Goodwin v. Hobza

a general objection which did not preserve the claim he now
raises on appeal. We also conclude that the district court’s sen-
tences were not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the
sentences imposed by the district court.
A ffirmed.
dAvid G oodwin, AppellAnt, v.
mAthiAs m. hobzA, Appellee .
762 N.W.2d 623
Filed February 10, 2009. 	No. A-08-435.
1. Directed Verdict: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a
motion for directed verdict, an appellate court must treat the motion as an admis-
sion of the truth of all competent evidence submitted on behalf of the party
against whom the motion is directed; such being the case, the party against whom
the motion is directed is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in its
favor and to have the benefit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced
from the evidence.
2. Pleadings: Proof. Complaints should be liberally construed in the plaintiff’s
favor, and a complaint should not be dismissed merely because it does not state
with precision all elements that give rise to a legal basis for recovery.
3. Actions: Torts: Minors. Generally, injury to a minor results in two causes of
action—one on behalf of the minor and the other on behalf of the minor’s par-
ent. The minor’s claim is based on damages caused by the personal or bodily
injury sustained by the minor, while the claim of a parent is based on the loss
of services during minority and the necessary expenses of treatment for the
injured child.
4. Attorney and Client. One who is not an attorney may not represent others in
legal proceedings, nor may such a person practice law for others.
5. Attorney and Client: Actions. Proceedings in a suit by a person not entitled to
practice law are a nullity, and the suit may be dismissed.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: G erAld
e. morAn, Judge. Affirmed.
David Goodwin, pro se.
Rex A. Rezac and Rebecca A. Zawisky, of Fraser Stryker,
P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
CArlson, moore, and CAssel, Judges.
GOODWIN v. hObZA 	353
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 353
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
11/01/2026 04:15 AM CST

CAssel, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
David Goodwin, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint seek-
ing damages for injuries sustained by his minor child, Desmond
Goodwin (Desmond). At trial, he offered only medical bills,
and the district court sustained Mathias M. hobza’s objections
to the exhibit. Goodwin then rested, and the court sustained
hobza’s motion for directed verdict. On appeal, Goodwin
claims that the rest was intended only to signify an inten-
tion not to offer additional exhibits and that the court knew
he intended to call witnesses. because the record does not
support Goodwin’s claim, we affirm the court’s judgment. To
the extent Goodwin attempts to prosecute an appeal on behalf
of his child, we conclude such an appeal by a nonattorney is
a nullity.
bACKGROUND
On June 22, 2007, Goodwin filed a complaint titled “David
Goodwin (Desmond Goodwin) v.s. Mathias M. hobza and
his insurance co. State Farm.” The complaint alleged in its
entirety:
[O]n 5-23-07 Plaintiff was in the van with his grand-
father billy Tyler when Mathia[s] hobza rear ended the
vehicle Desmond Goodwin was in at [a doctor’s] office.
Desmond Goodwin has not been the same since. he’s
had temperatures of 103.7 since the accident with fre-
quent crying spells. As we all know infants can’t talk
to let me know what[’]s the matter! he gets hot and
weak due to his personal injuries he’s suffered from
the accident!
I pray the court awards $100,000,000 on behalf of my
son Desmond Goodwin for seen and unseen problems
now or in the near and distant future!
Upon State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s
motion, the court dismissed the complaint against the insurer.
On April 23, 2008, the court conducted a trial as to the
claim against hobza. Goodwin appeared pro se. After the
parties waived opening statements, the following colloquy
occurred:
354 	17 NebRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

The COURT: All right. You can present any evidence
that you have then.
[Goodwin]: I just have bills, Your honor.
The COURT: You would have to take them up to the
court reporter and mark them as an exhibit.
(exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.)
The COURT: All right. This is a group of what you
have referred to as bills and they are marked as exhibit
Number 1. And I assume you are offering them for evi-
dence at this time?
[Goodwin]: Yes.
[hobza’s counsel]: I’d object to foundation, relevance.
The COURT: I am going to sustain that objection. You
have to have some foundation for what those bills are.
(exhibit No. 1 is hereby made a part of this bill of
exceptions and may be found at the end of this volume.)
The COURT: Do you have any other evidence that
you wish to offer?
[Goodwin]: Just those doctor bills for Desmond, Your
honor.
The COURT: I take it you are resting then?
[Goodwin]: Yes.
[hobza’s counsel]: I’d move the Court for a directed
verdict.
The COURT: That motion is sustained. I am going to
— the case is out of court because you don’t have any
evidence to support it.
So would you submit an order?
[hobza’s counsel]: I will.
(9:09 a.m. - adjournment accordingly.)
On April 24, 2008, the district court entered an order dis-
missing the case. The court’s order referred to Goodwin as the
plaintiff and did not reference Desmond.
Goodwin timely appeals. Pursuant to authority granted to
this court under Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-111(b)(1), this case
was ordered submitted without oral argument.
ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
Goodwin assigns that the court erred in dismissing the case.
GOODWIN v. hObZA 	355
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 353

STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
directed verdict, an appellate court must treat the motion as an
admission of the truth of all competent evidence submitted on
behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed; such
being the case, the party against whom the motion is directed
is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in its favor
and to have the benefit of every inference which can reason-
ably be deduced from the evidence. LeRette v. American Med.
Security, 270 Neb. 545, 705 N.W.2d 41 (2005).
ANALYSIS
Entry of Directed Verdict on Goodwin’s Complaint.
[2,3] Complaints should be liberally construed in the plain-
tiff’s favor, and a complaint should not be dismissed merely
because it does not state with precision all elements that give
rise to a legal basis for recovery. Ferer v. Erickson, Sederstrom,
272 Neb. 113, 718 N.W.2d 501 (2006). The complaint alleged
injuries sustained by Goodwin’s infant son, Desmond, and
liberally construed, it alleged a distinct cause of action on
Goodwin’s behalf because as the child’s parent, he may be
liable for the costs of the child’s medical care. See, e.g., Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 23-3522 (Reissue 2007); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-706
(Reissue 2008).
Generally, injury to a minor results in two causes of
action—one on behalf of the minor and the other on
behalf of the minor’s parent. The minor’s claim is based
on damages caused by the personal or bodily injury sus-
tained by the minor, while the claim of a parent is based
on the loss of services during minority and the necessary
expenses of treatment for the injured child.
Macku v. Drackett Products Co., 216 Neb. 176, 179, 343
N.W.2d 58, 60 (1984). The cause or right of action of parents is
distinct from the cause of action of their child. Id. but because
Goodwin offered no admissible evidence to support his claim,
we conclude that the court did not err in granting hobza’s
motion for a directed verdict.
Goodwin argues on appeal that the court “browbeat us ask-
ing if we ‘Rested’ knowing we meant we ‘Rested’ with respect
356 	17 NebRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS

to ‘documentary’ proffer” and that the court “clearly knew we
wanted to call live witnesses.” brief for appellant at 2. The
record simply does not support Goodwin’s contention, and
we note that he took no action to withdraw his rest or clarify
that he wished to call witnesses. This assignment of error
lacks merit.
Litigation of Claims on Behalf of Desmond.
[4] because Desmond is an infant, Goodwin is statutorily
authorized to bring an action on Desmond’s behalf as his
nonlegal representative. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-307 (Reissue
2008). however, one who is not an attorney may not represent
others in legal proceedings, nor may such a person practice law
for others. Waite v. Carpenter, 1 Neb. App. 321, 496 N.W.2d
1 (1992). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 7-101 (Reissue 2007).
Waite involved an attempt by an estate’s personal representa-
tive—who was not an attorney—to bring a wrongful death suit
for the benefit of the heirs of the estate. This court explained
that the rule against nonattorneys practicing law for others is
not to perpetuate a professional monopoly, but, rather, to pro-
tect citizens from injury caused by the ignorance and lack of
skill on the part of those who are untrained and inexperienced
in the law, to protect the courts in their administration of jus-
tice from interference by those who are unlicensed and are
not officers of the court, and to prevent the unscrupulous from
using the legal system for their own purposes to the harm of
the system and those who may unknowingly rely upon them.
See id.
We conclude that a parent who is not an attorney should
similarly be barred from personally litigating a child’s negli-
gence action. Our conclusion is consistent with that reached by
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to have considered
whether a nonattorney parent may provide legal representation
on behalf of his or her minor child. See, Shepherd v. Wellman,
313 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 2002); Wenger v. Canastota Cent.
School Dist., 146 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998); Devine v. Indian
River County School Bd., 121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 1997); Johns
v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1997); Meeker
v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1986); Zhu v. Countrywide
GOODWIN v. hObZA 	357
Cite as 17 Neb. App. 353

Realty Co., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Kan. 2001); Bullock
v. Dioguardi, 847 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Lawson v.
Edwardsburg Public School, 751 F. Supp. 1257 (W.D. Mich.
1990); Lowe v. City of Shelton, 83 Conn. App. 750, 851 A.2d
1183 (2004); Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska
2002); Byers-Watts v. Parker, 199 Ariz. 466, 18 P.3d 1265
(Ariz. App. 2001); Chisholm v. Rueckhaus, 124 N.M. 255, 948
P.2d 707 (N.M. App. 1997); Blue v. People, 223 Ill. App. 3d
594, 585 N.e.2d 625, 165 Ill. Dec. 894 (1992). Cf. Harris v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that nonattorney
parent could appear pro se on behalf of minor child in Social
Security appeal). The rule “helps to ensure that children right-
fully entitled to legal relief are not deprived of their day in
court by unskilled, if caring, parents.” Devine v. Indian River
County School Bd., 121 F.3d at 582. It is not in a child’s best
interests to be represented by a nonattorney.
[5] Proceedings in a suit by a person not entitled to practice
law are a nullity, and the suit may be dismissed. Anderzhon/
Architects v. 57 Oxbow II Partnership, 250 Neb. 768, 553
N.W.2d 157 (1996). Goodwin’s appellate brief is captioned
“David Goodwin ObO his minor child: Desmond Goodwin vs.
Mathias M. hobza.” To the extent Goodwin seeks to prosecute
this appeal pro se on Desmond’s behalf, it is a nullity.
CONCLUSION
We 	conclude 	that 	the 	court 	did 	not 	err 	in 	dismissing
Goodwin’s complaint.
A ffirmed.
billy tyler , AppellAnt, v.
John nAtviG, Appellee .
762 N.W.2d 621
Filed February 10, 2009. 	No. A-08-650.
1. Affidavits: Appeal and Error. An appellate court shall review the decision deny-
ing in forma pauperis eligibility de novo on the record based on the transcript of
the hearing or the written statement of the court.
2. Courts: Affidavits: Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2301.02 (Reissue 2008)
requires a district court to grant an application to proceed in forma pauperis—
358 	17 NebRASKA APPeLLATe RePORTS