CARDIORENTIS AG v. IQVIA LTD., 2024 NCBC 2

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
DURHAM COUNTY
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
18 CVS 2313
CARDIORENTIS AG,
Plaintiff,
v.
IQVIA LTD. and IQVIA RDS, INC.,
Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION ON
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISS
ACTION OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO
LIFT STAY AND GRANT MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
No counsel appeared for Plaintiff Cardiorentis AG.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard LLP, by Charles E.
Coble, Shepard D. O’Connell, and Daniel F. Smith, and Cooley LLP, by
Robert T. Cahill, Josh Siegel, and Michael J. Klisch, for Defendants
IQVIA Ltd. and IQVIA RDS, Inc.
Conrad, Judge.
1. 	Plaintiff Cardiorentis AG filed this lawsuit against Defendants IQVIA Ltd.
and IQVIA RDS, Inc. in March 2018. 	In response, Defendants asked the Court to
stay the case under N.C.G.S. § 1-75.12(a), arguing that North Carolina was an
inconvenient forum and that Cardiorentis’s claims should be litigated in England.
(See ECF No. 19.) The Court granted the motion and entered a stay on 31 December
2018. 	See Cardiorentis AG v. IQVIA Ltd., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 243 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Dec. 31, 2018), aff’d 2020 N.C. LEXIS 96 (Feb. 28, 2020).
2. 	Now, more than five years later, the Court dismisses the complaint.
3. 	A stay under section 1-75.12(a) cannot last forever. The “jurisdiction of the
court continues for a period of five years from the entry of the last order affecting the
Cardiorentis AG v. IQVIA Ltd., 2024 NCBC 2.

stay.” N.C.G.S. § 1-75.12(b). During that five-year period, the court may “modify the
stay order and take such action as the interests of justice require.” Id. But “[w]hen
jurisdiction of the court terminates by reason of the lapse of five years following the
entry of the last order affecting the stay,” the case must be dismissed. Id.*
4. 	So it is here. More than five years have passed since the stay took effect. At
no point did either side ask the Court to modify the stay. 	Thus, the Court’s
jurisdiction has terminated.
5. 	Defendants agree and have moved to dismiss the complaint administratively
under section 1-75.12(b). They also report that, even if the Court retains jurisdiction,
there is nothing left to do. 	The parties litigated their dispute in England, resulting
in a final judgment in February 2022 that neither side appealed. (See ECF No. 99.)
6. 	Cardiorentis, on the other hand, has stopped participating in this litigation.
It has not responded to the Court’s inquiries. 	It did not file a brief in response to
Defendants’ motion for administrative dismissal. And its attorneys received leave to
withdraw based on representations that it was no longer responding to their
communications. Because a corporation may not represent itself, see LexisNexis, Div.
of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. TRaviSHan Corp., 155 N.C. App. 205, 209 (2002), the Court
gave Cardiorentis ample time to hire new counsel, (ECF No. 101). 	The Court also
warned that a failure to respond to Defendants’ motion would leave the motion
unopposed and “result in a summary dismissal of this action,” (ECF No. 101). 	See
* Ordinarily, “the clerk” must “enter an order dismissing the action.” N.C.G.S. § 1-75.12(b).
But in mandatory complex business cases, such as this one, “[a]ll proceedings in the action
shall be before the Business Court Judge to whom it has been assigned.” Id. § 7A-45.4(f).

BCR 7.6 (“If a party fails to file a response within the time required by this rule, the
motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion.”).
7. 	For all these reasons, the Court concludes that dismissal is proper under
section 	1-75.12(b). 	The 	Court 	therefore 	GRANTS 	Defendants’ 	motion 	and
DISMISSES all claims.
SO ORDERED, this the 18th day of January, 2024.
/s/ Adam M. Conrad
Adam M. Conrad
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases