State of Maine v. Ronald P. Champagne — 2017 ME 235

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2017 ME 235
Docket: 	And-17-131
Argued: 	September 12, 2017
Decided: 	December 19, 2017
Panel: 	SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
RONALD P. CHAMPAGNE
PER CURIAM
[¶1] 	Following a final hearing on the Attorney General’s complaint
alleging that Ronald P. Champagne violated the Maine Civil Rights Act (MCRA),
the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, J.), entered a judgment
permanently enjoining Champagne from, inter alia, “threatening or using
physical force or violence against any person by reason of that person’s race,
color, religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, physical or mental disability or
sexual orientation.” See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4681(1), 4684-A (2016). Asserting that the
injunction was overbroad, Champagne moved the court to amend the judgment
and for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. See M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59.
The court denied the motions, and Champagne appealed.

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[¶2] Such a comprehensive injunctive remedy must rest upon articulated
factual findings that are supported by the evidence. Because the court did not
make the required factual findings providing the basis for its injunction, we do
not have a sufficient record for appellate review. Accordingly, we must remand
the matter for the court to make findings that provide the reasons for the
issuance of the judgment, as required by Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),
which provides, in part, that
[e]very restraining order and every order granting a preliminary
or permanent injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance;
shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail,
and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act
or acts sought to be restrained.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶3] In Vance v. Speakman, we vacated an injunction that was issued in
contravention of the Rule 65(d) requirement that a court “set forth the reasons”
for doing so, explaining that “[t]he purpose of the 65(d) requirement is to
enable an[] appellate court to know exactly what findings of fact and rulings of
law are being used to justify the injunction.” 	409 A.2d 1307, 1311 n.4
(Me. 1979). Here, the court did not articulate the “findings of fact and rulings
of law . . . being used to justify the injunction” beyond its limited finding

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regarding Champagne’s motivations based on sexual orientation. 	See Vance,
409 A.2d at 1311 n.4; M.R. Civ. P. 65(d).
[¶4] Absent adequate findings and an explanation of the court’s rationale
for the granting of and the broad scope of the injunction, we are unable to
determine whether the court abused its discretion when it issued the very
broad and permanent injunction. 	See Stanton v. Strong, 2012 ME 48, ¶ 8,
40 A.3d 1013 (“When a court grants a permanent injunction, our review is
limited 	to 	whether 	the 	injunction 	constitutes 	an 	abuse 	of 	discretion.”
(alteration and quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we remand the matter
for the court to make findings supporting an injunction of a scope that it
determines is warranted by the evidence, and to explain its rationale in doing
so.1
The entry is:
Remanded 	for 	further 	proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
1 In reaching this result, we do not suggest that the scope of the court’s original injunction is or is
not supportable; we simply hold that at this juncture there are insufficient findings to permit
appellate review.

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Donald 	S. 	Hornblower, 	Esq. 	(orally), 	Lewiston, 	for 	appellant 	Ronald 	P.
Champagne
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Leanne Robbin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally),
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number CV-2012-60
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY