State of Maine v. Jessica A. Williams

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2024 ME 37
Docket: Wal-23-13
Argued: November 8, 2023
Decided: May 16, 2024

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.*

STATE OF MAINE

v.

JESSICA A. WILLIAMS

MEAD, J.

[¶1] Jessica A. Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction for

depraved indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(B) (2024), entered by the

trial court (Waldo County, R. Murray, J.) following a jury trial. Williams

challenges the admission of evidence related to a prior bad act and testimony

and arguments regarding her lack of communication with police officers.

Williams further contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a

judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence. Williams finally argues that

if none of these issues is individually sufficient to warrant reversal, the

cumulative effect of all three is a violation of her due process rights. We

* Although Justice Jabar participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.
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disagree with her contentions and affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[¶2] “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the

jury could have rationally found the following facts beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Plummer, 2020 ME 106, ¶ 2, 238 A.3d 241.

[¶3] The victim, Maddox Williams, was born to Jessica Williams and

Maddox’s father on January 9, 2018. Initially Maddox lived with Williams, then

he lived with his father and paternal grandmother from March 23, 2018, until

February 12, 2020, when his father was arrested and Maddox returned to living

with Williams.

[¶4] In October 2020, Williams and Maddox’s father began sharing

custody of Maddox, each having Maddox on alternating weeks, but by

December 2020 Williams was preventing Maddox from visiting with his father.

Between October and December 2020, Maddox would occasionally have

bruises on his body, primarily on his face or forehead, when he came from

Williams’s care.

[¶5] Maddox’s father brought the custody matter to court, and as a result,

his visits with Maddox recommenced February 26, 2021. When Maddox

resumed visitation with his father in February 2021, his father and his paternal
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grandmother noticed that Maddox had a faded bruise on his forehead. On

March 7, 2021, Maddox’s father was arrested for reasons unrelated to this

matter and Williams assumed what amounted to sole custody of Maddox. At

that time, Williams was living with her boyfriend, along with their three other

children.

[¶6] When Williams took sole custody of Maddox, Maddox was not

missing any teeth and did not have any visible bruises. Although Maddox was

not particularly clumsy before returning to live with Williams, while he was in

her custody Williams messaged multiple acquaintances about instances where

Maddox had been injured due to his clumsiness, which she said had caused

visible bruises.

[¶7] In the Spring of 2021, Williams, her boyfriend, and their children

went on a trip to New Hampshire. At some point on the trip Maddox was

thrown out of a bathroom by Williams and landed on a hard, non-carpeted floor.

Maddox had skinned knees and elbows, a scratch on his face, and a bruise on

his forehead when he returned from New Hampshire.

[¶8] While living with Williams, Maddox sometimes had bruises on his

legs, arms, and forehead, which Williams would cover with make-up and

temporary tattoos. Williams would slap and hit Maddox in the mouth and tell
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him to turn away from her, saying that she did not want to look at his “ugly face”

because it reminded her of his father. Williams and her boyfriend called

Maddox offensive names. Williams’s other children were rough with each other

and with Maddox. Williams was aware that her other children hit Maddox but

did nothing to prevent it. Maddox occasionally played on a trampoline at

Williams’s house under her boyfriend’s supervision.

[¶9] In May or June 2021, Williams’s mother, Sherry Johnson, noticed

that Maddox had lost a front tooth while living with Williams. When she asked

Williams about it, Williams explained that Maddox had fallen over and knocked

the tooth out. Sometime after noticing Maddox’s first missing tooth, Johnson

noticed that Maddox was missing another tooth, which Williams explained as

having been knocked out when Maddox fell again.

[¶10] Williams called Johnson on June 20, 2021, and told her that

Maddox did not feel well and that she thought he should be taken to the

hospital, but that she would like Johnson’s opinion. When Johnson arrived at

Williams’s house about ten minutes after the call, she saw that Maddox was pale

and gray; the three went to the hospital. As they arrived at the hospital, Maddox

lost consciousness. Arriving at the emergency room at about 1 p.m., Williams

informed ER staff that Maddox had been caught in her puppy’s leash and been
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dragged by the puppy, hitting a boulder, after which his sister had kicked him

in the belly. The puppy in question weighed fifteen pounds.

[¶11] ER staff and police made the following observations about

Maddox:

• His head was misshapen.

• He had a very large bruise and bump on his forehead.

• He had a temporary tattoo on his forehead as well as on other parts of his
body.

• He had numerous bruises at various stages of healing all over his body.

• He had a grayish clear liquid coming out of a nostril and an ear.

• His neck and central joints were floppy, but his extremities were stiff.

• He appeared pale and thin, and his stomach was distended.

[¶12] At some point, Maddox’s heart stopped beating and, although ER

staff attempted to resuscitate Maddox for about an hour, he was pronounced

dead at the hospital. Williams did not appear to react strongly to Maddox’s

death, and Williams and Johnson left the ER shortly after his death.

[¶13] At around this time, an informant told the police that Williams’s

boyfriend had texted him that Williams had been abusing her son and that the

son was on the way to the hospital.
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[¶14] While still in the hospital parking lot, Williams received a call from

the police on her cellphone; Johnson answered it, and police informed her that

they would like her to keep Williams in the parking lot so that they could

interview her. When Johnson relayed this information, Williams said that she

was not ready to speak to anyone yet and immediately drove away from the

hospital. Williams drove the two of them back to Johnson’s house and stayed

there while Johnson went to Williams’s house. Williams asked Johnson to lie to

police and say that she had dropped Williams off at the pier in Searsport, and

Johnson told this to police at Williams’s house. Williams’s boyfriend told police

that Maddox and the other kids had been outside alone when Maddox was

injured. Police were dispatched shortly after Maddox’s death to locate

Williams, but they were unable to find her.

[¶15] While the police were looking for her, Williams was contacting

friends from phone numbers that were not her own. Williams appeared to be

hiding from police and, for example, informed one of her friends that “[t]he cops

are trying to charge me . . . and I need a place to hide out, saying I killed

[Maddox],” and “police [are] at my house, DHHS, everyone. I’m not going home

to deal with that . . . . Keep this between us, please.” Williams and her boyfriend

both created alternate email accounts and phone numbers, under pseudonyms,
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from which they could text and call. Williams also did not use her phone or

debit and credit cards because she knew that they could be used to track her.

On June 21, a friend of Williams picked her up from Johnson’s house and drove

her to the house of one of Williams’s other friends.

[¶16] Late on June 22 or early on June 23, Williams returned to Johnson’s

house. In a conversation with police on June 23, Johnson revealed that Williams

was in Johnson’s house and allowed police inside to interview Williams.

Williams told police the following:

• Maddox had fallen off the trampoline the week prior.

• She believed that the puppy had caused Maddox’s injuries.

• Maddox had been complaining that his stomach hurt.

• Maddox had had no injuries in the days preceding his death.

• Maddox was missing two teeth after returning from a stay with his father,
and she noticed a third missing tooth in the hospital.

• She never put her hands on her children.

• She was missing $1,600 in cash, which she claimed she had lost.

• She did not expect anything in her house to test positive for Maddox’s
blood.

[¶17] After interviewing Williams, police arrested her and found $1,600

in cash on her person.
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[¶18] Upon searching Williams's house, the police found several stained

items that tested presumptively positive for blood and were submitted to the

crime lab. When tested, these items contained DNA that matched a profile

taken from Maddox.

[¶19] The autopsy of Maddox’s body found the following:

• Multiple contusions and abrasions on his head and body, and a laceration
of his ear.

• Injuries covered with temporary tattoos.

• Lacerations of the mouth consistent with blunt-force injury to the lips.

• Three missing teeth, with one tooth’s socket fractured.

• Hemorrhages in his skull.

• Hemorrhages and lacerations in the abdomen and internal organs.

• The transection of his pancreas.

• Fractures in two vertebrae of his spine.

[¶20] The medical examiner drew the following conclusions:

• The internal organ injuries were recent, having occurred just hours
before his death, and they had led directly to Maddox’s death.

• The internal organ injuries were not consistent with injuries sustained
while playing or jumping on a trampoline, but rather with a more violent
event, like a car crash or fall from a great height.

• The internal organ injuries could not have been caused by a child’s kick
or adult’s punch, but a stomp from an adult could have caused them.
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• One tooth had been lost within a day of Maddox’s death, and the other
two less recently. This loss of teeth was not consistent with normal loss
of baby teeth, which usually occurs several years later in a child’s
development, but instead was consistent with blunt-force trauma.

[¶21] The medical examiner’s opinion was that Maddox’s death was a

result of battered child syndrome with recent and old blunt-force injuries, and

that the injuries were consistent with non-accidental trauma. The medical

examiner further opined that the potential reasons for Maddox’s injuries given

by Williams at the hospital could not have produced those injuries.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶22] On June 24, 2021, the State charged Williams by criminal

complaint with depraved indifference murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(B), and on

July 26, 2021, a grand jury indicted Williams for that charge. After Williams

entered a plea of not guilty on October 21, 2021, the court held a six-day jury

trial in October 2022.

[¶23] During the first day of the trial, the court heard argument on the

State’s motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of prior bad acts. The

State sought to offer testimony concerning the incident in New Hampshire

where Williams had thrown Maddox out of a bathroom. Over Williams’s

objection, the court granted the motion, but it indicated that the testimony
10

would need to be accompanied by a limiting instruction. The court specifically

found that the evidence was admissible under M.R. Evid. 403 and 404 for the

purpose of demonstrating the relationship between Williams and Maddox and

that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by

its prejudicial effect. The court stated that the limiting instruction would

“instruct the jury . . . that evidence of a prior bad act is generally not admissible

for the purpose of allowing . . . the jury, to infer that the defendant acted in

conformity with that prior bad act or even had a propensity to act in conformity

with that prior bad act” and that the evidence “may be considered” by the jurors

if they “find it persuasive as to the relationship between the defendant and the

alleged victim at the time of the incident testified about.”

[¶24] Immediately before the testimony was presented to the jury,

Williams requested that the instruction be given, at which point the court

instructed the jury:

[G]enerally evidence about some prior bad act by the defendant is
not admissible for the purposes of allowing you to make an
inference that the defendant acted in conformity with that prior
bad act, or even had a propensity to act in conformity with that
prior bad act. That’s—that would be improper for you to make that
kind of an [inference]. This evidence as it’s going to be described
to you, however, from this witness, may be considered by you, if
you find it persuasive, as to the relationship between the defendant
and the alleged victim at the time of this incident. Again, for the
relationship, not that it’s an inference that the defendant acted in
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conformity with that prior action sometime in the future. That’s
the purpose for which you can accept that evidence.

[¶25] During the trial, the State repeatedly elicited testimony

establishing, and in closing made reference to, the fact that Williams appeared

to have fled from the police. Williams did not object to this testimony or

address it in her argument at trial, nor did the court address it.

[¶26] At the close of the evidence, Williams moved for a judgment of

acquittal. The court denied the motion, ruling:

Again the Court at this stage, which it must, takes the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. There has been
presented evidence through various witnesses as well as experts
regarding the cause of death being a battered child syndrome
diagnosis with regard to a non-accidental force that resulted in
death of this particular [victim]. The inferences that can be drawn
from the testimony with respect to the defendant could lead this
Court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she was the
cause of that infliction of the death-producing incident. And given
that, as well as the numerous other incidents of injury
demonstrated to the defendant—excuse me, to the victim, any jury
could also conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that they
represented depraved indifference necessary to support a charge
before the Court. Accordingly the motion is denied.

The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty. On December 20, 2022,

Williams was sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a term of forty-

seven years. Williams timely appealed to this Court. M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1); 15

M.R.S. § 2115 (2024).
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III. DISCUSSION

[¶27] On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in

(1) admitting evidence related to a prior bad act, (2) admitting evidence

regarding her lack of communication with police officers, and (3) denying her

motion for a judgment of acquittal made after the close of the

evidence. Williams also argues that if none of these errors sufficiently warrant

reversal on their own, the cumulative effect of all three constitutes a violation

of her due process rights. We review Williams’s four arguments in that order.

A. The Trial Court’s Admission of Evidence of a Prior Bad Act

[¶28] Williams first argues that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence concerning her having thrown Maddox out of a bathroom during a trip

to New Hampshire. “[W]e review [a] trial court’s decision to admit . . . evidence

pursuant to Rule 404(b) for clear error and its determination pursuant to

Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.” Steadman v. Pagels, 2015 ME 122, ¶ 18,

125 A.3d 713 (quotation marks omitted).

1. Rule 404(b)

[¶29] Maine Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides, “Evidence of a crime,

wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
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character.” However, “evidence of prior bad acts is admissible for limited

purposes other than to prove propensity,” including, inter alia, “identity” and

“the relationship of the parties.” State v. Pratt, 2015 ME 167, ¶¶ 24-25,

130 A.3d 381 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶30] The State offered evidence of Williams’s having thrown Maddox

onto a hard floor to illustrate her attitude toward him and her willingness to

use violence against him, both of which were relevant to the identity and motive

of the person who inflicted the injuries that caused Maddox’s death, as well as

to the credibility of her explanation for the injuries. We have traditionally

permitted the admission of evidence for such a purpose in cases of assault or

abuse of a child. See Pratt, 2015 ME 167, ¶ 24, 130 A.3d 381; State v. Allen,

2006 ME 20, ¶ 19, 892 A.2d 447. In Pratt, we held that evidence that the

defendant had assaulted the victim fifteen hours before the victim was killed

“was relevant, and therefore admissible, concerning . . . identity . . . and the

relationship of the parties.” 2015 ME 167, ¶ 25, 130 A.3d 381. In another

similar case, we concluded that evidence that a father had spanked his son the

day before the son was killed was admissible as “relevant and probative to

negate pretrial statements made by [the defendant] that [the victim’s] injuries

may have been the result of falls [the victim] suffered.” Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 19,
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892 A.2d 447. In Allen we held that the evidence “was also relevant to show

that [the defendant] did not object to the spanking and that she was complicit

in physically disciplining [the victim]” and was “relevant and probative of the

relationship between [the defendant] and [the victim].” Id. The evidence in this

case was admitted for similar purposes and was probative as to similar issues.

Thus, its admission under Rule 404 was not clear error.

2. Rule 403

[¶31] Rule 403 provides that a “court may exclude evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”

In some circumstances, a court may also alleviate the prejudice of probative

evidence that is admitted by giving a limiting instruction to the jury. See Allen,

2006 ME 20, ¶ 20, 892 A.2d 447 (holding that a limiting instruction can help to

alleviate prejudice); State v. Hunt, 2023 ME 26, ¶ 30, 293 A.3d 423 (“A jury is

presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”).

[¶32] Although the evidence establishing that Williams threw Maddox

was prejudicial to her because it provided evidence of her prior violence

toward Maddox, the trial court limited any unfair prejudicial effect by providing

a limiting instruction informing the jury that the evidence could not be used to

infer that Williams had acted in conformity with that prior bad act.
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Furthermore, as discussed above, the evidence was highly relevant and

probative to a central issue at trial. See, e.g., Pratt, 2015 ME 167, ¶ 26,

130 A.3d 381. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial and did not err in declining to

exclude the evidence under Rule 403.

B. The Admission of Evidence About Williams’s Silence

[¶33] Williams’s second argument is that the State improperly elicited

evidence and made arguments in closing regarding her lack of communication

with police in the days immediately following Maddox’s death. Williams

concedes that she did not raise this issue at trial.

[¶34] Because Williams did not raise the issue at trial, the trial court did

not have an opportunity to address it, and, accordingly, our review is for

obvious error. See State v. Reeves, 2022 ME 10, ¶ 35, 268 A.3d 281. To vacate a

conviction based on obvious error, there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain,

(3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness and

integrity of judicial proceedings. See State v. Bilynsky, 2021 ME 56, ¶ 4,

263 A.3d 163. An error is plain if it is “so clear under current law that the trial

judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it.” Reeves, 2022 ME 10,

¶ 37, 268 A.3d 281 (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
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[¶35] Although in most cases the State cannot rely on a defendant’s

silence as evidence of guilt, “[n]ontestimonial actions such as flight, hiding, or

resisting arrest may be admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.” State

v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 20 n.6, 89 A.3d 1066 (citing Doe v. United States,

487 U.S. 201, 207 (1988); United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 32

(1st Cir. 2013); State v. Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶¶ 20-27, 82 A.3d 86). Indeed, we

have explicitly held that “[e]vidence of flight permits the jury to infer a

consciousness of guilt or that the defendant was motivated by a desire to avoid

prosecution for the underlying charges.” State v. Haji-Hassan, 2018 ME 42, ¶ 27,

182 A.3d 145 (quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also State v. Barnes,

2004 ME 38, ¶ 5, 845 A.2d 575 (“[E]vidence of flight, concealment, or analogous

conduct is probative to establish a consciousness of guilt.” (quotation marks

omitted)).

[¶36] Williams’s argument accordingly fails on the first prong of the

obvious error test—there was no error. Williams characterizes the State’s

references to her lack of communication with the police as a comment on her

invocation of her constitutional right to silence, but this is a mischaracterization

of the focus of the State’s evidence. The evidence elicited by the State at trial

was not a comment on Williams’s silence, but rather concerned what the jury
17

could rationally have found to be Williams’s attempts to flee from and evade

police. The State’s closing argument also focused on Williams’s flight and not

her silence, as the State argued that Williams “fled the emergency room”;

“concocted” a story; “hid out . . . to avoid detection”; and “was trying to hide

from the police to avoid arrest.” The admission of the evidence concerning

Williams’s flight was not obvious error.

C. The Trial Court’s Denial of Williams’s Motion for a Judgment of
Acquittal

[¶37] Third, Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence that

she had caused Maddox’s injuries, and that therefore the trial court’s denial of

her motion for a judgment of acquittal was error. “We review the denial of a

motion for judgment of acquittal by viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State to determine whether a jury could rationally have found

each element of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.

Abdullahi, 2023 ME 41, ¶ 41, 298 A.3d 815 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶38] “A person is guilty of murder if the person . . . [e]ngages in conduct

that manifests a depraved indifference to the value of human life and that in

fact causes the death of another human being.” 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(B).

Furthermore, “when causing a result is an element of a crime, causation may be

found when the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the
18

defendant, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause.”

17-A M.R.S. § 33(1) (2024).

[¶39] Williams’s argument is largely focused on the fact that there is no

direct evidence that she inflicted the injuries that led to Maddox’s death.

However, we have long held that a lack of direct evidence is not fatal to the

prosecution, because “[c]ircumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support

a conviction as long as the evidence as a whole supports each element of the

crime.” State v. Brown, 2017 ME 59, ¶ 9, 158 A.2d 501 (quotation marks

omitted); State v. Cheney, 2012 ME 119, ¶ 42, 55 A.3d 473; see also State v.

Moores, 2009 ME 102, ¶ 10, 982 A.2d 318; State v. Stinson, 2000 ME 87, ¶ 8,

751 A.2d 1011 (“Circumstantial evidence is not, as a matter of law, inherently

inferior evidence; factual findings may be supported by reasonable inferences

drawn from all the circumstances even if those inferences are contradicted by

parts of the direct evidence.” (emphasis added)); State v. Ardolino,

1997 ME 141, ¶ 20, 697 A.2d 73 (“A conviction may be grounded on

circumstantial evidence and is not for that reason less conclusive.”); State v.

LeClair, 425 A.2d 182, 184 (Me. 1981); State v. Liberty, 280 A.2d 805, 807

(Me. 1971); State v. Allen, 151 Me. 486, 489, 121 A.2d 342, 345 (1956) (“[A]ny

crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence.”); State v. Ward, 119 Me. 482,
19

494, 111 A. 805, 809 (1921); State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267, 289 (1874) (“Crime

is ordinarily proved by circumstantial evidence.”); State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11,

141-43 (1857) (holding that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is composed of facts

equally with that which is denominated direct” and affirming a jury instruction

that stated that if “the circumstances are all consistent with [the defendant’s]

guilt, if they conclusively tend to prove his guilt, and are of a character to

exclude all reasonable doubt that the crime could have been committed by any

other person, . . . the government . . . have done all that they were required to

do, and are entitled to a verdict” (quotation marks omitted)). In assessing

circumstantial evidence, “[a] factfinder may draw all reasonable inferences

from the circumstantial evidence.” State v. Woodard, 2013 ME 36, ¶ 23,

68 A.3d 1250 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶40] When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could

have rationally found the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: Maddox

was killed by the internal organ injuries that he sustained just hours prior to

his death. The force that was required to cause his injuries could not have

resulted from the accidental causes Williams offered in her explanation at the

hospital. The injuries were not accidental and were a result of battered child

syndrome. Williams had previously injured Maddox, permitted her children to
20

injure Maddox, and attempted to conceal the injuries that Maddox suffered in

her care. Williams would verbally abuse Maddox because he reminded her of

his father. Williams and her boyfriend would call Maddox offensive names. The

injuries to Maddox’s mouth were consistent with Williams hitting Maddox in

the mouth. Williams’s statement to police that she noticed that Maddox was

missing teeth after returning from a stay with his father was controverted by

evidence to the contrary, including a picture showing him not missing any teeth

after the date she claimed to have noticed missing teeth, as well as by Williams’s

own explanations to Johnson. There was no evidence that Williams’s boyfriend

hit Maddox.

