Daigle Oil Company v. Pelletier Sanitation, Inc

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
AROOSTOOK, ss Docket No. CARSC-CV-19-177

DAIGLE OIL COMPANY,

Plaintiff

V. ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PELLETIER SANITATION, INC.
and LAURIE PELLETIER

Defendants

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Daigle Oil Company's (DOC) motion for summary

judgment seeking judgment against Pelletier Sanitation, Inc. (Pelletier Sanitation) and Laurie

Pelletier (Laurie). The claim against Pelletier Sanitation is for $8204.08 owed on the account for

diesel and gasoline product sold by DOC to Pelletier Sanitation. And the claim against Laurie is

for the same amount on her personal guaranty. Pelletier Sanitation does not dispute it owes DOC

that sum. But Laurie asserts questions of fact exist which should prevent summary judgment

being entered as to her.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is granted to a moving paiiy where "there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." M.R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case. Lougee Conservancy v.

City Mortgage, Inc., 2012 ME 103, ,i 11, 48 A.3d 774. A genuine issue of fact exists when there

is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact. Id

1
When reviewing the record on a motion for swnmary judgment, a court views the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Cormier v. Genesis Healthcare LLC, 2015 ME

161, ,r 7, 129 A.3d 944. "Any doubt on this score will be resolved against the movant, and the

opposing party will be given the benefit of any inferences which might reasonably be drawn

from the evidence." 3 Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 56:5 at 240 (3d, 2011 ed.) A party seeking

to avoid summary judgment must present a prima facie case for the claim or defense that is

asserted for which it has the burden of proof. Flaherty v. Muther, 2011 ME 32, ,r 31, 17 A.3d

640.

FACTS

From the filings, the court finds there are no genuine issues to the following material facts:

(References to Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts-PSMF ,r_; references to Defendants'

Opposing Statement of Material Facts- DOSMF ,r_; and references to Defendants' Additional

Facts- DASMF ,r__)

DOC sells gasoline and diesel products, and in 2018 and 2019 sold product to Pelletier

Sanitation. Laurie is the Vice president of Pelletier Sanitation. (Affidavit of Laurie Pelletier

dated January 23, 2020, ,r2). On or aboutJuly 12, 2018 DOC entered an open end credit

arrangement with Pelletier Sanitation via a New Account Application. (PSMF ,r1, DOSMF ,r 1;

DASMF ,rs). Laurie acknowledges she signed the New Account Application. (DASMF ,r7; See

also Affidavit of Laurie Pelletier dated January 23, 2020, ,r3). Laurie signed the New Account

Application on behalf of Pelletier Sanitation. (PSMF ,r1 ). Above the signature line where Laurie

signed the New Account Application, the document states:

2
Everything that I have stated in this application is correct to the best of my knowledge,
and I have read both the front and back part of this application ... .If this application is
made by a corporation, it is agreed that the person making the application on behalf of the
corporation shall be individually liable for all purchases made pursuant to this agreement,
and any individual who signs the credit card for a purchase on behalf of said corporation
shall also be individually liable.

Pelletier Sanitation admits that between September 17, 2018 and June 5, 2019 DOC provided it

with diesel fuel and gasoline on credit, and that Pelletier Sanitation owes DOC $8,204.08.

(PSMF if3,4; DOSMF if3,4)

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

A. Pelletier Sanitation

Pelletier Sanitation does not dispute the amount owed regarding fuel purchases totaling

$8,204.08 and concedes there are no issues of material fact concerning the corporation's

obligation for the fuel debt. (See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, p.2, Section III)

Accordingly, Plaintiff DOC' s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Pelletier

Sanitation is granted, and judgment is entered in the amount of $8,204.08.

B. Laurie Pelletier

In her filings Laurie attempts to make a genuine issue of fact by denying DOC's Statement of

Material Facts as they pertain to her individually. Laurie also raises additional facts in which she

asserts she was never advised she was submitting herself to personal liability, and that she did

not receive any consideration or benefit personally from the credit agreement or fuel purchases.

(DASMF ,r 7,8,9; see also Affidavit of Laurie Pelletier, ,r 4,5,6). Laurie's denial ofDOC's

3
statement of facts and the additional facts she raises, including those in her affidavit, are simply

not supported by the record and insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

The new credit account was for Pelletier Sanitation, a corporation. The facts are not disputed

Laurie signed the New Account Application, and she signed it on behalf of Pelletier Sanitation so

Pelletier Sanitation would be extended credit for the purchase of product from DOC. There is

also no dispute that in the application, she indicated her capacity was vice-president of Pelletier

Sanitation. But, immediately above the signature line, the application clearly states that "If this

application is made by a corporation, it is agreed that the person making the application on

behalf of the corporation shall be individually liable ..".

A guaranty is a contract and is governed by the same rules of construction as other contracts.

Kandis v. Huotari, 678 A.2d 41,43 (Me. 1996). A contract that is not ambiguous is interpreted by

the court as a question of law. Whalen v. Down East Cmty. Hosp., 2009 ME 99,115. Laurie has

not asserted, and there is no evidence in this record, that the guaranty language is ambiguous.

The comt specifically finds the contract's guaranty language is not ambiguous, and that the

person signing the agreement is personally liable.

Laurie does raise as a fact that she " ..was never advised by an agent of DOC that she was

submitting herself to personal liability for said card." (DASMF 17). Yet, Laurie does not point to

any statute or law that imposes such a duty on DOC. Nor does she suggest she was tricked or

coerced into signing the application. The New Account Application, as a contract document

clearly speaks for itself within its four corners. If a contract is not ambiguous, the construction of

4
the contract is a question of law to be resolved by considering the writing as a whole and giving

the language its plain meaning. Andrew M. Horton, et.al, Maine Civil Remedies, § 10-4(a), (4th

ed. 2004). The contract unambiguously indicates that if the application is made for a corporation,

then the person signing is individually liable. Laurie signed the application for Pelletier

Sanitation, and she is therefore individually, or personally, liable. As the application is not

ambiguous, her assertion that she was not advised by an agent that she was submitting herself to

liability is extraneous and in-elevant, and is not a material fact.

Lastly, Laurie's assertion of fact that she did not receive any benefit or consideration from DOC

as a result of her signing the credit application is equally unavailing. (See DASMF 1 8,9). A

contract must be supported by consideration, in the form of benefit to the promisor or detriment

to or forbearance by the promise. Maine Civil Remedies, §10-3(d). In exchange for Laurie's

signing the credit agreement in which she agreed to be individually liable, DOC agreed to extend

credit to Pelletier Sanitation. And pursuant to that arrangement DOC sold and delivered to

Pelletier Sanitation product totaling $8,204.08, for which it hasn't been paid. Laurie's assertion

as facts that she received no consideration or benefit are simply an inaccurate statement of fact

and law. It does not raise a question of material fact.

The court finds there is no genuine issue of fact that Laurie signed the credit agreement and

agreed to be individually liable for amounts owed by Pelletier Sanitation. The amount owed is

$8,204.08. Accordingly, PlaintiffDOC's Motion for Sunnnary Judgment as to Defendant Laurie

Pelletier is granted, and judgment is entered in the amount of $8,204.08.

5
C. Attorney Fees

Defendants argue that an award of attorney fees should be denied because the attorney fees are

not included in the statement of material facts and not in compliance with M.R.Civ.P. 56(h). That

argument is also unavailing. The cmnt concludes an application for attorney fees and affidavits

in support thereof need not be in the statement of material facts required for summary judgment.

The material facts required by M.R.Civ.P. 56(h) are those facts that are needed to suppmt

judgment being entered on the whatever claim or claims are being made. See M.R.Civ.P.56(a).

In this case, DOC sought summary judgment on its account, specifically Count I, Account

Annexed. As indicated above, the court found that DOC is entitled to judgment against Pelletier

Sanitation for amounts owed pursuant to the New Account Application. Neither Pelletier

Sanitation nor Laurie dispute that Pelletier Sanitation owes DOC monies on the credit

application, specifically $8,204.08. And accordingly, DOC is awarded judgment on Count I.

Attorney fees incurred in a civil action are recoverable in that action only in three situations, one

of which is based on a contractual agreement of the parties. Maine Civil Remedies, §4-9. An

application should be sufficiently detailed to afford a basis for determining an appropriate award.

Id. Factors to consider include: time and labor required; novelty and difficulty of question

presented; skill required; preclusion of other employment; customary fee in the community;

whether fee is fixed or contingent; amount involved and results obtained; experience, reputation

and ability of the attorney; undesirability of the case; and awards in similar cases. Id.

6
The credit application signed by a representative of DOC and Laurie Pelletier states- "If Daigle

Oil Company refers collection of the balance to a lawyer, you will pay the court cost and

attorney fees." DOC has prevailed in this action. The application for fees made by the Affidavit

of Counsel Fees properly itemizes the time and costs incurred, and establishes that the hourly

rate charged is a usual and customary fee. An hourly rate of $200.00 is reasonable for a

collection case for a practitioner with the experience and ability of DOC's counsel. The affidavit

establishes a total of6.75 hours was expended, which includes the drafting and filing of the

motion for summary judgment. That time is also reasonable. The itemized costs are also

reasonable and customary. The court approves the application for fees and costs totaling

$1,906.48.

In summary, Plaintiff Daigle Oil Company's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to

both Defendant Pelletier Sanitation, Inc. and Defendant Laurie Pelletier, joint and several. The

clerk is directed to enter judgment as follows: judgment for Plaintiff Daigle Oil Company and

against Pelletier Sanitation, Inc in the amount of $8,204.08 on Count I, Account Annexed, plus

attorney's fees and costs of$1,906.48; and judgment for Plaintiff Daigle Oil Company and

against Defendant Laurie Pelletier in the amount of $8,204.08 on Count IV, plus attorney's fees

and costs of $1906.48.

Counts II and II are dismissed, as moot, without prejudice and without costs.

7
The clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference pursuant to

M.R.Civ.P. 79(a).

Harold Stewart, II

Justice, Superior Court

8