Knoblach v. Morris

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
ANDROSCOGGIN, ss CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. AP-19-009

John Knoblach, )
)
Plaintiff!Appellant, )
)
v. ) Order on Appeal
)
Stacylee Morris and Robert DeRice, )
)
Defendants/Appellees. )

This matter comes before the court on the appeal of Plaintif£1Appellant John Knoblach

from the District Court decision dismissing his small claims action.

Factual and Procedural History

On March 29, 2019, Knoblach filed a small claims complaint, or statement of claim,

against Defendants/Appellees Stacylee Morris and Robert DeRice [hereafter Morris and

DeRice], who are Knoblach's ex-wife and her current husband. Knoblach's claims against

Morris and DeRice arise out of the proceedings in the divorce action between Knoblach and

Morris. The complaint specifically states in relevant part as follows:

On May 26, 2016 I was served a subpoena from Defendant (Morris) for
Contempt. The Contempt hearing was 9 days later. Defendant (Morris) lied in
her sworn statement and perjured herself again at trial to get a positive ruling and
to receive additional alimony than ordered at divorce. The Court did find me in
contempt based on Defendant's lies. Defendant requested court send me to jail
twice for non-payment, also based on her lies. At the 2d hearing she perjured
herself again, claiming I still never paid, and also claimed she never heard of the
bank where the money was held .

. . . . Court ordered me to pay her over $9000 and over $3,300 in her lawyer fees.
The bank provided the first copies of the checks that DEFENDANT MORRIS
cashed 3 years earlier (proving that she was already paid in full) on 6/20/16,
weeks after the contempt hearing....

I am adding DERICE as a DEFENDANT as he was/is DEFENDANT MORRIS'
fiance, and he had stated all monetary communication must go through him.

1
Most if not all payment records were already sent and received by the
DEFENDANTS and their lawyer after trial.

... .I ask the court to find that DEFENDANT MORRIS lied, that her lies were the
only factor in determining that I was in contempt and request the court order the
same payment schedule with the same dire warnings about jail time that was
placed on me.

Before the date set for trial, Morris and DeRice moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state a

claim, and more specifically based on res judicata as to Morris 1 • After continuing the trial date in

order to consider the matter, the District Court (Martin, J.) granted the motion to dismiss as to

both Morris and DeRice on May 23, 2019. Knoblach moved to reconsider; that motion was also

denied, and this appeal followed.

Issue Presented and Sta,idard ofReview

On appeal, the comt reviews an order dismissing a complaint de nova. Estate of

Treworgy v. Comm 'r, HHS, 2017 ME 179110, Ordinarily on a motion to dismiss, the court

must consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, examining the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it alleges facts entitling him to relief. Argereow v.

Weisberg, 2018 ME 140, ir 12. When the issue of res judicata is raised as a defense in a motion to

dismiss, the facts establishing the defense may not appear completely in the statement of claim.

Therefore, in a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata, the court may also "consider

official public documents, documents that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents

referred to in the complaint" in addition to the allegations in the complaint. Moody v. State

Liquor & Lottery Comm 'n, 2004 ME 20 ,r 10. 2 In this case, it is appropriate for the court to

1 They also moved to dismiss on the ground that venue was improper; the motion was appropriately

denied because the divorce proceedings, including the contempt, occurred in Lewiston District Court.
See 14 M.R.S. § 7483.

2 As the Law Court explained,
2
consider pleadings and decisions in the divorce action, as those are documents referred to in the

complaint, central to Knoblach's claims, and public documents-indeed, documents of which the

court can take judicial notice. 3 Knoblach argues that the claim is not barred because he states an

independent claim for perjury pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 870; the issue of statutory interpretation is

a question of law which is also reviewed de novo on appeal. In re Children ofMary J., 2019 ME

2 ,i 8; Passamaquoddy Water Dist. v. City ofEastport, 1998 ME 94 ,i 5.

Res Judicata

There can be little question that, unless he states a claim under the civil perjury statute,

Knoblach's claims against Morris are barred by res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata, or

claim preclusion, bars relitigation of a claim between the same parties or their privies after a final

judgment in an earlier case involving the same claims. Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 644

(Me. 1982). The bar extends to all issues which were tried or could have been tried in the earlier

action. Id. Here, the contempt proceeding in the divorce case was between the same parties, was

fully litigated, and resulted in a final judgment. Knoblach is therefore barred from relitigating

the issue of his contempt in this case, including issues of whether Morris was credible. Knoblach

v. Morris, 2017 ME 116.

This narrow exception allows a court to consider official public documents, documents
that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint,
without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment when the
authenticity of such documents is not challenged. Alternative Energy, Inc., 267 F .3d at
33. These documents will merge into the pleadings. Id. The purpose for this exception is
that if courts could not consider these documents, "a plaintiff with a legally deficient
claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive
document on which it relied." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp,., 998 F .2d at 1196.
Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm 'n, 2004 MB 20 ,i 10.

3 Knoblach filed many other documents both with the trial court and this court on appeal, documents

which he planned to use at trial as evidence. Few ofthose are appropriate for consideration in connection
with a motion to dismiss, however, where the analysis is whether Knoblach has stated a claim at all.

3
To the extent Knoblach's claims against DeRice rest upon allegations arising from

litigation in that case, such a claim is derivative and would also be barred by res judicata. Res

judicata bars relitigation of issues between the same parties as well as their privies. IfK.noblach

is alleging DeRice acted as Morris' privy in the contempt proceeding, the claim is barred. See

Dep't ofHuman Services v. Richardson, 621 A.2d 855,856 (Me. 1993) (privity requires mutual

relationship establishing commonality of interest). 4

Civil Perjury

Knoblach asserts that he has pled a claim under the civil perjury statute, a claim which is

not barred by res judicata. That statute states in relevant part as follows:

1. Action; within 3 years. When a judgment has been obtained against a party by
the perjury of a witness introduced at the trial by the adverse party, the injured party
may ... bring an action against such adverse party, or any perjured witness or
confederate in the perjury, to recover the damages sustained by the injured party by
reason of such perjury. The judgment in the former action does not bar an action
under this section.

2. Specificity of claim. A claim under this section must identify the specific
testimony alleged to be false at the initial :filing of the claim.

3. Record; evidence. A claim may not be submitted under this section solely on
the same record as in the fmmer trial. Evidence discoverable by due diligence
before the trial cannot be introduced as new evidence to establish perjury.

4. Standard of proof. The plaintiff in an action under this section must prove the
alleged perjury by clear and convincing evidence.

5. Affirmative defense. It is an affirmative defense to an action under this section
that the plaintiff has no new evidence to present concerning the alleged perjury.

6. Strictly construed. The pleading and proof requirements of this section must be
strictly construed.

14 M.R.S. § 870. The statute requires the complaint to "identify the specific testimony alleged to

be false". Id. at§ 870(2). The pleading requirements of the statute must be strictly construed.

4The court is not deciding that DeRice was, in fact, Morris' privy, but simply noting that even ifhe were,
the claim would be barred.
4
Id. at§ 870(6); Spickler v. Greenberg) 644 A.2d 469,472 (Me. 1994). A strict construction of

the statute requires the complaint to show that information demonstrating the falsity of the

testimony was unavailable to the claimant before the underlying judgment was entered. Bean v.

Cummings, 2008 ME 18 ,r14. Unless Knoblach's statement of claim shows newly discovered

evidence regarding the perjury, evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence

before the contempt trial, Knoblach cannot prevail under this statute. Id.

In a small claims case, the rules require the statement of claim to contain "a short and

plain statement of facts showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." M.R. Sm. CLP. 3. That

rule is really no different than the requirements of other civil actions. Compare M.R. Civ. P. 8(a)

("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief ..."). In regular civil actions averring

fraud, "the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." M.R.

Civ. P. 9(b). Even if Rule 9(b) does not apply to a small claims action, the statutory

requirements do. Nothing in§ 870 exempts small claims actions, and indeed to do so would be

contrary to the purposes of the statute. Bean, 2008 ME 18 ,rn ("Heightened pleading

requirements are necessary to ensure that disgruntled litigants are not able to use civil perjury

claims as a means to re-litigate cases when they are displeased with the outcomes.") The

pleading requirements of 14 M.R.S. § 870 apply to small claims as with all other actions.

Turning then to the specific allegations made by Knoblach in this case, and taking the

facts alleged in the complaint as true, Knoblach fails to state a claim under 14 M.RS. § 870. He

alleges that Morris obtained a judgment against him in the contempt proceeding (and the

subsequent show cause hearing) by perjury. He does not identify any specific testimony alleged

to be false other than Morris "claiming I still never paid" and claiming "she never heard of the

5
bank where the money was held" at the show cause hearing. Statement ofClaim, quoted above.

Even assuming the claim sufficiently asserts that essentially all of her testimony that he owed her

money was false, the claim nonetheless fails because the statement of claim identifies no

evidence of perjury that could not have been discovered before the contempt proceeding. He

asserts that the "bank provided the first copies of the checks that DEFENDANT MORRIS

cashed 3 years earlier (proving that she was already paid in full) on 6/20/16, weeks after the

contempt hearing." Statement ofClaim. Even if that is true, however, such evidence was

patently discoverable with due diligence before the trial. IfKnoblach did not have his bank

records in his possession, he could have obtained them in time for trial by means of a simple

subpoena. He also could have asked to continue the trial, which he did not. Knoblach v Morris,

2017 ME 116 'if2-3. 5 The issue is not whether he actually was in possession of the records before

trial, but rather whether such evidence was discoverable by due diligence before trial~ and it

clearly was.

In summary, therefore, examining the statement of claim in the light most favorable to

Knoblach to determine whether it alleges facts entitling him to relief, and viewing the statement

of claim under 14 M.R.S. § 870 with the heightened scrutiny required by the statute and the cases

5 In the appeal, the Law Court specifically noted as follows:

Further, after Knoblach was served with the contempt subpoena informing him of the date of the
hearing, he did not move to continue the hearing either in his answer to the contempt motion or at
the hearing itself. Rather, the record demonstrates that at the contempt hearing, Knoblach
presented evidence and argued his position, and that in its judgment the court considered and
ultimately rejected K.noblach's contention on its merits.

Additionally, Knoblach has argued in his post~judgment motion and his brief on appeal only that
his attorney was unavailable during the week before the hearing. He has not described any
additional evidence that he would have presented or how he otheiwise would have proceeded
differently, . .ifhe had had one additional day to prepare.

Knoblach v Morris, 2017 ME 116 ~2-3.

6
trial, but rather whether such evidence was discoverable by due diligence before trial - and it

clearly was.

In summary, therefore, examining the statement of claim in the light most favorable to

Knoblach to determine whether it alleges facts entitling him to relief, and viewing the statement

of claim under 14 M.R.S. § 870 with the heightened scrutiny required by the statute and the cases

decided thereunder, Knoblach has failed to state a claim for civil perjury against either Morris or

DeRice. 6 Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

The entry is: Judgment affirmed. This Order on Appeal may be incorporated on the

docket of the case by reference pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated: hA CIA.ch 2 (;- 2---o Z.o
I
1ijLs@=··--­
Justice, Maine Superior Court

6 With regard to DeRice, there is another defect:there is no allegation that perjury by DeRice was
introduced at trial. Kraut v. Maine Bonding & Gas. Co., 672 A.2d 1107, 1109 (Me. 1996) ("The plain
meaning of the statutory language of section 870 requires that perjury of a witness be "introduced at the
trial."")

7