[¶41] In light of these facts, the jury could have rationally found beyond

a reasonable doubt that Williams’s conduct caused the non-accidental injuries

to Maddox’s internal organs that directly led to his death. See, e.g., Ardolino,

1997 ME 141, ¶ 21, 697 A.2d 73 (“[T]he jury properly could have found that the

circumstances, viewed in relation to each other and together with the rational

inferences that could be d[r]awn from them, satisfied the State’s burden of

proof that every element of the charged offense had been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.”). The evidence of Williams’s constant physical and verbal
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abuse of Maddox1 for no reason other than that he was the son of her former

partner could have permitted a jury to rationally find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the conduct that led to Maddox’s death manifested Williams’s

depraved indifference to the value of Maddox’s life.

[¶42] The facts surrounding cases of assault or abuse of a child by an

adult often present similar records, where there is little direct evidence and the

State’s case must be built on circumstantial evidence. For example, in Ardolino,

we considered a record that did not contain direct evidence of the injury that

caused the death of a battered child victim but supported a circumstantial

inference that the defendant had caused the injury that led to the victim’s death.

Id. ¶¶ 2, 19-21. There, we ultimately concluded that the lack of direct evidence

did not prevent the trial court from denying the defendant’s motion for a

judgment of acquittal. Id. ¶ 21.

[¶43] Moreover, the law in Ardolino was not new, as even before the

adoption of the Maine Rules of Evidence in 1976, we held the same way in a

similar case. See State v. Silva, 153 Me. 89, 134 A.2d 628 (1957); see also M.R.

Evid., Me. Rptr., 336-343 A.2d XL-LXXVIII (promulgating the Maine Rules of

It is worth noting there was no issue raised regarding the evidence of Williams’s prior abuse of
1

Maddox with the exception of the New Hampshire bathroom incident.
22

Evidence); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 1978) (Nichols, J.,

concurring) (“[I]n 1976 the Maine Rules of Evidence, modeled after the Federal

Rules of Evidence, were promulgated.”). In Silva, a mother brought her child,

who was in a state of shock and suffering trauma to his head, to a doctor.

153 Me. at 90-91, 134 A.2d at 629. The child’s mother explained that the child

had suffered an accidental fall and she had been the only person present at the

time of the accident. Id. at 91-92, 134 A.2d at 629. The child subsequently died

and an autopsy revealed that the child had had “an almost unparalleled

succession of traumatic experiences” over the course of his short life. Id. at

91-93, 134 A.2d at 629-30. Although there was no direct evidence that the

child’s mother had inflicted the fatal trauma, we said:

In determining whether or not the respondent was the
person whose unlawful acts caused the death of this child, the jury
had before it evidence of the relationship between the respondent
and her adopted child. Admittedly she assumed all the care of the
child and was its constant companion. She was in the best position
to know and observe whether it had apparently received severe
injury at any time. She was alone with the child much of the time
and had the best opportunity to commit the acts which necessarily
occurred. During her brief absences from the child, it was cared for
by her husband or a baby sitter. There was no suggestion by the
respondent or elsewhere in the evidence that the child had ever
been injured by either of them or by anyone else.

Id. at 100, 134 A.2d at 633-34. We then held that “the chain of circumstantial

evidence which the jury is entitled to consider” could, “if believed, forge[] an
23

unbroken chain of circumstances, all pointing to the guilt of this respondent,”

and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

Id. at 100, 102, 134 A.2d at 634.

[¶44] In light of our longstanding rule that circumstantial evidence alone

may support a conviction, and noting that circumstantial evidence is often,

unavoidably, the only evidence the State can present in cases of abuse of a very

young child by a parent or other adult, we conclude that there was no error in

the trial court’s denial of Williams’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

D. Cumulative Error

[¶45] Williams’s fourth and final argument is that if none of her three

other arguments alone justifies vacating her conviction, then collectively they

should under the “cumulative-error doctrine.” We have yet to clearly define the

parameters of a test for the cumulative-error doctrine, and instead review

allegations of multiple errors “cumulatively and in context to determine

whether the defendant received an unfair trial that deprived him or her of due

process.” State v. Daluz, 2016 ME 102, ¶¶ 52, 67-69, 143 A.3d 800 (quotation

marks and alterations omitted); Hassan, 2013 ME 98, ¶¶ 37-62, 82 A.3d 86

(Jabar, J., dissenting) (noting that the Law Court has “not . . . adopted the federal

cumulative error analysis”); State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 74-76,
24

58 A.3d 1032.

[¶46] In any event, because Williams’s three other arguments on appeal

fail, her cumulative-error argument cannot succeed.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Jessica A.
Williams

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Waldo County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-424
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY