Estate of Merrill P. Robbins v. Chebeague & Cumberland Land Trust et al. — 2017 ME 17

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 17
Docket: 	Cum-15-256
Argued: 	March 1, 2016
Decided: 	January 26, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
Majority: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD and GORMAN, JJ.
Dissent: 	ALEXANDER and JABAR, JJ.
ESTATE OF MERRILL P. ROBBINS
v.
CHEBEAGUE & CUMBERLAND LAND TRUST et al.
SAUFLEY, C.J.
[¶1] 	The appeal in this matter requires us to determine whether a
private owner of land encumbered by a conservation easement may bring a
lawsuit seeking the enforcement of the easement on other land that is not
owned by that landowner and in which the landowner has no other legal
interest. Here, the Estate of Merrill P. Robbins appeals from a judgment of the
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Mills, J.) dismissing for lack of standing1
the Estate’s complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages
1 The court’s judgment was alternatively based on its conclusion that the matter was not ripe for
judicial determination. Because the Estate’s claims are ripe now that the Land Trust has formally
stated its approval of the proposed use, we need not review the court’s determination on that
matter. See Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974) (holding that, because the
issue of ripeness “is peculiarly a question of timing, it is the situation now rather than the situation
at the time of the [trial court’s] decision that must govern”).

2
based on the decision of the Chebeague & Cumberland Land Trust—the
holder of a conservation easement—to allow the Town of Cumberland, which
also owns land subject to the easement, to develop 	its 	land for public
recreational use. Except with respect to the Estate’s breach of contract claim,
we agree with the Superior Court that the Estate lacks standing, and we affirm
the dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The following facts derive from the Estate’s complaint, the deed of
the conservation easement at issue, and other public documents presented on
appeal, the authenticity of which was not challenged on appeal.2 	In 1997,
Marion B. Payson, acting by and through her attorney-in-fact Merrill P.
Robbins, 	created 	a 	conservation 	easement 	by 	deed. 	The 	Chebeague
& Cumberland Land Trust 	is the current holder of the easement 	as 	the
successor to the original grantee, Cumberland Mainland and Islands Trust, Inc.
The land impressed with the easement comprises roughly 100 acres of land
on the coast in Cumberland, referred to as “the Property” throughout the deed
2 As an exception to the general rule that a court may consider only the pleadings on a motion to
dismiss, see Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm’n, 2004 ME 20, ¶¶ 8-9, 843 A.2d 43, courts may
consider “official public documents, documents that are central to the plaintiff’s claim, and
documents referred to in the complaint” in ruling on a motion to dismiss “without converting a
motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment when the authenticity of such documents
is not challenged,” id. ¶ 10.

3
of the easement. 	The conservation easement’s stated purpose is to retain the
Property “predominantly in its scenic, natural, and open space condition for
conservation purposes and to prevent any use of the Property that will
significantly impair or interfere with the conservation values of the Property
and the Property’s natural resources and associated ecosystems.” 	This
statement of purpose is consistent with the statutory requirement that “[a]
conservation easement . . . include a statement of the conservation purposes of
the easement, the conservation attributes associated with the real property
and the benefit to the general public intended to be served by the restriction
on uses of the real property subject to the conservation easement.” 33 M.R.S.
§ 477-A(1) (2016).
[¶3] 	The deed also specifically noted the importance of the easement
holder’s primary purpose to “promot[e] for the benefit of the general public the
preservation of natural resources in the Town of Cumberland and County of
Cumberland, including land and water resources, the plant and animal life
thereon, and unique scenic, natural, and historic sites.” 	(Emphasis added.)
Again, this purpose comports with the requirements of Maine law that a
conservation easement must inure to “the benefit [of] the general public.” Id.

4
[¶4] 	Following several conveyances of sections of the original parcel,
the Estate now owns only a portion of the original 100 acres of land subject to
the conservation easement. The Town of Cumberland has purchased another
part of the 100 acres, which it acquired after the easement was created, and a
real estate developer has acquired other land subject to the easement.
[¶5] The Town has received conditional approval from the Cumberland
Planning Board to allow the use of its property for a public beach. The Town
plans to construct a parking lot, resurface the existing access road with
reclaimed asphalt, relocate an existing bath house, and add portable toilets.
[¶6] 	As holder of the conservation easement and successor to the
grantee named in the deed, the Land Trust is, by the easement’s terms,
primarily responsible for enforcing the terms of the easement. 	See also 33
M.R.S. § 478(1)(B) (2016). The Land Trust has determined, and has informed
the Town, 	that the Town’s plans are 	permitted under the terms of the
conservation easement. Although the Land Trust concluded that the proposed
changes would expand public use of the Property, which would have “impacts
on the land, the shore and the water,” the Land Trust stated that its goal was
to achieve balance between resource protection and increased public access
to the land.

5
[¶7] 	The 	Estate, 	although 	not 	an 	owner 	of 	the 	land 	at 	issue,
communicated to the Land Trust and the Town its concerns that the Town’s
plan did not comply with the terms of the conservation easement and that the
Land Trust was violating its obligations as holder of the easement. 	On
December 18, 2014, the Estate filed a complaint in the Superior Court naming
the Land Trust and the Town as defendants. The four-count complaint sought
a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages and costs, and included
a breach of contract claim against the Land Trust.
[¶8] Upon the Town’s and the Land Trust’s motions to dismiss pursuant
to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court dismissed the Estate’s complaint in its
entirety, concluding that the Estate lacked standing to initiate an action to
enforce the conservation easement as it relates to the Town’s property. 	The
court interpreted the statutorily provided grant of standing, which applies to
“[a]n owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement,”
33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(A) (2016) (emphasis added), to be limited to the owner of
an interest in the real property that may actually be subject to development or
another 	use 	allegedly 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	conservation
easement. 	The court concluded that, in this context, the statutory language
does not include owners of other unrelated property that happens to be

6
burdened by the same easement. The court further concluded that the Estate
was not authorized to sue by virtue of any “special interest” standing and that
the deed of the conservation easement did not authorize enforcement by one
property holder against another. The Estate timely appealed.3
II. DISCUSSION
[¶9] The question presented is whether landowners with no ownership
or other rights to land on which a use is proposed may seek a judicial
determination of whether the proposed use on that land is permitted by the
terms of a conservation easement. The Estate contends that it has standing to
bring a claim to enforce the terms of the conservation easement as to the
Town’s land pursuant to the plain language of section 478(1) because the
Estate owns 	an interest in real property 	that is 	also 	burdened by the
easement, even if the dispute does not concern a use proposed on the Estate’s
property. See 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(A).
[¶10] 	Unless a party has standing to sue, that party’s complaint is
properly dismissed. See, e.g., Nevin v. Union Tr. Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶¶ 41-42, 726
A.2d 694. Standing, in this context, is fully addressed by the statute. The laws
3 Maine Farmland Trust, Inc., filed an amicus brief, and although the Attorney General also filed
an amicus brief with our leave, see M.R. App. P. 9(e)(1), she has not intervened in the action and is
not a party, see 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D) (2016).

7
codified at 33 M.R.S. §§ 476 to 479-C (2016) apply to the conservation
easement, see 33 M.R.S. § 479-A(1); P.L. 1985, ch. 395, § 3 (effective Sept. 19,
1985), and we look to section 478(1) to determine standing. 	That statute
specifies who may initiate or intervene in an action affecting a conservation
easement:
1. 	Action 	or 	intervention. 	An 	action 	affecting 	a
conservation easement may be brought or intervened in by:
A. An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by
the easement;
B. A holder of the easement;
C. A person having a 3rd-party right of enforcement; or
D. 	The Attorney General; except that the Attorney General
may initiate action seeking enforcement of a conservation
easement only when the parties designated as having the
right 	to 	do 	so 	under 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	conservation
easement:
(1) Are no longer in legal existence;
(2) Are bankrupt or insolvent;
(3) Cannot be contacted after reasonable diligence to
do so; or
(4) 	After 	90 	days’ 	prior 	written 	notice 	by 	the
Attorney General of the nature of the asserted failure,
have failed to take reasonable actions to bring about
compliance with the conservation easement.
33 M.R.S. § 478(1).

8
[¶11] 	We review de novo the interpretation of a statute. 	See Strout v.
Cent. Me. Med. Ctr., 2014 ME 77, ¶ 10, 94 A.3d 786. 	“In construing a statute
our duty is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature as evidenced by the
language of the statute.” 	Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins.
Co., 411 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Me. 1980). “We will construe a statute based on its
plain meaning in the context of the statutory scheme, and only if the statute is
ambiguous will we look to extrinsic indicia of legislative intent such as
relevant legislative history.” Strout, 2014 ME 77, ¶ 10, 94 A.3d 786 (quotation
marks omitted).
A. 	“An Action Affecting a Conservation Easement”
[¶12] We begin with the question of whether each count of the Estate’s
complaint is “[a]n action affecting a 	conservation easement.” 	33 M.R.S.
§ 478(1). 	The Estate alleged causes of action against the Town and the Land
Trust for declaratory relief, statutory enforcement, and injunctive relief. 	It
further alleged a breach of contract by the Land Trust. Based on these claims,
the Estate sought the following remedies in its complaint: declaratory and
injunctive relief, damages, and costs.
[¶13] 	Based 	on 	the 	plain 	meaning 	of 	“[a]n 	action 	affecting 	a
conservation easement,” id., we conclude that all causes of action, except

9
potentially the breach of contract claim asserted against the Land Trust, affect
the Land Trust’s conservation easement. 	Any injunctive, declaratory, or
enforcement 	relief 	would 	directly 	affect 	the 	scope, 	meaning, 	and
administration of the easement deed’s terms. Accordingly, 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)
applies to these claims.
[¶14] 	With respect to the breach of contract claim, however, it is not
clear from the complaint whether the contract allegedly breached was the
easement contract itself. 	See Windham Land Tr. v. Jeffords, 2009 ME 29, ¶ 16,
967 A.2d 690 (stating that a conservation easement is a contract between a
landowner and the easement holder). 	The complaint and record materials
available at this early stage in the proceedings indicate that the Estate is the
successor in title to Marion B. Payson; that Payson entered into a contract
with Cumberland Mainland and Islands Trust, Inc. (CMIT); that the Land Trust
is the successor to CMIT; and that the Land Trust, “[i]n agreeing to hold the
Conservation Easement . . . represented that it would enforce the restrictions
contained therein.”
[¶15] 	On this record, we cannot say that the Estate, claiming to be a
successor in interest to the contract, has no standing to sue the Trust, which is
also a successor. The record at this stage is insufficient for us to identify with

10
precision what agreement the Estate alleges has been breached. 	Any remedy
in the nature of specific performance related to enforcement of the easement
would be precluded, however, because it would be “[a]n action affecting a
conservation easement” as discussed below. See 33 M.R.S. § 478(1).
[¶16] 	Accordingly, although all other counts of the Estate’s complaint
are unambiguously “action[s] affecting a conservation easement,” for which
the statute governs standing, see id., we cannot determine that the contract
claim—which may be based on one or more agreements not yet clarified at
this stage—is an action affecting the easement. Based on the broad language
of the complaint, and given that Maine is a notice-pleading state, see M.R.
Civ. P. 8(a); Marshall v. Town of Dexter, 2015 ME 135, ¶ 1 n.1, 125 A.3d 1141,
dismissal of the contract claim is not appropriate at this time. 	The remaining
question is whether section 478(1) confers standing on the Estate to pursue
the other claims.
B. 	Authorization to Sue Pursuant to Section 478(1)
[¶17] 	Proceeding then to the statutory list of potential plaintiffs in
actions affecting a conservation easement, there are four classifications of
parties that have standing. It is evident that the Estate does not have standing
as the holder of the easement because the Trust is the holder, see 33 M.R.S.

11
§§ 476(2), 478(1)(B); as the Attorney General, see id. § 478(1)(D);4 or as a
third party that has, by contract or otherwise, obtained a right of enforcement,
see id. § 478(1)(C).5
[¶18] Thus, the question on appeal is limited to whether “[a]n owner of
an interest in the real property burdened by the easement,” id. § 478(1)(A)
(emphasis added), includes the Estate, which does not own an interest in the
Town-owned parcel on which enforcement is sought but does own an interest
in land that is also burdened by the conservation easement.
[¶19] Because section 478(1)(A) can be interpreted in different ways, it
is 	ambiguous regarding whether 	“[a]n 	owner of an interest in 	the 	real
property burdened by the easement,” id. (emphasis added), means an owner
of any real property burdened by the easement or instead means an owner of
the real property, burdened by the easement, upon which an enforcement
4 The Attorney General would have standing to sue if the Land Trust, as the party designated as
having the right to sue under the terms of the conservation easement, became unable to do so
because it (1) was no longer in legal existence, (2) became bankrupt or insolvent, (3) could not be
contacted with reasonable diligence, or (4) “failed to take reasonable actions to bring about
compliance with the conservation easement” within ninety days after “written notice by the
Attorney General of the nature of the asserted failure.” 	33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D). 	There is no
allegation in this matter, however, that any of these circumstances exist.
5 The complaint contains no allegation that any third party has, by contract or otherwise,
obtained a right of enforcement. See id. § 478(1)(C) (2016).

12
issue has arisen.6 See Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62,
¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411 (“A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to
different interpretations.”).
[¶20] The ambiguity of the statute is squarely presented in this appeal,
in which the Estate owns property “burdened by the easement,” 33 M.R.S.
§ 478(1)(A), 	but 	asserts 	standing 	to 	enforce 	the 	conservation 	easement
against another landowner 	by 	bringing 	claims 	that 	would ordinarily 	be
asserted by a person or entity that is benefitted by the easement. See Peter M.
Morrisette, 	Conservation 	Easements 	and 	the 	Public 	Good: 	Preserving 	the
Environment on Private Lands, 41 Nat. Resources J. 373, 381 (2001) (“[T]he
benefit is not tied to any specific piece of property; rather, the benefit accrues
to the land trust or organization that holds the easement.”).
6 	A leading treatise on property law states as follows about the Uniform Act’s language
concerning landowner standing, which the Maine Legislature adopted:
The Uniform Act provides that an action affecting a conservation easement may be
brought by four categories of plaintiffs. The first is the owner of an interest in the real
property burdened by the easement. While an owner might be motivated to terminate
or modify the restrictions, in most circumstances enforcement would be against the fee
owner’s interests. An exception might be the possibility of litigation between tenants
in common, if one disapproved of activities by another which violated the conservation
easement. 	Similarly there might be a dispute between the owner of the fee and a
tenant, or between a life tenant and the holder of a remainder.
4 Powell on Real Property § 34A.03[4] (2015) (footnote omitted); see Unif. Conservation Easement
Act § 3(a)(1) (1981), 12 U.L.A. 165, 184 (2008); 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(A) (2016). The author appears
to assume that the language refers only to the real property upon which an enforcement issue has
arisen.

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[¶21] 	To resolve the ambiguity in the statutory language, the Superior
Court applied the rules of statutory construction and reviewed the legislative
history of the provision, interpreting the statute not to confer blanket standing
on owners of property subject to a conservation easement to enforce the
easement against each other. 	As the court correctly observed, to the extent
that 	“[a]n 	owner 	of 	an 	interest 	in 	the 	real 	property 	burdened 	by 	the
easement,” 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(A), was authorized to bring suit by the uniform
act that Maine’s Legislature adopted,7 see Unif. Conservation Easement Act
(1981), 12 U.L.A. 165 (2008 & Supp. 2016), such authorization was for the
purpose of allowing the landowner to “sue in cases where the easements also
impose duties upon holders and these duties are breached by the holders,”8
Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 3 cmt., 12 U.L.A. at 185 (2008). Regarding
the filing of suit to enforce restrictions on landowners’ use of burdened
properties, the comments identified “[h]olders and persons having third-party
7 The legislative committee that recommended adopting the Maine legislation considered the
1981 Uniform Conservation Easement Act and its accompanying comments from the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. 	An Act to Adopt the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act: Hearing on L.D. 1737 Before the J. Standing Committee on Judiciary, 112th Legis.
(1985) (Uniform Conservation Easement Act: Synopsis, prepared by Davis Hartwell, Esq.).
8 For example, by the terms of the deed establishing the conservation easement at issue in this
matter, the holder “represents that it will manage access in and to” a trail on the property, which
would be used by the public, and the deed sets out specific management requirements. An owner of
the land containing that trail may wish to bring suit if the Land Trust fails to manage trail access as
required by the deed. Conversely, the deed grants to the Land Trust the “[a]ffirmative [r]ight[]” to
enforce the easement; it is not described as a duty.

14
rights of enforcement” as the entities with standing. Id. Thus, the Uniform Act
would identify the Land Trust, as the holder of the easement, as having
standing to enforce the easement. 	The Uniform Act also recognizes that a
state might adopt language to confer standing on, for instance, the Attorney
General. Id.
[¶22] 	In 2007, the Maine Legislature did just that. 	See P.L. 2007,
ch. 412, § 5 (effective Sept. 20, 2007) (codified at 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D)).
Although originally proposed to simply add the Attorney General as a party
with standing, see L.D. 1737, § 6 (123d Legis. 2007), the Legislature ultimately
adopted a statute that authorizes the Attorney General to enforce the terms of
a conservation easement only in limited circumstances, P.L. 2007, ch. 412, § 5
(codified at 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(D)), manifesting an intention not to extensively
expand the scope of standing to litigate over conservation easements, see Sen.
Amend. B to Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 1737, No. S-305 Summary at 3 (123d
Legis. 	2007) 	(stating 	that 	the 	amendment 	“specifies 	under 	what
circumstances the Attorney General may initiate action seeking enforcement
of a conservation easement”).
[¶23] 	Although Maine’s statute gives limited standing to the Attorney
General, other states’ statutes may confer standing upon “private attorney[s]

15
general,” 	Sierra Club 	v. Morton, 	405 	U.S. 	727, 	737-38 	(1972), 	whereby
individuals are empowered to advance the public interest, see, e.g., 765 Ill.
Comp. 	Stat. 	Ann. 120/4(c) 	(LEXIS 	through 	P.A. 	99-904) 	(authorizing
enforcement of a conservation right by “the owner of any real property
abutting or within 500 feet of the real property subject to the conservation
right” 	(emphasis 	added)). 	As 	the 	Superior 	Court 	stated: 	“Maine’s 	law
explicitly empowers the Attorney General, as a representative of the public,
with the backup authority to enforce the terms of a conservation easement in
the event that the holder fails to fulfill its duties.”
[¶24] 	We agree with the court that the limitations on enforcement by
the Attorney General support the conclusion that the Legislature did not
intend to authorize actions by private attorneys general. 	In addition to the
legislative 	materials summarized and considered 	by the Superior Court,
extrinsic 	evidence 	of 	legislative 	intent 	properly 	includes 	“preenactment
history, 	including 	circumstances 	and 	events 	leading 	up 	to 	a 	bill’s
introduction.” 	2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction 	§ 48:1 at 548-50 	(7th ed. 2014); 	see generally id. 	§ 48:3 at
561-73. 	In the instant matter, a review of the 	history 	of conservation
easements and their intended purposes illuminates the issue of to whom the

16
Legislature intended to give standing to commence lawsuits to enforce the
terms of an easement.
[¶25] 	“The conservation easement is a creature of statute, not the
common law.” 	Morrisette at 380; see also 4 Powell on Real Property § 34A.01
(2015). 	Before 	the advent of the conservation easement, 	common 	law
servitudes—including traditional easements—were used to secure rights in
land for the public interest. 	Morrisette at 380. 	See generally 4 Powell on Real
Property 	§ 34A.02[1] 	(discussing federal highway and scenic easements
created in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s); William H. Whyte, Jr., Securing Open
Space for Urban America: Conservation Easements, Urban Land Inst.–Tech.
Bulletin, 	no. 	36, 	Dec. 	1959, 	at 	11-14 	(discussing 	scenic 	easements,
right-of-way easements, airport easements, and easements for water control).
These common law servitudes were not without limitations in the area of
conservation. See Morrisette at 380-84.
[¶26] 	In 1959, the Urban Land Institute published a technical bulletin
authored by William H. Whyte, who argued that “conservation easement[s],”
Whyte at 8, should be used to secure open spaces in an urbanizing America.
See generally Whyte. Because conservation easements are an extension of the
law of eminent domain, id. at 7, “the purpose [of the easement] must be public,”

17
id. 	at 	15. 	Whyte 	argued 	that 	conservation 	easements 	would 	advance
numerous public benefits, including watershed protection, agricultural land
conservation, limited recreational use, 	control of urban sprawl, and the
reservation of future options for the use of those 	open spaces that are
protected. Id. at 16-19.
[¶27] 	In 1981, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State 	Laws 	approved 	and 	recommended 	for 	widespread 	enactment 	the
Uniform 	Conservation 	Easement 	Act 	(UCEA). 	See 	Unif. 	Conservation
Easement 	Act, 	12 	U.L.A. 	165 	(2008). 	The 	UCEA 	did 	away 	with 	many
limitations that would otherwise be present pursuant to the common law. See
Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 4 & cmt., 12 U.L.A. at 187-88. 	In 1985, the
Maine Legislature adopted the UCEA, see P.L. 1985, ch. 395 § 3 (effective
Sept. 19, 1985), with modifications, compare, e.g., 33 M.R.S. § 476(1) (2016),
with Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. at 174. Consistent with
the 	national 	movement, 	Maine’s 	definition 	of 	a 	conservation 	easement
requires a conservation easement to advance public benefits. 	See 33 M.R.S.
§ 477-A(1) (“A conservation easement executed on or after the effective date
of this section must include a statement of the conservation purposes of the
easement, the conservation attributes associated with the real property and

18
the benefit to the general public intended to be served by the restriction on
uses of the real property subject to the conservation easement.” (emphasis
added)); 	see 	also 	id. 	§ 	476(1) 	(“‘Conservation 	easement’ 	means 	a
nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or
affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting
natural, scenic or open space values of real property; assuring its availability for
agricultural, 	forest, 	recreational 	or 	open 	space 	use; 	protecting 	natural
resources; or maintaining or enhancing air or water quality of real property.”
(emphasis added)).
[¶28] Considering this history, had the Legislature intended, in enacting
section 478(1), for a broader group of private citizens to have standing to
enforce conservation easements upon land that they do not own, it would
have said so much more clearly.9
[¶29] 	Here, the use approved by the Land Trust is intended to provide
public access over municipal property to one of Maine’s most important
9 Such broader access to litigation could permit individuals to thwart the public purposes of a
conservation 	tool 	and 	instead 	use 	that 	tool 	to 	advance 	their 	own 	private 	interests.
Private-attorney-general standing “could allow neighbors to extract a private benefit (namely, the
continuation of an easement arrangement that only serves the personal goals of neighbors), when
the purpose of the easement, the overall conservation easement authorization, and the federal and
state tax subsidies is to benefit the public.” Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements:
A Means to Advance Efficiency, Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 467, 500 (2013).

19
natural resources—the coastal waterfront. 	The Land Trust has determined
this use to be consistent with the purposes of the conservation easement, and
although other landowners may disagree with making the identified land
accessible to the public, the Land Trust—not a private landowner such as the
Estate—is the entity identified by statute to enforce the easement’s pertinent
terms. 	See 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(B). 	If the Land Trust cannot, for identified
reasons, fulfill its obligations in reviewing and enforcing the easement, the
Attorney General—again, not a 	private landowner—has the authority to
enforce the easement. See id. § 478(1)(D).
[¶30] 	The 	pleadings disclose no 	impediment 	to the Land Trust’s
exercise of its authority, and we are not persuaded that the Legislature
intended to hinder a competent conservation easement holder’s ability to
carry 	out 	its 	responsibilities 	by 	authorizing 	expensive 	and 	complicated
enforcement lawsuits to be prosecuted by any party who happens to own land
that is also subject to 	the 	conservation easement. 	See Gerald 	Korngold,
Governmental Conservation Easements: A Means to Advance Efficiency, Freedom
from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 Brooklyn L. Rev. 467, 500-01
(2013) (observing, in a case where neighbors brought suit to enforce a
conservation easement and sued the owner of the burdened land and the

20
holder of the easement, Bjork v. Draper, 936 N.E.2d 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010),
that the “nonprofit organization was forced to spend [unknown sums of
money] on legal fees in several trials and appeals in this matter, rather than on
land conservation activities”).
[¶31] 	Although abutting or nearby landowners may have the capacity
to seek enforcement of local zoning regulations, which the Estate has also
done in a separate matter, see Estate of Robbins v. Town of Cumberland, 2017
ME 16, --- A.3d ---, the Legislature has specifically limited standing to enforce
the terms of a conservation easement against a landowner. 	There is no
suggestion in section 478(1) or in extrinsic sources that the Legislature
intended to expand litigation and increase costs to the holders of conservation
easements, especially when such standing would allow suit even by an owner
of land that, although subject to the easement, is distant from the property on
which compliance has been questioned. 	Rather, by enacting a statute that
narrowly 	defined 	the 	entities 	that 	may 	bring 	legal 	action 	and 	the
circumstances in which the Attorney General may step in for an easement
holder to enforce an easement’s terms, the Legislature acted to constrain
individual challenges to a conservation easement holder’s decision-making.

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III. CONCLUSION
[¶32] 	Marion B. Payson granted to CMIT, which was replaced by the
Land 	Trust, 	a conservation easement 	over a significant piece of 	coastal
property. 	Payson’s family has since sold part of the burdened land for
development. 	The Town of Cumberland has purchased a portion of that land
and intends to develop it so that the public may access a valued natural
resource: namely, a beach on the Town’s property. 	The Town has received
conditional 	approval 	from 	the 	Planning 	Board 	to 	undertake 	limited
development, an action which is under review in a separate appeal, with the
Land Trust’s permission and continued supervision.
[¶33] The Estate now seeks to litigate the details of enforcement of the
conservation easement upon land that it has no legal right to control. 	In
essence, the Estate seeks to enforce the easement for its own benefit.10 The
easement’s benefit, however, runs to the Land Trust, see Morrisette at 381,
10 Notably, for a conservation easement to be a valid charitable contribution for federal tax
purposes, thus permitting the owner to take a deduction for the contribution, the contribution must
be made “exclusively for conservation purposes.” 26 U.S.C.S. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), (h)(1)(C) (LEXIS
through Pub. L. No. 114-262). This is in response to Congress’s concern about “the property owner
who takes an income tax deduction, then sits on the back porch looking over the unspoiled acreage
that was the subject of the deduction.” 4 Powell on Real Property § 34A.04[4][b] (quotation marks
omitted). Thus, the tax laws are “‘designed to ensure that the payor’s primary purpose is to assist
the charity and not to secure some benefit personal to the payor.’” 	Id. § 34A.04[4][a] (quoting
Christiansen v. Comm’r, 843 F.2d 418, 420 (10th Cir. 1988)). The Maine Legislature could not have
intended to permit a landowner to donate a conservation easement for the public’s benefit with the
expectation that the landowner may, after selling a portion of the property, enforce the easement
against the new owner in order to advance the landowner’s private interests.

22
and the purpose of the easement is to benefit the public, see 33 M.R.S.
§ 477-A(1).
[¶34] 	The Superior Court correctly concluded that the Legislature did
not intend to authorize a proliferation of suits among neighbors to compel the
enforcement of conservation easements against each other. 	Accordingly, the
Estate lacks standing to bring an action to compel the Land Trust to bar the
proposed 	public 	access. 	We 	affirm 	the 	Superior 	Court’s 	well-reasoned
interpretation of the ambiguous statute and conclude that, applying that
interpretation of the statute, the Estate lacks standing to sue the Land Trust
and the Town of Cumberland in this matter to obstruct the planned use of the
land to benefit the public.11
[¶35] 	At this early point in the proceedings, however, we cannot
conclude as a matter of law that the claim for breach of contract was an
“action affecting a conservation easement.” 	33 M.R.S. § 478(1). 	Thus, we
vacate the judgment with respect to that count of the complaint but affirm the
judgment dismissing all other claims for lack of statutory standing.
11 Although the dissenting opinion suggests that the result is “absurd or illogical,” Dissenting
Opinion ¶ 52, we simply hold that an owner of similarly encumbered property does not have
standing to assert the interests of the holder of the easement (here, the Land Trust) as to another
owner’s land. See 33 M.R.S. § 478(1) (2016).

23
The entry is:
Judgment vacated to the extent that it dismissed
the 	breach 	of 	contract 	claim; 	in 	all 	other
respects, 	judgment 	affirmed. 	Remanded 	for
further proceedings on the breach of contract
claim.
ALEXANDER, J. and JABAR, J., dissenting.
[¶36] We respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision that the explicit
language of 33 M.R.S. 	§ 	478(1)(A) (2016) giving standing in any action
affecting the conservation easement to “[a]n owner of an interest in the real
property burdened by the easement,” is somehow ambiguous. 	After holding
that section 478(1)(A) is ambiguous, the Court erroneously determines that
the Estate of Merrill P. Robbins lacked standing to bring this action affecting
its interest in its real property burdened by the easement and affirms the
Superior Court’s order dismissing the Estate’s complaint seeking to enforce
the conservation easement. 	The Court does remand for the trial court to
explore whether or not there might be some contractual obligation that might
give the Estate standing.

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I. EASEMENT HISTORY
[¶37] In 1997, Marion B. Payson executed a conservation easement by
deed. 	The Chebeague & Cumberland Land Trust (the Land Trust) is the
current grantee of the deed and “holder” of the easement. 	The easement
covers a roughly 100-acre parcel of land on the coast in Cumberland, referred
to as “the Property” throughout the deed. The conservation easement’s stated
purpose is to retain the Property “predominantly in its scenic, natural, and
open space condition for conservation purposes and to prevent any use of the
Property that will significantly impair or interfere with the conservation
values of the Property and the Property’s natural resources and associated
ecosystems.” 	This 	stated 	purpose 	generally 	follows 	the 	definition 	of
“conservation easement” in 33 M.R.S. § 476(1) (2016). 	Neither the stated
purpose of the conservation easement nor the statutory definition make any
particular mention of public access, though many of the uses listed would
involve use by some individuals, though not necessarily the public at large.
See id.
[¶38] 	The Estate owns only a small portion of the 100-acre parcel
subject 	to 	the 	conservation 	easement. 	Since 	the 	1997 	creation 	of 	the
easement, (1) the Town of Cumberland has acquired another part of the 100

25
acres to develop a beach, a sixty-car parking lot, a bath house and related
amenities, and (2) a real estate developer has acquired the remainder of the
protected 	land 	that 	has 	been 	divided 	into 	ten 	house 	lots.12 	Although
conservation easements are required by law to be “unlimited in duration”
subject to certain exceptions, 33 M.R.S. § 477(3) (2016), limitations on uses
consistent with the original stated purposes of the easement apparently are
being abandoned, except on the Estate’s property.13
[¶39] 	The Land Trust, as holder of the conservation easement and
grantee of the deed, is primarily responsible for enforcing the terms of the
easement. 	See 33 M.R.S. §§ 476(2), 478(1)(B). 	The Land Trust supports the
planned development of the land.
[¶40] 	The Estate, after communicating its concerns to the Land Trust
and the Town, brought this action naming the Land Trust and the Town as
defendants. 	Upon the Town’s and the Land Trust’s motions to dismiss
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the 	trial 	court dismissed the Estate’s
complaint in its entirety, concluding that the Estate lacked standing to initiate
12 Three houses have already been built in this area, and seven lots remain available for
development.
13 This easement was created in 1997. 	Conservation easements created after 2007 may be
terminated or amended only with court approval in an action in which the Attorney General is
made a party. See 33 M.R.S. §§ 477(3)(B), 477-A(2)(B), 478 (2016).

26
an action to enforce the conservation easement as it relates to the Town’s
property.
[¶41] 	The trial court interpreted 33 M.R.S. § 478(1)(A) and concluded
that the statutory language “[a]n owner of an interest in the real property
burdened by the easement” is limited to an owner of an interest in the real
property that may actually be subject to development or other use allegedly
inconsistent with the limitations of the conservation easement—here, the
Town property. 	By that reasoning, accepted by the Court, only an owner of
land being developed in violation of a conservation easement has standing, as
an owner, to challenge its own violation of the easement.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶42] Every plaintiff who commences a lawsuit must demonstrate that
it has standing to do so. 	Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶ 7,
96 A.3d 700. 	“Standing” is a term that “refers to the minimum interest or
injury suffered that is likely to be redressed by judicial relief,” and what is
required to demonstrate standing may be set out by the common law or by
statute, depending upon the type of claim. Id.
[¶43] 	The conservation easement laws codified at 33 M.R.S. §§ 476 to
479-C (2016) apply to the conservation easement at issue in this matter,

27
because the easement was created after September 19, 1985. 	See 33 M.R.S.
§ 479-A(1); P.L. 1985, ch. 395, § 3 (effective Sept. 19, 1985). 	Section 478(1)
specifies who may initiate or intervene in an action affecting a conservation
easement. It provides, in pertinent part:
1. 	Action 	or 	intervention. 	An 	action 	affecting 	a
conservation easement may be brought or intervened in by:
A. An owner of an interest in the real property burdened by
the easement;
B. A holder of the easement;
C. A person having a 3rd-party right of enforcement; or
D. 	The Attorney General [provided certain conditions are
met first].
[¶44] 	The statute identifies four different entities that may enforce a
conservation easement. 	This case deals with only one of those alternatives,
section 478(1)(A). There is no reason to discuss the possible role of the Land
Trust that is a holder of the easement, section 478(1)(B); the Attorney General
pursuant 	to 	section 	478(1)(D); 	or 	other 	parties, 	including 	abutting
landowners, that may have third party rights of enforcement pursuant to
section 478(1)(C).
[¶45] 	The Estate’s complaint is “[a]n action affecting a conservation
easement.” 	33 M.R.S. § 478(1). 	To establish standing, pursuant to section

28
478(1)(A), therefore, the Estate must demonstrate only that it is “[a]n owner
of an interest in the real property burdened by the easement.” 	33 M.R.S.
§ 478(1)(A). 	There is no dispute that the Estate owns property that is
“burdened by the easement.”
[¶46] 	“In construing a statute our duty is to give effect to the intent of
the Legislature as evidenced by the language of the statute.” Concord Gen. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co., 411 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Me. 1980). 	“We
will construe a statute based on its plain meaning in the context of the
statutory scheme, and only if the statute is ambiguous will we look to extrinsic
indicia of legislative intent such as relevant legislative history.” Strout v. Cent.
Me. Med. Ctr., 2014 ME 77, ¶ 10, 94 A.3d 786. “If the meaning of the language
is plain, we must interpret the statute to mean exactly what it says.” 	Concord
Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 411 A.2d at 1020.
[¶47] 	As 	indicated 	in 	the 	quote 	from 	section 	478(1)(A) 	above,
“[a]n action affecting a conservation easement may be brought or intervened
in by . . . [a]n owner of an interest in the real property burdened by the
easement.” 	The plain meaning of this language confers standing to bring an
action affecting a conservation easement upon any person who owns an
interest in the land burdened by the easement. 	Section 478’s specific

29
reference to “the real property burdened by the easement” refers back to all of
the real property so burdened, not just the property that may be used in
violation of the easement.
[¶48] “The” is a definite article and it points to a definite object. “[T]he
real property burdened by the easement” is a specific reference, and it is a
reference to the property described in a conservation easement that is being
burdened by that conservation easement. To conclude that “the real property
burdened by the easement” refers only to the parcel being altered would
require this Court to add to the language of 478(1)(A). Although the holder of
the easement has certain duties that other property owners within the “real
property burdened by the easement” may enforce, this does not limit the
enforcement capacity given to any property owner who owns land within the
overall conservation easement.
[¶49] 	Under basic property law, a landowner who owns property
subject to an easement holds that property subject to all of the restrictions
within the easement. 	A conservation easement is one form of easement and
carries the same duties and burdens of any easement.
A conservation easement is usually not an easement in the sense
of 	an 	affirmative 	right 	to 	use 	or 	traverse 	the 	burdened
property . . . . 	Since the landowner agrees to restrict activity on

30
the land, a conservation easement may be more accurately viewed
as a restrictive covenant or negative easement.
4-34A Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34A.01 (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., 2005).
[¶50] 	The Land Trust and the Town argue that applying section 478’s
plain language would lead to illogical or absurd results contrary to public
interest. 	They speculate that landowners subject to conservation easements
spanning 	thousands 	of 	acres 	may 	commence 	lawsuits 	to 	prevent 	other
landowners living miles away from making small improvements to their
property. That hypothetical is not the situation before us. Here the easement
covers only 100 acres, and the use, quiet enjoyment, and value of the Estate’s
property may be directly affected by the development of the Town property as
a public beach.
[¶51] 	Even considering the Land Trust and the Town’s hypothetical,
though, such a result would not be absurd or illogical. 	In an analogous case
involving a 31,000-acre subdivision property, we concluded that owners of a
leasehold interest in a developed lot in a subdivision had standing to challenge
proposed changes in use of a few undeveloped lots not contiguous to the
leaseholder’s 	lot. 	Nelson v. Bayroot, LLC, 	2008 	ME 	91, 	¶¶ 	3-7, 	9-14,
953 A.2d 378 (noting that courts in other states have held that “those with

31
interests in property contained in a subdivision have interests in other
subdivision property”). 	Furthermore, courts and defendants have tools to
dispatch 	litigation 	that 	is 	frivolous 	or 	otherwise 	fails 	to 	state 	a 	claim
appropriate for judicial determination. See, e.g., M.R. Civ. P. 11, 12(b)(6), 56.
[¶52] The truly absurd or illogical application of section 478(1) would
be to hold that only the developer of land violating the easement, or the holder
of the easement who supports the development, have standing to challenge
the 	resulting 	violation 	of the 	easement. 	The 	plain 	meaning 	of section
478(1)(A) is that any owner of an interest in the real property burdened by a
conservation easement has standing to commence an action affecting that
easement.
[¶53] 	Because the Estate, as an owner of an interest in the land
benefitted and burdened by the conservation easement, has standing to
challenge an alleged violation of the conservation easement on another lot
that may adversely affect the Estate’s quiet enjoyment of its land, we would
vacate and allow the action to proceed on the merits of the Estate’s claim.

32
Scott D. Anderson, Esq. (orally) and Juliet T. Browne, Verrill Dana, LLP,
Portland, for appellant Estate of Merrill P. Robbins
Natalie L. Burns, Esq. (orally) and Alyssa C. Tibbetts, Esq., Jensen Baird
Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellee Town of Cumberland
Paul F. Driscoll, Esq., and Russell B. Pierce, Jr., Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson &
DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for appellee Chebeague & Cumberland Land Trust
R. Reeve Wood III, Esq., Maine Farmland Trust, Inc., Belfast, for amicus curiae
Maine Farmland Trust, Inc.
Lauren E. Parker, Asst. Atty Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for
amicus curiae Office of the Attorney General
Cumberland Superior Court docket number CV-2014-523
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY