Camp Clarke Ranch v. Morrill Cty. Bd. of Comrs.

district court was clearly erroneous in denying Shipler’s motion
for discharge.
CONCLUSION
The district court was clearly erroneous in finding that
Shipler’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. We
reverse the court’s order denying Shipler’s motion for absolute
discharge and remand the matter to the court with directions to
dismiss the information against Shipler.
R eveRsed and Remanded with
diRections to dismiss .
camp claRke R anch , l.l.c., et al ., appellees , and
dwayne nolte , appellant , v . moRRill county
B oaRd of commissioneRs , appellee .
758 N.W.2d 653
Filed September 30, 2008. 	No. A-08-198.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues presented for
review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the matter before it.
2. ____: ____. A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is
determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.
3. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. It is only when an inferior board or
tribunal acts judicially that a review by error proceedings is allowed.
4. ____: ____. A board or tribunal exercises a judicial function if it decides a dis-
pute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in a judicial manner.
5. Evidence: Proof: Words and Phrases. Adjudicative facts are facts which relate
to a specific party and are adduced from formal proof.
6. ____: ____: ____. Adjudicative facts pertain to questions of who did what, where,
when, how, why, and with what motive or intent. They are roughly the kind of
facts which would go to a jury in a jury case.
Appeal from the District Court for Morrill County: BRian c.
silveRman, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas D. Oliver for appellant.
Jean 	Rhodes 	for 	appellee 	Morrill 	County 	Board 	of
Commissioners.
76 	17 NeBRASkA AppeLLATe RepORTS
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:14 AM CST

sieveRs , mooRe, and cassel, Judges.
mooRe, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Dwayne Nolte appeals from the order of the district court
for Morrill County which dismissed the petition in error filed
by Nolte and the other plaintiffs, following the decision of the
Morrill County Board of Commissioners (the Board) to vacate
a portion of a public road. Because we find that the action by
the Board was not judicial in nature, we agree that the district
court was without jurisdiction to hear the petition in error and
we affirm. pursuant to the authority granted to this court under
Neb. Ct. R. App. p. § 2-111(B)(1), this case was ordered sub-
mitted without oral argument.
BACkGROUND
On December 12, 2006, the Board held a public hearing to
“receive comments and objections relative to vacating” a por-
tion of “public road RD98e.” The hearing consisted of several
local property owners giving their views on why the road
should not be vacated. On January 23, 2007, the Board voted
to vacate the portion of the public road in question. Nolte and
other plaintiffs filed a petition in error on February 22, 2007
(incorrectly file stamped as “2006”), challenging the decision
and resolution by the Board. The Board filed a motion to dis-
miss, which was granted by the district court in an order entered
January 25, 2008. The district court found that the action of the
Board was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, citing to Sarpy
Cty. Bd. of Comrs. v. Sarpy Cty. Land Reutil., 9 Neb. App. 552,
615 N.W.2d 490 (2000). Nolte filed a timely appeal.
ASSIGNMeNTS OF eRROR
Nolte assigns several errors with respect to the granting
of the motion to dismiss and the failure to reverse the deci-
sion of the Board to vacate the road due to insufficiency of
the evidence.
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1,2] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
CAMp CLARke RANCh v. MORRILL CTy. BD. OF COMRS. 	77
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 76

jurisdiction over the matter before it. Poppert v. Dicke, 275
Neb. 562, 747 N.W.2d 629 (2008). A jurisdictional question
which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an
appellate court as a matter of law. Id.
ANALySIS
The district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction
over the petition in error because the Board was not exercising
a judicial or quasi-judicial function in vacating the road.
A petition in error is a statutory creation which is limited
to a review of a “judgment rendered or final order made by
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and
inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.” Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1901 (Supp. 2007).
The Board has been granted the power to alter or discon-
tinue any road running through the county. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 23-108 (Reissue 2007). The Board is vested with general
supervision and control of public roads in the county, which
includes abandonment of public roads. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-1402 (Reissue 2004). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1722 (Reissue
2004) provides the procedure when a board “deems the public
interest may require vacation or abandonment of a public road,”
which procedure includes a study and report by the county
highway superintendent or person designated to perform such a
study. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-1725 (Reissue 2004) then provides
that after a public hearing, the board shall by resolution “vacate
or abandon or refuse vacation or abandonment, as in the judg-
ment of the board the public good may require.”
The issue in the present case is whether the Board is act-
ing in a judicial capacity. Nolte argues that §§ 39-1722 and
39-1725 require the Board to make findings of “public inter-
est” and “public good,” which he contends are adjudicative
findings of fact, thereby rendering the action a judicial or
quasi-judicial action.
In Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Comrs. v. Sarpy Cty. Land Reutil.,
supra, this court determined that the decision of the Sarpy
County Land Reutilization Commission to sell a piece of prop-
erty to a city rather than giving it to a governmental agency for
public use or to open a bidding process was not an exercise of
78 	17 NeBRASkA AppeLLATe RepORTS

judicial function and therefore not subject to judicial review
by a petition in error. Of significance in the Sarpy Cty. Bd. of
Comrs. case was the fact that the statute in question allowed
the commission to manage and sell property under its jurisdic-
tion using its sole discretion.
[3-6] It is only when an inferior board or tribunal acts judi-
cially that a review by error proceedings is allowed. Hawkins
v. City of Omaha, 261 Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001). A
board or tribunal exercises a judicial function if it decides a
dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in
a judicial manner. Id. See, Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 2, 246 Neb. 138, 517 N.W.2d 113 (1994); Sarpy Cty.
Bd. of Comrs. v. Sarpy Cty. Land Reutil., 9 Neb. App. 552,
615 N.W.2d 490 (2000). “Adjudicative facts” are facts which
relate to a specific party and are adduced from formal proof.
Hawkins v. City of Omaha, supra. Adjudicative facts pertain to
questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, and with
what motive or intent. They are roughly the kind of facts which
would go to a jury in a jury case. Id.
We conclude that in the present case, the Board did not
decide a dispute of adjudicative fact, nor do the statutes require
it to act in a judicial manner. As in the Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Comrs.
case, while the Board in the instant case may need to look into
facts to perform its duties in good faith, the discretion it exer-
cises is not judicial in nature. Rather, the statutes in question
allow the Board to act, in its discretion, using its judgment as
to the public interest and public good.
This conclusion is supported by case law which, although
rendered approximately a century ago, is still good law. See,
Stone v. Nebraska City, 84 Neb. 789, 122 N.W. 63 (1909)
(decision of necessity or expediency of establishing, maintain-
ing, or vacating public road is committed exclusively to county
boards and other like legislative and governmental agencies
and is not subject to judicial review); Otto v. Conroy, 76 Neb.
517, 107 N.W. 752 (1906).
The action of the Board in vacating a portion of a public
road within the county was not the exercise of a judicial func-
tion. As such, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the petition in error.
CAMp CLARke RANCh v. MORRILL CTy. BD. OF COMRS. 	79
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 76

CONCLUSION
Because the Board was not exercising a judicial function
in its determination to vacate the road in question, the district
court properly dismissed the petition in error. We affirm.
affiRmed .
dan schiefelBein , appellant , v . school distRict no . 0013
of thuRston county , neBRaska , also known as walthill
puBlic school , a political suBdivision of the
state of neBRaska , appellee .
758 N.W.2d 645
Filed September 30, 2008. 	No. A-08-283.
1. Declaratory Judgments. An action for declaratory judgment is sui generis;
whether such action is to be treated as one at law or one in equity is to be deter-
mined by the nature of the dispute.
2. Breach of Contract: Damages: Appeal and Error. A suit for damages arising
from breach of a contract presents an action at law. In a bench trial of a law
action, the trial court’s factual findings have the effect of a jury verdict and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong.
3. Evidence: Stipulations: Appeal and Error. In a case in which the facts are
stipulated, an appellate court reviews the case as if trying it originally in order to
determine whether the facts warranted the judgment.
4. Contracts: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a contract is a ques-
tion of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
its conclusions independently of the determinations made by the court below.
5. Schools and School Districts: Employment Contracts: Termination of
Employment. The contract of a probationary certificated employee shall be
deemed renewed and remain in full force and effect unless amended or not
renewed in accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-824 to 79-842 (Reissue 2003
& Cum. Supp. 2006).
6. ____: ____: ____. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-827 (Reissue 2003) authorizes cancella-
tion of a superintendent’s contract during the school year for cause.
7. Schools and School Districts: Employment Contracts: Termination of
Employment: Notice. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-827(2) (Reissue 2003) requires a
written notice and specifies only two requirements for its content: (1) The notice
must state the alleged grounds for cancellation of the contract, and (2) it must
notify the employee that his or her contract may be canceled.
8. Schools and School Districts: Employment Contracts: Termination of
Employment: Notice: Time. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-827(2) (Reissue 2003),
upon receiving notice of possible cancellation of his or her contract, an employee
has 7 calendar days to request a hearing.
80 	17 NeBRASkA AppeLLATe RepORTS