Catherine Dudley v. Hudson Specialty Insurance Company

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 12
Docket: And-25-76
Argued: November 12, 2025
Decided: February 10, 2026

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.

CATHERINE DUDLEY

v.

HUDSON SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

LIPEZ, J.

[¶1] Catherine Dudley appeals from an order of the Superior Court

(Androscoggin County, Archer, J.) entering summary judgment in favor of

Hudson Specialty Insurance Company. The Superior Court concluded that

24-A M.R.S. § 2009-A(1) (2025) does not require an insurer to send notice of

nonrenewal of a policy to its insured when the insurer has made an offer to

renew the policy. Because we hold that this conclusion is contrary to the plain

language of the applicable statutes, we vacate the judgment and remand for

further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] This case is a reach-and-apply action, see 24-A M.R.S. § 2904 (2025),

filed by Dudley after she was injured at a property insured by Hudson and
2

owned by Michel Kanyambo and Speciose Mahirwe. We draw the following

facts from the parties’ statements of material facts and the summary judgment

record. See Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2021 ME 54,

¶ 2, 261 A.3d 920.

[¶3] In 2017, Hudson issued Kanyambo and Mahirwe a general liability

insurance policy that covered their property from September 14, 2017, to

September 14, 2018. Kanyambo and Mahirwe did not negotiate directly with

Hudson. Instead, they retained Champoux Insurance Group, who in turn

partnered with New England Excess Exchange Limited to procure the policy

from Hudson.

[¶4] On July 31, 2018, a New England Excess employee emailed a

Champoux employee a “renewal quote” for the policy. The Champoux

employee then called Kanyambo and informed him of the quote, although the

parties dispute the full extent of what was discussed in that phone call. What is

undisputed is that Kanyambo and Mahirwe never received a written copy of the

quote nor communicated directly with either New England Excess or Hudson

about the offer to renew. Kanyambo and Mahirwe did not take any steps to

accept the quote or renew the policy. Neither Hudson nor New England Excess
3

sent them written notice prior to September 14, 2018, informing them that

their insurance coverage would terminate on that date.

[¶5] On September 23, 2018, nine days after the end of the policy term,

Dudley was injured on the property. She filed a lawsuit against Kanyambo and

Mahirwe. Hudson refused to defend the suit, claiming that Kanyambo and

Mahirwe’s policy had expired on September 14. Dudley subsequently settled

her claims with Kanyambo and Mahirwe, resulting in a stipulated judgment

against them. She then initiated this reach-and-apply action against Hudson.1

[¶6] Dudley moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of

whether the policy was in effect on the date of the injury. Hudson moved for

summary judgment on the same issue. On February 6, 2025, the court granted

Hudson’s motion and denied Dudley’s. The court concluded that because

Kanyambo and Mahirwe received notice of the renewal quote from Champoux,

Hudson was not required to send them written notice that their policy would

terminate on its expiration date. The court found that there was no dispute of

material fact and that the policy was not in effect on the date of Dudley’s injury,

1 Count I sought satisfaction from Hudson of the settlement amount, Count II alleged that Hudson

breached its insurance contract with Kanyambo and Mahirwe, and Count III asserted negligence by
Champoux. The court granted summary judgment for Champoux on Count III. Dudley does not
appeal from that decision.
4

barring her from pursuing her reach-and-apply and contract claims against

Hudson. See 24-A M.R.S. § 2904. This timely appeal followed. See M.R.

App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶7] We review an entry of summary judgment “de novo, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party to determine

whether the parties’ statements of material facts and the record evidence

. . . demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Beal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010

ME 20, ¶ 11, 989 A.2d 733 (quotation marks omitted).

A. Insurers must send written notice of nonrenewal.

[¶8] This case implicates one of two provisions of the Maine Insurance

Code, codified at Title 24-A: section 2908, which applies to all casualty

insurance contracts, and section 2009-A, which applies only to surplus-lines

coverage.2 Both provisions require insurers to send written notice of

“nonrenewal” to an insured; in the absence of such notice, the nonrenewal is

2Surplus-lines coverage is generally defined as “[i]nsurance offered by a nonadmitted insurer
that is not available from a licensed insurer within the state where the risk is located.” Surplus-Lines
Insurance, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Corinth Pellets, LLC v. Arch Specialty Ins.
Co., 2021 ME 10, ¶ 5 n.1, 246 A.3d 586.
5

not effective. See 24-A M.R.S. §§ 2009-A(1), 2908(5)(B) (2025); Corinth Pellets,

LLC v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 2021 ME 10, ¶ 37, 246 A.3d 586 (holding that

section 2009-A requires insurers to give advance written notice in event of

either cancellation or nonrenewal). Under section 2009-A, the nonrenewal of

a surplus-lines policy “shall not be effective unless [written notice of

nonrenewal is] received by the named insured at least 14 days prior to the

effective date.”3 24-A M.R.S. § 2009-A(1); Corinth Pellets, 2021 ME 10, ¶ 37, 246

A.3d 586. Section 2908 provides that “[n]onrenewal . . . shall not be effective

prior to 30 days after receipt of written notice by the insured.” 24-A M.R.S.

§ 2908(5)(B).

[¶9] The parties dispute whether Hudson is a surplus-lines insurer and

therefore whether section 2009-A or 2908 governs.4 In this case, where it is

undisputed that no notice was ever sent and the injury occurred just nine days

after the end of the policy term, this distinction is immaterial. This is because,

3 Section 2009-A was recently amended. See P.L. 2025, ch. 348, § 23 (effective Sep. 24, 2025) (to
be codified at 24-A M.R.S. § 2009-A). These amendments, which postdate the filing of Dudley’s
complaint, affect only the dates by which notices must be received and do not impact the analysis in
this case.
4 The trial court’s characterization of Hudson as a surplus-lines insurer is not supported by the
summary judgment record. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 22, 28 A.3d 1158
(explaining that facts not asserted in a party’s statement of material facts are not a part of the
summary judgment record).
6

for reasons that we will explain, the only pertinent difference between the two

notice provisions is the number of days between the date that an insured

receives notice of nonrenewal and the earliest date that the nonrenewal may

be effective. Both general-casualty and surplus-lines insurers must send notice

of nonrenewal in the same circumstances; the failure to do so means the

nonrenewal “shall not be effective.” 24-A M.R.S. §§ 2009-A(1), 2908(5); see also

Corinth Pellets, 2021 ME 10, ¶ 37, 246 A.3d 586. Thus, regardless of which

statute applies in this case, coverage remained in effect unless Hudson is

correct that its offer to renew the insurance policy relieved it of the obligation

to send notice of nonrenewal.

B. Notice of nonrenewal was required in this case.

[¶10] As discussed, it is undisputed that Hudson did not send notice of

nonrenewal to Kanyambo and Mahirwe. Dudley maintains that, as a result,

coverage was in effect on the date of her injury. Hudson counters that

“nonrenewal” under the statute requires an affirmative decision by the insurer

not to renew a policy, and that because it made no such decision in this case,

and in fact offered to renew the policy, the statutory notice requirements do not

apply. This appeal thus presents the question of whether the statutory

provisions requiring an insurer to send notice of nonrenewal apply when the
7

policy terminates not because the insurer decided against renewal but because

the insured party did not take steps to renew the policy.

[¶11] To answer this question, we examine the statute. Our review is de

novo. See, e.g., Corinth Pellets, 2021 ME 10, ¶ 19, 246 A.3d 586. “In interpreting

a statute, our single goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent in enacting

the statute.” Dorsey v. N. Light Health, 2022 ME 62, ¶ 11, 288 A.3d 386

(quotation marks omitted). To ascertain that intent, we look to the plain

language of the statute, and “[u]nless the statute itself discloses a contrary

intent, words in a statute must be given their plain, common and ordinary

meaning.” State v. Marquis, 2023 ME 16, ¶ 14, 290 A.3d 96 (quotation marks

omitted). If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we will not “look beyond

the words of the statute.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “A term is ambiguous

only if it is susceptible to different meanings.” Corinth Pellets, 2021 ME 10, ¶ 21,

246 A.3d 586 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶12] Section 2908 defines “[n]onrenewal” as the “termination of a

policy at its expiration date.” 24-A M.R.S. § 2908(1)(D). In Corinth Pellets we

concluded that this definition of “nonrenewal” applies as well to section

2009-A, which does not independently define that term. Corinth Pellets, 2021

ME 10, ¶ 22, 246 A.3d 586 (rejecting argument that definitions of “cancellation”
8

and “nonrenewal” in section 2908 do not apply to surplus-lines policies).

Although “termination” is not defined within the statute, it is commonly

understood to mean “[t]he end of something in time or existence; conclusion or

discontinuance,” Termination, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). See

Marquis, 2023 ME 16, ¶ 16, 290 A.3d 96 (“In determining the plain meaning of

statutory language in the absence of a statutory definition, we frequently look

to dictionary definitions.”). Thus, even a policy that expires automatically can

be said to have “terminat[ed],” or ended, resulting in a “nonrenewal” under

sections 2009-A and 2908.

[¶13] Contrary to Hudson’s assertion that there is a difference between

“nonrenewal” and the circumstances here, the plain language of

sections 2009-A and 2908(1)(D) does not require an affirmative act by either

the insurer or the insured for nonrenewal to occur. Nowhere in the definition

of nonrenewal is there any language suggesting that nonrenewal is a decision

made by anyone—it is simply the “termination,” or end, “of a policy at its

expiration date.” And although we conclude that the language is unambiguous,

to the extent that the statutes lack clarity we interpret them consistently with

our practice of reading the Maine Insurance Code in favor of the insured. See

Corinth Pellets, 2021 ME 10, ¶ 27, 246 A.3d 586 (explaining that “[w]e construe
9

these types of consumer protections laws liberally in favor of insureds and

strictly against insurers” (quotation marks omitted)); Me. Bonding & Cas. Co.

v. Knowlton, 598 A.2d 749, 750 (Me. 1991) (noting that a similar notice

provision of Title 24-A has a “consumer protection bent”).

[¶14] Therefore, we read sections 2908 and 2009-A as meaning that

when a policy will terminate at its expiration date, the insurer must give notice

of that impending termination in accordance with section 2908 or section

2009-A, whichever is applicable. It is undisputed that termination of the policy

at its expiration date is what occurred here. Consequently, Hudson was

required either by section 2908 or by section 2009-A to provide Kanyambo and

Mahirwe with prior notice of nonrenewal.

[¶15] Although Hudson argues that this reading will result in an

“undeserved windfall” for insureds because it results in the extension of

coverage at the expense of the insurer, this contention is unpersuasive.

“A notice of cancellation or nonrenewal enables a policyholder to act to avoid

any lapses in insurance coverage.” Corinth Pellets, 2021 ME 10, ¶ 27, 246 A.3d

586 (describing section 2009-A as “a policyholder protection statute”). It is

unequivocally the intention of sections 2908 and 2009-A to place on insurance

providers the burden of providing adequate notice and to postpone the
10

termination of policies if such notice is not given. We do not believe that this

requirement is particularly burdensome for insurers, who are also statutorily

obligated to send notice when they decide to cancel a policy or decline to renew

a policy. See 24-A M.R.S. §§ 2009-A, 2908.

[¶16] In this case, Hudson did not send Kanyambo and Mahirwe notice

prior to the termination of the policy on September 14, 2018. Because the trial

court erred in concluding that Hudson was not obligated to send such notice,

we vacate the entry of summary judgment in Hudson’s favor.5

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Anthony K. Ferguson, Esq. (orally), Fales & Fales, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant
Catherine Dudley

Christian H. Hinrichsen, Esq. (orally), Melick & Porter, LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts, for appellee Hudson Specialty Insurance Company

Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2023-111
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY

We decline Dudley’s request for an instruction to the trial court to enter partial summary
5

judgment in her favor and leave that determination for the trial court to make, consistent with this
opinion.