Patricia M. Minerich v. Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 11
Docket: Lin-25-56
Argued: October 9, 2025
Decided: February 10, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

PATRICIA M. MINERICH et al.

v.

BOOTHBAY-BOOTHBAY HARBOR COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.

MEAD, J.

[¶1] Patricia Minerich and seven other residents of Boothbay and

Boothbay Harbor1 (collectively, the Residents), appeal from a judgment of the

Superior Court (Lincoln County, Cashman, J.) denying their Rule 80B complaint

for judicial review of a decision of the Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor School Board

(the Board) denying their petition for reconsideration of a bond question. They

also appeal the dismissal of their independent claims against the Board and

several individuals2 for a declaratory judgment that their First Amendment

rights had been violated and for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983

1 The other named residents are James Farrin, Virginia Farrin, Elizabeth Grant, Roy Tholl, Stephen

Carbone, Pamela Mancusco, and Daniel Zajdel.

2 The individuals are Ronnie Campbell, Troy Lewis, Matt Doucette, Paul Roberts, Darrell Gudroe,
and Sewall Maddocks.
2

(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 119-59). Finding no error with the Board’s denial

of the petition and the Superior Court’s dismissal of independent claims, we

affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the Superior Court’s decision

and are supported by the record. Hurricane Island Found. v. Town of Vinalhaven,

2023 ME 33, ¶ 2, 295 A.3d 147. On February 6, 2024, the Boothbay-Boothbay

Harbor Community School District initiated a referendum to vote on a bond of

$29,950,000 to renovate the elementary and middle schools in the district.

A special election was held on April 24, 2024, and voters approved the bond.

[¶3] On May 1, 2024, the Residents, from both Boothbay and Boothbay

Harbor, submitted a petition to the Board containing two articles requesting “a

Reconsideration Referendum” of the April 24th election. Article 1 asked: “Shall

Article 1 as approved by the voters of the Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor

Community School District on April 24, 2024, and reprinted as follows, be

reconsidered and repealed pursuant to 20-A M.R.S. § 1504?” Article 2 asked: “If

Article 1 on this ballot is validly approved, resulting in the repeal of the April 24,

2024 vote regarding the Elementary/Middle School Project as described on the

April 24, 2024 ballot, do you favor authorizing the board of Trustees of
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Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District (the ‘District’) to

update and renovate the existing Boothbay Region Elementary School as

further described below (the ‘Project’), and to issue bonds of notes (the ‘Bonds’)

in the name of the District solely for the Project in an amount not to exceed

$10,250,300.”

[¶4] On May 14, 2024, the Board rejected the petition because it

requested a referendum on “(i) an article that is different from the article

considered by the District Voters on April 24, 2024, and (ii) a second article that

is unrelated to the April 24, 2024, referendum.” The Board did not reform the

submitted articles, because doing so “would change what the voters who signed

the petition put their name to.”

[¶5] The Residents filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking

review of the Board’s decision pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B and asserting

independent claims seeking a declaratory judgment to recognize their

compliance with 20-A M.R.S. § 1504 (2025) and attorney fees based on

deprivation of their First Amendment rights to petition the government

pursuant to section 1983. On December 31, 2024, the Superior Court denied

both the 80B complaint and the independent claims, finding that the petition

was not a petition for reconsideration because of the inclusion of Article 2 and
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that the independent claims were barred by the exclusivity principle. The

Residents timely filed a notice of appeal on January 17, 2025. See M.R.

Civ. P 80B(n); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

[¶6] The District argues that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to

review the Board’s decision under Rule 80B because the Board’s duty is

discretionary and neither section 1504 nor its statutory scheme provide for

judicial review. The District argues that only a writ of mandamus could provide

a mechanism for judicial review and because mandamus applies only to

ministerial duties, not discretionary duties, the Superior Court should have

dismissed the 80B complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

[¶7] We review de novo whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction over

a complaint for review of governmental action pursuant to Rule 80B, Hurricane

Island Found., 2023 ME 33, ¶ 10, 295 A.3d 147, because “Rule 80B itself does

not confer jurisdiction to review a municipal action; it simply prescribes the

procedure for judicial review when there is a separate basis for such

jurisdiction.” 15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2024 ME 79,

¶ 12, 327 A.3d 1093. Jurisdiction exists over an 80B complaint if it is “provided
5

by statute or is otherwise available by law.” M.R. Civ. P. 80B(a). Judicial review

is not provided for in section 1504, nor in its statutory scheme. See 20-A M.R.S.

§§ 1501-1506 (2025). “Because the extraordinary writs were virtually

eliminated as separate procedural devices, Rule 80B is ordinarily the only

procedural path to assert against the government the substantive rights

protected by the extraordinary writs.” Hurricane Island Found., 2023 ME 33,

¶ 10, 295 A.3d 147.

1. Availability of the Writ of Mandamus

[¶8] Review is “otherwise available by law” if “it is in the nature of that

formerly available under the common law extraordinary writs, such as

certiorari, mandamus or prohibition.” Dowey v. Sanford Hous. Auth., 516 A.2d

957, 959 (Me. 1986). A writ of mandamus functions “to compel the

performance of a ministerial act.” 15 Langsford Owner LLC, 2024 ME 79, ¶ 17,

327 A.3d 1093. We have previously spoken to whether a duty is ministerial or

discretionary, and thus whether a writ of mandamus could issue:

When the law requires the public officer to do a specified act, in a
specified way, upon a conceded state of facts, without regard to his
own judgment as to the propriety of the act, and with no power to
exercise discretion, the duty is ministerial in character and
performance may be compelled by mandamus if there is no other
remedy. When, however, the law requires a judicial determination
to be made, such as the decision of a question of fact, or the exercise
of judgment in deciding whether the act should be done or not, the
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duty is regarded as judicial and mandamus will not lie to compel
performance.

Id. (quotation marks omitted). Because the determination of Superior Court

jurisdiction turns on whether the Board’s duty is ministerial or discretionary,

see 14 M.R.S. § 5301 (2025), we must interpret the statute at issue, namely

section 1504.

2. Interpretation of Section 1504

[¶9] “We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo,” first

looking to “the statute’s plain meaning.” Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 37 v. Pineo,

2010 ME 11, ¶ 16, 988 A.2d 987. Section 1504(1) provides:

The regional school unit board shall, within 60 days, initiate a new
regional school unit referendum to reconsider the vote of the
previous referendum if, within 7 days of the first referendum, at
least 10% of the number of voters voting for the gubernatorial
candidates in the last gubernatorial election in the municipalities
within the regional school unit petition to reconsider a prior
regional school unit referendum vote.

20-A M.R.S. § 1504(1) (emphasis added). The Legislature has explicitly stated

that “‘[s]hall’ and ‘must’ are terms of equal weight that indicate a mandatory

duty, action or requirement. ‘May’ indicates authorization or permission to

act.” 1 M.R.S. § 71(9-A) (2025). Further, we have “consistently held that the

word shall is to be construed as must, and that such statutory language
7

indicates a mandatory duty.” Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 18, 988 A.2d 987 (quotation

marks omitted).

[¶10] The plain language of the statute establishes that the Board’s duty

is ministerial, not discretionary, so long as the minimum statutory criteria are

met. See 1 M.R.S. § 71(9-A); infra ¶ 13. While the District is correct that the

prior cases of Heald v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 74 and Dobbs v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist.

No. 503 hold that school district boards have discretionary authority to manage

the referendum process, they were decided under section 1504’s predecessor

statute, 20 M.R.S.A. § 225(2)(A) (1964 & Supp. 1980).4 Heald, 387 A.2d 1, 3-4

(Me. 1978); Dobbs, 419 A.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Me. 1980).

[¶11] Our determination in Heald and Dobbs that section 225 conferred

discretionary authority upon school boards was predicated upon the statutory

language that preceded subsection 2(A): “[S]chool directors shall be authorized

to call such meeting as follows.” 20 M.R.S.A. § 225 (Supp. 1980); Heald, 387

3 In Dobbs, the ultimate question was whether the Board had the authority to seek reconsideration

on a prior bond question, not whether the Board had authority to refuse to submit a resident led
reconsideration effort for referendum. 419 A.2d at 1028. Accordingly, its precedential value is
limited.

4 The applicable portion of section 225(2)(A) reads: “When requested by 10% of the number of
voters voting for the gubernatorial candidates at the last statewide election in the municipalities
comprising the district, the directors shall call a district meeting, placing before the voters the specific
school construction article which has been requested by the petitioners.” 20 M.R.S.A. § 225(2)(A)
(Supp. 1980).
8

A.2d at 4 (“The quoted language does not require the directors to call such a

meeting. It merely authorizes them to do so at their discretion.”). We noted

that if section 225(2)(A) “were to require the directors to order a new election

at the request of 10% of the voters in the district,” then the Board’s duty would

have been ministerial. See Heald, 387 A.2d at 3 n.5.

[¶12] In this matter, by contrast, section 1504 contains no such

“authorizing” language. Instead, it provides an unambiguous mandate that the

Board must put the articles up for reconsideration if the statutory requirements

are met. The Legislature could have included the language of authorization but

did not. See 21-A M.R.S. § 901(3-A) (2025) (conferring on the Secretary of State

the power to review direct initiative legislation before putting it out to the

voters). Moreover, we declared when interpreting another Title 20-A statute

that, because the statute “requires the selectmen to meet, countersign, and post

the warrants, and does not afford them any discretion or offer an alternative

procedure, the selectmen of each town had a mandatory duty to comply with

the statute.” Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 18, 988 A.2d 987.

[¶13] Section 1504 has three requirements that must be met in order to

trigger the obligation to initiate a new referendum: (i) the number of

signatories to the petition must be at least ten percent of the number of voters
9

voting for the gubernatorial candidates in the last gubernatorial election in the

municipalities within the school regional unit, (ii) the petition must be received

by the regional school unit within seven days after the first referendum vote,

and (iii) the petition must specifically be to reconsider a prior regional school

unit referendum vote. See 20-A M.R.S. § 1504(1).5 The Board is vested with a

limited degree of gatekeeping discretion to determine that the threshold

requirements have been met, but once they are met, the Board’s duty to put the

reconsideration question up for a referendum is ministerial.

[¶14] The District also relies on this Court’s decision in Dunston v. Town

of York for the notion that a school board’s authority over reconsideration

articles is discretionary. 590 A.2d 526 (Me. 1991). However, our rationale in

Dunston in finding that the statute containing the procedure for calling a town

meeting did not create a mandatory duty for municipal officers was predicated

upon the specific language of the statute at issue that provided an alternative

method for convening a meeting if the municipal officers unreasonably refused

to call the meeting. Id. at 527. We concluded that the combination of the

standard and alternative methods “recogniz[ed] the authority of the selectmen

to exercise their sound discretion” in determining whether a petition met the

5 Sections 1504(2) and (3) provide additional requirements related to quorum and bonds that
are not at issue here.
10

statutory requirements. Id. Here, section 1504 does not provide an alternative

pathway should the Board decide not to put the reconsideration question up

for a referendum. As a result, “[n]o such discretion exists in this case because

there is no method for calling a referendum other than the one outlined in

[20-A M.R.S. § 1504].” Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶ 19, 988 A.2d 987.

[¶15] In sum, we conclude that the Board’s duty to initiate a referendum

upon receipt of a reconsideration petition is ministerial, provided that the

petition meets the statutory requirements of section 1504. As a result, the

Superior Court had jurisdiction to hear the request for judicial review of the

Board’s decision, see 14 M.R.S. § 5301, because a writ of mandamus could

function to compel the Board to put the article up for a referendum if the

petition was a proper reconsideration petition.6 Therefore, we reach the merits

of the case.

6 In the alternative, the District argues that if the Board’s duty is ministerial, the case is moot

because the statutory deadline of sixty days for reconsideration motions has passed and thus a writ
of mandamus is no longer viable. This matter is not moot because the bonds in dispute have not been
issued, so we can still provide meaningful relief. See Brunswick Citizens for Collaborative Gov’t v. Town
of Brunswick, 2018 ME 95, ¶ 8, 189 A.3d 248 (finding moot a declaratory judgment action seeking to
allow an initiative to overrule the sale of property by a town council because the property had already
been sold, making it so that any ruling would be without effect).

Even if a case is moot, we may still address it if it falls into one of the three recognized exceptions
to the mootness doctrine: (i) the collateral consequences exception, (ii) the public interest exception,
and (iii) the exception for issues that are repetitive, yet evade review. Me. Civ. Liberties Union v. City
of S. Portland, 1999 ME 121, ¶ 9, 734 A.2d 191. We conclude that both the second and third
exceptions apply here. See Pineo, 2010 ME 11, ¶¶ 9-10, 988 A.2d 987.
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B. Petition for Reconsideration

[¶16] The Residents contend that (1) the Board erred in finding that the

petition was not a reconsideration petition because section 1504 does not place

any limitations on the form or contents of a reconsideration petition, and

(2) Article 2 constituted a distinct budget question with a separate procedure

under 20-A M.R.S. § 1482-A(3) (2025). The District maintains that the petition

was not a reconsideration petition because a normal reading of the phrase

“petition to reconsider,” which is undefined in statute, would preclude the

Board from taking up a petition to reconsider and repeal the prior referendum

vote plus another article that is conditioned upon whether Article 1 passes.

1. Scope of the Petition Language

[¶17] “When the Superior Court acts in an appellate capacity,” we

directly review the operative administrative decision “to determine whether

the findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, and

whether there was any abuse of discretion or error of law.” Penkul v. Town of

Lebanon, 2016 ME 16, ¶ 14, 136 A.3d 88 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶18] As the District accurately noted, the term “reconsideration” is

undefined in section 1504. As a result, we must interpret the term to determine

whether the petition was in fact a petition for reconsideration. We review
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questions of statutory interpretation de novo, focusing on the plain language,

see supra ¶ 9, while “considering the entire statutory scheme to achieve a

harmonious result,” Cassidy Holdings, LLC v. Aroostook Cnty. Comm’rs, 2023 ME

69, ¶ 6, 304 A.3d 259 (quotation marks omitted). When construing an

undefined statutory term, courts “often rely on the definitions provided in

dictionaries.” Apex Custom Lease Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 677 A.2d 530, 533

(Me. 1996). Reconsideration means “[t]o discuss or take up (a matter) again.”

Reconsider, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

[¶19] Here, the Residents’ petition does not request a reconsideration as

provided by the limited and specific context of the statute. Because of the

inclusion of the language “and repeal” emphasized by the Residents in their

petition, Article 1 was not merely seeking a referendum to reconsider the

April 24th vote. Rather, the Residents made a request to affirmatively repeal

the result of that vote. Plainly, this is not what “reconsideration” means. See

supra ¶ 18. As the Superior Court correctly stated, “a proper [section] 1504

reconsideration request does not propose a different or replacement ballot

initiative. It can only ask if a previous referendum should be revisited at the

ballot.” The Superior Court’s concise language accurately reflects how a

reconsideration referendum is meant to work: voters are invited to revisit a
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ballot question and have the option of either re-approving it or denying it. By

adding in the additional language of “and repeal,” the Residents have changed

how reconsideration works in the context of a referendum vote. Because

section 1504 provides for a referendum to only reconsider the prior

referendum vote, the Residents’ petition exceeds the scope of the statute’s

provisions by seeking something beyond a true reconsideration initiative.

[¶20] Moreover, Article 2 is unquestionably not a question on

reconsideration. Because it asks the voters to approve an entirely distinct

replacement initiative, not to merely take up a previous matter again, the article

does not and cannot fall into the statutory definition of “reconsideration” as

provided by section 1504.

[¶21] While the Residents contend that Article 2 was meant to be a

separate article submitted under section 1482-A, the article contains no

reference to that statute, nor does it give any indication that the signatories to

the petition should consider it to be a separate referendum initiative. The

Residents cannot “backdoor” an entirely separate and independent budgetary

initiative by submitting it as part and parcel of a reconsideration petition. The

Residents’ petition makes no suggestion that they were not proceeding, in

Article 2, pursuant to section 1504, but rather were attempting a separate,
14

de facto referendum initiative pursuant to section 1482-A. In any event, section

1482-A affords the Residents no independent process to trigger a

reconsideration vote.

2. Severability of the Articles

[¶22] The Residents argue the introduction of Article 2 is not fatal to

their case and that the Board could have severed Article 2 from Article 1; this

argument is unavailing. Even if we determined that either article constituted a

reconsideration petition, we have previously warned against joining multiple

issues in referenda because of the confusion it can cause. See Common Cause v.

State, 455 A.2d 1, 13 (Me. 1983). The Board had no way of knowing which

article motivated the signatories to the petition, and it is certainly possible that

the inclusion of Article 2 helped induce the signers’ support of Article 1.

[¶23] Prospective signers were presented with a unitary two-article

petition that carries no suggestion of a later severance of the articles. A person

signing the petition might reasonably believe they were “pre-approving”

authority for the District to “issue bonds or notes . . . in the name of the District

solely for the Project in an amount not to exceed $10,250,300” (emphasis

omitted). Neither the Board nor the court can speculate upon the signatories’
15

motive or intent in signing the two-article petition or whether they would have

signed the petition had it contained only a single article.

[¶24] The Board properly concluded that the Articles could not be

severed from each other, and the reconsideration petition, as drafted and

signed, could not be submitted to referendum.

C. Independent Claims

[¶25] Because we determine that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to

hear the Residents’ Rule 80B complaint, and because the Residents’ claims were

fully adjudicated in that context, the exclusivity principal bars the independent

claims;7 we affirm the Superior Court’s denial of the independent claims. See

Cayer v. Town of Madawaska, 2016 ME 143, ¶¶ 16-17, 148 A.3d 707; Fair

Elections Portland, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2021 ME 32, ¶ 21 n.7, 252 A.3d 504;

Cape Shore House Owners Ass’n v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2019 ME 86, ¶¶ 7-9,

209 A.3d 102.

7We also note an additional ground for the denial of the Residents’ First Amendment claim. See
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Wilk, 2013 ME 79, ¶ 19, 76 A.3d 363 (stating that this Court “may affirm
a trial court’s judgment on a ground not relied upon by the trial court.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Because we hold that there has been no violation of the reconsideration process provided by
section 1504, the Residents’ First Amendment claim fails on the merits as they have not
demonstrated any abridgements of their right to petition.
16

III. CONCLUSION

[¶26] Because Article 1 did not constitute a proper reconsideration

petition given that it requested affirmative action beyond the scope of the

statutory provisions, and because Article 2 simply did not constitute a

reconsideration petition of a previous vote, the Board did not abuse its

discretion or commit an error of law in declining to submit the articles in the

petition to the voters in a referendum pursuant to section 1504. The Superior

Court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision is therefore affirmed.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Kristin M. Collins, Esq. (orally), Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Augusta,
for appellants Patricia M. Minerich, James Farrin, Virginia Farrin, Elizabeth
Grant, Roy Tholl, Stephen Carbone, Pamela Mancusco, and Daniel Zajdel

David Kallin, Esq. (orally), and Amy K. Olfene, Esq., Drummond Woodsum,
Portland, for appellee Boothbay-Boothbay Harbor Community School District,
Ronnie Campbell, Troy Lewis, Matt Doucette, Paul Roberts, Darrell Gudroe, and
Sewall Maddocks

Lincoln County Superior Court docket number AP-2024-5
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY