In re Interest of Carrdale H.

I n re I nterest of Carrdale H. II,
a CHIld under 18 years of age .
state of nebraska , appellee ,
v. Carrdale H., appellant.
781 N.W.2d 622
Filed April 27, 2010. 	No. A-09-953.
1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the
record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the
juvenile court’s findings.
2. Juvenile Courts: Proof. Generally, in an adjudication proceeding, the State need
not prove that the juvenile has actually suffered harm but must establish that
without intervention, there is a definite risk of future harm.
3. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Proof. At the adjudication stage, in order for
a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008), the State must prove the allegations of the petition
by a preponderance of the evidence.
4. ____: ____: ____. If the pleadings and evidence at the adjudication hear-
ing do not justify a juvenile court’s acquiring jurisdiction of a child, then the
juvenile court has no jurisdiction, i.e., no power to order compliance with a
rehabilitation plan and no power over the parent or child at the disposition hear-
ing unless jurisdiction is alleged and proved by new facts at a new adjudication-
disposition hearing.
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County:
donna f. taylor, County Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions to dismiss.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
Stephen P. Kraft for appellant.
Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Jordan
Boler for appellee.
I nbody, Chief Judge, and sIevers and Cassel, Judges.
sIevers, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Carrdale H. appeals from an order of the separate juvenile
court of Douglas County which took jurisdiction over his son,
Carrdale H. II (the juvenile). On appeal, Carrdale challenges
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www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
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the sufficiency of the evidence to support adjudication under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008).
STATeMeNT OF FACTS
In May 2009, the State filed a motion for temporary cus-
tody, which was granted by the juvenile court. The State filed
its amended petition in July 2009, in which it alleged that the
juvenile lacked proper parental care and supervision by reason
of the habits of his mother and Carrdale. Because the mother
has not appealed in this matter, it is unnecessary to discuss the
allegations against her. The petition alleged that the juvenile
was at risk of harm because of Carrdale’s use of alcohol and/or
controlled substances, because Carrdale engages in domestic
violence with the juvenile’s mother in the presence of the juve-
nile, and because Carrdale had failed to provide the juvenile
with safe, stable, and appropriate housing.
The hearing in this case was based on a few stipulated
facts: The juvenile was born in October 2008, Carrdale is his
biological father, and a substance which proved to be .3 of a
gram of crack cocaine was found in Carrdale’s possession in
March 2009. The remaining allegations in the petition against
Carrdale, such as domestic violence, were dismissed. After
brief arguments by counsel, the juvenile court found that the
juvenile, less than 1 year old at the time of the hearing, was
harmed by Carrdale’s possession of illegal drugs. The court
noted that such possession subjects Carrdale to arrest and the
inability to care for the juvenile. The juvenile was adjudicated
under § 43-247(3)(a). Carrdale filed a motion to reconsider,
which the separate juvenile court denied. Carrdale has timely
appealed to this court.
ASSIGNMeNT OF eRROR
Carrdale asserts that there was insufficient evidence to adju-
dicate the juvenile within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).
STANDARD OF ReVIeW
[1] Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and
an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	351
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 350

of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Angelica L. &
Daniel L., 277 Neb. 984, 767 N.W.2d 74 (2009).
ANAlYSIS
Carrdale contends that the fact of his possession of a small
amount of crack cocaine is insufficient to warrant the juve-
nile court’s adjudication of the juvenile under § 43-247(3)(a).
Carrdale directs us to In re Interest of Brianna B. & Shelby B.,
9 Neb. App. 529, 614 N.W.2d 790 (2000), a case in which a
father appealed from an adjudication of his two children under
§ 43-247(3)(a) on the basis of his alcohol use. As summarized,
the evidence in that case established a pattern of drinking. This
court found that although the evidence showed that the parents
had consumed alcohol on occasions when the children were in
the house, there was no evidence presented to show any impact
such drinking had on the children. The juvenile court’s order of
adjudication was reversed.
Carrdale argues that his case is analogous to In re Interest
of Brianna B. & Shelby B. because there was no evidence to
establish that his actions had any impact on the juvenile. We
agree that it is. However, it is important to note one distinc-
tion. In In re Interest of Brianna B. & Shelby B., the conduct
of the parents was not illegal, whereas Carrdale had an illegal
substance in his possession, which is a Class IV felony. See
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(3) (Reissue 2008). The juvenile court
based its decision upon this fact and reasoned that because
Carrdale’s actions subjected him to arrest, the juvenile was
subjected to the risk that Carrdale could not properly care
for him.
[2] Generally, the State need not prove that the juvenile has
actually suffered harm but must establish that without inter-
vention, there is a definite risk of future harm. See, e.g., In re
Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008). In In
re Interest of Anaya, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that
the parents’ failure to submit their infant to mandatory blood
testing required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-519 (Reissue 2009)
did not, standing alone, establish neglect to warrant adjudica-
tion under § 43-247(3)(a). By refusing to submit their child
to the blood test, the parents engaged in illegal activity. The
352 	18 NeBRASKA APPellATe RePORTS

mandatory blood testing is enforced through civil proceedings
and “any other remedies which may be available by law” pur-
suant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-524 (Reissue 2009). Similarly,
Carrdale’s offense, if he was in fact charged and convicted,
may result in imprisonment, but of course, he could also
be convicted and placed on probation. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-105 (Reissue 2008).
In prior cases, we have determined that a showing that the
parent is in prison and thereby unable to care for his child
may be sufficient for adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a). See
In re Interest of Maxwell T., 15 Neb. App. 47, 721 N.W.2d 676
(2006) (father who was incarcerated prior to and at time of
State’s petition, had not had contact with his son for 6 months,
and had left son in care of someone who was unable to care
for him was properly adjudicated because juvenile was lacking
proper parental care due to faults or habits of father). likewise,
in the context of cases involving termination of parental rights,
the appellate courts have often held that while incarceration
alone cannot serve as the basis for the termination of parental
rights, when a parent voluntarily engages in illegal activity
leading to incarceration, the court may consider the parent’s
inability to perform his or her parental obligations because of
imprisonment. See In re Interest of Theodore W., 4 Neb. App.
428, 545 N.W.2d 119 (1996).
[3] But, here, the State failed to adduce any evidence whether
Carrdale was actually charged with an offense, and thus there
obviously was no conviction and incarceration. Furthermore,
§ 28-105 does not require imprisonment for a Class IV felony,
but, rather, there is no minimum prison term prescribed by the
statute. The State also failed to adduce whether there was any
history of drug use either away from or in the presence of the
juvenile, whether Carrdale had prior drug- or alcohol-related
offenses, whether the juvenile was present when Carrdale had
drugs in his possession, whether the juvenile was in any way
affected by Carrdale’s actions, or any other such information
that allows a reasonable inference that Carrdale’s “use of alco-
hol and/or controlled substances places said child at risk for
harm” as alleged in the amended petition. Based only upon an
exhibit showing that Carrdale had a controlled substance in his
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	353
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 350

possession in March 2009, and without evidence of charges
filed or a sentence imposed or any impact on the juvenile, the
risk of harm to the juvenile cannot be considered “definite.” At
the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume
jurisdiction of minor children under § 43-247(3)(a), the State
must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance
of the evidence. In re Interest of Rebekah T. et al., 11 Neb.
App. 507, 654 N.W.2d 744 (2002). Based upon our de novo
review, we find that the juvenile court erred in finding that
the limited evidence presented at the adjudication hearing
proved the allegation in the petition by a preponderance of
the evidence.
[4] If the pleadings and evidence at the adjudication hear-
ing do not justify a juvenile court’s acquiring jurisdiction
of a child, then the juvenile court has no jurisdiction, i.e.,
no power to order compliance with a rehabilitation plan and
no power over the parent or child at the disposition hearing
unless jurisdiction is alleged and proved by new facts at a new
adjudication-disposition hearing. See In re Interest of D.M.B.,
240 Neb. 349, 481 N.W.2d 905 (1992). Therefore, we remand
the cause with directions to dismiss the petition because the
juvenile court does not have jurisdiction.
But, our respected colleague’s dissent demands a response.
While in the “Internet age” one can readily access virtually
unlimited sources and amounts of information, we do not
think that our jurisprudence has now evolved to the point that
a judge can plug the gaps in a State’s burden of proof by quo-
tations obtained by Internet research. If we have reached that
point, then the notion that judges in our decisionmaking proc-
ess are limited to consideration of only the evidence in the
record becomes essentially meaningless. We strongly believe
that we are limited to the evidence in the record. Here, the
State chose to limit its evidence to the solitary fact that on one
occasion, Carrdale possessed a small amount of crack cocaine.
The dissent concludes from such solitary fact that “the strong-
est inference flowing from Carrdale’s possession of this drug
is that he had used it in the past and intended to do so again.”
How this is not purely speculation escapes us. From this truly
uninformative record, one could likewise speculate that this
354 	18 NeBRASKA APPellATe RePORTS

was the first time he had ever possessed the drug, or that he
was “holding” for someone else. The dissent, when reduced
to its essence, simply would hold that “parental possession of
drugs is enough to adjudicate” and that no evidence is needed
that the child is being neglected, that the child is lacking in
proper parental care, or that the father is a habitual user or
dealer of drugs such that we can conclude, from the evidence,
that the risk of harm to the child justifies the intervention
of the State in the parent-child relationship. Obviously, we
are well aware that the court need not await harm or trag-
edy to the child before such intervention can occur, but we
cannot accept the proposition that the mere stipulation that
a father possessed a small amount of crack cocaine on one
occasion, without more, satisfies the State’s burden of proof
for adjudication.
CONClUSION
The State failed to show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that Carrdale’s use of alcohol and/or controlled sub-
stances placed the juvenile at risk of harm. Thus, because we
find there was insufficient evidence presented to warrant an
adjudication of the juvenile as concerns Carrdale, we reverse
the adjudication order and remand the cause with directions
to dismiss.
reversed and remanded wItH
dIreCtIons to dIsmIss.
Cassel, Judge, dissenting.
A parent who possesses crack cocaine places his or her child
at substantial risk of harm. The majority opinion, however well
intended, refuses to accept this simple reality. Although, as
Justice Holmes famously observed, the life of the law has been
experience, the majority opinion disregards human experience
with crack cocaine and other such drugs. While many legal
questions are complex and nuanced, I find no such complexity
here. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority opinion for four reasons. First,
the majority fails to heed the rule that a court need not wait
until disaster has befallen a minor child before the court
may acquire jurisdiction. Second, the majority inappropriately
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	355
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equates possession of crack cocaine to a parent’s religiously
motivated resistance to government-mandated blood testing of
an infant child. Third, the majority overlooks the many cases
involving drug use that have come before the Nebraska appel-
late courts and that illustrate the devastation of children’s lives
caused by a parent’s involvement with illegal drugs. Finally,
numerous federal and state government reports demonstrate the
enormous costs suffered by society, as well as the individual
children involved, from parental use of illegal drugs. I now
discuss each reason in greater detail.
There is no requirement that a juvenile court wait until
disaster has befallen a minor child before the court may
acquire jurisdiction. If it is reasonable to assume that injury
will occur absent action by the court, then the court may
assume jurisdiction and act accordingly. In re Interest of
Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997).
Carrdale H. stipulated that .3 of a gram of crack cocaine was
found in his possession in March 2009. By far, the strongest
inference flowing from Carrdale’s possession of this drug is
that he had used it in the past and intended to do so again.
This inference satisfies the burden of proof for adjudication
of the child, which at this stage requires only a preponder-
ance of the evidence. At the adjudication stage, in order for a
juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008), the State must
prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the
evidence. In re Interest of Heather R. et al., 269 Neb. 653, 694
N.W.2d 659 (2005). The purpose of the adjudication phase of a
juvenile proceeding is to protect the interests of the child. The
parents’ rights are determined at the dispositional phase, not at
the adjudication phase. Id. The probability of harm to the child
follows naturally from the nature of the parent’s problem. It
is more than reasonable to assume that absent action by the
juvenile court, the possession of crack cocaine by the parent
will lead to injury to the child. The majority opinion fails to
recognize this train of logic.
The majority opinion equates possession of crack cocaine
to a parent’s religiously motivated resistance to government-
mandated blood testing of an infant child. This comparison
356 	18 NeBRASKA APPellATe RePORTS

is inapposite. In In re Interest of Anaya, 276 Neb. 825, 758
N.W.2d 10 (2008), upon which the majority relies, the Nebraska
Supreme Court confronted an attempt by the State to use the
juvenile code to address the parents’ failure to submit their
infant to mandatory blood testing required by Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 71-519 (Reissue 2009). Although Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-524
(Reissue 2009) afforded a direct remedy to the State for the
parents’ failure to submit the child for testing, the State chose
to proceed under the juvenile code despite the clear absence of
any other evidence of abuse or neglect. The majority opinion
in the case before us effectively treats the parents’ sincerely
held religious beliefs in In re Interest of Anaya the same as
Carrdale’s possession of crack cocaine. To me, the difference
is profound and self-evident. Both case law and social litera-
ture are replete with examples of harm befalling children as
a direct result of a parent’s use of illegal drugs. I have been
unable to find any case law or general literature documenting
harm actually resulting from a parent’s refusal to implement a
government-mandated test of an infant’s blood.
The critical question—whether it is reasonable to assume
that injury will occur absent action by the court—requires
one to consider human experience bearing on the situation.
In doing so, I first look to Nebraska case law, which repeat-
edly describes the effect of such drugs as crack cocaine upon
children and families. This court and the Nebraska Supreme
Court have seen numerous juvenile cases involving the abuse
and neglect of children due to a parent’s involvement with
illegal drugs, thus demonstrating that parental substance abuse
is a significant issue in the juvenile court system. See, e.g.,
In re Interest of Michael B. et al., 258 Neb. 545, 604 N.W.2d
405 (2000) (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights
in part due to her habitual use of illegal drugs); In re Interest
of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450, 598 N.W.2d 729
(1999) (affirming termination of mother’s parental rights in
part because mother used cocaine and refused to comply with
court’s order to participate in drug dependency treatment pro-
gram); In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 256 Neb. 596, 591
N.W.2d 557 (1999) (concluding mother’s parental rights were
properly terminated where mother was unfit due to her habitual
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	357
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 350

use of narcotic drugs); In re Interest of H.P.A., 237 Neb. 410,
466 N.W.2d 90 (1991) (affirming termination of mother’s
parental rights where mother used marijuana on nearly daily
basis and used other drugs when available); In re Interest of
Eden K. & Allison L., 14 Neb. App. 867, 717 N.W.2d 507
(2006) (testimony and evidence provided that mother’s use of
methamphetamine impaired ability to provide proper parenting
and that mother was not in position to parent due to incarcera-
tion for check forgery and drug charges, but this court reversed
juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights); In
re Interest of Stacey D. & Shannon D., 12 Neb. App. 707, 684
N.W.2d 594 (2004) (affirming termination of mother’s parental
rights where mother failed to demonstrate capability of caring
for her children without presence of drugs in her life despite
being given approximately 3 years to do so); In re Interest
of Brook P. et al., 10 Neb. App. 577, 634 N.W.2d 290 (2001)
(affirming termination of parental rights where parents used
drugs repeatedly over many years and were unable to abstain
from them despite extensive help); In re Interest of Theodore
W., 4 Neb. App. 428, 545 N.W.2d 119 (1996) (affirming ter-
mination of father’s parental rights where, approximately 21⁄2
months after child’s birth, father was arrested for possession of
crack cocaine with intent to deliver and would remain incarcer-
ated until child was almost 8 years old). These cases clearly
demonstrate the reasonableness of the assumption that absent
court action, injury to the child will follow from Carrdale’s
possession of crack cocaine.
I find another source of accumulated human experience in
government reports describing such drugs and their effects
upon parents and children. These reports make evident the
societal costs due to a parent’s use of illegal drugs and the
harm thereby resulting to children. As aptly explained by
the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at
Columbia University,
[t]he human costs are incalculable: broken families;
children who are malnourished; babies who are neglected,
beaten and sometimes killed by alcohol- and crack-
addicted parents; eight-year-olds sent out to steal or buy
drugs for addicted parents; sick children wallowing in
358 	18 NeBRASKA APPellATe RePORTS

unsanitary conditions; child victims of sodomy, rape and
incest; children in such agony and despair that they them-
selves resort to drugs and alcohol for relief. For some of
these children it may be possible to cauterize the bleed-
ing, but the scars of drug- and alcohol-spawned parental
abuse and neglect are likely to be permanent.
No Safe Haven: Children of Substance-Abusing Parents at
ii (Jan. 1999), http://www.eric.ed.gov/eRICDocs/data/ericdocs
2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/16/cd/a9.pdf (last visited
Apr. 16, 2010).
Substance abusers often abandon or neglect their chil-
dren because their primary focus is obtaining and using
drugs or alcohol. They also place their children’s safety
and well-being at risk when they buy drugs or engage
in other criminal activity to support their drug habit.
Recovery from drug and alcohol addiction is generally
a difficult and lifelong process that may involve periods
of relapse.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Foster Care: Agencies Face
Challenges Securing Stable Homes for Children of Substance
Abusers at 2 (Sept. 1998), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/
he98182.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
Parents who use hard drugs may be unable to meet
even the basic needs of their children. Their use of hard
drugs can lead to erratic behavior that places the safety
and well-being of their children at risk. For example,
the immediate effects of both crack-cocaine and crystal-
lized methamphetamines include hyperstimulation and an
amplified sense of euphoria. Crack-cocaine users may
also experience feelings of depression, restlessness, irri-
tability, and anxiety, and prolonged use can lead to para-
noid behavior.
Id. at 14.
Most children with substance-abusing parents enter
foster care because their parents fail to meet their basic
physical and emotional needs. . . . Because of the nature
of addiction, obtaining and using drugs or alcohol are the
most important focus in the lives of substance abusers. As
a consequence, the safety and well-being of their children
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	359
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 350

is often secondary to their addiction. Research suggests
that substance-abusing parents of children in foster care
do not always form healthy emotional attachments with
their children and may have limited parenting skills. These
parents may abandon their children at birth or sometime
later in their lives, be periodically absent from the home,
or leave their children in unsafe environments.
Id. at 14-15.
Children of substance-abusing parents often come to the
attention of the child welfare system at birth due to prenatal
substance exposure or later in life when they are found to have
been abused or neglected. U.S. General Accounting Office,
Parental Substance Abuse: Implications for Children, the Child
Welfare System, and Foster Care Outcomes (Oct. 28, 1997),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98040t.pdf 	(last 	visited
Apr. 16, 2010). One report stated that children whose parents
abuse alcohol or drugs are almost three times more likely
to be verbally, physically, or sexually abused and four times
more likely to be neglected. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration’s 	Center 	for 	Substance 	Abuse 	Treatment,
You Can Help: A Guide for Caring Adults Working with
Young People experiencing Addiction in the Family, http://
csat.samhsa.gov/publications/youcanhelp.aspx (last visited Apr.
16, 2010). A publication of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services reported that parents with substance abuse
problems are more likely than other parents to maltreat their
children and that between one-third and two-thirds of sub-
stantiated child abuse and neglect reports involved substance
abuse. Blending Perspectives and Building Common Ground:
A Report to Congress on Substance Abuse and Child Protection
(Apr. 	1999), 	http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/subabuse99/chap4.htm
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010). Further, children from substance-
abusing households were more likely than others to be served
in foster care rather than in the home, spent longer periods of
time in foster care, and were less likely to have left foster care
within 1 year. Id. In a January 1999 report, the National Center
on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University
estimated that drug abuse caused or contributed to 7 of 10
360 	18 NeBRASKA APPellATe RePORTS

cases of child maltreatment and accounted for approximately
$10 billion in federal, state, and local government spending
on child welfare programs. http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/
publications/policy/ndcs00/chap2_9.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2010). Another study estimates that $5.3 billion of annual state
spending goes toward child welfare costs associated with sub-
stance abuse. U.S Department of Health and Human Services,
Parental Substance Use and the Child Welfare System (Jan.
2009), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/parentalsub
abuse.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
This is but a sample of the information available in govern-
ment reports found via the Internet and is by no means exhaus-
tive. See, also, U.S. General Accounting Office, Foster Care:
Parental Drug Abuse Has Alarming Impact on Young Children
(Apr. 	1994), 	http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151435.pdf 	(last
visited Apr. 	16, 	2010); 	U.S. 	General Accounting 	Office,
Child Protective Services: Complex Challenges Require New
Strategies 	(July 	1997), 	http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he
97115.pdf 	(last 	visited Apr. 	16, 	2010); 	U.S. 	Department
of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse Among
Women and Parents (July 1994), http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/cyp/
xsfamdrg.htm 	(last 	visited 	Apr. 	16, 	2010); 	Jill 	Goldman
et al., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, A
Coordinated 	Response 	to 	Child Abuse 	and 	Neglect: 	The
Foundation for Practice (2003), http://www.childwelfare.gov/
pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundation.pdf (last visited Apr.
16, 2010); Nancy K. Young et al., U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Screening and Assessment for Family
engagement, Retention, and Recovery (SAFeRR) (2007), http://
download.ncadi.samhsa.gov/prevline/pdfs/SMA07-4261.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010); Nancy K. Young et al., National
Center on Substance Abuse and Child Welfare, A Review of
Alcohol and Other Drug Issues in the States’ Child and Family
Services Reviews and Program Improvement Plans (Nov. 2005),
http://www.ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/SummaryofCFSRs.pdf
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
The harm resulting to children from use of illegal drugs
has also been well documented in Nebraska. Here, nearly
77 percent of children reviewed in 2005 who were under
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	361
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3 years old had parental substance abuse as a factor for
removal from the parental home. Carolyn K. Stitt, Nebraska
Foster Care Review Board, 2005 Annual Report, Hope is On
the 	Horizon, 	http://www.fcrb.nebraska.gov/pdf/publications/
archive/2005%20Annual%20Report%20-%20main%20
body.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). Among the barriers to
permanency for children with a plan of reunification, paren-
tal substance abuse affected the greatest number of chil-
dren. Report to Governor Dave Heineman on the Special
Research Project on Young Foster Children Conducted by
the Foster Care Review Board August 2006–January 2007,
http://www.fcrb.nebraska.gov/pdf/publications/special/2006
%20special%20study%20on%20children%20birth%20-%20
five.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
The state and federal government reports reinforce the basic
premise supporting the juvenile court’s decision: Carrdale’s
possession of crack cocaine placed his child at substantial risk
of harm.
Contrary to the majority opinion’s suggestion, I have not
relied on facts outside the record. I rely solely upon the stipu-
lated fact that Carrdale possessed crack cocaine and upon the
reasonable inferences that flow from the stipulated fact. The
finder of fact may draw reasonable inferences from the facts
and circumstances proved. Jindra v. Clayton, 247 Neb. 597,
529 N.W.2d 523 (1995). From the stipulated fact, I draw the
reasonable inferences that Carrdale used crack cocaine in the
past and intends to do so in the future. While the majority may
believe it is equally likely that this was the first time he pos-
sessed the drug or that he was “‘holding’” it for someone else,
I respectfully disagree. I contend that in the light of human
experience, my inferences are reasonable.
The majority’s search for “evidence . . . that the child is
being neglected, that the child is lacking in proper parental
care, or that the father is a habitual user or dealer of drugs”
demonstrates its reluctance to implement the applicable rule. If
it is reasonable to assume that injury will occur absent action
by the court, then the court may assume jurisdiction and act
accordingly. In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614,
558 N.W.2d 548 (1997). I find it reasonable to assume that
362 	18 NeBRASKA APPellATe RePORTS

Carrdale’s possession of crack cocaine will result in harm to
the child, while the majority does not. I contend that the weight
of human experience, as described in the extensive cases and
government reports cited above, firmly establishes that my
assumption is the reasonable one. It therefore follows that
the juvenile court was empowered to assume jurisdiction and
act accordingly. I would affirm the juvenile court’s decision
doing so.
IN Re INTeReST OF CARRDAle H. 	363
Cite as 18 Neb. App. 350