22039143, 23707610.doc

NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

I.C. NOS. 22-039143 & 23-707610; RALPH SCOTT, Employee, Plaintiff v. EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY, Employer, SELF-INSURED, (CORVEL, Third-Party Administrator), Defendant.  

OPINION AND AWARD for the Full Commission by JAMES C. GILLEN, Commissioner

FILED: August 4, 2026

This case was heard before the Full Commission on 12 November 2025, upon appeal of Plaintiff from an Opinion and Award filed by Deputy Commissioner Wes Saunders on 13 June 2025.  The hearing transcripts, exhibits, and depositions from both the 8 March 2024 hearing and the 12 March 2025 hearing are in the evidentiary record in this matter.  Specifically, the deposition transcripts of Dr. Jane DeWire, Dr. Mitchell Freedman, and Jean Conlin, NP are part of the evidence of record.  
A P P E A R A N C E S
Plaintiff: 	Lennon Camak and Bertics, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina; 
Michael W. Bertics, appearing. 

Defendant:	Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, Charlotte, North Carolina; 
		Brad Kline, appearing.

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	The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Saunders, the Form 44 Application for Review, and the briefs and arguments of the parties.  The Full Commission hereby enters the following Opinion and Award pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-85:
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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties as:
STIPULATIONS
All parties are properly before the Commission, and this is the Court of proper jurisdiction for this action.
All parties have been correctly designated, and there is no question as to misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.
On both 5 October 2022, and 29 October 2022, the parties were subject to, and bound by, the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.
At all relevant times, an employment relationship existed between the parties.
Defendant is self-insured. Corvel is the third-party administrator.
Decedent's average weekly wage is $1,699.84. This yields a compensation rate of $1,133.28.
Decedent's date of injury is 5 October 2022. Decedent's date of death is 29 October 2022.
Decedent was out of work from 6 October 2022, through the date of his death, 29 October 2022.
On 5 October 2022, decedent suffered a fall on the premises of defendant-employer.
Decedent's fall on 5 October 2022, was a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment.
Defendants have admitted the causal relation of [Decedent's] compensable 5 October 2022 injury by accident to his death of 29 October 2022.
Decedent's sole whole dependent at the time of his death was his widow, Nancy Scott [Plaintiff].
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The following documents were accepted into evidence by the Deputy Commissioner as Stipulated Exhibits: 
 EXHIBITS
Stipulated Exhibit #1: Pre-Trial Agreement from 8 March 2024 hearing; 
Stipulated Exhibit #2: Indexed and paginated set of documents including Industrial Commission forms and filings, motions, orders, discovery, investigation, text messages, employment records, claim payments, medical records and videos;  
Stipulated Exhibit #3: Executed Pre-Trial Agreement from 12 March 2025 hearing; and 
Stipulated Exhibit #4: Medical Records of Nancy Scott. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Deputy Commissioner Saunders held a hearing in this matter on 8 March 2024.  At issue at the 8 March 2024 hearing was whether Decedent's death was the result of the 5 October 2022 compensable workplace incident.  After that hearing and prior to the record closing, Defendant agreed to accept that Decedent's 29 October 2022, death was the result of his 5 October 2022 accident.  Thereafter, this matter was removed from the active docket pending the submission of appropriate paperwork for the payment of death benefits pursuant to 11 NCAC 23A .0409.  In the process of completing the death benefits paperwork, the parties discovered an outstanding dispute as to whether Plaintiff as the surviving widow was physically or mentally disabled at the time of Decedent's death and is therefore entitled to extended widow benefits.  Therefore, this matter was placed back on the active hearing docket to resolve the outstanding issue.
Deputy Commissioner Saunders held another hearing on 12 March 2025.  After the 12 March 2025 hearing, the parties took the expert deposition testimony of Nurse Practitioner Jean Conlin.  Additionally, post-hearing, Deputy Commissioner Saunders ordered the parties to resubmit the required forms and documents pursuant to Rule 11 NCAC 23A .0409, with notations regarding the pendency of the outstanding issue of extended widow compensation.  On 7 April 2025, Deputy Commissioner Saunders approved a Form 30D, Award Approving Agreement for Compensation for Death, with a note explaining that the extended widow compensation dispute "is being resolved through the March 12, 2025 hearing process."  Furthermore, on 11 April 2025, Deputy Commissioner Saunders approved a consent agreement between the parties resolving a contested issue involving the payment of attorney's fees and sanctions. 
On 13 June 2025, Deputy Commissioner Saunders filed an Opinion and Award denying Plaintiff the extended widow compensation.  Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission.
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The Full Commission addresses the following: 
ISSUE

Whether Plaintiff was unable to support herself because of a physical or mental disability as of the date of Decedent's death?  
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Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, the Full Commission makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On 5 October 2022, Ralph Scott (hereinafter "Decedent") was employed by Defendant-Employer as a professor and curator of rare books.  
On 5 October 2022, Decedent tripped and fell while walking on Defendant-Employer's campus, sustaining injuries.  In the ensuing days, Decedent developed headaches.  
  On 8 October 2022, Decedent's wife, Nancy Scott (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), took Decedent to the East Carolina University Medical Center Emergency Department.  Hospital records from 8 October 2022 reflect that Decedent "slipped on uneven concrete in front of McGinnis Theater . . . striking his right knee, right shoulder and head."  Hospital records further reflect that a CT scan of Decedent's head taken 8 October 2022 showed a:
large holohemispheric mixed density subdural hematoma with a more focal hematoma along the inferior aspect of the right frontal lobe . . . a significant mass effect with 10 mm of leftward midline shift and sub[-]falcine herniation along the anterior cingulate gyrus[,] . . . a small amount of intraventricular hemorrhage[,] . . . and a small ventral epidural hematoma at the cervicomedullary junction with minimal mass effect.   

Decedent's condition continued to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in his death on 29 October 2022.  
Defendants have stipulated that Decedent's 5 October 2022 fall was compensable and that it caused his death.
Decedent and Plaintiff were a married couple as of 29 October 2022, having been married since 1988.  Plaintiff was 71 years old on the date of Decedent's death.  Plaintiff resided with Decedent at their home in Greenville, North Carolina.
Plaintiff graduated from McMurray College in Jacksonville, Illinois in 1973 with a degree in history and concentration in Spanish.  In 1975, Plaintiff obtained her Master's in Library Studies from the University of Illinois.  From 1975 to 1984, Plaintiff worked for the Illinois Library System as a cataloguer.  In this role, Plaintiff would travel to library systems throughout the state to assist the libraries with the transition to automation. 
After working in Illinois, Plaintiff took a job as the head cataloguer for the University of Arkansas.  In 1986, Plaintiff accepted a job with the University of North Carolina system and moved to North Carolina.  In North Carolina, Plaintiff worked to establish a joint online library catalogue system among the University's 17 member institutions.  During this time, the internet was relatively new and Plaintiff performed her work on large mainframe computers while traveling to all of the UNC campuses.  In 1990, Plaintiff's contract with UNC ended.  At the time, Decedent was a tenure-track faculty member at East Carolina University.  Consequently, Plaintiff was limited in employment options to the vicinity of Greenville, North Carolina.  In 1991, Plaintiff obtained her Masters in Public Administration from East Carolina University.  In 1991, Plaintiff took a job as a high school librarian in Goldsboro, North Carolina.  Plaintiff left this job after working one year due to her mother's deteriorating health.  Plaintiff's mother lived in Illinois and Plaintiff would frequently travel there to assist with her mother's needs.  
In the early 1990s, after Plaintiff's mother was moved into an assisted living facility, Plaintiff began teaching adjunct courses at East Carolina University in cataloguing.  Additionally, in the early 1990s Plaintiff took coursework towards a PhD at UNC-Chapel Hill. However, Plaintiff ultimately abandoned this pursuit.  
In addition to Decedent's position as a professor and curator of rare books at East Carolina University, Decedent was very active in faculty governance and was a past state president of the American Association of University Professors.   
Plaintiff would travel frequently with Decedent on work trips such as when he presented papers and attended meetings and seminars.  Plaintiff also supported Decedent by proofreading his papers and reviewing his presentations.  
Between 2002 and 2022, Plaintiff did not look for work outside her home.  At home, Plaintiff performed household chores, such as laundry, dishes, and running errands. 
In 2013, Plaintiff fractured her left tibia while mowing the grass in her yard. Plaintiff was bedridden for three months after this injury.  For a year after the fracture and surgical repair, Plaintiff required the use of a walker.  
Plaintiff continues to have limited mobility due to her 2013 left leg injury and has a handicap tag for her vehicle.  Plaintiff has a cane but does not use it on a regular basis.  Plaintiff can stand and walk but experiences pain after walking for prolonged periods of time.  
Plaintiff's last medical evaluation prior to Decedent's death was an evaluation with her primary care provider, Nurse Practitioner Jean Conlin with ECU Family Medicine Center, which took place on 7 October 2022.  The record from this visit reflects that the only medications Plaintiff was taking at the time were aspirin and Vitamin D3.  The only "Active Problems" listed on this record are "[a]ge-related osteoporosis without current pathological fracture" and "[c]hronic pain of left knee."  The "Visit Diagnoses" noted in the 7 October 2022 record include only "[a]ge-related osteoporosis without current pathological fracture," "[d]ry skin dermatitis," and "[o]besity."  This record also reflects that Plaintiff was "[n]egative for shortness of breath."  Elsewhere, her shortness of breath was noted to have resolved in 2024.  The purpose of Plaintiff's 7 October 2022, evaluation was a three-month follow-up evaluation after Plaintiff began taking Fosamax for her osteoporosis. 
For approximately 7 months in 2024, Decedent worked part-time for her church.  The number of hours Plaintiff worked in this position varied.  In this position Plaintiff sat at a desk answering phones.  Additionally, approximately four to seven times per shift, members of the local homeless population came to a door at the church, and Plaintiff was tasked with giving them a "blessings bag."  Delivering a "blessings bag" to the door required Plaintiff to navigate stairs in the old church building.  Plaintiff stopped working for the church because she could not go up and down the stairs. 
Plaintiff testified at the 12 March 2025 hearing that during an average day she performs housework, meets with friends, and runs errands if necessary.  She also testified that she attends bible study once a week, attends educational programs through ECU lifelong learning, and reads. 
Subsequent to the 12 March 2025 hearing, the parties deposed Nurse Practitioner Jean Conlin.  Nurse Practitioner Conlin was Plaintiff's primary care provider in October of 2022, and for approximately 4 years prior to October of 2022.  Nurse Practitioner Conlin testified that Plaintiff's mobility was impacted by her prior tibia fracture.  Nurse Practitioner Conlin also testified that Plaintiff was diagnosed with osteoporosis in 2022. For her osteoporosis, Nurse Practitioner Conlin started Plaintiff on Fosamax, a bisphosphonate used to increase bone density.  Nurse Practitioner Conlin explained that she encourages patients with osteoporosis to move and stay active.  According to Nurse Practitioner Conlin, Plaintiff experienced shortness of breath at times.  Nurse Practitioner Conlin testified that, given her shortness of breath and left leg limitations, "long periods of walking or any kind of physical strength things . . . would probably be limitations for her."  However, Nurse Practitioner Conlin testified that she did not recall Plaintiff experiencing shortness of breath while sitting.  
Nurse Practitioner Conlin testified that, as of October 2022, Plaintiff was in "good health" and "managed well with what she was doing … supporting her husband and taking care of the home and things like that."  Nurse Practitioner Conlin further testified to the effect that if Plaintiff had located a sedentary desk job in October 2022, she had no reason to believe Plaintiff would not have been able to perform it mentally or physically.  Later, Nurse Practitioner Conlin testified to the effect that Plaintiff, in 2022, probably could have returned to part-time sedentary employment. 
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence in view of the entire record, the Full Commission finds that Plaintiff has not shown that she was unable to support herself because of physical or mental disability as of the date of Decedent's death.  In reaching this finding, the Full Commission observes that Plaintiff is highly educated, notes her primary care provider's testimony that, as of October 2022, Plaintiff was in "good health," and further notes her primary care provider's testimony to the effect that, at the time of Decedent's death, there was no reason to believe that Plaintiff could not perform a sedentary desk job.
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The foregoing Stipulations and Findings of Fact engender the following:
		                             CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3) reads, in part:
Compensation payments due on account of death shall be paid for a period of 500 weeks from the date of the death of the employee; provided,  however, after said 500-week period in case of a widow or widower who is unable to support herself or himself because of physical or mental disability as of the date of the death of the employee, compensation payments shall continue during her or his lifetime or until remarriage . . . .

(emphasis added).  The few cases which have awarded lifetime benefits to a spouse under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38 have considered the situations of widows who were suffering far greater health problems at the time of their spouse's death than Plaintiff experienced in the case at bar.  In Hedrick v. Southland Corp., the Court of Appeals considered a widow's claim for lifetime benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38.  41 N.C. App. 431, 432, 255 S.E.2d 198, 200 (1979).  The Hedrick Court explained that Ms. Hedrick, prior to her husband's death, was a severe alcoholic who had been in and out of the hospital with a degenerative disc problem.  Id.  The Hedrick Court also cited medical records in evidence showing that Ms. Hedrick suffered from, among other things:  "[v]ery crippling arthritis," "advanced degenerative disc disease at L5-S1, with virtually complete loss of the intervertebral disc substance," and '[n]uerosis with anxiety state."  Id. at 435, 255 S.E.2d at 201.  Furthermore, Ms. Hedrick had been evaluated by a psychiatrist prior to her husband's death.  This psychiatrist diagnosed her with passive-dependent personality disorder and observed that, prior to her husband's death, she "had stopped functioning as a productive and self-sufficient individual."  Id. at 434, 255 S.E.2d at 201.  Over four years prior to her husband's death, Ms. Hedrick was adjudged entitled to Social Security disability benefits, and this determination was still in effect when he died.  Id. at 432, 255 S.E.2d at 200.  On these facts, which are far different than those presented by the case at bar, the Hedrick Court upheld the Industrial Commission's determination that the widow was entitled to lifetime compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38.  In Speer v. Bodenheimer Plumbing, a Full Commission panel found a widow to be entitled to lifetime benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38.  I.C. No. 288050 (N.C. Indus. Comm'n July 19, 2005).  However, the Speer Full Commission panel found as fact that the widow in Speer "suffered from a variety of medical problems including insulin dependent diabetes II, seizure disorder, cardiac problems, back problems, migraine and arthritis" and further found that a Physician's Assistant who treated her indicated that, at the time of her husband's death, she was in "very poor health."  Id. at 7.  In Prince v. Underground Construction Co., a Full Commission panel found a widow to be entitled to lifetime benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38.  I.C. No. 13-731249 (N.C. Indus. Comm'n June 5, 2017).  However, the Prince Full Commission panel found as fact that the widow in Prince had a "complete fusion of the vertebrae from T10 to S1, constituting a fusion of the sacrum plus nine thoracic and lumbar vertebrae" and further that her doctor had "only seen one other patient with that amount of hardware in her back."  Id. at 10. Further, the Prince Full Commission panel found as fact that she had also undergone major bowel and abdominal surgeries.  Id. at 12. 
The Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff in this case has not shown that she was "unable to support herself . . . because of physical or mental disability" as of the date of her husband's death under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3).  In reaching this conclusion, the Full Commission observes that Plaintiff is highly educated, notes her primary care provider's testimony that, as of October 2022, Plaintiff was in "good health," and further notes her primary care provider's testimony to the effect that, at the time of Decedent's death, there was no reason to believe that Plaintiff could not perform a sedentary desk job.  Absent any contrary indication within the Act or in the appellate caselaw, the Full Commission concludes that it would be inappropriate to incorporate the definition of "disability" as articulated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) into N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3).  "Disability" is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) as an employee's "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages . . . the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment."  Plainly, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3) contemplate completely different concepts.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) is concerned with an injured employee's inability to earn pre-injury wages, while N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3) is concerned with a widow or widower who was physically or mentally disabled at the time of their spouse's work-related death.  Further, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3) uses terminology "unable to support herself or himself because of physical or mental disability" (emphasis added) which implies a different standard than that articulated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9).  Therefore, the Full Commission concludes that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9) and the appellate caselaw construing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(9), such as Russell v. Lowes Product Distr., 108 N.C. App. 762, 425 S.E.2d 454 (1993), are inapplicable to the current controversy.  Given the foregoing, the Full Commission concludes that Plaintiff has not shown that she was "unable to support herself . . . because of physical or mental disability" as of the date of Decedent's death, and therefore that Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits beyond 500 weeks. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3) (2025). 
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Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Full Commission makes the following: 
				        AWARD
Plaintiff's claim for death benefits beyond 500 weeks under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38(3) is hereby DENIED.

Chair BADDOUR and Commissioner GOODMAN concur.

I.C. NOs. 22-039143 & 23-707610		Page 2