging in the three-part State v. Faulkner, 314

Md. 630 (1989), analysis for the admission of Rule 5-404(b) evidence, 13 the circuit court

determined that the first two steps were satisfied. The circuit court noted several

commonalities between the fires, including: every victim had some relationship with

Mr. Crawford; every fire occurred at night (and many between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m.);

gasoline was present at nearly all the fires; the starting point of every fire was near the

garage and driveway; several fires were initiated in the same way; there was “evidence

that [Mr. Crawford] has certain behavior[] traits that may suggest . . . to a jury that there’s

no slight that could be trivial”; and entries on Mr. Crawford’s List corresponded to every

victim of a fire. These commonalities, the circuit court acknowledged, “standing

alone . . . wouldn’t be enough but it’s all circumstantial evidence, it all works together.”

Thus, the circuit court found “that by clear and convincing evidence, the identity

exception has been met[,]” and clear and convincing evidence of “ill will for motive

13
The three-part Faulkner test for admissible evidence under Maryland Rule
5-404(b) requires: (1) the evidence of other bad acts is relevant for a non-propensity
purpose; (2) the defendant’s involvement in the other bad acts is proven by clear and
convincing evidence; and (3) “the necessity for and probative value of the evidence must
not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” Browne v. State, 486 Md.
169, 190 (2023) (citing Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634–35).

14
purposes” had been established, too. 14

Under the third step of the Faulkner analysis, the circuit court concluded that the

probative value of the eight other fires and the State’s need for the evidence outweighed

any risk of undue prejudice:

Because of the nature of the crime, it’s at night, it’s secretive, I think there is
a necessity for this evidence and by unduly [sic] all evidence of guilt is
prejudicial, if it’s not prejudicial, then it’s irrelevant and it’s inadmissible.
But I do not find that the evidence necessarily, that the evidence will
cause the jury to think, well he set fires in Montgomery, and Charles, and
Frederick County, so he must have set the Howard County fires. I don’t think
that that will be [the] effect of this evidence. I think the effect of this evidence
is to identify [Mr. Crawford] as the perpetrator as envisioned by the
exception under the law. I find there is a significant necessity on the part of
it that outweighs any prejudice, well I don’t see an undue prejudice but if
there is, it’s been outweighed by the necessity for [the evidence].

Thus, the circuit court permitted the State to introduce evidence of the eight other

fires during Mr. Crawford’s trial.

C. Mr. Crawford’s Contentions

Mr. Crawford argues that “the [circuit] court abused its discretion by failing to

limit the number of the eight additional other act fires[.]” The circuit court, he claims,

“erroneously believed that no legal principle required a trial court to limit the number of

prior bad acts when the number becomes excessive,” and he asserts that Maryland law

requires (and other jurisdictions support) that if there are multiple instances of bad act

14
Mr. Crawford does not challenge the circuit court’s findings on these criteria
under Faulkner. We thus focus our attention on the third criterion, where Mr. Crawford
contends error.
15
evidence, then the circuit court must “carefully consider whether to limit the number of

other bad acts admitted[.]”

According to Mr. Crawford, the evidence of the eight other fires exacerbated risks

of “propensity implications” from the Howard County fires already being tried together,

and the eight other fires were central to the State’s case. As such, admitting the evidence

was not harmless error and warrants remand for a new trial. We disagree.

D. Law

Maryland Rule 5-404(b) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in the conformity therewith.
Such evidence, however, may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or in conformity with
Rule 5-413.

Md. Rule 5-404(b). The rule makes two things clear: (1) “other bad acts” 15 evidence is

not admissible to suggest that, because a person is of a particular character, they are more

likely to have committed the crime they are on trial for; and (2) “other bad acts” evidence

is admissible for “other purposes.” Browne v. State, 486 Md. 169, 187 (2023). The

“overarching concern” of the rule is to prevent conclusions that a “defendant is a ‘bad

person’ and, therefore, should be convicted of the charges for which the defendant is on

15
In Maryland, we have defined a “bad act” as “an activity or conduct, not
necessarily criminal, that tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one’s character,
taking into consideration the facts of the underlying lawsuit.” Klauenberg v. State, 355
Md. 528, 549 (1999).
16
trial for that reason, rather than based on evidence specific to those charges.” Id. at 187–

88 (cleaned up) (quoting Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 317 (1998)).

We apply an exclusionary approach when analyzing evidence of other acts under

Maryland Rule 5-404(b). Browne, 486 Md. at 188–90. In State v. Faulkner, our Supreme

Court laid out a three-part test for evidence to be excepted from the general exclusionary

approach. Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634–35. Once again, in order to be admissible: “(1) the

evidence must be specially relevant; (2) the defendant’s involvement must be proved by

clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the necessity for and probative value of the

evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.” Browne,

486 Md. at 190 (citing Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634–35). Mr. Crawford asserts error in only

the third portion of the circuit court’s analysis, and we focus our analysis accordingly.

Under the third part of the Faulkner test, the circuit court exercises discretion

whether to admit evidence after weighing “the necessity for and probativeness of the

evidence concerning the collateral criminal act against the untoward prejudice which is

likely to be the consequence of its admission.” Faulkner, 314 Md. at 640–41 (quoting

Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 474 (1978) (emphasis added in Faulkner)). This balancing

test is concerned with unfair prejudice, and “[w]hat is ‘unfair’ is only the incremental

tendency of the evidence to prove that the defendant was a ‘bad man.’” Cousar v. State,

198 Md. App. 486, 516 (2011). On the other hand, when the other bad act evidence

presents only a risk of “legitimate prejudice,” the State should not be “constrained to

forego relevant evidence and to risk going to the fact finder with a watered down version

17
of its case.” Cousar, 198 Md. App. at 517 (quoting Oesby v. State, 142 Md. App. 144,

166–67, cert. denied, 369 Md. 181 (2002)).

We review the circuit court’s balancing “of probative value against the danger of

unfair prejudice for an abuse of discretion.” Browne, 486 Md. at 194. Reversal of the

circuit court is reserved only for the “rare and bizarre exercises of discretion that are, in

the judgment of the appellate court, not only wrong but flagrantly and outrageously so.”

Cousar, 198 Md. App. at 517–18. If we find an abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s

ruling on evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), we engage in harmless error analysis

to determine if reversal is required. Burral v. State, 118 Md. App. 288, 298 (1997).

E. Analysis

To sharpen our focus on the circuit court’s findings that Mr. Crawford does

challenge, we start by outlining the findings that he does not. Mr. Crawford does not

contest the trial court’s findings regarding the first two steps of the Faulkner analysis. In

other words, Mr. Crawford does not challenge the special relevance of the eight other

fires for proving Mr. Crawford’s identity as the culprit of the Howard County fires and

his motive for setting them. Nor does Mr. Crawford challenge the circuit court’s finding

(by clear and convincing evidence) that he was the one who set the eight other fires.

Thus, homing in on the last Faulkner step (i.e., whether the “necessity for and

probativeness of the evidence” is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice,

Faulkner, 314 Md. 640–41), we disagree with Mr. Crawford that there was no need for

the admission of the eight fires or that their probative value was substantially outweighed

by the risk of unfair prejudice.

18
To be sure, the “needless presentation of cumulative evidence” can preclude

admission of evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(b). Burris v. State, 435 Md. 370, 392

(2013). Indeed, as Mr. Crawford argues, there may be a point where evidence of an

additional bad act tips the scales towards unfair prejudice and inadmissibility under the

balancing test in the third step of the Faulkner analysis. See, e.g., Cross, 282 Md. at 474

(noting that all, some, or no other bad act evidence may be admissible depending on the

application of the balancing test in 5-404(b)).

Here, though, the circuit court determined that “there is a significant necessity on

the part of [all eight fires] that outweighs any prejudice[.]” As we have explained,

“[a]rson is likely to be a clandestine offense and proof of it must often be by

circumstantial evidence and inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom.”

Nasim v. State, 34 Md. App. 65, 76 (1976) (cleaned up). The circuit court recognized this

principle and noted that “[b]ecause of the nature of the crime, it’s at night, it’s secretive, I

think there is a necessity for this evidence[.]” As further described by the circuit court, it

is “all circumstantial evidence” that “works together.”

What made evidence of all eight other fires necessary was that all of them were

perpetrated against people on Mr. Crawford’s List. As the circuit court put it,

“[Mr. Crawford] had a list of names on his computer and everybody whose house got

burned name appeared on that list.” Moreover, each person on the List was acquainted

with Mr. Crawford but could only recall seemingly inconsequential grievances with

19
him. 16 We agree with the State that limiting its ability to connect as many List entries to

other fires as possible would have significantly weakened its use of the List to prove

Mr. Crawford’s involvement in the Howard County fires. For each entry that was

unconnected to a fire, the List would have become “significantly less inculpatory.”

There was also a need for the evidence of the eight other fires to explain

Mr. Crawford’s motive for the Howard County fires. Accord Nasim, 34 Md. App. at 76

(“[G]enerally, evidence tending to show malice or motive is admissible in arson cases.”)

Ms. Byrne testified that she did not know Mr. Crawford, and the Anticos could not

remember having any disagreements with him. The Hendersons could only recall two

incidents: a confrontation about the dog collar Ms. Henderson was using, and

Ms. Henderson’s interruption of Mr. Crawford at a community meeting. None of this

evidence seems to explain, on its own, Mr. Crawford’s motive for setting the Howard

County fires. However, as the circuit court noted, evidence from the eight other fires all

together showed that “[Mr. Crawford] has certain behavior traits that may suggest . . . to a

jury that there’s no slight that could be trivial.”

Having determined that there was “a significant necessity” for the admission of all

eight fires, the circuit court then recognized that the evidence would be prejudicial to

Mr. Crawford but balanced whether the necessity for the evidence was outweighed by the

risk of unfair prejudice to Mr. Crawford. “I find there is a significant necessity on the part

16
Mr. Hawkins, Jr. did not know Mr. Crawford; Mr. Hawkins, Sr. had worked
with Mr. Crawford and had known him “in passing,” but could not recall having had any
negative interactions with Mr. Crawford.

20
of it that outweighs any prejudice, well[,] I don’t see an undue prejudice but if there is,

it’s been outweighed by the necessity for [that evidence].” Under the circumstances of

this case, we cannot say this determination was “flagrantly and outrageously” incorrect.

See Cousar, 198 Md. App. at 517–18.

In an attempt to overcome this conclusion, Mr. Crawford argues that the circuit

court incorrectly failed to limit the number of other fires that would be admitted. Rule

5-403 (and by extension, Rule 5-404(b)), he contends, implicitly limit the number of

other bad acts that can be admitted, and the eight fires here exceeded that limit. 17 In other

words, Mr. Crawford contends that the number of other bad acts, standing alone, can be

dispositive of their admissibility. To further support his view, Mr. Crawford points to

several out-of-state cases, arguing that “the admission of numerous other bad acts

committed by the defendant is so prejudicial that it outweighs any probative value.” We

disagree.

First, we find no support in Maryland law that the number of other bad acts is

determinative of their admissibility. Under our established framework for admitting

evidence under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), courts must “carefully weigh the necessity for

and probativeness” of the other bad acts against the unfair prejudice. Faulkner, 314 Md.

at 640–41. Indeed, the number of other bad acts may bear on the need and probative

17
Stated differently, Mr. Crawford is challenging the admission of all eight other
fires because, in his view, eight was too many. By way of contrast, Mr. Crawford does
not contend that two or three of the eight would have been enough to prove that he was
the one who set the four Howard County fires or his motive in doing so. Nor does
Mr. Crawford identify which of the eight other fires were unnecessary.

21
value for the evidence; but our law is also clear that both need and probative value

require a case-specific inquiry. See, e.g., Cross, 282 Md. at 474 (“In some cases, [the 5-

404(b) balancing test] may require that evidence of the criminal actions of the defendant

be totally excluded; in others, admission of portions or all of the evidence of the

defendant’s specific criminal actions may be permissible.”)

Nor do the out-of-state cases Mr. Crawford cites suggest that the number of other

bad acts is the only factor determinative of their admissibility. Although these cases

involve other courts finding error in the admission of large numbers of other bad acts, the

reasoning in these cases does not rest only on how many other bad acts there were; rather,

it rests on the need for the evidence. These cases do not, as Mr. Crawford suggests,

establish a bright-line rule that other bad act evidence is rendered inadmissible simply

because many other bad acts are proffered. Moreover, in none of the out-of-state cases

that Mr. Crawford cites was the other bad acts evidence necessary to prove identity or

motive, 18 as it was here. We briefly summarize these cases. 19

18
In State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 2009), the court noted that the
evidence of the other bad acts was relevant (although the relevance of some of them was
lessened by their attenuation to the charged assault) for proving the defendant’s motive.
Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d at 290–92. However, because of the clear animus between the
defendant and the victim, there was no need for all the bad act evidence to prove the
defendant’s motive. Id.
19
We do not address Mr. Crawford’s citation to State v. Little, 81 N.W.2d 302

22
Three of the out-of-state cases presented circumstances where there was no need

for all the bad act evidence the State sought to admit. In State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d

283 (Iowa 2009), the defendant was convicted of assaulting a man who was having an

extramarital affair with (and eventually married) the defendant’s wife. Reynolds, 765

N.W.2d at 287, overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d

699, 708 (Iowa 2016). The Iowa Supreme Court determined it was error to admit

evidence of eleven prior instances of harassment, threats, assault, and intimidation by the

defendant toward the same victim. Id. at 291–92. The court concluded there was “little

need” for all eleven instances to prove the defendant’s intent, particularly because the fact

of the affair “had already been disclosed.” Id. at 291. Similarly, the Supreme Court of

New Hampshire reversed a defendant’s conviction in State v. Marti, 672 A.2d 709 (N.H.

1996), where “hundreds” of “identical” sexual assaults were not needed because they

served no purpose beyond leading the jury “to conclude that because the defendant had

sexually abused the victim [in the past], he probably committed the charged” assault.

Marti, 672 A.2d at 711. In People v. Turner, 668 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998),

the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division) determined that thirty instances of the

defendant issuing bad checks was “more ‘than was appropriate or necessary to the jury’s

(Iowa Ct. App. 2010), because it does not conform to Maryland Rule 1-104(b). Under
this rule, out-of-state opinions may be cited as persuasive authority “if the jurisdiction in
which the opinion was issued would permit it to be cited as persuasive authority or
precedent.” Md. Rule 1-104(b). Further, “[t]he citation shall indicate whether the opinion
is precedent in the issuing jurisdiction.” Id. In Iowa, “[u]npublished opinions or decisions
of a court or agency do not constitute controlling legal authority, but they may be cited as
providing persuasive reasoning.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(2)(a)(2). However,
Mr. Crawford did not indicate to us whether State v. Little is precedent in Iowa.
23
evaluation of [the] defendant’s credibility[,]’” but did not reverse after concluding that

the error was harmless. Turner, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 844.

The fourth out-of-state case, Williams v. State, 983 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. Ct. App.

2013), is a post-conviction case where the Indiana Court of Appeals held the defense

counsel was deficient for failing to object to prior bad acts evidence having no relevance

“other than [to Mr.] Williams’ propensity to commit the charged crimes[.]” Williams, 983

N.E.2d at 666. The improper nature of the evidence, again, did not hinge on how many

other bad acts there were but instead turned on the need (or lack thereof) for all of them.

Ultimately, we see no abuse of discretion in the circuit court admitting evidence of

the eight other fires under the circumstances here. As required under our law, the circuit

court engaged in a fact-specific analysis and determined that the need for evidence of all

eight fires was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Although the circuit

court was aware of the number of other fires that the State wanted to offer, 20 the court did

not find that number to be dispositive. We see no error in the circuit court’s analysis.

Accordingly, we do not address Mr. Crawford’s contention that admission of the eight

fires was not harmless.

20
The circuit court acknowledged Mr. Crawford’s argument about the number of
other fires, and as Mr. Crawford now emphasizes, termed it as a “back-loader of evidence
in other crimes[.]” Despite doing so, however, the circuit court found that the necessity of
evidence of all eight other fires was not outweighed by unfair prejudice before admitting
them all.

24
II. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Crawford’s
motion for a mistrial based on testimony that he refused consent to search his
phone.

A. Mr. Crawford’s Contentions

Mr. Crawford also claims that the circuit court erred by admitting evidence that

Mr. Crawford had withheld consent for a search of his cellphone, and further, that the

circuit court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial motion Mr. Crawford made

afterward. Mr. Crawford argues that evidence of a defendant refusing to give consent to a

search “is inadmissible, prejudicial per se, and cannot be cured.” Premising his argument

on Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486 (2007), Mr. Crawford contends that the circuit court

erroneously determined a curative instruction could have cured the situation, and thus

wrongfully denied his request for a mistrial.

B. Testimony Regarding Mr. Crawford’s Lack of Consent to Search his
Phone

The testimony that prompted Mr. Crawford’s mistrial motion is as follows:

[PROSECUTOR]: Can you tell the jury what kind of cellphone [you
recovered from Mr. Crawford] is?

[DETECTIVE SMITH]: Yes, it’s an Apple iPhone.

[PROSECUTOR]: And then did you make contact with [Mr. Crawford] in
regards to that phone?

[DETECTIVE SMITH]: Yes, I did.

[PROSECUTOR]: And did you make a request of [Mr. Crawford] about that
phone?

[DETECTIVE SMITH]: Yes. I asked him for both permission to search the
phone and the passcode to the phone.

[PROSECUTOR]: And did he give that to you?

25
[DETECTIVE SMITH]: He did not give me permission to search the phone,
but he did give me the passcode to the phone.

Defense counsel immediately objected. The prosecutor explained that “he obviously

didn’t know that there was no consent,” and that he was “only asking for the purpose of

the passcode.”

Mr. Crawford moved for a mistrial, which the circuit court denied. The circuit

court determined that Detective Smith’s answer was a “blurt” 21 and twice offered

Mr. Crawford the remedy of a curative instruction; 22 Mr. Crawford declined.

C. Law

Maryland applies a “well established analytical framework” when determining

whether a “blurt” prejudices a defendant enough to warrant a mistrial. Washington v.

State, 191 Md. App. 48, 100 (2010). This framework revolves around five factors initially

laid out in Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653 (1984). These five factors are: (1) whether the

inadmissible evidence “was repeated or whether it was a single, isolated statement;”

21
A “blurt” or a “blurt out” has been defined as “an abrupt and inadvertent
nonresponsive statement made by a witness during his or her testimony.” Washington v.
State, 191 Md. App. 48, 100 (2010) (citing State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 277 (1992)).
Neither party challenges the circuit court’s determination that Detective Smith’s answer
was a “blurt.”
22
The curative instruction offered by the circuit court to the jury was:

[Y]ou heard Sergeant Smith’s testimony that Mr. Crawford did not give him
permission to access Mr. Crawford’s phone. Every citizen is entitled to deny
such a request. You’re not permitted to consider the denial of permission as
evidence of guilt. Further, I’m striking that testimony which means that you
are to treat that testimony as never happening and you are not to consider it
at all.

26
(2) whether the inadmissible evidence was inadvertent rather than intentionally solicited

by counsel; (3) whether the witness testifying to the inadmissible evidence “is the

principal witness upon whom the entire prosecution depends;” (4) “whether credibility is

a crucial issue;” and (5) “whether a great deal of other evidence exists[.]” 23 Guesfeird,

300 Md. at 659. These factors, however, “are not exclusive and do not themselves

comprise the test.” Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 408 (1992) (quoting Kosmas v. State,

316 Md. 587, 594 (1989)). Indeed, “[e]very trial is different and the test articulated in

Guesfeird is open-ended and fact-specific.” Washington, 191 Md. App. at 100.

A mistrial is an “extraordinary remedy” 24 that is necessary only when “the

prejudice to the defendant was so substantial that [the defendant is] deprived of a fair

trial.” Kosh v. State, 382 Md. 218, 226 (2004) (quoting Kosmas, 316 Md. at 594). See

also Wilson v. State, 148 Md. App. 601, 666 (2002) (requiring that appellants

demonstrate “real and substantial prejudice” necessitating a mistrial). With their “finger

on the pulse of the trial,” the circuit court is in the best position to evaluate prejudice to

the defendant. State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278 (1992). Thus, we review the circuit

23
Guesfeird involved a “blurt” that indicated to the jury that the witness had taken
a lie detector test. Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 656–57. Regarding such “blurts,” a court should
also consider “whether an inference as to the result of the test should be drawn.” Id. at
659. In situations like the present case, however, we focus on the first five factors
provided in Guesfeird. See, e.g., Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 408 (1992).

Whack v. State, 433 Md. 728, 751 (2013) (quoting Powell v. State, 406 Md. 679,
24

694 (2008)).

27
court’s decision to deny a mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Simmons v.

State, 436 Md. 202, 212 (2013).

D. Analysis

Under the facts presented in this case, we cannot say the circuit court abused its

discretion by denying Mr. Crawford’s motion for a mistrial.

We conclude that none of the factors articulated in Guesfeird weigh in favor of a

mistrial. As for the first two factors, Detective Smith’s comment about Mr. Crawford’s

denying consent to search was a one-off that was unsolicited by the State. As such, the

comment was a “blurt.” See Washington, 191 Md. App. at 100. Third, although Detective

Smith was an officer involved in the investigation of Mr. Crawford, he was one of

twenty-nine witnesses the State called (and one among many investigating officers); by

no means was he the State’s “principal witness.”

Fourth, witness credibility was no more important here than it ordinarily would be;

in other words, witness credibility was not crucial to the State’s case against

Mr. Crawford. Guesfeird itself is instructive on this point, as it was a case where the

prosecution relied on the truth of a single witness’s testimony (the witness who uttered

the “blurt”), making credibility “the crucial issue for the jury.” 300 Md. at 666. The

“blurt” the witness made related to a lie detector test she had taken, creating the

“unavoidable inference” that “if she took the test, she passed and was telling the truth at

trial; otherwise, the prosecution would not have gone forward with her as the only

witness.” Id. Here, by contrast, Detective Smith’s blurt had no real bearing on the

28
credibility of any of the State’s witnesses. 25 Although an improper inference could be

drawn about Mr. Crawford’s guilt due to his lack of consent, the blurt would not support

an inference of untruthfulness (or truthfulness) about the State’s witnesses.

Fifth, a “great deal of other evidence” was presented to link Mr. Crawford to the

fires beyond the testimony of Detective Smith that Mr. Crawford refused consent for his

phone to be searched. Id. at 659. Thus, none of the Guesfeird factors suggest that a

mistrial was warranted.

Moreover, we note that, contrary to Mr. Crawford’s contentions, our Supreme

Court’s decision in Longshore is not determinative here. In Longshore, the Court found

that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial after a detective

testified that the defendant refused consent to search his vehicle. Longshore, 399 Md. at

535. Because refusing to consent to a warrantless search is a constitutional right, the

Court explained, refusal to consent cannot be used to “implicate guilt” because “[a]n

unfair and impermissible burden would be placed upon the assertion of a constitutional

right if the State could use a refusal to a warrantless search against an individual.” Id. at

537. Under the circumstances presented in Longshore, the defendant “was prejudiced by

the inadmissible testimony and the instruction of the court to disregard the testimony did

not cure the error.” Id. at 538. Central to this holding, however, was the importance of the

defendant’s knowledge to the case. “An important issue in the case was whether [the

25
Notably, the State presented twenty-eight other witnesses to support the charges
against Mr. Crawford besides Detective Smith, and Mr. Crawford did not present a case.
Thus, even if the “blurt” had implicated the credibility of Detective Smith, we would not
see credibility as a “crucial issue” in this case.
29
defendant] had knowledge of the contraband contained within [his] car.” Id. Because the

jury could have inferred from the defendant’s refusal of consent that he knew his vehicle

contained drugs, the Court could not consider the error to be harmless. Id.

Here, however, the charges against Mr. Crawford did not hinge on his knowledge

of what a search of his phone would reveal. Instead, the core of the State’s case was

whether Mr. Crawford was the one who set the Howard County fires, and his intent in

doing so. Moreover, while Mr. Crawford did not consent to the search of his phone, he

did provide Detective Smith the passcode to his phone and did not object to the

admission of what was found on his phone (or other electronic devices) after they were

searched. In short, Longshore is inapposite here because Mr. Crawford was not

prejudiced by Detective Smith’s “blurt.” The evidence of Mr. Crawford’s guilt extended

well beyond any impermissible inference that might have been drawn from Mr.

Crawford’s lack of consent.

Faced with these circumstances, the circuit court, with its “finger on the pulse of

the trial,” Hawkins, 326 Md. at 278, analyzed the situation and determined that a curative

instruction would adequately address any prejudice from Detective Smith’s comment.

Mr. Crawford, as was his right, denied this curative instruction. In our view, though, the

decision that the “extraordinary remedy” of a mistrial was unwarranted did not constitute

an abuse of discretion.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS ARE TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.

30