Adult Guardianship and Conservatorship of R.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2026 ME 43
Docket: Cum-25-331
Submitted
On Briefs: March 18, 2026
Decided: May 12, 2026

Panel: MEAD, CONNORS, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ., and HORTON, A.R.J.

ADULT GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF R.

LIPEZ, J.

[¶1] R. appeals from a judgment of the Cumberland County Probate

Court (Aranson, J.) denying his petition to terminate his existing guardianship

and granting a petition of the Department of Health and Human Services to be

appointed as his conservator. R. contends that the court erred in declining to

terminate his guardianship and in determining that appointment of a

conservator was necessary. He also claims that his attorney was ineffective.

Although we are unpersuaded by R.’s arguments and accordingly affirm the

Probate Court’s judgment, we expressly recognize for the first time that a

person subject to guardianship or conservatorship proceedings has a right to

the effective assistance of counsel. We also take this opportunity to articulate

a procedure by which an individual may challenge a guardianship or

conservatorship order based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The court appointed the Department as R.’s guardian in September

2022. Over two years later, in December 2024, R. filed a petition to terminate

the guardianship. Soon after, the Department filed a petition for appointment

of a conservator for R., nominating itself to serve.1 On the Department’s motion,

the court consolidated the petitions for a single hearing, held over two days. In

a subsequent written order, the court made the following findings of fact, which

are supported by competent evidence in the hearing record. See Guardianship

of Patricia S., 2019 ME 23, ¶ 2, 202 A.3d 532.

[¶3] R. has had multiple strokes and has been diagnosed with moderate

vascular dementia. His behavior and his performance on cognitive assessments

are generally consistent with this diagnosis.

[¶4] R. resides at an assisted living facility. He needs help with activities

of daily living such as washing, dressing, and taking medications. He also

requires assistance with sending mail, voting via absentee ballot, and making

grocery lists.

1 R.’s sister also filed a petition for appointment of a conservator, nominating herself to serve. The

court declined to appoint the sister upon concluding that she was not suitable for the role. See 18-C
M.R.S. § 5-702 (2026). Because the sister is not a party to this appeal and because neither party
challenges the court’s choice between the two petitioners, we do not further discuss the sister’s
involvement in these proceedings.
3

[¶5] R. generally does not have insight into his own limitations; he does

not believe he has had a stroke. He also has a poor memory. He is, however,

able to make and communicate decisions about his wants and needs and can

participate in group activities.

[¶6] R. is unhappy at the assisted living facility and wants to leave. At

times he has become frustrated and aggressive with staff at the facility, yelling

at them and throwing objects, or refusing to take his prescribed medications.

He is unsteady on his feet and has fallen multiple times. R. has been to the

hospital five times since 2023: twice due to altered mental status, once because

he could not calm down and was throwing things at staff, and twice because he

had fallen.

[¶7] R. is expected to inherit a substantial sum of money from his late

mother’s estate. His cognitive limitations generally impair his ability to be

realistic about finances and to recognize the possibility that he might be

exploited. For instance, R. has given money to a woman whom he has never

met. He believes that she is his girlfriend and that she has inherited thirty-five

million dollars. Although R. has no vehicle or driver’s license, he wants to leave

the assisted living facility and drive to Michigan, where he believes the woman

lives.
4

[¶8] Based on these facts, the court denied R.’s petition to terminate his

guardianship and appointed the Department as his public conservator.

R. timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] Contrary to R.’s contentions, the evidence is sufficient to support the

court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the

guardianship is not appropriate, see 18-C M.R.S. §§ 5-301(1)(A), 5-319(1)(A),

(4) (2026), 2 and that a basis for appointment of a conservator exists, see 18-C

M.R.S. § 5-401(2) (2026). See Adult Guardianship & Conservatorship of T., 2022

ME 51, ¶ 13, 284 A.3d 83; In re Child of Barni A., 2024 ME 16, ¶ 14, 314 A.3d

148. We write, however, to address R.’s argument that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel during the guardianship and conservatorship

proceedings.

