Estate of Patricia M. Spofford

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2025 ME 15
Docket: Lin-24-235
Argued: December 12, 2024
Decided: February 11, 2025

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

ESTATE OF PATRICIA M. SPOFFORD

CONNORS, J.

[¶1] Michael Zani and Peter Zani are the sons of Patricia M. Spofford, who

passed away on June 7, 2020. The Zanis appeal from the order of summary

judgment entered by the Probate Court (Lincoln County, Avantaggio, J.) finding

that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning Spofford’s

testamentary capacity when she executed her will on March 1, 2018. On appeal,

the Zanis argue that the court erred and that there is a genuine issue concerning

her testamentary capacity. While the Zanis concede that they have “no direct

evidence regarding the events that took place on March 1, 2018,” they argue

that other evidence “from before and after the date the will was

executed . . . puts [Spofford’s] testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018, into

serious doubt.” Examining the issue de novo and viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Zanis, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of

material fact regarding whether Spofford possessed the requisite testamentary
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capacity when she executed her will, and we thus affirm the judgment.

See Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242.

[¶2] The summary judgment record contains significant evidence of

Spofford’s testamentary capacity on March 1, 2018. This evidence includes

videos of the will’s execution recorded by Spofford’s attorney. These videos

show that Spofford understood “the business [she] was engaged in”; possessed

knowledge of the makeup and general extent of her estate; could identify her

family members and her relationships to them; knew how she wished to

dispose of her estate; and had clear wishes about the persons she wanted “to

participate in [her] bounty” and whom she wished to exclude. In re Loomis’ Will,

133 Me. 81, 85, 174 A. 38, 41 (1934); see also Est. of Washburn, 2020 ME 18,

¶ 10, 225 A.3d 761. The videos also establish that Spofford reviewed her will

with her attorney, that Spofford confirmed that the drafted will accurately

reflected her wishes, and that she signed her will in the presence of two

witnesses and a notary.1

1 Additional evidence of Spofford’s testamentary capacity includes an affidavit signed by
Spofford’s attorney stating that she believed that Spofford was competent to execute her will on
March 1, 2018, and an affidavit signed by one of the witnesses attesting that she “had no reason to
believe that [Spofford] was not acting of her own free will or that she lacked a ‘sound mind’ during
the will signing.” The witness added that on the day that Spofford executed her will, she appeared
“present, alert, and aware of her surroundings and actions.”
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[¶3] Testimony by Spofford’s primary care physician further supports

the conclusion that Spofford possessed testamentary capacity when she

executed her will. In an affidavit, the physician stated that he had examined

Spofford on the day that she executed her will and had concluded, based on that

examination “as well as [his] review of [Spofford’s] medical history,” that she

“possessed the capacity and intention to execute a testamentary will on

March 1, 2018.”2 See In re Waning’s Appeal, 151 Me. 239, 252, 117 A.2d 347,

354 (1955) (“An attending or family physician’s opinion as to the mental health

of his patient is competent [evidence of that patient’s testamentary capacity].”);

Est. of Mitchell, 443 A.2d 961, 963 (Me. 1982) (relying on an examination by a

neurologist conducted “on the day before” the decedent executed her will in

assessing whether the decedent possessed sufficient testamentary capacity “at

the time when [s]he execute[d] [her] will”).

[¶4] In contrast, the evidence on which the Zanis rely is too remote from

the issue of Spofford’s testamentary capacity at the time that she executed her

2 The physician found that “[Spofford] was alert and oriented to person, place, and time of day”;
that she said “she understood the nature of her testamentary will, the extent of her possessions, and
the purpose and consequences of executing the will”; that she gave him no “reason to suspect that
she was under any duress”; and that “[w]hile [Spofford] had been previously diagnosed with
dementia and Alzheimer’s disease, during the examination she was neither confused nor disoriented,
and she was not presenting with delusional thought or altered thinking.” He added that “[t]hough
[Spofford] presented with mild cognitive dysfunction and memory impairment, she completed a
cognitive assessment with little difficulty.”
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will to create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Zani v. Zani, 2023 ME 42,

¶ 12, 299 A.3d 9; 18-C M.R.S. § 3-407 (2024). The Zanis reference, for example,

an incident that occurred a year before the execution of Spofford’s will in which

she assaulted her caregivers and drove erratically through town. They also

reference notes in Spofford’s medical records regarding her cognitive issues

written by the same doctor who determined that she was of sound mind on the

day she executed her will. The Zanis specifically discuss a February 15, 2018,

note in which Spofford’s physician wrote that she displayed “[s]ignificant

cognitive dysfunction” and a June 4, 2018, note in which he described Spofford

as “uncooperative,” “not able to listen,” and “aggressive and reactive.” The

Zanis also reference a report by another doctor, based on two examinations of

Spofford conducted in the summer of 2017, in which that doctor diagnosed

Spofford with cognitive impairment and recommended the appointment of a

guardian and conservator.

[¶5] This evidence does not create a genuine dispute of material fact

regarding whether Spofford lacked testamentary capacity on the day that she

executed her will. See Appeal of Royal, 152 Me. 242, 247, 127 A.2d 484, 487

(1956) (“The want of capacity, when urged as a ground for invalidating a

testamentary act, must relate to the time of the act. Incompetency may exist
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before or after, and still the will be valid.” (quotation marks omitted)); In re

Loomis’ Will, 133 Me. at 87, 174 A. at 41–42 (“Except in so far as it may tend to

show the quality of [the] testator’s mind at the time of executing the will, the

condition of his mind before or after that time is unimportant. If he was then

rational and acting rationally, or, in popular phrase, knew and understood what

he was about, the will is valid.”); cf. In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 489 (Me. 1974)

(“[E]vidence of testator’s conduct, emotions, methods of thought, and the like,

for a very considerable period before and after the execution of the will, is

admissible to show his capacity at the moment of making the will. The evidence

must be restricted to a reasonable time on either side of the execution of the

will.” (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶6] Additionally, the Zanis challenge their mother’s capacity partly on

the ground that she had been diagnosed with dementia and Alzheimer’s

disease; however, we have established that some degree of cognitive

impairment, including dementia, does not preclude testamentary capacity. E.g.,

In re Loomis’ Will, 133 Me. at 87, 174 A. at 42 (“Although fixed insanity has been

established, it may be shown that execution was during a lucid interval. There

may, in a case of senile dementia, be such a thing as a ‘lucid interval,’ during

which the person is qualified to will.”).
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[¶7] Also, while the Zanis argue that “the fact that [Spofford] was under

a guardianship and conservatorship at the time the will was executed . . . is

certainly persuasive evidence that testamentary capacity did not exist,” we

have established that someone under guardianship and conservatorship may

have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will. E.g., In re Am. Bd. of

Comm’rs for Foreign Missions, 102 Me. 72, 101, 66 A. 215, 226 (1906) (“[T]he

incapacity of guardianship is simply a fact which may be proven like any other

fact tending to establish mental incapacity, but it does not work an estoppel

upon the proponents. The law recognizes that a person may require a guardian

by reason of incapacity in one particular, while, in other respects, he may be

entirely competent. It is well settled . . . that there may be partial insanity of the

testator, some unsoundness of mind, that does not in any way relate to his

property or disposition of the same by will.”); Est. of Turf, 435 A.2d 1087, 1089

n.4 (Me. 1981) (concluding that a testator possessed testamentary capacity

despite having been assigned a guardian in an unrelated conservatorship

proceeding in another state).

[¶8] Because we find that there was no genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether Spofford had the requisite testamentary capacity when she
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executed her will, we affirm the Probate Court’s judgment. See Grant, 2016 ME

85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Christopher K. MacLean, Esq. (orally), Camden, for appellants Michael Zani and
Peter Zani

Oliver M. Walton, Esq. (orally), and Amy K. Olfene, Esq., Drummond Woodsum,
Portland, for appellee St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital

Lincoln County Probate Court docket number 2020-0149
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY