Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P.

Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P., 2026 NCBC 19.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION
MECKLENBURG COUNTY 23CVS012833-590

JARED RAYMOND LONDRY and
POINTBLANK VENTURES, LLC,

Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND OPINION ON
v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
LIMITED RECONSIDERATION
STREAM REALTY PARTNERS,
L.P., STREAM REALTY
PARTNERS-CHARLOTTE, L.P.,
and DANIEL FARRAR,

Defendants.

1. THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion for Limited

Reconsideration pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) (Motion),

(ECF No. 54).

TLG Law, by David G. Redding and Tyler A. Rhoades, for Plaintiffs
Jared Raymond Londry and Pointblank Ventures, LLC.

Jackson Lewis P.C., by Daniel Leake II and Kathleen K. Lucchesi, and
Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by Scott M. Tyler and Katherine McDiarmid,
for Defendants Stream Realty Partners, L.P., Stream Realty Partners-
Charlotte, L.P., and Daniel Farrar.

Earp, Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. Plaintiff Jared Raymond Londry (Londry) alleges that, based on an oral

agreement with Defendant Daniel Farrar (Farrar), Londry became a partner in

Defendant Stream Realty Partners-Charlotte, L.P. (Stream Charlotte).
3. After resigning from his position with Stream Charlotte, Londry initiated

this action by filing the Complaint on 25 July 2023. (Compl., ECF No. 3.) Londry

asserted claims for breach of contract against Stream Charlotte and its parent

Stream Realty Partners, L.P. (Stream); breach of the alleged partnership agreement,

breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud against Farrar; and unfair and deceptive trade

practices against all Defendants. (See generally Compl.)

4. On 4 March 2024, Londry filed an Amended Complaint adding Plaintiff

Pointblank Ventures, LLC (Pointblank) as a party and adding a claim for wrongful

interference with contract against all Defendants. (First Am. Compl. [Am. Compl.],

ECF No. 32.)

5. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on 29 November

2024, seeking a judgment on all claims Plaintiffs asserted against them. (ECF No.

42.) On 2 December 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

requesting offensive summary judgment on their wrongful interference with contract

claim. (ECF No. 44.)

6. The Court issued its Order and Opinion on the Motions for Summary

Judgment on 7 July 2025. Londry v. Stream Realty Partners, L.P., 2025 NCBC LEXIS

80 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 7, 2025) (the Summary Judgment Order). Among its rulings,

the Court denied Defendants’ motion on Plaintiffs’ breach of partnership agreement

and breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding that “absent Stream Charlotte’s

partnership agreement, and given the mix of evidence presented, the Court cannot
conclude, as a matter of law, whether Londry and Farrar reached an enforceable

agreement to divide Farrar’s interest in Stream Charlotte.” Id. at *31, 33.

7. On 17 July 2025, Defendants filed the present Motion seeking

reconsideration of this ruling. After full briefing, the Motion is now ripe for

disposition. 1

II. LEGAL STANDARD

8. “Rule 54(b) is the source of authority for what litigants typically refer to as

motions to reconsider.” Pender Farm Dev., LLC v. NDCO, LLC, 2020 NCBC LEXIS

110, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sep. 25, 2020) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

It provides that an interlocutory ruling “is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the

parties.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

9. Absent guidance from North Carolina’s appellate courts on the standard to

apply when considering a motion to reconsider an interlocutory ruling under Rule

54(b), the Court turns to federal case law addressing similarly worded portions of

Federal Rule 54(b). See Ehmann v. Medflow, Inc., 2019 NCBC LEXIS 10, at *9 (N.C.

Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2019) (“Without the benefit of North Carolina appellate precedent,

in considering a motion for reconsideration the Business Court has previously relied

on case law addressing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).” (citations omitted)).

10. “Courts will reconsider an interlocutory order in the following situations:

(1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) there is additional

1 The Court determines, in its discretion, that oral argument will not aid in its decision and

issues this ruling without a hearing pursuant to BCR 7.4.
evidence that was not previously available; or (3) the prior decision was based on clear

error or would work manifest injustice.” Akeva L.L.C. v. Adidas Am., Inc., 385 F.

Supp. 2d 559, 566 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (citations omitted). As this Court has observed,

however, “[s]uch problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally

rare.” W4 Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Farms, Inc., 2017 NCBC LEXIS 99, at *5 (N.C. Super.

Ct. Oct. 19, 2017) (citing DirecTV, Inc. v. Hart, 366 F. Supp. 2d 315, 317 (E.D.N.C.

2004)). “A motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) is within the trial court’s

discretion.” Id. (citing Akeva, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 565); Ward v. FSC I, LLC, 2017

NCBC LEXIS 19, at *6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2017) (citations omitted).

11. In addition to Rule 54(b), Rule 60(a) permits a judge to correct, upon his or

her own initiative, “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the

record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission[.]” N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(a).

Further, “[a]n order denying summary judgment is not res judicata and a judge is

clearly within his rights in vacating such denial.” Miller v. Miller, 34 N.C. App. 209,

212 (1977).

III. ANALYSIS

12. Defendants present the Stream Charlotte Partnership Agreement

(Partnership Agreement) and argue that it constitutes additional evidence that was

not previously available to the Court, and that it is therefore appropriate for the

Court to consider it now under Rule 54(b). (Mem. L. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Limited

Recons. [Defs.’ Mem.] 4, ECF No. 55.) They argue that the Partnership Agreement

did not vest Farrar with the authority to transfer a portion of his ownership interest
in Stream Charlotte to Londry and therefore Londry could not have become a partner

by virtue of any communication with Farrar alone. Consequently, they maintain, no

fiduciary duty based on a partnership existed. (Defs.’ Mem. 4–6.)

13. Plaintiffs respond that the Partnership Agreement is not newly discovered

evidence because it has always been available to Defendants. (Mem. L. Opp’n Defs.’

Mot. Limited Recons. [Pls.’ Opp’n] 2, ECF No. 59.) Plaintiffs conclude that it is

“improper to use [the Motion] to ‘ask the Court to rethink what the Court has already

thought through—rightly or wrongly.’ ” (Pls.’ Opp’n 2 (quoting Potter v. Potter, 199

F.R.D. 550, 552 (D. Md. 2001) (cleaned up))).

14. On this point, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs. The Partnership Agreement

was indisputably available to Defendants and could have been presented with their

Motion for Summary Judgment. See South Carolina v. United States, 232 F. Supp.

3d 785, 793 (D.S.C. 2017) (“[A] motion to reconsider an interlocutory order should not

be used to rehash arguments the court has already considered” or “to raise new

arguments or evidence that could have been raised previously.” (citations omitted)).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion on that basis lacks merit.

15. However, Rule 54(b) also allows for reconsideration of an interlocutory

order when the prior decision was based on clear error or would work manifest

injustice. N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Akeva, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 566. In addition, as stated

above, Rule 60(a) authorizes the Court to reconsider its own interlocutory rulings, see

Miller, 34 N.C. App. at 212, and the Court finds reason to do so here.
16. In the Summary Judgment Order, the Court entered judgment for

Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims for (1) breach of contract against Stream and Stream

Charlotte for allegedly divesting Londry of his partnership and stripping him of his

title as co-Market Leader; (2) fraud against Farrar; (3) unfair and deceptive trade

practices against all Defendants; and (4) wrongful interference with contract against

all Defendants. Londry, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 80, at *40–41. The Court denied

summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claims against Stream and Stream Charlotte for

allegedly failing to pay commissions and profit participation and for violating the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as well as Plaintiffs’ claims against

Farrar for breach of the partnership agreement and breach of fiduciary duty based

on the alleged partnership. Id. at *40.

17. Londry contends that he became a partner in Stream Charlotte as a result

of Farrar’s alleged promise to transfer half of Farrar’s own 30% interest in Stream

Charlotte to Londry prior to Londry’s employment there. At paragraph 56 of the

Summary Judgment Opinion, the Court stated:

Londry also argues that he became a partner in Stream Charlotte
because Farrar transferred half of his own interest in Stream Charlotte
to Londry. However, it is undisputed that Farrar did not transfer an
ownership interest to Londry and instead transferred a 15% ownership
interest back to Stream as part of Stream’s agreement to bring Londry
onboard. Consequently, Londry cannot find his way to a partnership
interest in Stream Charlotte through an alleged agreement with Farrar.

Londry, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 80, at *23–24.

18. Nevertheless, the Court was troubled that neither side provided Stream

Charlotte’s Partnership Agreement and reasoned that, absent that agreement, it
could not conclude whether Farrar’s alleged promise resulted in an enforceable

agreement between Londry and Farrar. Id. at *31. Consequently, the Court denied

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim

because “the Court [could not] determine whether a legal partnership, and therefore

an accompanying fiduciary relationship, existed between Londry and Farrar.” Id. at

*33.

19. In reaching its decision, however, the Court placed the burden of producing

the Partnership Agreement on Defendants, the moving party, rather than on Londry.

On further reflection, that was incorrect. Defendants moved for summary judgment

and presented substantial evidence that Londry was not a partner in Stream

Charlotte. See Londry, 2025 NCBC LEXIS 80, at *22–24, 28–31. It was then Londry’s

burden to present evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact existed with

respect to his status as a partner. N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“When a motion for summary

judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party . . . must

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”); see also Lowe

v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369–70 (1982) (stating that after the movant satisfies its

burden under Rule 56, “then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” (citation modified)).

20. To do that, Londry presented his own testimony that Farrar, who held a

minority interest, promised to make Londry a partner. He failed to present evidence

supporting Farrar’s authority as a minority partner to single-handedly make this

decision. See N.C.G.S. § 59-39(b) (“An act of a partner which is not apparently for the
carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the

partnership unless authorized by the other partners.”).

21. Without evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding

Londry’s status as a partner of Stream Charlotte, there can be no claim for breach of

the partnership agreement. See Cutter v. Vojnovic, 388 N.C. 1, 18 (2025) (“A lack of

co-ownership is fatal to plaintiff’s claim that a partnership existed.” (citing N.C.G.S.

§ 59-36(a)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to

this claim shall be GRANTED.

22. Londry bases his breach of fiduciary duty claim against Farrar on the

existence of a partnership. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 89–90.) Without one, there is no fiduciary

duty and no valid legal claim. Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 651 (2001) (“For a

breach of fiduciary duty to exist, there must first be a fiduciary relationship between

the parties.” (citations omitted)); Haddock v. Volunteers of Am., Inc., 2021 NCBC

LEXIS 70, at *23 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2021) (“The Amended Complaint and its

attachments fail to establish the existence of a partnership carried on by the parties

and thus Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief to the extent it is based on a ‘breach of

fiduciary duty as a partner’ cannot survive the Motion to Dismiss.”).

23. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment shall be

GRANTED on this claim as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

24. WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, the Court, in the exercise of

its discretion, GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Limited Reconsideration and
AMENDS the Summary Judgment Order to replace paragraphs 77, 82, and 103 as

follows:

A. Paragraph 77. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment with respect to Londry’s claim for breach of an alleged

partnership agreement shall be GRANTED.

B. Paragraph 82. As stated above, Londry has not presented

evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue regarding the existence of a

partnership, the source of the alleged fiduciary duty. Therefore, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect

to Londry’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

C. Paragraph 103. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS in

part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

DENIES Plaintiffs’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment and ORDERS

as follows:

a. With respect to the First and Second Causes of Action

(Breach of Contract Against Stream and Against Stream Charlotte)

for failing to pay commissions and profit participation and for

violating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,

Defendants’ Motion is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED

with respect to the remaining contract claims (for allegedly

divesting Londry of a partnership and stripping him of his title as

co-Market Leader), the Fifth Cause of Action (Fraud against
Farrar), and the Seventh Cause of Action (Unfair Trade Practice

against all Defendants).

b. As to the Third Cause of Action (Breach of Partnership

Agreement against Farrar) and the Fourth Cause of Action (Breach

of Fiduciary Duty against Farrar), Defendants’ Motion is

GRANTED.

c. With respect to the Sixth Cause of Action (Wrongful

Interference with Contract against All Defendants), Defendants’

Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.

d. The Court shall set a status conference to determine a trial

date in this matter.

25. The Court determines that no other changes to the Summary Judgment

Order are appropriate or necessary.

SO ORDERED, this the 9th day of March, 2026.

/s/ Julianna Theall Earp
Julianna Theall Earp
Special Superior Court Judge
for Complex Business Cases