[¶10] R. argues that his attorney’s performance was prejudicially

deficient because the attorney failed to obtain an independent psychological

evaluation of him before the hearing. Although the Department concurs that R.

had a right to the effective assistance of counsel, it contends that the

2 Title 18-C M.R.S. § 5-319 was amended in 2025. See P.L. 2025, ch. 168, § 5 (effective

Sep. 24, 2025) (codified at 18-C M.R.S. § 5-319). The amendment does not affect the applicable
standard for termination of a guardianship, compare 18-C M.R.S. § 5-319 (2025), with 18-C M.R.S.
§ 5-319 (2026), and we accordingly cite to the most recent version of the statute.
5

performance of R.’s attorney did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and, in any case, did not affect the outcome.

[¶11] We have not yet had the occasion to explicitly hold that adult

respondents in guardianship or conservatorship proceedings or adults seeking

termination of their guardianships or conservatorships have a right to the

effective assistance of counsel, but we agree with the parties that such a right

exists. The Legislature grants adults subject to guardianship and

conservatorship proceedings the right to court-appointed counsel. See 18-C

M.R.S. §§ 5-305(1), 5-319(7), 5-406(1), 3 5-431(9) (2026). Where, as here,

“there is a right to counsel, there is a right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

Stack v. State, 492 A.2d 599, 601 (Me. 1985); see also In re Henry B., 2017 ME

72, ¶ 6, 159 A.3d 824 (explaining that “where a state statute affords an

individual . . . the right to counsel, the legislature could not have intended that

counsel could be prejudicially ineffective” (quotation marks omitted)). We

therefore hold that individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship

proceedings are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of

3 Title 18-C M.R.S. § 5-406 has been amended since the events at issue in this case, though not in
any way that affects our analysis. See P.L. 2025, ch. 511, §§ 8-9 (effective July 13, 2026) (to be codified
at 18-C M.R.S. § 5-406).
6

those proceedings and may seek to vindicate that right through claims that

counsel’s performance was prejudicially deficient.

A. The Strickland Standard

[¶12] We next set forth the standard by which the effectiveness of

counsel is to be judged in this context. The State recommends that we adopt

the test used in criminal cases, which was first announced in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984). To prevail on an

ineffective-assistance claim in a criminal post-conviction proceeding, a

petitioner must show both (1) deficient performance by counsel and

(2) resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. R. argues that Strickland does not “strictly

apply,” although he does not propose an alternative standard.

[¶13] In addition to mandating its use in criminal cases, see, e.g., Theriault

v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶¶ 13-14, 125 A.3d 1163, we have applied the Strickland

standard to assess counsel’s performance in proceedings involving motions to

revoke probation, see Petgrave v. State, 2019 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8, 208 A.3d 371,

petitions for child-protection and termination-of-parental-rights orders, see,

e.g., In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 22-26, 126 A.3d 718, abrogated by, In re

Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶¶ 38-41, 322 A.3d 1183, and applications

for involuntary commitment, see In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-9, 159 A.3d
7

824. We have favored use of this test because it “is known to the bar and the

bench, and . . . carries with it a developing body of case law, which will aid courts

in the efficient and timely resolution of such claims.” In re M.P., 2015 ME 138,

¶ 26, 126 A.3d 718. We have further recognized that the liberty interests at

stake in child-protective and involuntary-commitment proceedings are on par

with those at stake in criminal cases. See id.; In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶¶ 7-8,

159 A.3d 824.

[¶14] The same rationale applies here. Like defendants in criminal

matters, individuals subject to guardianship and conservatorship proceedings

face substantial deprivations of liberty, and we see no reason to deviate from

the familiar standard we use in similarly weighty contexts. See In re Howes, 471

A.2d 689, 691 (Me. 1984) (“The appointment of a guardian for an incapacitated

person affects the fundamental personal liberty of [that individual].”). We

therefore adopt the Strickland test as the metric to evaluate whether counsel

provided effective representation in such proceedings. To succeed on his

ineffective-assistance claim, R. “must show (1) that counsel’s representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that errors of

counsel actually had an adverse effect on [the outcome of the case].” In re Henry

B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 12, 159 A.3d 824 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
8

B. Procedure for Raising an Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim

[¶15] We further determine that to assert an ineffective-assistance claim

in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, parties must follow a process

similar to that we have articulated for use in termination-of-parental-rights and

involuntary-commitment cases, with some modifications.

[¶16] First, an individual may raise an ineffective-assistance claim on

direct appeal when “there are no new facts that the [individual] seeks to offer

in support of the claim”—in other words, “when the record is sufficiently well

developed to permit a fair evaluation of [the] claim.” In re M.P., 2015 ME 138,

¶ 19, 126 A.3d 718; see also In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 9, 159 A.3d 824.

However, when the basis for the claim is not apparent from the record, the

individual must first file a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).4 See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 20, 126 A.3d

718; In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 9, 159 A.3d 824. As we have explained in

other contexts, “if the [individual]’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is denied, the trial

court’s findings will amplify the record and provide the necessary context

should the [individual] decide to pursue an appeal of that decision along with

4 Rule 60(b) of the Maine Rules of Probate Procedure incorporates by reference Rule 60(b) of the

Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.
9

the appeal of the underlying judgment.” In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶ 20, 126 A.3d

718.

[¶17] Next, an individual asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in

guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, whether by direct appeal or

Rule 60(b)(6) motion, must submit at least one affidavit—the individual’s

own—“stating, with specificity, the basis for the claim.” See In re M.P., 2015 ME

138, ¶ 21, 126 A.3d 718 (requiring parents raising ineffective-assistance claims

in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to provide affidavits); In re

Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 10, 159 A.3d 824 (requiring the same for

involuntary-commitment cases). When appended to a Rule 60(b)(6) motion,

an affidavit helps the trial court to “determine what process is necessary to

meaningfully assess a . . . claim, including whether to hold an evidentiary

hearing at all.” In re Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶ 41, 322 A.3d 1183

(quotation marks omitted). When offered in support of a direct appeal, the

affidavit serves a different purpose; it should not contain information extrinsic

to the record but rather is “the means by which the [individual] states

affirmatively that he or she is making the ineffectiveness claim.” 5 In re Aliyah

5 The affidavit should identify, with specificity, the facts in the record showing (1) that counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) the resulting prejudice. See In re Children of Brittany B., 2020 ME
1, ¶ 14 n.4, 223 A.3d 109.
10

M., 2016 ME 106, ¶ 7, 144 A.3d 50. In either scenario, the affidavit “constitutes

the foundation for an ineffectiveness claim.” Id. ¶ 9. An individual may also

provide additional affidavits from people whose statements will help the

reviewing court to “meaningfully assess” the substance of the claim, although

such supplemental affidavits are not required. See In re Children of Destiny H.,

2024 ME 66, ¶ 41, 322 A.3d 1183 (quotation marks omitted). 6

[¶18] Lastly, we address the time in which one must assert an

ineffective-assistance claim arising from guardianship or conservatorship

proceedings. Claims brought by direct appeal, of course, are subject to the

deadlines in the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure. See M.R. App. P. 2B. For

claims brought to the attention of the trial court by a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, we

require a parent asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in a child-protective

proceeding to file the motion within forty-two days of the expiration of the time

to file a notice of appeal from the underlying jeopardy order or termination

6For involuntary-commitment cases, we require an individual raising ineffective assistance of
counsel via Rule 60(b)(6) to provide affidavits “from any individuals the claimant asserts should have
been called as witnesses during the involuntary commitment hearing, as well as from any others
whose evidence would buttress the claimant’s assertions that counsel was deficient and that the
deficiency affected the fairness of the proceeding.” See In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72, ¶ 10, 159 A.3d
824 (quotation marks omitted). We have relaxed this requirement in child-protection cases, in part
because we have observed that it may be difficult for a claimant to “compel the signing of an affidavit
by every potentially relevant witness.” See In re Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶¶ 40-41, 322
A.3d 1183 (abrogating a component of the procedure announced in In re M.P., 2015 ME 138,
¶¶ 20-21, 126 A.3d 718). We similarly see no reason to impose that more stringent requirement
here.
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judgment. See In re Children of Destiny H., 2024 ME 66, ¶ 39, 322 A.3d 1183.

This relatively short timeframe reflects children’s need for permanence and

finality. See id. ¶ 38. There is no equally pressing need for finality in

proceedings involving adult guardianships and conservatorships, although we

generally adhere to “a strong policy in favor of ending litigation and giving

finality to court judgments.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. White, 2015 ME 145, ¶ 11,

127 A.3d 538 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a claimant who wishes

to file a Rule 60(b)(6) motion asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in a

guardianship or conservatorship proceeding must do so within one year of the

expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal from the judgment establishing

or declining to terminate the guardianship or conservatorship. 7

C. R.’s Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim

[¶19] Turning back to this case, we do not fault R.—who did not file an

affidavit supporting his ineffective-assistance claim—for failing to follow the

procedure we have just announced. See In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 12, 28, 126

A.3d 718 (“permit[ting] the mother to file, and the District Court to act on, a

[late] motion for relief from judgment” because we had not “previously opined

This is consistent with the general time limit imposed on criminal defendants asserting claims
7

of ineffective assistance of counsel through a petition for post-conviction review. See 15 M.R.S.
§ 2128-B (2026).
12

on” the proper procedure to assert an ineffective-assistance claim in a

termination-of-parental-rights proceeding). We also determine that we can

assess R.’s claim on direct appeal because the basis for the claim is apparent

from the record and R. does not rely on facts extrinsic to the record in making

his argument.

[¶20] In keeping with our role as an appellate court, “our task is to

determine whether [R.] has made a prima facie showing of ineffective

assistance of counsel sufficient to justify a remand to the trial court for a

hearing on the claim.” In re Children of Kacee S., 2021 ME 36, ¶ 21, 253 A.3d

1063; see also In re Aliyah M., 2016 ME 106, ¶¶ 12-13, 144 A.3d 50 (explaining

that “when a party makes a prima facie showing on any claim or defense, triable

issues of fact must be determined in the trial court”). Applying the Strickland

standard, we conclude that R.’s claim is unavailing.

[¶21] R. contends that his trial counsel should have provided the court

with an independent psychological evaluation of him. We need not determine

whether R. has generated a prima facie case that his attorney’s failure to do so

“fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 8 because even assuming

Although R.’s trial counsel maintained at the hearing that she asked the Department to have R.
8

evaluated, she never filed such a request with the court and did not appear to realize until midway
through the second day of the hearing that no evaluation was performed. Instead, the Department
13

that it did, R. has not made a prima facie showing that counsel’s actions

adversely affected the outcome of the hearing. See In re Henry B., 2017 ME 72,

¶ 12, 159 A.3d 824 (quotation marks omitted). There are simply no facts in the

record or alleged in R.’s briefing to suggest that a psychological assessment

would have shown anything other than that R. suffers from serious cognitive

deficits that limit his ability to care for himself.9 He therefore suffered no

prejudice from the absence of such an assessment, and his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must fail. See id.

III. CONCLUSION

[¶22] Individuals subject to guardianship or conservatorship

proceedings have a right to the effective assistance of counsel at all stages of

those proceedings. If the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in

a guardianship or conservatorship case is apparent from the record, then the

person subject to guardianship or conservatorship may pursue the claim via an

appeal from the judgment creating or declining to terminate the guardianship

or conservatorship. If the record requires supplementation, however, then the

provided her with a PP-505 report, which is a summary description of an individual’s physical and
mental condition typically used in emergency guardianship or conservatorship proceedings.

9 The Department presented substantial testimony from R.’s regular medical providers regarding

R.’s limitations.
14

person must move for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)

within one year after the time authorized for taking an appeal. In either case,

the claim must be accompanied by one or more supporting affidavits. Courts

addressing such claims must apply the Strickland standard to determine

whether the individual is entitled to relief.

[¶23] In this case, we have reviewed R.’s ineffective-assistance claim—

the basis of which is apparent from the record—and conclude that it lacks

merit. We further conclude that the Probate Court did not err in denying R.’s

petition to terminate his guardianship or in granting the Department’s petition

to be appointed as R.’s conservator. We accordingly affirm the Probate Court’s

judgment.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Carl E. Woock, Esq., Steve Smith Trial Lawyers, Augusta, for appellant R.

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Cody M. P. Hopkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human
Services

Cumberland County Probate Court docket number 2022-1044
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY