Jessen v. Line

instructions to the jury at the close of the case, the court did
give a jury instruction in regard to the prior bad act evidence.
However, the court did not give a limiting instruction at the time
the rule 404 evidence was introduced. We need not consider
whether the trial court’s failure to abide by the Sanchez require
ments constitutes reversible error in the instant case, given that
we have concluded that the evidence was inadmissible. We
simply point it out to remind trial courts of the requirements set
forth in State v. Sanchez, supra.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted evi
dence of Sutton’s prior bad act for an improper purpose and
that the admission of this evidence was not harmless error.
Accordingly, we reverse, and remand for a new trial in accord
ance with this opinion.
R eveRsed and Remanded foR a new tRial .
teRRy l. J essen , appellee , v .
donna J. line , appellant .
742 N.W.2d 30
Filed November 27, 2007. 	No. A 07 076.
1. Paternity: Appeal and Error. In a filiation proceeding, questions concerning child
custody determinations are reviewed on appeal de novo on the record to determine
whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court, whose judgment
will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In such de novo review,
when the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers, and may give weight
to, the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one
version of the facts rather than another.
2. Paternity: Child Support: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s award of child sup
port in a paternity case will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse
of discretion by the trial court.
3. Paternity: Attorney Fees: Appeal and Error. An award of attorney fees in a
paternity action is reviewed de novo on the record to determine whether there has
been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
4. Motions for Continuance: Appeal and Error. A motion for continuance is
addressed to the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
JeSSeN v. LINe 	197
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:16 AM CST

5. Child Custody. According to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42 364(5) (Cum. Supp. 2006), the
court may place a minor child in joint custody after conducting a hearing in open
court and specifically finding that joint custody is in the best interests of the minor
child regardless of any parental agreement or consent.
6. ____. Fundamental fairness requires that when a trial court determines at a gen
eral custody hearing that joint physical custody is, or may be, in a child’s best
interests, but neither party has requested this custody arrangement, the court must
give the parties an opportunity to present evidence on the issue before imposing
joint custody.
7. ____. The same considerations of notice in the context of a joint physical custody
order—the opportunity to be heard and present evidence on the issue—are equally
applicable when the trial court is considering making an award of joint legal
custody, and therefore the court must give the parties an opportunity to present
evidence on the issue of joint legal custody before imposing such.
Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County:
R obeRt o. H ippe, Judge. Affirmed in part as modified, and in
part reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Jeffrey L. Hansen, of Simmons Olsen Law Firm, P.C., for
appellant.
James L. Zimmerman, of Zimmerman Law Firm, P.C., L.L.O.,
for appellee.
sieveRs, C aRlson, and C assel, Judges.
sieveRs, Judge.
Donna J. Line appeals from the decision of the district court
for Scotts Bluff County that determined Terry L. Jessen was the
biological father of Donna’s minor child, Parker Jessen; awarded
joint legal custody of Parker to both parties and awarded primary
physical custody to Donna; awarded Terry reasonable visitation;
and awarded Donna $1,000 per month in child support begin
ning January 1, 2007.
We affirm the district court’s award of child support in the
amount of $1,000 per month; however, we find that such award
should be retroactive to January 1, 2005, and order modifica
tion of the award to that extent. We find that the trial court
erred in awarding the parties joint legal custody of Parker with
out conducting the appropriate hearing. We therefore reverse,
and remand the cause for further proceedings on this issue of
legal custody.
198 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

FACTUAL BACkGROUND
Donna is the natural mother and Terry is the natural father
of Parker, born on September 8, 1997. Donna and Terry were
never married, but were in a relationship for 9 years beginning
in June 1995. At the time of Parker’s birth, Donna was living
in Colorado and Terry was living in Scottsbluff, Nebraska. In
2001, Donna and Parker moved to Nebraska to live with Terry.
In 2004, Donna and Terry parted ways, apparently permanently.
In October 2004, Donna and Parker moved to Colorado.
Donna is a teacher in Colorado and says she earns $36,000
per year. Terry is involved in various business entities and farm
ing, and he owns or has ownership interest in hotels, numerous
duplexes and homes, and 8 to 10 farms. He also has ownership
interest in numerous corporations. Terry’s holdings are substan
tial. To put Terry’s finances in perspective, he testified that his
personal debt is more than $9 million and that his corporate
debt is more than $13 million, and on cross examination, Terry
agreed that his assets would exceed his debt.
PROCeDURAL BACkGROUND
On December 9, 2004, Terry filed his “Complaint to establish
Paternity and Award Custody,” alleging that he is the natural
father of Parker. Terry asked the district court to award him sole
custody of Parker. On December 13, Donna filed a motion for
an ex parte custody order granting her custody of Parker. The
district court granted Donna’s motion.
On December 15, 2004, Donna filed her answer and counter
complaint to establish paternity and award custody. Donna asked
the district court to determine that Terry is Parker’s father; grant
her sole custody of Parker, subject to Terry’s reasonable rights
of visitation; order Terry to pay child support; and require that
the parties are to meet at a midway point to exchange Parker for
visitation. That same day, Donna also filed motions for tempo
rary custody and child support.
After a hearing, the district court filed its journal entry on
December 28, 2004, granting Donna temporary custody of
Parker, subject to Terry’s specific visitation schedule set forth in
such journal entry. Temporary child support was denied due to
lack of appropriate evidence.
JeSSeN v. LINe 	199
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197

On December 29, 2004, Donna filed another motion for tem
porary child support. After a hearing, the district court entered
an order on February 2, 2005, directing Terry to pay Donna tem
porary child support of $346.76 per month, beginning January
1, 2005. A child support worksheet was attached to the district
court’s order.
On July 7, 2005, Donna filed a motion to compel Terry to
respond to discovery, particularly in regard to information and
documents concerning his businesses necessary to determine his
income and/or earning capacity. In the district court’s journal
entry filed on August 2, the court sustained Donna’s motion and
directed Terry to respond to certain discovery requests. The dis
trict court directed Terry to “provide three years personal bank
statements and any entities that he has an interest in.”
On September 2, 2005, Donna again filed a motion to compel
Terry to respond to discovery pursuant to the court’s previous
order. The court’s journal entry filed September 19 shows that
Terry was again ordered to comply with the discovery requests.
Terry was ordered to “produce tax returns filed in the years
2002, 2003, 2004, and the past three years of bank statements,
with copies of cancelled checks and deposit slips in the name of
[Terry], plus any business entities he controls.”
On December 21, 2005, Donna again filed a motion to com
pel Terry to respond to discovery pursuant to the court’s previ
ous orders. The court’s journal entry filed January 17, 2006,
shows that Terry was ordered to “respond to the request for
production of documents in writing as to documents allowed
in the September [19], 2005 Order by identifying their loca
tion and cooperating with [Donna] to make them available for
inspection by the entity having control of the documents by
January 27, 2006.”
On November 29, 2006, Donna filed a motion to continue
the trial, which was to begin that morning, stating that her attor
ney had not received any financial information from Terry. In
support of such motion, Donna’s attorney attached his affidavit
stating that he had “attempted on several occasions to request
financial information from [Terry],” but had not received such
information. Counsel stated, “It is imperative that we have
[Terry’s] financial information in order to proceed with this
200 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

case.” Also on November 29, Donna filed an application for
attorney fees in the amount of $8,290.75 and attached an item
ized statement of such fees and expenses. Donna’s motion to
continue was denied, the trial court reasoning that the case had
already been delayed a number of times and that there was
no indication further delay would solve the problem—which
we assume was Terry’s failure to provide financial disclo
sure concerning his various enterprises—and trial was held on
November 29.
On December 11, 2006, the district court entered its order
establishing paternity, child custody, visitation, and support. The
district court determined that Terry is Parker’s father, awarded
joint legal custody of Parker to both parties and awarded primary
physical custody to Donna, awarded Terry reasonable visitation
as set forth in the order, and awarded Donna $1,000 per month
in child support beginning January 1, 2007. Regarding the child
support, the district court said:
In the court’s opinion using child support guidelines
in this case would be both unjust and inappropriate.
If the court assumes income for Donna at the current
amount and averages Terry’s last three years of income,
the monthly child support would be $71.46 after applying
guideline R. Therefore the court deviates from guidelines
and orders that Terry pay the sum of $1,000 per month for
child support beginning January 1, 2007.
In explaining its reasons for deviating from the guidelines, the
district court said:
▶ Terry has traditionally had very low income reported on
his income tax returns. He has made it impossible for
Donna to test whether that income is a fair figure to use
for purposes of child support because
▶ All of Terry’s financial records were seized by a
U. S. Government investigation.
▶ Terry has replicated some of those records by print
ing items from his computer (which he apparently
still has) and has used those reprints in his own
case, but did not furnish anything similar to Donna
in discovery.
JeSSeN v. LINe 	201
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197

▶ Terry has extensive assets including motels, farms, busi
nesses, commercial property, residential property, and
has extensive involvement in family corporations. It is
either inaccurate or voluntary limitation of income on
Terry’s part to assume that his real income is as low
as what his tax returns show when one considers these
extensive assets that he owns. He is well able to contrib
ute $1,000 per month to Parker’s care.
We read the court’s reasoning as addressing in a broad sense
the concept of earning capacity as opposed to reported income
on Terry’s personal tax returns, which were not complete. For
example, only the first page of his 2004 personal tax return is
in evidence. After Donna’s motions to alter and amend the order
and for a new trial were overruled on January 4, 2007, she has
timely appealed.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Donna alleges that the district court erred in (1) awarding
joint legal custody to the parties, (2) ordering child support in
the amount of $1,000, (3) not making the child support amount
retroactive to the date of the temporary order, (4) not awarding
Donna attorney fees, and (5) not granting a continuance prior
to trial.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] In a filiation proceeding, questions concerning child
custody determinations are reviewed on appeal de novo on
the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of
discretion by the trial court, whose judgment will be upheld in
the absence of an abuse of discretion. In such de novo review,
when the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court consid
ers, and may give weight to, the fact that the trial court heard
and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the
facts rather than another. State on behalf of Pathammavong v.
Pathammavong, 268 Neb. 1, 679 N.W.2d 749 (2004).
[2] A trial court’s award of child support in a paternity case
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
discretion by the trial court. Henke v. Guerrero, 13 Neb. App.
337, 692 N.W.2d 762 (2005).
202 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

[3] An award of attorney fees in a paternity action is reviewed
de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an
abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Cross v. Perreten, 257
Neb. 776, 600 N.W.2d 780 (1999). Absent such an abuse, the
award will be affirmed. Id.
[4] A motion for continuance is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford New
Holland, 254 Neb. 182, 575 N.W.2d 392 (1998).
ANALYSIS
Denial of Motion for Continuance.
On the day the trial was to begin, Donna filed a motion to
continue the trial, stating that her attorney had not received any
financial information from Terry. The motion was addressed at
a hearing, and Donna argued that the only information she had
regarding Terry’s finances consisted of two personal tax returns,
which, in her opinion, were not reliable. Donna argued that it
was Terry’s duty to provide the court with information about
his income and that if his records were seized by government
officials, then he should get copies of his tax returns from the
government or copies of statements from his banks. Donna
argued that without accurate records, the court could not deter
mine child support.
Terry, through counsel, argued that the personal tax returns
show the sources of all income and that “whether an individual
owns numerous pieces of property, is involved in corporations,
or whatever, really has no bearing because it’s based upon what
his personal income is, and he has his personal tax returns.” That
argument is repeated here, but we summarily reject the obvi
ously spurious claim that financial records concerning Terry’s
businesses are neither discoverable nor relevant. The district
court denied Donna’s continuance saying:
In the Court’s opinion, the problem in this case, it’s two
years old already. It has been delayed a number of times
because [Terry’s] financial records were seized pursuant
to a search warrant in some federal investigation. And, the
Court has made rulings before on whether he is obliged to
JeSSeN v. LINe 	203
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197

furnish something that he does not have or doesn’t have
access to.
The thing that bothers me is the continuances and the
postponements are without end, even with this affidavit
and at the time now of trial. The Court has no hint of what
time will do to solve the problem or how much time is
needed to solve the problem. So it looks to me like it has
been a case that has had interminable delays, and that that
will continue into the unknown future. And, the case has
to be tried at sometime, and now is a[s] good [a] time as
any. There is no indication of delay of another month, or
six months, or a year would do any good because we have
been in this spot, essentially, stuck on the case for over a
year already. So the motion to continue the trial is over
ruled, and we’ll go ahead and proceed with the trial.
The trial commenced immediately upon the court’s denial of
Donna’s motion to continue.
As noted in the procedural background section of this opin
ion, Donna filed three different motions to compel Terry to
produce financial information for entities he has an interest in
and each time Donna’s motion was granted by the district court.
By the time of trial on November 29, 2006, it had been more
than 15 months since Terry was first ordered to provide Donna
with his business finance records. Despite the orders by the
district court, Terry failed to comply with Donna’s discovery
requests. Terry’s conduct in this regard cannot be condoned, but
we note that Donna failed to invoke the “persuasive powers”
of the court to enforce the discovery orders—for example, by
initiating contempt proceedings under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42 370
(Reissue 2004). See, also, Jessen v. Jessen, 5 Neb. App. 914,
567 N.W.2d 612 (1997).
The district court, clearly tired of the case dragging on for so
long, decided to proceed with the trial without Terry’s business
finance records. While we are not completely comfortable with
the trial court’s ruling, because it allows Terry to flout the trial
court’s orders and forces Donna into a trial without the finan
cial information she sought and was entitled to, after review of
the record and considering the result reached, we cannot say
the denial of the continuance was an abuse of discretion. We
204 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

reach this conclusion for three reasons: first, Donna’s failure to
timely invoke the trial court’s powers to enforce the discovery
which had been ordered; second, the trial court’s deviation from
the child support guidelines, awarding Donna substantial child
support at a level that she may not have received even had she
gained access to the financial records of Terry’s various entities,
which records he was clearly intent on hiding; and third, the
fact that child support is not final, meaning that Donna is not
precluded from another effort to increase the support.
In reaching our decision to uphold the denial of the continu
ance, we find it significant that by our calculation, to produce a
monthly child support obligation for one child under the guide
lines, given Donna’s monthly income of $3,000, the trial court
would have to attribute $8,500 monthly income to Terry—or an
income of $102,000 per year. In short, while Donna’s argument
that she should have had the continuance is rather persuasive,
given Terry’s conduct, we recall that this is an equitable pro
ceeding and we cannot say that the overall result was inequi
table. Moreover, we understand and empathize with the trial
court’s rationale in denying the continuance requested on the
morning of trial. Therefore, given all of these considerations,
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in deny
ing Donna’s requested continuance.
Child Support.
From the above discussion, it is undoubtedly apparent that
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in order
ing Terry to pay $1,000 per month in child support. See Henke
v. Guerrero, 13 Neb. App. 337, 692 N.W.2d 762 (2005) (trial
court’s award of child support in paternity case will not be
disturbed on appeal in absence of abuse of discretion by trial
court). Our conclusion is based on a number of factors. First,
while Donna complains that the award of child support should
be more, she did not adduce evidence to support that claim, and
while we recognize that Terry failed to produce the financial
information he was ordered to produce, the record reveals that
the enforcement tools available to Donna were not utilized.
Second, Terry has not cross appealed—a fact which implies
that if he had produced the data he was ordered to produce,
JeSSeN v. LINe 	205
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197

such would support the amount of child support ordered by the
district court.
However, we do find merit to Donna’s claim that the child
support order should have been made retroactive to January 1,
2005—the first day of the month following the filing date of
Donna’s countercomplaint for increased child support. Prior to
the trial court’s final order of December 11, 2006, setting child
support of $1,000 per month effective January 1, 2007, the court
had entered a temporary order for child support of $346.76
per month beginning January 1, 2005. But, the earlier support
order was merely an interlocutory order from which no appeal
could be taken, because final resolution of custody and support
had not yet been made. See Dawes v. Wittrock Sandblasting &
Painting, 266 Neb. 526, 667 N.W.2d 167 (2003) (when multiple
issues are presented to trial court for simultaneous disposition
in same proceeding and court decides some of those issues,
while reserving some issue or issues for later determination,
court’s determination of less than all those issues is interlocu
tory order and is not final order for purpose of appeal), disap-
proved on other grounds, Kimminau v. Uribe Refuse Serv., 270
Neb. 682, 707 N.W.2d 229 (2005). The fact that the initial child
support order was interlocutory militates in favor of making
the final order retroactive, particularly as here, when the delay
between the interlocutory order and the final order was in large
part traceable to the difficulty encountered in getting financial
records and information from Terry. While we acknowledge that
the instant case is not a modification of a previous final support
order, the principles of, and reasons for, retroactivity in such
proceedings are clearly analogous, and therefore applicable in
the present case. See Riggs v. Riggs, 261 Neb. 344, 622 N.W.2d
861 (2001) (absent equities to contrary, rule should generally be
that modification of child support order should be applied retro
actively to first day of month following filing date of applica
tion for modification). Clearly, the record reveals no equities in
Terry’s favor which would prevent retroactive application of the
final child support award to the first day of the month follow
ing Donna’s request. Consequently, we modify the trial court’s
order to make the child support order of $1,000 per month
206 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

retroactive to January 1, 2005, with Terry to receive credit for
payments made under the temporary order.
Joint Legal Custody.
[5] Donna argues that the district court erred in awarding joint
legal custody to the parties. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42 364(5) (Cum.
Supp. 2006) states:
After a hearing in open court, the court may place the
custody of a minor child with both parents on a shared
or joint custody basis when both parents agree to such an
arrangement. In that event, each parent shall have equal
rights to make decisions in the best interests of the minor
child in his or her custody. The court may place a minor
child in joint custody after conducting a hearing in open
court and specifically finding that joint custody is in the
best interests of the minor child regardless of any parental
agreement or consent.
We have held that § 42 364(5) applies to joint legal custody
determinations. See Kay v. Ludwig, 12 Neb. App. 868, 686
N.W.2d 619 (2004).
[6,7] The Nebraska Supreme Court recently held in Zahl v.
Zahl, 273 Neb. 1043, 736 N.W.2d 365 (2007), that fundamental
fairness requires that when a trial court determines at a general
custody hearing that joint physical custody is, or may be, in a
child’s best interests, but neither party has requested this cus
tody arrangement, the court must give the parties an opportunity
to present evidence on the issue before imposing joint custody.
While Zahl was decided in the context of a joint physical cus
tody order, the same considerations of notice—the opportunity
to be heard and present evidence on the issue—are equally
applicable when the trial court is considering making an award
of joint legal custody. In the instant case, by ordering joint legal
custody, which neither party requested, the trial court made a
finding that the parties are capable of communicating and work
ing together effectively without harmful rancor affecting Parker
as they make major decisions for him, for example, schooling
and religious training. For these reasons, we find that the hold
ing in Zahl, supra, extends to joint legal custody, and therefore
requires that the court must give the parties an opportunity
JeSSeN v. LINe 	207
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197

to present evidence on the issue of joint legal custody before
imposing such.
However, we note that Terry does not cross appeal the trial
court’s award of physical custody to Donna, and the record
reflects that she is the appropriate custodial parent. Thus,
we affirm such award, and our remand goes only to whether
granting joint legal custody is in the best interests of Parker or
whether Donna should have legal custody as well.
Attorney Fees.
Donna argues that the district court erred in not awarding her
attorney fees. In denying Donna’s request for attorney fees, the
district court reasoned:
[B]oth parties are self sufficient adults, [both] of them
have their own separate families, the case only involved
less than a one day trial, extensive discovery was not con
ducted because there were no financial records available
to discover, and Donna did not request attorney fees in her
answer or counterclaim.
Donna’s counsel testified that his fee is $150 per hour and
that such fee is fair and reasonable. Counsel testified that this
case was complex due to the lack of financial information
provided by Terry and that thus, the attorney fees incurred
by Donna total $8,290.75, which includes 3 hours for trial.
Donna’s counsel conceded that his bill does not set out the
time spent on individual items of service. And, on cross
examination, he admitted that there might be a mistake on the
bill, because the bill shows two motions to compel in a 4 day
period and he probably would not have drafted two motions
in a 4 day span. Counsel also said that a paralegal may have
been involved, although the billing statement does not show
paralegal charges.
While the billing statement was received into evidence, it
has the above noted shortcomings. Moreover, each page of the
statement shows work done on several different days, with the
total amount charged listed at the bottom of the page—without
specifying which portion of the charges went for what work.
For example, we reproduce a portion of the billing statement
as follows:
208 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS

PReVIOUS BALANCe 	$690.00
FeeS
10/03/2006 JLH Prepared letter to Donna with
copy of Order to Show Cause
10/11/2006 JLH Call with Donna.
10/12/2006 JLH Reviewed e mail from Donna.
JLH Prepared e mail to Donna.
10/13/2006 JLH Prepared Affidavit. Attended
hearing to keep case alive.
10/17/2006 JLH Prepared letter to Donna with
copy of Order; Reviewed Order
FOR CURReNT SeRVICeS ReNDeReD 	240.00
PAYMeNTS
10/18/2006 	PAYMeNT 	THANk YOU 	−700.00
BALANCe DUe 	$230.00
Without an accurate accounting of time spent on the various
aspects of the services recorded, the trial judge could not have
known whether the attorney fees were reasonable, especially in
light of counsel’s admission to mistakes in the bill, as well as
the fact that counsel did not have to deal with financial records
from Terry’s various business entities, given that such were not
produced. Thus, for a number of reasons, we cannot say after
our de novo review of the record that the district court abused its
discretion in failing to award Donna attorney fees. See Morrill
County v. Darsaklis, 7 Neb. App. 489, 584 N.W.2d 36 (1998) (in
paternity action, attorney fees are reviewed de novo on record
to determine whether there has been abuse of discretion by trial
judge; absent such abuse, award will be affirmed).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we find that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Donna’s motion to continue.
We further find that the district court’s order that Terry pay
$1,000 per month in child support was not an abuse of discre
tion. However, we find that the child support order should be
retroactive to January 1, 2005, and we modify the district court’s
order accordingly.
We find that the district court abused its discretion in award
ing the parties joint legal custody of Parker without having the
JeSSeN v. LINe 	209
Cite as 16 Neb. App. 197

appropriate hearing as required by § 42 364(5) and Zahl v. Zahl,
273 Neb. 1043, 736 N.W.2d 365 (2007). We therefore reverse,
and remand the cause for further proceedings on this issue, con
sistent with our opinion.
Finally, we find that the district court did not abuse its dis
cretion in failing to award Donna attorney fees. We affirm this
portion of the district court’s order.
affiRmed in paRt as modified , and in paRt ReveRsed
and Remanded foR fuRtHeR pRoCeedings .
in Re inteRest of a.w. et al ., CHildRen undeR 18 yeaRs of age .
state of nebRaska , appellee , v .
daniel v., appellant .
742 N.W.2d 250
Filed November 27, 2007. 	No. A 07 270.
1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional question does
not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which requires
an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent from the decision made by
the lower courts.
2. Juvenile Courts: Evidence: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de
novo on the record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion inde
pendent of the juvenile court’s findings. When the evidence is in conflict, how
ever, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the lower court observed
the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts over the other.
3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, as in any
other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty
of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter
before it.
4. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A judicial
determination made following an adjudication in a special proceeding which affects
the substantial right of parents to raise their children is a final, appealable order.
5. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Time: Appeal and Error. In juvenile cases,
where an order from a juvenile court is already in place and a subsequent order
merely extends the time for which the previous order is applicable, the subsequent
order by itself does not affect a substantial right and does not extend the time in
which the original order may be appealed.
6. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Visitation: Final Orders. An order terminat
ing visitation is a final order.
7. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. The question of whether a substantial right of a par
ent has been affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent upon both the
210 	16 NeBRASkA APPeLLATe RePORTS