State of Maine v. Corey W. Farley — 2024 ME 52

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2024 ME 52
Docket: 	Som-23-55
Argued: 	September 12, 2023
Decided: 	July 18, 2024
Panel: 	STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.*
STATE OF MAINE
v.
COREY W. FARLEY
LAWRENCE, J.
[¶1] Corey W. Farley appeals from a judgment of conviction of one count
of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C) (2024), and one count
of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2024),
entered by the trial court (Somerset County, Mullen, C.J.) after a jury trial. Farley
argues that the court erred in denying his motions to suppress his statements
to a police detective after determining that he was not in custody during his
interview and in finding that his statements to the detective were voluntary.
Farley also contends that the court erred in 	providing 	only 	a curative
instruction in 	response to prosecutorial statements 	made 	during closing
* Although Justice Jabar participated in this appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified.

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argument, regarding his ability to hear and his anxiety, that mischaracterized
the evidence; in allowing prosecutorial statements during closing argument,
regarding the meaning of emojis in a message chain, that were unsupported by
the 	evidence; 	and 	in 	allowing 	prosecutorial 	statements 	during 	closing
argument regarding the credibility of witnesses. 	We disagree and affirm the
judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. 	Background
[¶2] “Viewing the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable
to the State, the jury could rationally have found the following facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Athayde, 2022 ME 41, ¶ 2, 277 A.3d 387.
[¶3] In the spring and summer of 2020, the victim frequently visited and
spent the night at a friend’s house, where Farley lived; the victim had spent time
there for over a year. The victim was eleven years old.1
1 Farley was twenty-eight or twenty-nine years old in November 2019, he was thirty-one years
old at the time of trial in December 2022, and he was not married to the victim.

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[¶4] The victim slept in Farley’s bed. Farley touched the victim’s genitals
and had the victim touch Farley’s genitals multiple times. Farley also had the
victim engage in oral-genital contact multiple times.2
[¶5] 	After law enforcement received a 	complaint 	about 	Farley, a
detective interviewed Farley on August 20, 2021. During the interview, Farley
admitted to having oral-genital contact with the victim and having the victim
touch Farley’s genitals.
[¶6] 	Farley 	was 	charged 	initially 	by 	criminal 	complaint 	filed 	on
August 24, 2021, and then by indictment filed on November 18, 2021, with one
count of gross sexual assault (Class A) (Count 1), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C), and
one 	count 	of 	unlawful 	sexual 	contact 	(Class 	B) 	(Count 	2), 	17-A 	M.R.S.
§ 255-A(1)(E-1). Farley pleaded not guilty.
B. 	Motions to Suppress
[¶7] On October 4, 2021, Farley filed a motion to suppress his statements
made in the interview with the detective. Farley contended that the interview
violated his rights because he “was in a custodial interrogation” but “no
Miranda 	warnings 	were 	given.” 	On 	January 	18, 	2022, 	Farley 	filed 	a
2 Farley and the victim also communicated via text message and social media from 2018-2020,
and Farley sent pictures to the victim. The pictures showed, for example, Farley and the victim lying
down together without shirts and Farley’s arm around the victim as the victim slept shirtless.

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supplemental motion to suppress. 	Farley argued that the court should
suppress the statements for the additional reason that he “could not hear” the
questions due to hearing loss and his confession was thus involuntary.
[¶8] The court held a hearing on the motions to suppress on August 12,
2022. The parties stipulated to the admission in evidence of the recording of
the August 20, 2021, interview, and the interview was played during the
hearing. The court heard the testimony of the detective; Farley did not testify.
The parties subsequently submitted memoranda of law regarding the motions
to suppress.
[¶9] 	In an order entered on August 26, 2022, the court denied Farley’s
motions to suppress. 	“Viewed in the light most favorable to support the
suppression court’s decision, the record on the motion[s] to suppress supports
the following facts” found by the court. State v. Ames, 2017 ME 27, ¶ 2, 155 A.3d
881.
[¶10] 	In July 2021, a detective received a complaint that Farley had
sexually abused the victim. 	The victim was interviewed by the Children’s
Advocacy Center, and the detective then unsuccessfully attempted to “solicit
contact between the [victim] and [Farley] by . . . messaging [Farley]” while
posing as the victim.

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[¶11] 	On August 20, 2021, the detective went to Farley’s residence for
approximately forty-five minutes and interviewed Farley for approximately
forty minutes. 	The interview was unscheduled, was recorded, and occurred
mid-afternoon in an unmarked law enforcement cruiser in Farley’s driveway,
about ten yards from his residence. 	The detective wore plain clothes but
displayed his badge and firearm.
[¶12] 	The detective said that he was there to gather information and
“chat” with Farley to see if Farley was going to be “up front” with the detective
“because that makes a world of difference,”3 and Farley said that he had
“nothing to hide.”4 (Quotation marks omitted.) The detective said that Farley
did not have to talk to him and that Farley could stop talking to him and leave
at any time. 	The detective did not have any difficulty understanding Farley
during the interview. During the same time, Farley did not ask the detective to
3 When asked at the hearing if the purpose of the interview was to obtain Farley’s confession, the
detective testified that he wanted Farley to tell the truth, even if that meant confessing to what was
alleged.
4 The detective’s other statements to Farley included “I’ve got all kinds of pictures” of you without
a shirt on, “the more upfront you are with [this],” “honesty [] and being forthright mean[s] a lot,” “I’m
[just] looking for you to . . . take [some] ownership of it,” and “you knew . . . that was not right,” and
he asked Farley, “[A]re you sorry for what you did?” (Quotation marks omitted.)

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repeat any questions and did not show that he was having any problem
hearing.5
[¶13] Based on the totality of the circumstances,6 the court determined,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that Farley was not in custody during the
interview.7 The court also determined that “[t]here is basically no evidence to
support” Farley’s contention that his “alleged hearing deficiency resulted in”
him involuntarily making statements to the detective. The court further found
that multiple factors indicated that Farley’s statements were voluntary.8
5 The court found that Farley did not exhibit any difficulty hearing during the suppression hearing.
6 Specifically, the court highlighted that Farley “was just outside his home”; there was only one
detective involved in the interview, which was “reasonably brief (less than an hour)” and “was
‘relatively low-key and conducted in a conversational manner’”; Farley was told he could stop the
interview at any time; Farley was not physically restrained; and Farley never asked to stop the
interview. The court also found that Farley was told that he was not under arrest. The detective did
not use this terminology in the recorded interview, but he did promise Farley that he would leave
and that Farley would get to go home at the end of their interview. The court determined that the
facts weighing in favor of finding Farley in custody were that the interview took place in a cruiser,
Farley 	was 	the 	only 	suspect, 	and 	the 	detective 	told 	Farley 	about 	allegedly 	inculpatory
communications between the victim and Farley that the detective had.
7 The court also noted in a footnote that Farley had acknowledged in his memorandum that he
was not interrogated. On November 9, 2022, Farley filed a motion requesting that the court “amend
its order to correct [a] clerical error,” arguing that the memorandum should have stated that Farley
was subject to an interrogation. The court granted the motion in an order entered on November 15,
2022, stating that “[r]egardless of whether the issue of interrogation was at issue, the Court finds that
[Farley] was not subject to custodial interrogation, and thus no Miranda violation occurred.” The
court ordered that the footnote be deleted from the court’s August 26, 2022, order.
8 Specifically, the court found that “there was only one interview” that was not custodial. The
interview involved one detective; took place in a “neutral” location; and was relatively short,
conversational, and civil. Although the detective was “persistent,” he did not use trickery or threats,
and nothing regarding Farley’s age, health, emotional stability, or conduct suggested that the
statements were involuntary.

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C. 	Trial
[¶14] The court held a jury trial on December 14 and 15, 2022. The court
admitted in evidence photographs of messages displayed on the screen of a
device and almost the entire recording of the detective’s interview with Farley.9
One of the photographs depicted a series of messages that began with Farley
stating, “10:30 good boy 11 bad boy.” The victim responded, “Me bad boy,” and
Farley messaged, “11 tomorrow night bud.” The victim responded, “No,” and
used three emojis, which the victim testified were “a pointer at — like closing
their finger meaning small and an eggplant emoji.”10
[¶15] 	The victim testified that the eggplant emoji meant “[a] penis,”
responded yes when asked if the victim was telling Farley that “he has a small
penis,” and explained that the victim “was making a joke.” 	The detective
testified that because of his training and experience he knew that the eggplant
emoji meant a penis; that he “deemed [the emoji] to be indicating there was
some sort of activity going on with the male genitalia”; and that he thought the
9 In its statement of the issues presented, the State includes “whether the Trial Court properly
ruled in limine to redact a portion of the recording” of Farley’s interview with the detective, “under
[Maine Rule of Evidence] 403.” The State, however, does not elaborate regarding this issue other
than to say that the court “properly ruled in limine to redact a portion of the recording.” Regardless,
the issue is moot because we affirm the judgment.
10 Farley then messaged, “Please bud, u know why.” The victim responded “N9,” which the victim
testified meant no, and then the victim messaged, “Plz 11.”

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emojis meant the victim was “saying, no, I don’t want this” and that Farley and
the victim “were talking about a sexual exchange that’s going to happen.”11
[¶16] Later during the trial, Farley and his aunt both testified that Farley
had issues with hearing loss. 	Farley further testified that he was diagnosed
with anxiety, which also affected his answers during the interview.
[¶17] 	During the prosecutor’s closing argument, he discussed the
victim’s testimony and stated that it “had all of the hallmarks of truth,” that the
victim “was forthright,” and that the victim “has been forthright and maintained
the truth.”12 The prosecutor also stated to the jury that the emojis corroborated
11 The detective testified, “Whether or not I was correct or not, we have been clarified today on
what that actually meant.”
12 After stating to the jury that the victim’s “testimony had all of the hallmarks of truth,” the
prosecutor continued,
First, [the victim] answered all of the questions asked . . . as best [as the victim] could
and [the victim] did it directly. If you examine the jury instructions that you are going
to be sent back with, it is going to give you a number of different ways in which you
can evaluate someone’s testimony. . . . [Y]ou may consider whether the witness was
forthright. [The victim] was forthright. [The victim’s] testimony was very — clearly
very emotional and very difficult for [the victim]. We could plainly see that on the
stand.
It defies logic to think that [the victim] would maintain a deception to this extent
and at such great personal and emotional cost to get up here in front of this group and
tell that story. 	There was no evidence introduced about any equivocation in [the
victim’s] account.
You will see in the jury instructions, again you may consider whether . . . on some
prior occasion the witness made a statement inconsistent with their testimony. There
was no evidence of that. Since [the victim] has disclosed to [the victim’s] mother, [the
victim] has been forthright and maintained the truth.

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the victim’s account of the events.13 	Farley did not object to the prosecutor’s
statements.
[¶18] 	During the prosecutor’s rebuttal, he stated to the jury that there
was no evidence other than Farley’s testimony to show that Farley had hearing
issues or anxiety.14 Farley’s counsel objected, and the court instructed the jury
that “the attorneys are free to argue what they say the evidence shows or what
the evidence doesn’t show or what there is or isn’t for evidence, but it is your
The prosecutor later stated to the jury, “The second [h]allmark of truth and justified by [the victim’s]
testimony is that it is corroborated, right.”
13 The prosecutor argued,
A fair reading of those texts, especially in the context of the relationship described by
[the victim] and described by the defendant on the recording with [the detective][,]
is that the defendant was implying that he wanted [the victim] to be a bad boy starting
at around 11 o’clock at night when [the victim] went to bed in Corey Farley’s bed.
That’s where [the victim] slept . . . . The implication is that he was going to do naughty
things in bed with [the victim]. That’s what those emojis were about.
[The victim] was seemingly willing to be a bad boy, but couldn’t help commenting
how small the defendant’s penis was using those emojis. Again, [the victim] couldn’t
have known anything about this 29-year old man’s penis unless [the victim] had seen
it. 	It is also too suspicious to ignore that reference to a penis being immediately
connected to the talk about being a bad boy in the text, right.
14 The prosecutor stated,
There is also some other evidence that we didn’t hear any of. Wouldn’t it have
been nice to hear from [the doctor Farley said diagnosed his anxiety]? We have the
defendant’s words that he has anxiety. No medical professionals came here and told
you about that. You can have doubt about that because it is not corroborated. He told
you that he had a hearing issue, but he couldn’t even name the doctor who diagnosed
him with that. There is no evidence to show he has either of those issues, other than
his word, and his word only when it is most convenient for him to bring it, right, he
didn’t mention any of that to [the detective]. He didn’t mention any of that on the
stand — or until he came on to the stand here.

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memory of what transpired that controls.”15 The prosecutor then stated to the
jury that Farley’s aunt had testified that Farley “had a hearing problem, but you
know what, my mom thinks I am handsome, that doesn’t really carry a lot of
weight.” The prosecutor later commented on Farley’s “throwing every excuse
against the wall” and indicated that this was “not the [h]allmark of truth.”16
Farley did not object.
[¶19] 	The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. Farley was
sentenced to twenty-three years of imprisonment on Count 1 and ten years of
imprisonment on Count 2, to be served concurrently with Count 1. The court
also 	imposed 	lifetime 	supervised 	release.17 	Farley 	timely 	appealed.
See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2024); M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).
15 The court also stated, “So if your memory is different from that of the attorneys, then your
collective memory is the one that you should follow.” The court later instructed the jury, after the
prosecutor had concluded his rebuttal, that “[t]he attorneys have just presented to you their evidence
and have explained . . . how they believe you should view the evidence . . . .” The court also instructed
the jury, “You are the only ones that can decide what the evidence shows.” Prior to closing argument,
the court had instructed the jury that the arguments were not evidence and that if the jury’s
recollection of the evidence differed from what counsel relayed in closing argument, the jury should
rely on its recollection of the evidence. During its general instructions, the court again stated that the
attorneys’ closing arguments were not evidence and that the jury’s memory of the evidence
controlled over the attorneys’ arguments.
16 The prosecutor argued to the jury that “some of this talk about the hearing, or was it the anxiety,
they are just throwing every excuse against the wall. 	It sounds like a kid, right, the dog ate my
homework, and my alarm didn’t work, and I was late for the bus, like just throw it all at the wall and
see what sticks. That is not the [h]allmark of truth.”
17 Farley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Nevertheless, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we determine that the jury “rationally could find

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II. DISCUSSION
A. 	Suppression Issues18
1. 	Custodial Interrogation Determination
[¶20] Farley contends that the court should have excluded the recorded
interview with the detective because, given the totality of factors, Farley was in
custody during the interview. Farley points out that, inter alia, he was the only
suspect under investigation; he was in a closely-confined police vehicle; and the
detective was armed, persistent in his questioning, and implied that Farley
would “receive favor for disclosing information.”
beyond a reasonable doubt every element” of the charged offenses. State v. Dorweiler, 2016 ME 73,
¶ 6, 143 A.3d 114 (quotation marks omitted).
18 Farley’s motions to suppress raised two arguments: (1) Farley’s interview with the detective
was custodial and thus required a warning, before questioning, that Farley was free to remain silent
and (2) Farley’s statements were involuntary. As to the first argument, Farley has not developed a
claim under the Maine Constitution, and so we review his claim under only federal law. See State v.
Tripp, 2024 ME 12, ¶ 20 n.9, 314 A.3d 101.
As to the second argument, we have previously explained in some detail how we review whether
a statement is involuntary under article I, section 6 and article I, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution,
and how that review is more expansive than the review given under the federal constitutional
counterparts to these state constitutional provisions. 	See, e.g., State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120,
1122-24 (Me. 1982); see also State v. Athayde, 2022 ME 41, ¶ 23, 277 A.3d 387. We therefore review
Farley’s claim under the Maine Constitution. Because, as explained infra, that claim fails under the
Maine Constitution, it also fails under the Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. See Athayde, 2022 ME 41, ¶ 39, 277 A.3d 387. See generally State v. Norris, 2023
ME 60, ¶ 34, 302 A.3d 1 (noting that “[w]hat is required to preserve a state constitutional claim will
vary by context” and that less development is required “when we have already explained in some
depth the scope of the state constitutional provision at issue”).

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[¶21] 	“When addressing a challenge to a court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review the motion court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo.” 	State v. Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 14, 159 A.3d 840.
“A Miranda warning is necessary only if a defendant is: (1) in custody; and
(2) subject to interrogation.”19 State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 21, 928 A.2d 746
(alteration and quotation marks omitted). 	“We treat the determination of
whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes as a mixed question of
law and fact.” Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 14, 159 A.3d 840; see also Ames, 2017 ME
27, ¶ 11, 155 A.3d 881 (explaining that if a ruling is “based primarily on
undisputed facts,” we will view that ruling de novo as a legal conclusion and
“will uphold the court’s denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view
of the evidence supports the trial court’s decision” (quotation marks omitted));
State v. Glenn, 2021 ME 7, ¶ 21, 244 A.3d 1023 (stating that we “will not reverse
a trial court’s custodial determination unless the record fails to rationally
support the finding” (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶22] 	To determine whether a person was in custody, “a court must
objectively review the pertinent circumstances to decide whether a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to terminate the
19 The State concedes that Farley was subject to interrogation.

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interaction with law enforcement or if there was a restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” 	Perry, 2017 ME 74,
¶ 15, 159 A.3d 840 (quotation marks omitted). 	“[A] court may consider a
number of factors” in this analysis.20 Id.
[¶23] The court did not err in concluding that Farley was not in custody.
The court’s factual findings are all supported by competent evidence. Although
there are some factors that could support a conclusion that Farley was in
custody, only a single detective interviewed Farley; the interview occurred
mid-afternoon, in an unmarked cruiser parked within yards of Farley’s home;
Farley was not physically restrained; Farley was told he could leave at any time
and did not have to talk to the detective; Farley never asked to stop the
interview; and the interview was conversational and under an hour long.
See State v. Williams, 2011 ME 36, ¶¶ 2, 8, 15 A.3d 753.
20 Those factors include “(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements; (2) the party
who initiated the contact; (3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent
communicated to the defendant); (4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to
the defendant, to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position
would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant
manifested to the police, to the extent the officer’s response would affect how a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave; (6) the focus of the investigation
(as a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would perceive it); (7) whether the suspect was
questioned in familiar surroundings; (8) the number of law enforcement officers present; (9) the
degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and (10) the duration and character of the
interrogation.” State v. Perry, 2017 ME 74, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 840 (quoting State v. Michaud, 1998 ME
251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222); see also State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746 (explaining that the
factors “are viewed in their totality, not in isolation”).

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[¶24] Therefore, given the totality of the circumstances, the court did not
err. 	See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, ¶¶ 3-4, 11-14, 97 A.3d 595
(concluding that the defendant was not in custody during an interview in a
police cruiser located “immediately outside” the defendant’s residence); Perry,
2017 ME 74, ¶ 16, 159 A.3d 840; Ames, 2017 ME 27, ¶¶ 3-6, 14-15, 22, 155 A.3d
881; Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶¶ 3-13, 16, 20, 24-30, 928 A.2d 746; State v. Higgins,
2002 ME 77, ¶¶ 5-8, 14-18, 796 A.2d 50.
2. 	Voluntariness Determination
[¶25] Farley contends that the objective conditions of the interview, “and
the subjective emotional agitation coursing through [him] as he was confronted
with serious allegations, give[] rise to a finding of involuntariness in the
statements.”
[¶26] 	“We 	review 	the 	trial 	court’s 	factual 	findings 	regarding
voluntariness 	for 	clear 	error 	and 	its 	ultimate 	determination 	regarding
voluntariness de novo.” 	Glenn, 2021 ME 7, ¶¶ 25, 28-29, 244 A.3d 1023
(quotation marks omitted) (explaining that because “the test is essentially a
factual one . . . we defer to the trial court’s findings in the absence of clear
error”). “A confession is voluntary if it results from the free choice of a rational
mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the

15
circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.” 	State v. Seamon,
2017 ME 123, ¶ 18, 165 A.3d 342 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶27] 	“The 	suppression 	judge 	must 	consider 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances in determining whether a confession is voluntary.” 	Dion, 2007
ME 87, ¶¶ 32, 35, 928 A.2d 746 (quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the
factors supporting a determination that a defendant was not in custody can also
support a conclusion that the defendant’s statements were voluntary). 	The
determination depends on “the details of the interrogation; [the] duration of
the interrogation; [the] location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation
was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers
involved; the persistence of the officers; [any] police trickery; [any] threats,
promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant’s age,
physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.” Glenn, 2021 ME
7, ¶ 26, 244 A.3d 1023 (quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Annis, 2018
ME 15, ¶¶ 	14-15, 178 A.3d 467 	(“[N]either a law enforcement officer’s
generalized and vague suggestions that telling the truth will be helpful to a
defendant in the long run, nor mere admonitions or exhortations to tell the

16
truth, will factor significantly into the totality of the circumstances analysis.”
(quotation marks omitted)).21
[¶28] 	Competent 	evidence 	supports 	the 	court’s 	factual 	findings
regarding voluntariness. 	The court “properly concluded that those facts
establish a voluntary confession,” and we affirm the court’s denial of Farley’s
motions to suppress. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 35, 928 A.2d 746 (determining that
the defendant’s statements were voluntary where there was no physical force,
“[t]he interview was conversational and cooperative, and the officers remained
calm and polite”); Seamon, 2017 ME 123, ¶¶ 3-7, 19-22, 165 A.3d 342; see also
Annis, 2018 ME 15, ¶¶ 14-15, 16 & n.3, 178 A.3d 467 (explaining that “[t]he
suppression record here is devoid of any testimony concerning how [the
defendant’s] claimed psychiatric disorders may have affected his ability to
voluntarily speak with the investigators”).
21 Hearing loss was the only basis for Farley’s argument, in his motions to suppress, that his
statements were involuntary. Farley thus failed to preserve the argument that he asserts on appeal
regarding his anxiety causing a lack of voluntariness. See, e.g., State v. Annis, 2018 ME 15, ¶ 12 & n.1,
178 A.3d 467 (declining to address an argument regarding “an additional ground for suppression”
relating to “cognitive limitations and mental health issues” because “this argument was not raised
before the suppression court”).

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B. 	Prosecutorial Error Issues
1. 	Prosecutor’s Statements 	About Farley’s Hearing Loss and
Anxiety
[¶29] Farley contends that the prosecutor “unfairly mischaracterized the
evidence” 	when 	the 	“prosecutor 	improperly 	suggested” 	there 	was 	“‘no’
corroborating evidence” to support Farley’s deafness and anxiety.22 	Farley
argues that the court’s curative effort after his objection was insufficient
because 	it 	was 	a 	general 	instruction 	and 	the 	prosecutor’s 	statement
immediately thereafter undermined its usefulness,23 and that the error was not
harmless. The State concedes that the prosecutor made an error in stating that
there was no corroboration for Farley’s testimony regarding his hearing issues,
but it argues that any error was harmless because the prosecutor immediately
corrected himself and the court gave a curative instruction, which was also
given multiple times throughout the delivery of the jury instructions.
[¶30] Because Farley objected to the prosecutor’s initial statements, “we
review the preserved claim of prosecutorial error for harmless error.” State v.
22 Here, as in State v. Tripp, 2024 ME 12, ¶ 20 n.9, 314 A.3d 101, Farley is not alleging that the
prosecutor’s statements were made in bad faith. Rather, he focuses on the statements’ impact on his
trial.
23 	Farley did not object to the prosecutor’s statement after the court’s instruction. 	We thus
consider this statement below, see infra n.25, but apply an obvious error standard of review, see State
v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 35-38, 58 A.3d 1032.

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Osborn, 2023 ME 19, ¶ 21, 290 A.3d 558. “Harmful error is error that affects
the criminal defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that the error was
sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding.” 	Id.
(quotation marks omitted); see M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a).
[¶31] “We analyze claims of prosecutorial error in the overall context of
the trial.” Osborn, 2023 ME 19, ¶ 22, 290 A.3d 558 (quotation marks omitted);
see also State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 32-34, 58 A.3d 1032 (describing
factors that we consider in determining the effect of an error). “[W]e generally
defer to the determination of the trial judge, who has the immediate feel of what
is transpiring, that a curative instruction will adequately protect against the
jury’s consideration of a misstatement by the prosecutor.” State v. Bethea, 2019
ME 169, ¶ 26, 221 A.3d 563 (quotation marks omitted). “Only where there are
exceptionally prejudicial circumstances or prosecutorial bad faith will a
curative 	instruction 	be 	deemed 	inadequate 	to 	eliminate 	prejudice.” 	Id.
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶32] 	Here, the conceded error was harmless. The prosecutor initially
stated that there was “no evidence to show [Farley] has either [anxiety or a
hearing issue], other than his word.” This was untrue with respect to Farley’s

19
hearing,24 because Farley’s aunt had testified that Farley had problems with
hearing. The court, however, gave a curative instruction to the jury, see supra
¶ 18 & n.15, indicating, inter alia, that “the attorneys are free to argue . . . what
there is or isn’t for evidence, but it is your memory of what transpired that
controls.” 	See Bethea, 2019 ME 169, ¶ 27, 221 A.3d 563 (stating that we
presume that the jury follows the court’s instruction regarding “the jury’s
responsibility to rely on its own recollection of the evidence”).
[¶33] 	The court had given a similar instruction prior to the start of
closing argument and gave a similar instruction after closing argument.
See Osborn, 2023 ME 19, ¶ 25, 290 A.3d 558. Further, after the court’s curative
instruction, the prosecutor acknowledged that Farley’s aunt had “said that
[Farley] had a hearing problem.” 	Cf. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 54-55, 58 A.3d
1032 (determining the court’s multiple instructions “were sufficient to remedy
any prejudice” even though the prosecutor continued to make improper
statements after the defense counsel’s objection and the court’s first curative
instruction). 	Thus, we 	determine 	that 	any 	error did not affect Farley’s
substantial rights.
24 Regarding Farley’s anxiety, the prosecutor was correct that there had been no evidence offered
at trial other than Farley’s testimony.

20
2. 	Prosecutor’s Statements Regarding the Emojis
[¶34] 	Farley argues that the “prosecutor improperly proffered an
unsupported conclusion about the ‘emoji’ text message (sent by [the victim])
having sexual connotations, despite such a conclusion being directly opposite
to the testimonial evidence at trial,” and that this prejudiced his substantial
rights to a fair trial.
[¶35] 	Because Farley did not object to the prosecutor’s statements at
trial, our review is for obvious error. See id. ¶¶ 35-38. “To demonstrate obvious
error, the defendant must show that there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and
(3) that affects substantial rights.” 	Id. ¶ 35 (quotation marks omitted);
see M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b). “Even if these three conditions are met, we will set
aside a jury’s verdict only if we conclude that (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 	Dolloff,
2012 ME 130, ¶ 35, 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶36] Prosecutors should avoid “[m]isrepresenting material facts in the
record or making statements of material fact unsupported by any evidence.” Id.
¶ 42. 	In determining whether the prosecutor erred, the issue is “whether the
prosecutor’s comment is fairly based on the facts in evidence.” 	State v. Cote,
2017 ME 73, ¶ 26, 159 A.3d 831 (quotation marks omitted). We have, however,

21
consistently “upheld the prosecutor’s ability to argue vigorously for any
position, conclusion, or inference supported by the evidence.” 	Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
[¶37] Here, there was no obvious error. Although Farley is correct that
the victim testified that the messages reflected a joke, exhibits containing the
messages and emojis were admitted in evidence, the victim and detective both
testified that the eggplant emoji meant a penis, and the detective also testified
that he initially thought the messages indicated that Farley and the victim “were
talking about a sexual exchange.” 	Cf. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 54-55, 58 A.3d
1032 (concluding the prosecutor made multiple improper statements that
could “be seen as the prosecutor’s belief as to what a dog might have been
thinking” and were “not based on evidence”). 	The prosecutor did not err in
inferring from this testimony and from the exhibits that the messages had a
sexual connotation, despite the testimony to the contrary that the messages did
not mean this. 	See Cote, 2017 ME 73, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 831 (explaining that
although the defendant “denied stomping on the victim’s head, the State’s
attorney was free to argue to the jury that, based on the evidence presented, it
could arrive at the opposite conclusion”); State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, ¶¶ 19-21,
43 A.3d 952.

22
3. 	Prosecutor’s Statements Regarding Credibility
[¶38] 	Farley contends that the prosecutor improperly commented
regarding the victim’s truthfulness and Farley’s dishonesty and that the
statements 	were 	obvious 	error.25 	The 	State 	concedes 	that 	one 	of 	the
prosecutor’s statements regarding the victim may have been in error,26 but it
argues, inter alia, that when read in context, the statements related to how to
evaluate the witness’s credibility and that even the potentially problematic
statement was not a plain error.
[¶39] “The role of a prosecutor in the courtroom is unique, serving as a
minister of justice who is obligated to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
25 	As mentioned above, see supra ¶ 29 & n.23, Farley also takes issue with the prosecutor’s
comment about Farley’s aunt’s testimony, a comment which the prosecutor made after the court’s
instruction. 	Farley contends that the prosecutor’s comment regarding Farley’s aunt’s testimony
“injected [the prosecutor’s] opinion about credibility of the aunt’s testimony.” Because Farley did not
object after the prosecutor’s statement, we review for obvious error. 	See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130,
¶¶ 35-38, 58 A.3d 1032. The prosecutor stated, “So we did hear from his aunt, and she said that he
had a hearing problem, but you know what, my mom thinks I am handsome, that doesn’t really carry
a lot of weight.” The court did not commit obvious error in allowing this statement, given the brief
nature of the prosecutor’s comment; the court’s curative instruction, which was given to the jury
immediately prior to the prosecutor’s statement and which was repeated in the court’s closing
instructions; and the fact that the prosecutor’s statement suggested that the jury should consider the
weight to give the aunt’s testimony in light of her relationship to Farley, and did not directly state
that the aunt was untruthful or not credible. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 59-60; State v. Clark, 2008 ME 136, ¶ 15,
954 A.2d 1066.
26 Specifically, the State identifies the prosecutor’s statement that the victim “has been forthright
and maintained the truth.”

23
evidence.” State v. Hanscom, 2016 ME 184, ¶ 18, 152 A.3d 632 (quotation marks
omitted). 	“[T]he use of the authority or prestige of the prosecutor’s office to
shore up the credibility of a witness, sometimes called ‘vouching,’ constitutes
prosecutorial error.” Osborn, 2023 ME 19, ¶ 23, 290 A.3d 558 (quotation marks
omitted); see also Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 42, 58 A.3d 1032 (listing, as a type of
statement that is almost always error, “[i]njecting personal opinion regarding
the guilt or credibility of the accused or other witnesses”); Hanscom, 2016 ME
184, ¶ 20, 152 A.3d 632 (“It is improper . . . for a prosecutor to vouch for a
witness by . . . implying that the jury should credit the prosecution’s evidence
simply because the government can be trusted.” (alteration and quotation
marks omitted)). However, “a prosecutor may attack credibility by analyzing
the evidence and highlighting absurdities or discrepancies in a witness’s
testimony.” State v. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 17, 957 A.2d 80 (quotation marks
omitted).
[¶40] Because Farley did not object to any of the prosecutor’s statements
regarding credibility, we review the court’s allowance of those statements for
obvious error. See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶¶ 35-38, 58 A.3d 1032. Even when
the prosecutor has committed an error, it is not obvious error unless it is
“plain.” Id. ¶ 35. “An error is plain” if it “is so clear under current law, that the

24
trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the
defendant’s timely assistance in detecting it.” 	Id. ¶ 36 (alteration, quotation
marks, and citation omitted). To constitute obvious error, the error must also
have 	affected 	the 	defendant’s 	substantial 	rights 	by 	being 	“sufficiently
prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 37 (quotation
marks omitted). “When a prosecutor’s statement is not sufficient to draw an
objection, particularly when viewed in the overall context of the trial, that
statement will rarely be found to have created a reasonable probability that it
affected the outcome of the proceeding.” 	Id. ¶ 38. 	“We will first review
instances of alleged prosecutorial error to determine whether error occurred,
and, if there was error, we will then review the State’s comments as a whole,
examining the incidents of error both alone and cumulatively.” State v. Warner,
2023 ME 55, ¶ 14, 301 A.3d 763 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶41] Despite the conceded prosecutorial error, the court did not commit
obvious error. 	The prosecutor contended during closing argument that, inter
alia, the victim’s “testimony had all of the hallmarks of truth” and that the victim
“was forthright” and “has been forthright and maintained the truth.” Although
the 	prosecutor 	should 	have 	omitted 	these 	references 	to 	the 	truth, 	the
prosecutor made the statements in the context of discussing jury instructions

25
and methods that the jury could use to evaluate the victim’s credibility based
on the way the victim testified. The prosecutor argued, for example, that the
victim answered all questions directly, despite the difficult nature of the
testimony; that there was no evidence of equivocation in the victim’s account
of the events; that there was no evidence of the victim making statements
inconsistent with the victim’s testimony; and that the evidence corroborated
the victim’s testimony. See State v. Comer, 644 A.2d 7, 8-10 (Me. 1994); State v.
Moontri, 649 A.2d 315, 316-17 (Me. 1994) (determining that there was no
obvious error because the prosecutor’s comment, regarding the version of
events testified to by the defendant’s friend, was “based on the evidence”);
see also State v. Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 40, 119 A.3d 727 (concluding that
although the prosecutor’s statement in closing argument that the victim’s
“testimony was very strong” could “constitute vouching, the error is not plain”
(quotation marks omitted)). Further, the prosecutor did not convey a personal
opinion of the victim’s credibility. See M.R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(e); Schmidt, 2008
ME 151, ¶¶ 17-18, 957 A.2d 80; cf. Hanscom, 2016 ME 184, ¶¶ 17-21, 152 A.3d
632 (determining that the prosecutor had impermissibly vouched for the
credibility of two child witnesses, including by arguing that “[t]hey were

26
specific, they were detailed, and I would submit to you they were genuine in
their testimony” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶42] In his rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that Farley’s “talk about the
hearing, or was it the anxiety,” was “just throwing every excuse against the
wall” and “not the [h]allmark of truth.” 	This argument was grounded in the
evidence that the defense offered, evidence which was discussed in the defense
counsel’s closing argument, and the argument was made in the larger context
of the prosecutor’s earlier arguments about the jury’s evaluation of a witness’s
credibility—here, Farley’s credibility—given the evidence. See Comer, 644 A.2d
at 9 (“Although unable to assert personal opinion, a prosecutor may attack
credibility 	by 	analyzing 	the 	evidence 	and 	highlighting 	absurdities 	or
discrepancies in a witness’s testimony.”); Warner, 2023 ME 55, ¶ 14, 301 A.3d
763 	(explaining 	that 	analyzing 	incidents 	of 	alleged 	prosecutorial 	error
“includes taking into account the statements, comments, and strategy of the
defense, especially when the prosecutor’s statements are made in response to
the theory, argument, or provocation of the defendant or defense counsel”
(quotation marks omitted)); 	cf. 	State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d 1318, 1319-21
(Me. 1994) (determining there was obvious error where the prosecutor, in
addition to improperly cross-examining the defendant, argued that the victim

27
‘‘told you the truth” and that either the victim or defendant “was lying here to
all of us” and explaining that “[t]he clear implication is that the prosecutor
believed that the victim told the truth but defendant lied” (quotation marks
omitted)).
[¶43] The case against Farley did center on the credibility of the victim
and on the credibility of Farley, whose testimony disputed the victim’s account.
However, the jury also 	had before it 	the 	admitted 	recording of Farley’s
interview and his own admissions to having engaged in sexual acts with the
victim and having the victim touch Farley’s genitals. Cf. State v. Tripp, 634 A.2d
1318, 1319-21 (Me. 1994) (determining the prosecutor’s statements in closing
argument constituted obvious error in part because it was a “close case,” where
“[o]ther than the testimony of the victim, there was no direct evidence of guilt
and limited circumstantial evidence”). 	Further, the prosecutor’s statements
were isolated. 	Cf. State v. Clark, 2008 ME 136, ¶¶ 6-7, 11-14, 954 A.2d 1066
(determining there was not obvious error, considering the context of the record
in the case, where the prosecutor argued in four instances that the defendant
lied to the jury during the defendant’s testimony).
[¶44] 	Finally, the court later instructed the jury that it could “consider
whether the witness was forthright or evasive” and that “[t]he attorneys have

28
every right to argue with respect to the facts and the credibility of witnesses,
however, you [the jurors] are to make your own decisions as to credibility, and
you make your own decisions as to the facts.” See Fahnley, 2015 ME 82, ¶ 40,
119 A.3d 727 (explaining that “given the court’s instructions regarding the
jury’s role in determining the facts,” any error relating to the prosecutor
arguing that the victim’s “testimony was very strong” did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights (quotation marks omitted)).
[¶45] 	The court’s allowance of the prosecutor’s statements regarding
credibility, 	even 	when 	those 	statements 	are 	considered 	cumulatively,
see Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 74, 58 A.3d 1032, was not obvious error, see Comer,
644 A.2d at 8-10 (concluding that there was not obvious error and stating that
it was “reasonable to assume that the jury was not induced to focus on anything
other than the evidence”).
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.

29
Stephen C. Smith, Esq., and Carl E. Woock, Esq. (orally), Steve Smith Trial
Lawyers, Augusta, for appellant Corey W. Farley
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Frayla Tarpinian, Dep. Dist. Atty.
(orally), Prosecutorial District IV, Skowhegan, for appellee State of Maine
Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2021-821
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY