Sinclair v. Tangaro

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
WALDO, SS. DOCKETNO. CV-17-21

WAYNE SINCLAIR )
Plaintiff )
) FINDINGS & JUDGMENT
v. )
)
RANDY TANGARO )
Defendant )

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The proceeding before the Court in this case included 14 counts from the
Plaintiffs Complaint, and an additional nine counts from the Defendant's
Counterclaim. A trial in this matter was held before the Court on August 19,
2020, at which time testimony was presented by both the parties, and a total
32 exhibits were achnitted into evidence.

At the outset of the trial, the pmiies stipulated to the dismissal of Counts 1
and 2 in the Complaint and Counts 1 through 4 of the Counterclaim. At an
earlier pretrial conference, the Comi had issued an order identifying the trial
issues to be, in pati, "existence of contracts, breach of contracts, damages."
The specific remaining counts all alleged claims for either breach of
contract, or, in the alternative, claims of implied contract or unjust
em·ichment with respect to various interactions between the paiiies. 1

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The only remaining count (Count 9 of the Counterclaim) which does not assert this sort
of Breach of Contract or related alternative claim, is a claim of Conversion relating to a
2014 Dodge pickup truck.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The paiiies to this proceeding have had a lengthy transactional relationship
with each other that spanned several years. The various transactions
involved, in part, the purchase and sale of real estate, purchase and/or repair
or refurbishing work to numerous vehicles, investments in business ventures,
and a specific transaction involving a 2014 Dodge Ram pickup truck.
Despite this lengthy transactional relationship, the specific details and
formalities associated with these various business transactions was sparse, at
best.

It is clear that the Defendant, at various times and involving various
vehicles, performed refurbishing services relating to the Plaintiffs vehicles.
It is equally clear that the Plaintiff paid substantial sums to the Defendant for
the Defendant to perfo1m such services. However, based upon the evidence
presented at the trial, this Comi can not determine, by a preponderance of
the evidence standard, what work was done by the Defendant on any
paiiicular vehicle, what amount was paid by the Plaintiff for any such work,
and what, if any, amounts may be due to either the Plaintiff or the Defendant
relating to the transactions involving the vehicles referred to as: the 1968
Oldsmobile (Count 9 of Complaint and Count 5 of Counterclaim); the 1969
Oldsmobile or Studebaker (Count 12 of the Complaint); the 1965 Ford
Galaxy (Count 7 and 8 of the Counterclaim); and the 1941 Oldsmobile (not
specified in a particular Count). Accordingly, the paiiy with the burden of
proof with respect to any such claim involving work done or payments made
for vehicle refurbishing or repair work, has failed to meet their respective

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burden, and Judgment will be rendered in favor of the Defendant and
Counterclaim Defendant as to each such Count as noted below.

Sometime around early 2016, the paiiies engaged in discussions involving a
business venture referred to as "In the Bag." This project involved the
Defendant manufacturing a product in which to store motorcycles which
would be sold to interested buyers. Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 was a handwritten
document signed by both patiies which purported to describe at least parts of
the business transaction associated with "In the Bag." This Comi concludes
that neither that document, nor the testimony presented at trial establishes
the existence of an enforceable contract relevant to the "In the Bag" venture.

Moreover, the evidence suggests the "In the Bag" venture was generally a
business failure with income limited to a single sales trip to Florida which
yielded limited success. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of
establishing any entitlement to a return of his "investment" based upon any
reading of the incomprehensible terms outlined in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, or
any theory of implied contract or unjust em·ichment.

Accordingly, judgment will be rendered in favor of the Defendant with
respect to Counts 6, 7, and 8 of the Complaint.

The remaining Counts in the Complaint and Counterclaim relate to a 2014
Dodge Ram pickup truck which had initially been owned by the Plaintiff,
and later owned by the Defendant. Specifically, on or about February 2016,
the parties signed what the Court concludes was a contract for the purchase
and sale of the same vehicle for $46,000. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1). The Court is

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not persuaded that the transaction involved a gift to the Defendant despite
the earlier document which had been signed by the Plaintiff on or about
January 25, 2016. (Defendants Exhibit 1).

Subsequent to the signing of the contract for the purchase of the 2014
Dodge, the Defendant made monthly payments of approximately $274 for
the months of January, Feb1uary, March, October, November, December
2016, and an additional monthly payment of$274 for January 2017.
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, 8, and 9). The total payments made by the Defendant
for the purchase of the 2014 Dodge equaled $1,917.83. Based on the
purchase price as set forth in the sales contract, the Plaintiff is entitled to
$44,082.17 in payments due based upon the breach of the sales contract.

In Count 9 of the Defendant's Counterclaim, he asserts a claim based upon
alleged conversion of the same 2014 Dodge Ram pickup t1uck. 2 The
conversion claim seems to be based upon the Plaintiff's use and possession
of the 2014 Dodge during a portion of 2016 after the Plaintiff had sold the
truck to the Defendant. There was testimonial evidence presented by both
parties regarding that use of the vehicle during this timeframe, as well as a
motor vehicle collision which occurred sometime during that period when
the vehicle was being used by the Plaintiff.

The Law Court in the relatively recent case, Estate ofBarron v. Shapiro &
Morley, LLC, 2017 ME 51, ~14, held as follows:

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The actual Count refers to a mobile home, but the Court considers this to be a
typographical error.

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[t]he necessary elements to establish a claim for conversion are a
showing that (1) the person claiming that his or her prope1iy was
convetied has a propetiy interest in the property; (2) the person had
the right to possession at the time of the alleged conversion; and (3)
the pa1iy with the right to possession made a demand for its retutn that
was denied by the holder.

The same couti went on to state:
"[C]onversion requires an actual interference with the propetiy
owner's rights beyond a brief and ultimately-harmless withholding."
(Internal citations omitted). "To determine whether an interference is
sufficiently serious as to amount to conversion, the court should
consider the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or
control; the actor's good faith; the extent and duration of the resulting
interference with the other's right to control; the harm done; and the
inconvenience and expense caused to the owner." (Inte111al citations
omitted). Id. at ~17.

In the pending case, the plaintiffs use of the 2014 Dodge Ram pickup in
2016 was completely authorized by the Defendant. Neither pa1iy specified
the precise duration of the Plaintiffs use of the vehicle in 2016, but there
was no indication that the Defendant had made any demand for the return of
the vehicle at any point prior to its actual return by the Plaintiff. Moreover,
the Court finds the Defendant's description of the alleged damage to the
vehicle to be not credible. Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to meet his
burden with respect to his claim of conversion in Count 9 of the

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counterclaim. As a result, judgment is awarded to the Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant as to this count.

For the reasons set forth above, the Clerk is directed to incorporate these
Findings & Judgment, by reference, in accordance with MRCivP 79(a) as
follows:

Complaint:
Count 1: dismissed by stipulation of the parties;
Count 2: dismissed by stipulation of the parties;
Count 3: Judgment for the Plaintiff in the amount of $44,082.17 plus
interest and costs;
Count 4: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 5: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 6: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 7: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 8: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 9: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 10: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 11: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 12: Judgment for the Defendant;
Count 13: Judgment fort the Defendant;
Count 14: Judgment for the Defendant.

Counterclaim:
Count 1 - 4: Dismissed by stipulation of the parties;

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Count 5: Judgment for the PlaintiffYCounterclaim Defendant;
Count 6: Judgment for the PlaintiffYCounterclaim Defendant;
Count 7: Judgment for the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant;
Count 8: Judgment for the Plaintif£'Counterclaim Defendant;

Count 9: Judgment for the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant;

Date: - - - - !/ - ~
sU:iruoR c;e5URT JUSTICE

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